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FOREWORD 
Research project HR-234 was sponsored by the Iowa Highway Research Board 
and the Iowa Department of Transportation. 
In the preparation of this compilation of highway and street laws of Iowa, 
an attempt has been made to include those sections of the Code to which 
reference is frequently required by the Department of Transportation, coun-
ties, cities and towns in their conduct of highway and street adminis-
tration, construction and maintenance. 
Because of the broad scope of highway and street work and the many interre-
lated provisions of Iowa law, and in the interests of keeping this volume 
in a convenient and usable size, some Code provisions which have some bear-
ing on the principal subject were of necessity omitted. The volume has 
been compiled in loose leaf form with the expectation that periodic updates 
will keep the reader informed regarding changes in the law and/or new laws. 
A general index is provided at the end of the text of this volume. Each 
major topic is divided into relevant subtopics and are accompanied by 
appropriate Code sections. 
This publication is offered with the hope and belief that it will prove to 
be of value and assistance to those concerned with the problems of estab-
1 ishing, maintaining and administering a highway and street system. 
The reader is cautioned to consult legal counsel on all matters beyond the 
scope of this text. 
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Article I, Section 18 
IOWA CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 18 
Taking of private property for public use - just compensation - damages -
laws relating to drains, ditches and levees - drainage districts. 
Sec. 18 - Private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation first being made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as 
soon as the damages shall be assessed by a jury, who shall not take into 
consideration any advantages that may result to said owner on account of the 
improvement for which it is taken. 
The general assembly, however, may pass laws permitting the owners of 
lands to construct drains, ditches, and levees for agricultural, sanitary or 
mining purposes across the lands of others, and provide for the organization 
of drainage districts, vest the proper authorities with power to construct and 
maintain levees, drains and ditches and to keep in repair all drains, ditches, 
and levees heretofore constructed under the laws of the state, by special 
assessments upon the property benefited thereby. The general assembly may 
provide by law for the condemnation of such real estate as shall be necessary 
for the construction and maintenance of such drains, ditches and levees, and 
prescribe the method of making such condemnation. Amended 1908. 
1. Construction and application. 
Land use restrictions, when justifiable under police power, validly 
inacted and not arbitrary or unreasonable, generally are held not to be 
invalid as taking of property for public use without compensation. Stone v. 
City of Wilton, 331 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1983). 
Court found a "taking" of property by city, requiring acquisition of 
property and compensation after the city repeatedly brought, dropped and 
reinstituted eminent domain proceedings, causing a nearly continuous threat to 
the property and its developmental potential. Substantial interference with 
use of property so as to constitute a "taking" is a fact question. Osborn v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 324 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1982). 
Condemnor's unavoidable failure to restore the tract to condemnees on 
time should not deprive condemnees of right to redress in tort, contract or 
other appropriate proceeding. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185. 
N.W.2d 746 (1971). 
Landowner who is dissatisfied with assessment by condemnation 
commissioners and who desires to appeal to d·istrict court must substantially 
follow the procedure prescribed by chapter 472. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Where there is a temporary closing of a road for improvement, there is no 
actual "taking" as contemplated by this section, and property owners are not 
entitled to damages. Blank v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1128, 
109 N.W.2d 713 (1961). 
Testimony of valuation witness of condemnation commission that farm of 
owners was worth more after construction of new highway than before taking was 
properly stricken as being in violation of this section. Trachta v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Provisions of section a limitation on its exercise and should be 
liberally interpreted. Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 
N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Restriction or charge for use of navigable streams or lakes is "taking" 
within this section. Witke v. State Conservation Commission, 244 Iowa 261, 56 
N.W.2d 582 (1953). 
1 
Article I, Section 18 
Should be broadly and liberally construed. Anderlik v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (194g). 
Applies equally within or without municipal corporate limits. Id. 
A county board of supervisors may, under the County Home Rule Amendment, 
regulate the drainage districts within the county on a county-wide basis by 
adopting ordinances regulating the drainage districts. O.A.G. March 13, 1980. 
The Iowa relocation assistance act, ~ 316.1 et seq. provides for 
payments separate from and in addition to just compensat~on payable in 
condemnation proceedings. O.A.G. November 20, 1970. 
2. Drains and drainage, 1908 amendment, construction and application. 
Organization of sanitary districts under Section 358.l not 
unconstitutional. Walker v. Sears, 61 N.W.2d 729 (Iowa 1954). 
Same rules apply for levee and drainage districts. Harris v. Board of 
Trustees of Green Bay Levee and Drainage Dist. No. 2, Lee County, 244 Iowa 
1169, 59 N.W.2d 234 (1953). 
Where improvement caused intermittent overflow, dama~e was a "taking." 
Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Failure to notify or assess does not invalidate proceedings for 
improvement of drainage ditch. Board of Supervisors Pottawattamie County v. 
Board of Superviors Harrison County, 214 Iowa 655, 241 N.W. 14 (1932), motion 
denied, 54 S. Ct. 47, appeal dismissed, 54 S. Ct. 125, 290 U.S. 595 78 L. Ed. 
523. 
Notice of establishment of drainage district not subject to attack where 
notice not required. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors Hamilton 
County, 182 Iowa 60, 162 N.W. 868 (1917), modified on other grounds, 182 Iowa 
60, 165 N.W. 390. 
Organization of drainage district regulated by character of public use. 
Hatcher v. Board of Supervisors of Green County, 165 Iowa 197, 145 N.W. 12 
(1914). 
Separate official organization for each drainage district and vote on 
officers by people affected not required. Id. 
Nothing for Supreme Court to consider where assessment equitably 
apportioned based on benefits. Farley Drainage Dist. No. 7 v. Hamilton 
County, 140 Iowa 339, 118 N.W. 432 (1908). 
3. Power of state or legislature generally. 
Power of eminent domain can be exercised for public use and cannot be 
used. for taking private property from one person for private use of another. 
Simpson v. Low-rent Housing Agency of Mt. Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1974). 
Power of eminent domain inherent in sovereign and not dependent on 
constitutional grant. Reter v. Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 
1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952), 35 A. L. R.2d 1306. 
Power of legislature over roads and streets "plenary," but must pay just 
compensation. Liddick v. _Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 1g7, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1g42). 
Legislature may take private property only for: (1) forfeiture for crime, 
(2) public use under eminent domain, (3) police power, (4) taxing power. 
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 1 Am. Rep. 215 (186g). 
Legislature may -authorize use of city streets held in fee by city by 
railroad without compensation. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids etc. R. Co., 
24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
4. Distinction between eminent domain and other eowers. 
There may be a "taking" without actual invasion or physical 
appropriation. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 
(1942). 
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Article I, Section 18 
Municipal enlarging of boundaries not a "taking." Wertz v. Ottumwa, 201 
Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511 (1926). 
Ordinance prohibiting rebuilding frame house with certain materials not a 
"taking." City of Shenandoah v. Replogle, 198 Iowa 423, 199 N.W. 418 (1924). 
Zoning ordinance prohibiting business operation not a "taking." City of 
Des Mo.ines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921), 23 A. L. 
R. 1322. 
Proper exercise of governmental power not directly encroaching on private 
property not a "taking." Higgins v. Board of Supervisors Dickinson County, 
188 Iowa 448, 176 N.W. 268 (1920). 
Imposing liability for support of insane on relatives not a "taking." 
Guthrie County v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N.W. 454 (1907). 
Judgment for violation of liquor law a lien not a "taking." Polk County 
v. Hierb, 37 Iowa 361 (1873). 
Maximum fees for defense of person criminally indicted not a "taking." 
Samuels v. Dubuque County, 13 Iowa 536 (1862). 
Act authorizing city to extend corporate limits without owners consent 
unconstitutional. Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82, 8 Clarke 82 (1859). 
5. Police rower generally, distinguished from eminent domain. 
Genera ly, police power is the state's right to regulate use of property 
to prevent use which would be harmful to public interest. Iowa Natural 
Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111 (1968). 
Ordinance regulating storage of inflammable liquid not "taking." Cecil 
v. Toenjes, 210 Iowa 407, 228 N.W. 874 (1930). 
This section not designed to limit police power. City of Des Moines v. 
Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921), 23 A. L. R. 1322. 
Organization of land into drainage districts justified under police 
power. Hatcher v. Board of Supervisors Greene County, 165 Iowa 197, 145 N.W. 
12 (1914). 
6. Animals, reTulations as to, distin9uished from eminent domain. 
Where conf icting evidence of reliability of bovine tests, not a 
"taking." Panther v. Dept. of Agriculture of Iowa, 211 Iowa 868, 234 N.W. 560 (1931). . 
7. Game and fish regulations, distinguished from eminent domain. 
Section 109.14 declaring a dam without a fishway a nuisance not a 
"taking." State v. Meek, 112 Iowa 338, 84 N.W. 3 (1900), 51 L. R. A. 414, 84 
Am. St. Rep. 342. 
8. Drains and drainage, regulations as to, distinguished from eminent domain. 
Crossing of R. R. right of way and requirement that railway bridge 
without compensation not a "taking." Chicago etc. Co. v. Board of Supervisors 
Appanoose County, Iowa, C. C., 170 F. 665 (1908), affirmed, 182 F. 291, 104 C. 
C. A. 573, 31 L. R. A., N. S., 1117, and 182 F. 301, 104 C. C. A. 583. 
Failure to notify land owners of drainage assessment rendered tax against 
owner who had notice void. Smith v. Peterson, 123 Iowa 672, 99 N.W. 552 
(1904). 
Abating of dam without fishway not a "taking." State v. Beardsley, 108 
Iowa 396, 79 N.W. 138 (1899). 
9. Schools, regulations resaecting, distin~uished from eminent domain. 
Organization of schoo 1 i stn ct not a tak mg." Th 1 e v. Con so 11 dated 
etc. School Dist. of Mediapolis, 197 Iowa 344, 197 N.W. 75 (1924). 
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Article I, Section 18 
Condemnation of land for school construction not a violation. Munn v. 
Independent School Dist. of Jefferson, 188 Iowa 757 176 N.W. 811 (1920). 
Consolidation of all land in city into one school district not 
"taking." State v. Grefe, 139 Iowa 18, 117 N.W. 13 (1908). 
10. Streets and highways, regulations as to, distinguished from eminent 
domain. 
Vacating an alley not a "taking." Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 173 
Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915). 
Act of 1866 providing for taking of private property for private roads 
unconstitutional. Ch. J. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
11. Taxation and licensing, distinguished from eminent domain. 
No invasion of constitutional rights by requiring person to make written 
application to National Resources Council when excavating or building on flood 
plains. Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 
111 (1968). 
Taxation of Missouri R. R. Bridge by city unconstitutional. Arnd v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 120 F. 812, 57 C. C. A. 184 (1903). 
General advantages and protection afforded by government sufficient 
benefit to grant power to tax. Dickinson v. Porter, 31 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 
1948). 
. Blue sky law section 502.1 constitutional. State v. Soeder, 216 Iowa 
815, 249 N.W. 412 (1933). 
Denial of applicant's permit to sell cigarettes not unconstitutional. 
Ford Hopkins Co. v. Iowa City, 216 Iowa 1286, 248 N.W. 668 (19~3). 
Distribution of auto license fees to counties without returning exact 
amount collected not a "taking." Mcleland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232, 
201 N.W. 401 (1924), modified on other grounds, 199 Iowa 1232, 203 N.W. 1 (1925). 
Act authorizing city to levy tax for benefit of private toll bridge not 
unconstitutional. Pritchard v. Magoun, 109 Iowa 364, 80 N.W. 512 (1899), 46 
L. R. A. 381. 
Tax of moneys and credits not unconstitutional. Hutchinson v. Board of 
Equalization City of Oskaloosa, 66 Iowa 35, 23 N.W. 249 (1885). 
Laws 1870 permitting municipal taxation to aid railroads not 
unconstitutional. Stewart v. Board of Supervisors Polk County, 30 Iowa 9 
(1870), 1 Am. Rep. 238, followed in Bonnifield v. Bidwell, 32 Iowa 149 (1871.). 
Enlargement of municipal boundaries may be "taking." Langworthy v. City 
of Dubuque, 16 Iowa 271 (1864). 
Enlargement of municipal boundaries without owners' consent a "taking." 
Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82, 8 Clarke 82 (1859). 
12. Waters and water courses, regulations as to distinguished from eminent 
domain. 
Where public structure results in flooding of private property there is a 
"taking." Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Littoral owner not entitled to compensation where publ'ic dock to be 
erected on public shore. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Const. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 
N.W. 131 (1932), 89 A. L. R. 1147. 
Discharge of sewer by city upon private lands a "taking." Beers v. Town 
of Gilmore City, 197 Iowa 7, 1g6 N.W. 602 (1924). 
Erection of levee and assessment of cost not a "taking." Richman v. 
Board of Supervisors Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513, 42 N.W. 422 (1889), 4 L. 
R. A. 445, 14 Am. St. Rep. 308. 
4 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Article I, Section 18 
13. Delegation of power. 
Condemnation right delegable to railroads because use is public. Reter 
v. Davenport etc. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952), 35 A. L. R.2d 
1306. 
Proper delegation of right of eminent domain in legislature. Sisson v. 
Board of Supervisors Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 (1905), 70 
L. R. A. 440. 
When eminent domain delegated to city it has same power as state. 
Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628,· 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
Off street parking a "public use" though resulting special benefit to 
private individuals. Ermels v. Webster City, 71 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1955). 
14. Public use or purpose. 
Private property may only be taken for public use; there must be public 
necessity for such use, and only property necessary for public use may be 
taken. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 7Dl, 134 N.W.2d 335 
(1965). 
As long as use is public use, courts are not concerned with wisdom of law 
that delegates right to condemn, but it is for court to say whether condemnor 
has brought itself within the law so that it is empowered to condemn. Aplin 
v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). ' 
Right of eminent domain is a sovereign power limited to public uses or 
public purposes. Mid-America Pipeline Company v. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 253 Iowa 1143, 114 N.W.2d 622 (1962). City of Emmetsburg v. 
Central Iowa Telephone Company, 250 Iowa 768, 96 N.W.2d 445 (1959). R. & R. 
Welding Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). 
Courts decide "public use" when constitutionality of legislative grants 
questioned. Reter v. Davenport etc. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952). 
Court cannot interfere with legislative determination unless clear 
transgression. Id. 
Presumption in favor of legislative declaration of public use. Id. 
Condemnor may not reserve to condemnee rights inconsistent with public 
use. DePenning v. Iowa etc. Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948), 5 A. L. R.2d 716. 
Right of special charter city to condemn must be exercised for public 
purpose. Heinz v. Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. 783 (1941). 
Right to condemn by city must be exercised for public use. Carroll v. 
Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W. 652 (1935). 
Board of railroad commissioners order must comply with public use. 
Ferguson v. Illinois etc. Co., 202 Iowa 5D8, 210 N.W. 604 (1926), 54 A. L. R. 
1. 
"Substantial benefit" does not necessarily constitute public use. Id. 
"Public use" means public possesses certain rights to use and enjoyment 
of property. Id. 
Section limited to taking for public or quasi-public purpose. Wertz v. 
Ottumwa, 201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511 (1926). 
Use by entire community not required. Sisson v. Board of Supervisors 
Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 (1905), 70 L. R. A. 440. 
Right to condemn for railroad right of way is a public one. Stewart v. 
Board of Supervisors Polk County, 30 Iowa 9 (1870), 1 Am. Rep. 238. 
Section prohibits taking of private property for private use. Bankhead 
v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
15. Extent of use or benefit, public use. 
In absence of showing by compla1n1ng property owner that restraint 
imposed on him outweighs collective benefit to people of state, it cannot be 
said that there is an illegal taking. Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van 
Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W.2d 111 (1968). 
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Use by public agency is "public use" regardless of lack of right of 
individuals to use it. Merrit v. Peet, 237 Iowa 1200, 24 N.W.2d 757 (1946). 
If a use is public its extent is iTllTlaterial upon right of eminent 
domain. Dubuque etc. Co. v. Ft. Dodge etc. Co., 146 Iowa 666, 125 N.W. 672 
(1910). 
Public use is one which will inure to community as a whole. Sisson v. 
Board of Supervisors Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 (1905), 70 
l. R. A. 440. 
16. Destruction of property, public use. 
Destruction of property to prevent spread of fire not "taking." Field v. 
Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874), 28 Am. Rep. 46. 
17. Particular uses or pur~oses. 
A mun1c1pal1ty, throug its power of eminent domain, may take over a 
private water system bond payment of just compensation. O.A.G. (Curnan), 
April 26, 1978. 
Condemnation by power company for power line granted easement only, not a 
fee. DePenning v. Iowa etc. Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948), 5 A. L. 
R.2d 716. I 
Use of private property for electric transmission lines a "public 
purpose." Carroll v. Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W. 652 (1935). 
Coal shed for sale for private profit not "public purpose." Ferguson v. 
Illinois etc. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926), 54 A. L. R. I. 
Right to condemn for waterworks does not include laying track for ice. 
Creston Waterworks Co. v. McGrath, 89 Iowa 502, 56 N.W. 680 (18g3). 
Construction of mills and mill dam held public purpose. Burnham v. 
Thompson, 35 Iowa 421 (1872). 
18. Streets and highways, particular uses or purposes. 
Regulation of means of access to highway does not constitute such a 
"taking" of property rights as will entitle owners of abutting property to 
compensation unless such regulation deprives owners of abutting property 
reasonable access to highway. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 
Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
During his tenancy, lessee of premises abutting highway has all the 
rights of access thereto of an owner. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 
248 Iowa 86g, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
Landowner has private property right in hi9hway which, when destroyed, is 
a taking. Schiefelbein v. U.s;, C. C. A., 124 F.2d 945 (1942). 
Vacation of public street without assessing damages not a "taking." 
Landowner may sue for consequential damages. Hubbell v. Des Moines, 173 Iowa 
55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915). 
Vacation of highway cutting off convenient access a "taking." Mccann v. 
Clarke, 149 Iowa 13, 127 N.W. 1011 (1910), 36 L. R. A., N. S., 1115. 
Laws 1874 not unconstitutional in authorizin9 road to quarry for stone. 
Phillips v. Watson, 63 Iowa 28, 18 N.W. 659 (1884). 
Erection of embankment instead of bridge, and diverting stream a public 
use. Reusch v. Chicago etc. Co., 57 Iowa 687, 11 N.W. 647 (1882). 
Legislature may authorize condemnation for highway by published and 
posted notice. Wilson v. Hathaway, 42 Iowa 173 (1875). 
City parking lot a "public use." Ermels v. Webster City, 71 N.W.2d 911 
(Iowa 1g55). 
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19. Railroads, particular uses. 
Probable use by public of spur track sufficient for "public use." 
Dubuque etc. Co. v. Fort Dodge etc. Co., 146 Iowa 666, 125 N.W. 672 (1910). 
Right of way for mine railroad a public way. Morrison v. Thistle Coal 
Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 N.W. 507 (1903). 
Condemnation of land for channel change by railway a public use. Reusch 
v. Chicago etc. Co., 57 Iowa 687, 11 N.W. 647 (1882). 
Failure of railroad to construct on condemned right of way does not 
prevent transfer of right of way to another railroad. Noll v. Dubuque etc. 
Co., 32 Iowa 66 (1871). 
20. Levees and dikes, particular uses or purposes. 
State and county may be liable as one permitting a nuisance if a proposed 
dike system becomes such, and they would be liable if the project results in a 
"taking" of property in violation of this section. O.A.G. April 8, 1968 (No. 
68-4-23). 
Construction of river levee a public use. Kroon v. Jones, 198 Iowa 1270, 
201 N.W. 8 (1924). 
21. Drains and drainage, particular uses or purposes. 
Increased flow of water through tile drain not "taking." Grimes v. Polk 
County, 34 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 1948). 
Taking for drainage of agricultural lands proper legislative grant. 
Sisson v. Board of Supervisors Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 
(1905), 70 L. R. A. 440. 
Legislative grant of public benefit for drainage districts too broad. 
Hatch v. Pottawattamie Co., 43 Iowa 442. 
Assessments for drainage not invalid. Oliver v. Monona County, 117 Iowa 
43, go N.W. 510 (1902). 
City may condemn for sewer outside corporate limits and in limits of 
another city. O.A.G. 1916, p. 59. 
22. Property subject to appropriation. 
One whose personal property is damaged, destroyed, or reduced in value in 
a condemnation is as much hurt as if it had been his real estate which the 
public agency appropriated, and such constitutes a taking for which 
compensation must be paid. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
"Property" not limited to corporeal thing. Liddick v. Council Bluffs; 
232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d (1942). 
All private property held subject to eminent domain. Hoover v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 210 Iowa 1, 230 N.W. 561 (1930). 
Dower right subordinate to right of eminent domain. Caldwell v. Ottumwa, 
198 Iowa 666, 200 N.W. 336 (1924). 
23. Public roperty, property subject to appropriation. 
Consoli ation of property for school district not taking. State v. 
Grefe, 139 Iowa 18, 117 N.W. 13 (1908). 
24. Public use or purpose, property previously devoted to as subject to 
appropriation. 
Property devoted to public use cannot be taken for another public use 
unless authority granted by legislature. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 
Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Action of railroad commissioners in fixing rental value on right of way 
valid. Ferguson v. Illinois etc. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926), 54 
A. L. R. 1. 
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Property devoted to public use cannot again be condemned for inconsistent 
public use. Town of Alvord v. Great Northern etc. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 
467 (1917). 
Substitution of one public use to exclusion of other public uses not 
"taking." Board of Park Commissioners Des Moines v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 
603, 105 N.W. 203 (1905), 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1103, 8 Ann. Cas. 28. 
Railroad, buyer of right of way, unaffected by condemnation against 
granter. Minneapolis etc. Co. v. Chicago etc. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N.W. 1082 
(1902). 
Land owned by individual and transportation corporation jointly not 
exempt from condemnation. Diamond etc. Steamers v. Davenport, 114 Iowa 432, 
87 N.W. 399 (1901), 54 L. R. A. 859. 
Town may extend street over railroad right of way. Chicago etc. Co. v. 
Starkweather, 97 Iowa 159, 66 N.W. 87 (1896), 31 L. R. A. 183, 59 Am. St. Rep. 
404. 
25. Discretion in.exercise of delegated power. 
Public convenience, not absolute necessity, the test for right to 
condemn. Minear v. Plowman, 197 Iowa 1188, 198 N.W. 67 (1924). 
26. Private use, taking for. 
Governmental regulation of railroad does not deprive it of protection of 
section. Ferguson v. Illinois etc. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926), 54 
A. L. R. 1. 
Condemnation not authorized for private road. Richards v. Wolf, 82 Iowa 
358, 47 N.W. 1044 (1891), 31 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
Laying of drains for benefit of individuals not public use. Fleming v. 
Hull, 73 Iowa 598, 35 N.W. 673 (1887). 
Entering private property for public use without condemnation or 
compensation a trespass. Hibbs v. Chicago etc. Co., 39 Iowa 340 (1874). 
27. Determination of validity of exercise of power or necessity of taking. 
Whether zoning can be so oppressive as to constitute unconstitutional 
taking of property depends on the circumstances. Incorporated City of Denison 
v. Clabaugh, 306 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1981). 
The character of the invasion and not the amount of damage resulting from 
it determines the question of whether a "taking" has occurred. Phelps v. 
Board of Sup'rs of Muscatine County, 211 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1973). 
A "taking" does not necessarily mean the appropriation of the fee, but 
may be anything which substantially deprives one of the use and enjoyment of 
his property or a portion thereof. Id. 
Presumption in favor of municipal determination of public use but 
presumption not conclusive. In re Primary Road U.S. 30, West of 
Mechanicsville, Cedar County, Iowa, Project No. F-57, 230 Iowa 1069, 300 N.W. 
287 (1941). 
Absent fraud, municipal determination of public use not upset by 
courts. Ermels vs. Webster City, 71 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1955). 
Courts and not legislature determine public use. Ferguson v. Illinois 
etc. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926), 54 A. L. R. 1. 
Township trustees required to determine public use prior to review by 
court. Barrett v. Kemp, 91 Iowa 296, 59 N.W. 76 (1894). 
Necessity for using eminent domain for legislature not the courts. 
Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
Courts will not inquire into necessity or propriety of taking. Reter v. 
Davenport etc. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d (1952), 35 A. L. R.2d 1306. 
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28. Nuisances. 
Prior to abatement must show ownership and use. Mclane v. Leicht, 69 
Iowa 401, 29 N.W. 327 (1886). 
29. Right to take. 
Necessity must be shown prior to taking. Porter v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 44 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1950). 
30. Leases. 
Lessee is entitled to an award of just compensation for the public taking 
of his leasehold interest. Twin-State Engineering & Chemical Co. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1972). 
Lessee entitled to reasonable compensation for leasehold taken under 
condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 
308 (1967). 
Where entire leasehold property is taken by eminent domain, amount lessee 
may recover is value of unexpired term of lease, less the rental reserved, and 
where only part of leasehold is taken, amount of recovery is value of use of 
premises before appropriation less what it is worth afterwards. Batcheller v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 101 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1960). 
31. Urban renewal. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
32. Due process. 
Fourteenth Amendment requires due process on condemnation. Aplin v. 
Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
33. Electric transmission lines. 
Eminent domain may be exercised in transmission of electric current for 
public use. Race v. Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, 257 Iowa 701, 134 
N.W.2d 335 (1965). 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize a telephone company to place 
an underground telephone cable along the untraveled portion of a controlled 
access highway, within primary road system of the state. O.A.G. March 13, 
1970. 
34. Partial takinS. 
"faking" maye anything which substantially deprives one of use and 
enjoyment of their property not necessarily just the appropriation of the 
fee. Osborn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 324 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1982). 
Where partial takings are involved in an interstate highway project, the 
landowner is entitled to be compensated not only for the value of his land 
actually taken but also for diminution of the value of what is left to him 
after the taking; the proper measure of compensation is the difference between 
the fair and reasonable market value of the entire ownership immediately 
before the taking and the fair and reasonable market value of what is left 
immediately after the taking. Farmland Preservation Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 611 
F.2d 233 (lg79). 
Where less than entire tract is taken, just compensation is generally 
based on the difference between the reasonable market value of the entire 
tract and the remaining portion after the taking. Twin-State Engineering & 
Chemical Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1972). 
Condemnee, part of whose livestock sale business premises was taken by 
condemnation, was not required to effect substitute livestock pen arrangements 
to minimize damage resulting to him from condemnation proceedings. Wilkes v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1971). 
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Measure of damages for a partial taking of landowners' property is 
difference in fair market value of subject property i11T11ediately before and 
immediately after condemnation. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 
Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
II. NECESSITY OF COMPENSATION 
61. In general, necessity of compensation. 
Construction of bridge and causeway in such a manner as to cause greater 
flooding on adjoining property than previously was a "taking" thereof. Phelps 
v. Board of Sup' rs of Muscatine County, 211 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1973). 
Unless barred by the terms of the lease, taking of leasehold interest for 
public use entitles tenant to compensation. State v. Starzinger, 179 N.W.2d 
761 (Iowa 1970). 
Rights of individual whose private property is taken must be fully 
protected. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 N.W.2d 
187 (1956). 
Compensation must be determined before land taken for public park. 
Mathiasen v. Conservation Commission, 70 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1955). 
Municipality cannot take without payment therefor. Sioux City v. Tott, 
244 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W.2d 510 (1953). 
Just compensation required for taking by governmental subdivisions. 
Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). State ex rel. 
Board of R. R. Com' rs, State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 
249 N.W. 366 (1933), Certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 
589. 
Ascertainnment and payment of damages is first step. Hubbell v. Des 
Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915). 
Fair compensation due owner for taking. OeCastello v. Cedar Rapids, 171 
Iowa 18, 153 N.W. 353 (1915). Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874), 28 Am. 
Rep. 46. 
Compensation for taking and right to be heard essential elements. Taylor 
v. Drainage Dist. No. 56, 167 Iowa 42, 148 N.W. 1040 (1914), L. R. A. 1916B, 
1193; affirmed, 37 S. Ct. 651, 244 U.S. 644, 61 L. Ed. 1368. 
Assessment of damages synonymous with "just compensation." Henry v. 
Dubuque etc. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1856). 
Issuance of warrant complies with payment. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 245. 
62. Waiver of or estoppel to claim compensation. 
Waiver or part of money damages a limitation on requirement of payment. 
DePenning v. Iowa etc. Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948), 5 A. L. R.2d 
716. 
Sale of portion of fee did not waive right to recover consequential 
damages for destruction of drainage. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 
944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Failure to file claim precluded charge of invalidity of proceedings where 
no damages appraised. Goeppinger v. Board of Supervisors of Sac, Buena Vista, 
and Calhoun Counties, 172 Iowa 30, 152 N.W. 58 (1915). 
Failure to utilize remedies provided waives right to complain. Tharp v. 
Witham, 65 Iowa 566, 22 N.W. 677 (1885). 
Landowner entitled to damages for right of way taken though he had no 
right to erect building. Renwich v. Davenport etc. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), 
affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 226 L. Ed. 51. 
Written agreement not complied with does not relieve necessity of 
compensation. Hibbs v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 39 Iowa 340 (1874). 
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Article I, Section 18 
Failure to claim damages in method prescribed waives question of 
constitutionality. Abbott v. Scott County Supervisors, 36 Iowa 354 (1873). 
Dunlap v. Pulley, 28 Iowa 469 (1870). 
63. Property and rights subject of compensation. 
All of condemnee's property substantially interfered with by a taking in 
a condemnation proceeding should originally be considered by the condemnation 
commission. Wilkes v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 172 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 
1969). 
Where corporation obtained necessary permits to erect and operate signs 
and billboards on its properties, theirs was a vested interest or property 
right which could not be arbitrarily interfered with. McCray System v. City 
of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956). 
"Property" subject to taking includes intangibles such as access, light, 
air and view. Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 
N.W.2d 605 (1949). 
Tenant entitled to compensation for damage to leasehold. Des Moines etc. 
Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486 (1924), 34 A. L. R. 1517. 
Owner of abandoned town site property had compensable interest. 
Independent School Dist. of Marietta, Marshall County v. Timmons, 187 Iowa 
1201, 175 N.W. 498 (1919). 
Condemnor cannot collect rents from owners in lawful possession of 
condemned lands and buildings.· O.A.G. April 20, 1970. 
64. Riparian rights and water rights, necessity of comhensation. 
Appropriation of river front property improved wit out sanction of 
congressional act was federal question as to compensation. Davenport etc. Co. 
v. Renwick, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51 (1880). 
Compensation not required for taking of land below highwater mark on 
navigable stream. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224 (1876). 
Taking of property on navigable river requires compensation but 
consequential injuries not compensable. Goodman v. U.S., C. C. A., 113 F.2d 
914 (1940). 
Drainage of meandered lake not a "taking" from abutting owner. Higgins 
v. Board of Supervisors Dickinson County, 188 Iowa 448, 176 N.W. 268 (1920). 
Grant of right to build dam does not relieve necessity of compensation 
for overflow. Iowa Power Co. v. Hoover, 166 Iowa 415, 147 N.W. 858 (1914). 
Improvement of Des Moines river city property and controlling its use not 
"taking." Board of Park Commissioners Des Moines v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 
603, 105 N.W. 203 (1905), 3 L. R. A., N. S. 1103, 8 Ann. Cas. 28. 
Value of spring taken should be considered. Winklemans v. Des Moines 
etc. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
Erection of building between high and low water not required to entitle 
one to compensation. Renwick v. Davenport etc. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), 
affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
Flow of water course cannot be taken without compensaton. McCord v. 
High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868). 
Private wharf cannot be taken without compensation. Grant v. Davenport, 
18 Iowa 179 (1865). 
65. Easements and rights of way, necessity of compensation. 
Condemnees not required to make further proof on trial to preserve 
claimed error in court's ruling on condemnor's motion to exclude mention of 
claimed offers. Gustafson v. Iowa Light and Power Company, 183 N.W.2d 212 
(Iowa 1971). 
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Material interference with rights of ingress and egress, and of light, 
air and view of owners of realty abutting on street or highway is a taking of 
property of such owner for which, under constitution, compensation must first 
be made. Rhodes v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 416, g4 N.W.2d 97 
(1959). 
Cattle pass is a property right. Licht v. Ehlers, 234 Iowa 1331, 13 
N.W.2d 688 (1944). 
Pipe line company must give compensation for taking. Browneller v. 
Natural etc. Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
Right of access is a property right. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 
197, 5 N~W.2d 361 (1942). 
Compensation must be made for taking of public property. State ex rel. 
Board of R. R. Com'rs of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Co., 216 Iowa 436, 
249 N.W. 366 (1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 
589. 
Postponed payment of crop damage until maturity not violation. Draker v. 
Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 182 N.W. 896 (1921). 
Right of access is a compensable property right. Hubbell v. Des Moines, 
183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
Vacated street occupied by street railway does not require 
compensation. Tomlin v. Cedar Rapids etc. Co., 141 Iowa 599, 120 N.W. 93 
(1909), 22 L. R. A., N. S. 530. 
Owners entitled to damages where easement ·only taken. Kucheman v. C. C. 
etc. Ry. Co., 46 Iowa 366 (1877). 
Abutting owners have property right in streets subject to proper public 
use. Cadle v. Muscatine etc. Co., 44 Iowa 11 (1876). 
Easement is a compensable interest in land. O.A.G. 1928, p. 112. 
66. Payment secured. 
Bond conditioned on payment of damages for taking sufficient security. 
Sisson v. Board of Supervisors Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 
(1905), 70 L. R. A. 440. 
67. Payment - time of payment. 
Promissory stipulation of taker not sufficient compensation. DePenning 
v. Iowa etc. Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948), 5 A. L. R.2d 716. 
Ascertainment and payment of amount prior to taking not required. U.S. 
v. 1.997, 66 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Polk County, Iowa, C. C. A., 137 
F.2d 8 (1943). 
Payment of award prerequisite to invasion of land. Scott v. Price Bros. 
Co., 207 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 75 (1927). 
Payment of compensation prerequisite to taking property. Wulke v. 
Chicago etc. Co., 189 Iowa 722, 178 N.W. 1009 (1920). 
Railway may occupy street without payment of damages. Chicago etc. Co. 
v. Town of Newton, 36 Iowa 299 (1873). 
Occupation pending outcome of appeal from award authorized. Peterson v. 
Ferreby, 30 Iowa 327 (1870). 
Damages or security therefor must be deposited prior to occupation. 
Henry v. Dubuque etc. Co., 10 Iowa 540 (1860). 
Allowance of damage rather than judgment is final result on appeal. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 245. 
68. Direct or consequential damages, necessity of compensation. 
Duty of condemnation commissioners to consider all items of damage and, 
if requested by condemnee, to divide the damages as to a direct taking and as 
to those which are consequential. Wilkes v. State Highway Commission, 172 
N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1969). 
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Article I, Section 18 
Destruction of access a direct damage and not consequential. Liddick v. 
·Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Damages for property "taken" and not for consequential injuries. 
Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 567, 176 N.W. 314 (1920). 
Remote and prospective benefits set off for change of grade by viaduct. 
Western Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367 (lg13). 
No liability in railroad for proper use of streets. O'Connor v. St. 
Louis etc. Co., 56 Iowa 735, 10 N.W. 263 (1881). 
69. Streets and highways, necessity of compensation. 
Evidence as to loss of revenue from commercial property abutting on 
highway due to detour of traffic while highway is being widened and improved 
is inadmissible and should not be considered in assessing damages. Wilson v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Damages payable for loss of light, air, view, and access. Liddick v. 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Remedy of landowner not inadequate. Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 
1341, 195 N.W. 363 (1923). 
Street improvement and assessment of cost based on benefits not a 
"taking." Hutchins v. Hanna, 179 Iowa 912, 162 N.W. 225 (1917). 
Loss of light and air an element of damage to leasehold. Western 
Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367 (1913). 
Construction of switches in street may impose liability on railroad for 
"taking." Drady v. Des Moines etc. Co., 57 Iowa 393, 10 N.W. 754 (1881). 
Use of streets by railroad involves no liability where act authorized 
such action. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, etc. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
Failure to compensate entitles owner to injunction. Dinwiddie v. 
Roberts, 1 G. Greene 363 (1848). 
70. Change of grade of street or highway, necessity of compensation. 
Construction of viaduct not change of grade to preclude payment of 
damages. Western Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367 
(1913). 
Excavation of adjoining lot and loss of lateral support not "taking." 
Talcott Bros. v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N.W. 311 (1906), 12 L. R. A. N. 
S. 696, 120 Am. St. Rep. 419. 
71. Obstruction of access, necessity of compensation. 
Taking by destruction of access is compensable. Twin-State Engineering & 
Chemical Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1972). 
Unless the question is free from doubt, it is for the jury's 
determination whether a property owner has been denied reasonable access. 
Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1971). · 
Property owner abutting condemned property cannot be deprived of all 
access by public authorities without just compensation. Jones v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Owners of land abutting on highway are not entitled to access to their 
property from all points along highway, but they are entitled to reasonable or 
free and convenient access to their property and cannot be deprived thereof 
without just compensation. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 
994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Where only means of ingress and egress for residential site adjoining 
controlled access highway would be by constructing a private service road 
parallel to highway between residential site and a driveway provided by state 
highway commission, another driveway should be permitted from such residential 
site to the highway or just compensation should be paid for taking of right of 
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access thereto. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 86g, 82 
N.W.2d 755 (lg57). 
Material interference with ingress and egress a "taking." Gates v. 
8loomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 27g. 
Destruction or substantial impairment of access, light, air or view a 
"taking." Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 
605 {1949). 
City without eminent domain power on access, light, air, or view but 
controlled by section 389.22. O.A.G. 1949, p. 11. 
Destruction of interference with access a "taking." Liddick v. Council 
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Substantial interference with access a "taking." N•lon v. Sioux City, 
216 Iowa 1041, 250 N.W. 166 (1933}. 
72. Vacation of streets or highways, necessity of compensation. 
Vacation of highway destroying access a "taking." Schiefelbein v. U.S., 
C. C. A., 124 F.2d 945 (1942). 
Vacation of street or alley without prior assessment of damages 
authorized. Louden v. Starr, 171 Iowa 528, 154 N.W. 331 (1915). 
Compensation for vacating street is required where access destroyed. 
Sutton v. Mentzer, 154 Iowa 1, 134 N.W. 108 (1912). Ridgway v. Osceola, 13g 
Iowa 590, 117 N.W. 974 (1908). 
Erection of building on land sold by city which destroyed all access a 
"taking." Borghart v. Cedar Rapids, 126 Iowa 313, 101 N.W. 1120 (1905), 68 L. 
R. A. 306. 
73. Railroads, necessity of compensation. 
Railroads authorized to occupy streets without compensation. Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224 (1876). 
Authority for railroad to construct viaduct does not relieve liability 
for "taking." Wulke v. Chicago etc. Co., 189 Iowa 722, 178 N.W. 1009 (1920). 
Condemnation payment held by sheriff does not relieve condemner of 
obligation to pay before possession. White v. Wabash etc. Co., 64 Iowa 281, 
20 N.W. 436 (1884). 
Unauthorized erection of building not a bar to recover for taking. 
Renwick v. Davenport etc. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 26 
L. Ed. 51. 
Authority to use city street by railroad without compensation proper. 
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids etc. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
III. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION 
101. Generall~, amount of compensation. 
Condemnation award not considered comparable because of compromise and/or 
compulsion. Taylor v. City of Des Moines, 337 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1983). 
Although, in condemnation proceeding, evidence relative to lessee's loss 
of profits was not admissible as an independent element of damages, such 
evidence as to the nature and prosperity of the lessee's business on the 
property being partially condemned was a proper item to be considered along 
with all facts. Twin-State Engineering & Chemical Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Conmission, 197 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1972). 
In determining value of condemned leasehold, variety of elements of loss, 
expense and inconvenience may be considered by jury, not as substantive 
elements of damage, but as descriptive of injury resulting to leaseholder by 
condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 
308 {1967}. 
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Measure of damages for leasehold interest taken under eminent domain is 
market value of unexpired term of lease over and above rent stipulated to be 
paid. Id. 
Owner of apartment building, later taken by condemnation for public 
purpose, who, in reasonable anticipation of condemnation but prior to any 
taking, sold or removed all furnishings therefrom was entitled to no damages 
assessed for loss in value to personal property. Gaar v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 252 Iowa 1374, 110 N.W.2d 558 (1961). 
Generally, no compensation is due a citizen by reason of damage to 
property from lawful exercise of the police power, but compensation must be 
made for what is taken by eminent domain. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959). 
Question of adaptability of residential property for industrial use is an 
element of value to be taken into consideration in condemnation case. 
Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 39, 99 N.W.2d 284 (1959). 
Measure of damages in condemnation cases is not what the land is worth to 
the landowners themselves, but rather the difference between the fair and 
reasonable market value of land as a whole immediately before the taking and 
immediately after the taking, without considering the benefits, if any. Hamer 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 1228, 98 N.W.2d 746 (1959). 
Forced sale of personal property on condemnation not elements of 
damage. Foster v. U.S., C. C. A., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Compensation based on physical condition, location, present and future 
use. Hubbell v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
Present value and immediate consequences are basis for compensation. 
Henry v. Dubuque etc. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). 
102. Just compensation. 
Statutes available for use in condemnation for secondary road purposes 
which provide for notice to condemnees and opportunity to be heard do not 
constitute denial of due process. Cahill v. Cedar County, 367 F. Supp. 39 (1973). 
Statutes pertaining to individual drainage rights. Peel v. Burk, 197 
N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1972). 
Correct measure of damages in partial taking is the difference between 
the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before and immediately 
after condemnation without regard to resultant benefit or betterment. Powers 
v. City of Dubuque, 176 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1970). 
Just compensation due for taking toll bridge property. Plattsmouth 
Bridge Co., v. Globe etc. Co., 232 Iowa 1118, 7 N.W.2d 409 (1943). 
Just compensation required. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 (1937), 118 A. L. R. 862. 
Just compensation to be assessed by jury. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 
(1868). 
Fair equivalent in money for property taken required. Henry v. Dubuque 
etc. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). 
102.5. Nominal damages. 
Proceeding to condemn right of way and easement for electric transmission 
line across part of farm. Danker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 86 
N.W.2d 835 (1958). 
103. Value of land taken, amount of compensation. 
A jury may, in determining value of land remaining after condemnation, 
consider the future uses to which the land may reasonably be put, as well as 
the advantages the land posse.sses which a seller would press to the attention 
15 
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of a buyer. Heins v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 
1971). 
Compensation to which condemnees are entitled, for a partial taking, is 
the difference between fair market value of the entire tract of land 
immediately before and immediately after condemnation without regard to 
resultant benefit or betterment. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185 
N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1971). 
In condemnation action wherein state highway commission sought to condemn 
strip of land along portion of farm, instruction of court to the effect that 
test of damages was not what the land was worth to landowners but fair market 
worth was not erroneous. Hamer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 
1228, 98 N.W.2d 746 (1959). , 
Value to owner and loss to him and not necessities of public the test. 
U.S. v. Foster, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 (1943), certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 
318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. U.S. v. Buescher, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 (1943), 
certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. 
Value before and after the taking only question involved. Eggleston v. 
Town of Aurora, 233 Iowa 559, 10 N.W.2d 104 (1943). 
Value of lots before and after taking proper measure of damages. Fleming 
v. Chicago etc. Co., 34 Iowa 353 (1872). 
104. Growing trees and crops, amount of compensation. 
Value of growing crops proper item to consider. Bracken v. Albia, 194 
Iowa 596, 189 N.W. 972 (1922). 
105. Im~rovements and fixtures, amount of compensation. 
Rig t of lessee to use improvements over term of lease is, in a sense, 
ownership right, and compensable upon condemnation of leasehold. Interstate 
Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
Sale of buildings on condemned lots after condemnation and before appeal 
did not preclude recovery for them by owner. Hollingsworth v. nes Moines etc. 
Co., 63 Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
106. Value for special use, amount of compensation. 
Jury may award for most advantageous and valuable use. U.S. v. Foster, 
C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 (1943), certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 
87 L. Ed. 1138. U.S. v. Buescher, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 (1943), certiorari 
denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. 
Most advantageous use must be reasonably probable and such as to affect 
present market value. Id. 
Contiguous tracts used for different purposes by single owner considered 
as separate tracts. Hoeft v. State, 221 Iowa 694, 266 N.W. 571 (1936), 104 A. 
L. R. 1008. 
Peculiar adaptability for purpose for which sought may be shown by owner. 
Tracy v. Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914). 
Jury may consider prospective location of depot on railway condemnation. 
Snouffer v. Chicago etc. Co., 105 Iowa 681, 75 N.W. 501 (1898). 
107. Property not taken, amount of compensation. 
Damages do not include unlawful acts of condemnor which may result. 
Fleming v. Chicago etc. Co., 34 Iowa 353 (1872). King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 
34 Iowa 458 (1872). 
Denial of damages not warranted where landowner refused to permit removal 
of buildings. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 
N.W. 693 (1932). 
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Damages include present or future matters which proximately affect market 
value. Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Damages include damage to entire tract if occupied as a whole even though 
only part taken. Haggard v. Independent School Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 
85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Value inmediately before and immediately after taking, less benefits, is 
proper measure in city sewer condemnation. Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 
76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
108. Value of land, property not taken, amount of compensation. 
A condemnee is damaged to extent his property is diminished in ~alue by 
the condemnation, which is an ultimate fact to be determined by the Jury. 
Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Effect of proper use of land taken on balance of tract proper to consider 
in assessing damages. Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Market value before and after condemnation is actual price it may be sold 
to willing buyer. Watters v. Platt, 167 Wis. 470, 168 N.W. 808 (1918). 
Damage may include damage to entire tract even though only partial 
taking. Haggard v. Independent School Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 
777 (1901). 
Value of whole tract prior to taking and value of remainder after taking 
proper measure. Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
Premises after taking with damages assessed should equal in value 
premises prior to taking. Henry v. Dubuque Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 
(1855). 
109. Injuries to property not taken, amount of compensation. 
When real estate is condemned, damage to, destruction of, or reduction in 
value of personal property located thereon is considered in fixing damages to 
the owner or tenant. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Damages for flooded land is difference in value before and after 
flooding. Wapsipinicon Power Co. v. Waterhouse, 186 Iowa 524, 167 N.W. 623 
(1918). 
Where soil taken in condemnation damages not restricted to value of soil 
taken. Parott v. Chicago etc. Co., 127 Iowa 419, 103 N.W. 352 (1905). 
Owner entitled to consequential damages for proximity of school. Haggard 
v. Independent School Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). Quality and condition of building and its loss of use proper to consider 
where building destroyed. Freeland v. Muscatine, 9 Iowa 461 (1859), followed 
in Kahn v. Muscatine, 9 Iowa 461 (1859). 
110. Diminution in value of land not taken, amount of compensation. 
State highway commission cannot avoid payment of compensation for the 
taking of right of access to highway by express waiver of abandonment 
thereof. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 
(1958). 
Landowner entitled to reimbursement for difference in fair and reasonable 
market value before and after. Harris v. Board of Trustees of Green Bay etc. 
Dist. No. 2, Lee County, 244 Iowa 116g, 59 N.W.2d 234 (1953). 
Difference between fair and reasonable market value before and after 
taking proper. Gregory v. Kirkman Consol. etc. Dist., 193 Iowa 579, 187 N.W. 
553 (1922). 
Damages not allowed for improper construction of improvement. Richardson 
v. Centerville, 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071 (1908). 
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Owner entitled to damages to entire lot when used as a whole but only 
half lot taken. Haggard v. Independent etc. Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 
N.W. 777 (1901). 
Immediate and not remote consequences considered. Fleming v. Chicago 
etc. Co., 34 Iowa 353 (1872). 
All circumstances that immediately depreciate value of premises 
considered and none others. Henry v. Dubuque etc. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 
288 (1856). 
Fair market value of premises before and after disregarding benefits the 
test. Sater v. Burlington etc. Co., 1 Iowa 386, 1 Clarke 386 (1855). 
111. Easements or rights of way, amount of compensation. ; 
Landowner seeking recovery for loss of access to his property is not 
limited to recovery by terms of~ 364.15, providing, inter alia that city 
shall pay owner of property amount of damage or injury by reason of alteration 
of the established grade of any street; if landowner can show that he had been 
deprived of reasonable access to his property he may demand compensation under 
Iowa Const. Art. 1, ~ 18, for a valuable property right which has been 
taken. Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1971). 
Award for 17-acre tract through 200-acre farm for construction of 
interstate highway which in effect severed farm on slanting curve and caused 
difficulty in traveling from one section of farm to other was not exhorbitant 
in view of substantial injury to farm and contemporary value of agricultural 
land. Perry v. Iowa State Highway Cormiission, 180 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1970). 
Damages need not necessarily equal amount required to construct 
another. Gear v. C. C. & D. R. Co., 39 Iowa 23 (1874). 
112. Railroads, property not taken, amount of compensation. 
Damages are fair value of whole tract before and after appropriation. 
Henry v. Dubuque etc. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). Ham v. Wisconsin, 
etc. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 (1883). 
Proper for jury to consider duty of railroad to construct crossing. 
Lough v. Minneapolis etc. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
Proper to instruct that measure of damages fair market value before 
taking where whole lot taken. Hollingsworth v. Des Moines etc. Co., 63 Iowa 
443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
Negligence in construction not to be considered but damage to remaining 
lot may be. Cummins v. Des Moines etc. Co., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 268 (1884). 
Obstruction of view and interfering with privacy proper to be considered. 
Ham v. Wisconsin etc. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 (1883). 
Where railway through entire farm, instruction on value of separate 
tracts was error. Winklemans v. Des Moines etc. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 
(1883). 
Value is in then condition and not as in city lots if not so laid out. 
Everett v. Union Pac. etc. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 13 N.W. 109 (J.882). 
Depreciation in market value of entire farm proper and not restricted to 
value of governmental subdivisions. Hartshorn v. Burlington etc. Co.-, 52 Iowa 
613, 3 N.W. 648 (1879). 
Adjacent landowner to street used by railway may recover all damages 
proximately resulting from its use. Kucheman v. C. C. etc. Co., 46 Iowa 366 
(1877). 
Where negligent construction, only proper construction is to be 
considered in assessing damages. Cadle v. Muscatine etc. Co., 44 Iowa 11 (1876). 
Owner entitled only to compensation for appropriation. Gear v. C. C. 
etc. Co., 39 Iowa 23 (1874). 
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Enhanced value because of improvement not considererl. Henry v. Dubuque 
etc. Co., 5 Iowa (Cole Ed.) 576 (1858). 
113. Streets and highways, amount of damages. 
Damage may be greater to farm than value per acre when attached to farm. 
Luthi v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 Iowa 678, 276 N.W. 586 (lg38}. 
Fair and reasonable market value before and after condemnation the 
measure of damages. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 
241 N.W. 693 (1932). Randall v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 
214 N.W. 685 (1932). 
Damage to be considered as a whole - not separate items. -Dean v. State, 
211 Iowa 143, 233 N.W. 36 (1930). 
Measure is value immediately before and immediately after without 
considering benefits. Beal v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 209 Iowa 1308, 
230 N.W. 302 (1930}. 
Jury should not award sum of specific items but rather damage as a 
whole. Kosters v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
Area of land taken for street compared with entire tract not true 
measure. Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Measure where street cut down where no grade established is value before 
and after. Richardson v. Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
Depreciation in market value true measure where embankments 
constructed. Nicks v. Chicago etc. Co., 84 Iowa 27, 50 N.W. 222 (1891). 
Amount expanded for fences not measure of recovery. Bland v. Hixenbaugh, 
39 Iowa 532 (1874}. 
If damages for new road located over vacated old road are less than 
damages for old road owner is entitled to nothing. Jewett v. Israel, 35 Iowa 
261 (1872). 
114. Expenses necessitated by taking in general, amount of compensation. 
Where grade change increases value of property owner not entitled to 
compensation for inconvenience. Meyer v. Burlington, 52 Iowa 560, 3 N.W. 558 (1880). 
Recovery for fences not amount expended but is amount reasonable and 
proper. Bland v. Hixenbaugh, 39 Iowa 532 (1874). 
115. Benefits, deduction or set-off of, amount of compensation. 
Benefits not considered where strip taken for highway. Stoner v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (193g). 
Benefits not considered where land taken for school purposes. Gregory v. 
Kirkman etc. School Dist., 193 Iowa 579, 187 N.W. 553 (1922). Haggard v. 
Independent School Dist. Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Benefits not considered where land taken for drain. Gish v. Castner etc. 
Co., 137 Iowa 711, 115 N.W. 474 (1908). 
All benefits and advantages are excluded. Britton v. Des Moines etc. 
Co., 59 Iowa 540, 13 N.W. 710 (1882). 
Benefits excluded because enjoyed by all the public. Meyer v. 
Burlington, 52 Iowa 560, 3 N.W. 558 (1879). 
Appreciation in value because of improvement not considered. 
Koestenbader v. Pierce, 41 Iowa 204 (1875). 
Benefits because of erection of fences not considered. Bland v. 
Hixenbaugh, 39 Iowa 532 (1874). 
Jury charge to disregard benefits not erroneous. Brooks v. Davenport 
etc. Co., 37 Iowa 99 (1873). 
Drainage and improvement of land not to be considered. Frederick v. 
Shane, 32 Iowa 254 (1871). 
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Advantages arising out of improvement not considered. Israel v. Jewett, I 
29 Iowa 475 (1870). Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 594 (1859). Sater v. 
Burlington & Mt. P. etc. Co., 1 Iowa 386, 1 Clarke 386 (1855). 
116. General or special benefits, deduction or set-off, amount of 
compensation. I 
Benefits excluded mean road itself as well as use made of it. Frederick 
v. Shane, 32 Iowa 254 (1871). 
117. Limited estates or interests in property, amount of compensation. 
Leasehold entitled to compensation. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 
1948). . 
Tenants recovery is value of unexpired term less rent reserved. Des 
Moines etc. Laundry v. Des Moines, 199 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486 (1924), 34 A. 
L. R. 1517. 
Where lessee not permitted to connect to viaduct, error to show grant of 
right to do so. Western Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 
367 (1913). 
Error to show whether leasehold listed for taxation. Id. 
Lessee entitled to value of annual use before and after taking. Werthman 
v. Mason City etc. Co., 128 Iowa 135, 103 N.W. 135 (1905). Renwick v. 
Davenport etc. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affinned 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
118. Interest, amount of compensation. 
Compensation for condemnation of private property for public use can only 
be allowed where there is a taking of a compensable interest and cannot be 
allowed for something that does not exist. R. & R. Welding Supply Co. v. City 
of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). 
Acceptance of award by one tenant does not preclude recovery by another 
tenant. Ruppert v. Chicago etc. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
Interest allowed from date of possession. Beal v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 209 Iowa 1308, 230 N.W. 302 (1930). 
Interest allowed from date of possession if evidence of that date. Quinn 
v. Iowa etc. Co., 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209 (1906). 
Interest from first date of month following possession proper. Lough v. 
Minneapolis etc. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
119. Inadequate or excessive compensation. 
Evidence in action by landowner seeking award for loss of access to lots 
fronting on platted but unopened street was inadequate to support verdict. 
Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1971). 
Condemnation case is one in which the amount allowed is peculiarly within 
the province of the trier of fact. Van Horn v. Iowa Public Service Co., 182 
N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1970). 
Fair value of property basis even though less than owners investment. 
Foster v. U.S., C. C. A., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
$2,000 not excessive for 1.2 acres including trees which are part of 
landscaping plan. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 
N.W. 269 (1939). 
$1,020 for easement 100 feet wide over 34 acres not excessive when 
evidence in conflict. Evans v. Iowa etc. Co. of Delaware, 205 Iowa 283, 218 
N.W. 66 (1928). 
$3,875 not excessive for 3.9 acres where cattle pass inadequate. Kosters 
v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
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120. Market value. 
In condemnation proceeding, award for taking condemnees right to direct 
access to and from its business property was not so large as to call for 
interference of Supreme Court on appeal. Twin-State Engineerin9 & Chemical 
Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1972). 
To be considered as a "comparable", sale must be between willing buyer 
and seller, and sale to condemner by condemnee is not a "comparable". Socony 
Vacuum Oil Co. v. State, 170 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 1969). 
Jury specifically instructed to make award of fair and reasonable market 
value of interest as of date of condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. 
Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
IV. REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE 
141. Nature and form of proceeding. 
Determination of damages is civil in nature and removable to federal 
court where other requisites exist. Kirby v. Chicago etc. Co., C. C., 106 F. 
551 (1901). Myers v. Chicago etc. Co., 118 Iowa 312, 91 N.W. 1076 (1902). 
Taking without compensation subjects taking to action in ejectment. 
Daniels v. Chicago etc. Co., 35 Iowa 129, 14 Am. Rep. 490 (1872). 
Failure to follow remedy provided waives right to resist road opening. 
Dunlap v. Pulley, 28 Iowa 469 (1870). 
Owner only entitled to compensation in manner prescribed by law. Connoly 
v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 416, 7 Clarke 416 (1858). 
142. Persons entitled to maintain proceedings for compensation or damages. 
Damages cannot be recovered by one who sustains same damages as general 
public. Ellsworth v. Chickasaw County, 40 Iowa 571 (1875), Brady v. Shinkle, 
40 Iowa 576 (1875). 
143. Injunction. 
Generally, exercise of power of eminent domain by governmental body may 
not be stayed or interfered with by injunction. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 
Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
Maintenance of action by owners to enjoin commission from proceeding with 
construction of highway not justified. Rhodes v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 250 Iowa 416, 94 N.W.2d 97 (1959). 
Question of right to condemn by special charter city can be raised on 
appeal, not injunction. Heinz v. Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. 783 (1941). 
Injunction proper against corporation attempting to evade constitutional 
requirement. Scott v. Price Bros. Co., 207 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 75 (1927). 
144. Mandamus. 
Appeal from judgment awarding condemnee mandamus to compel condemnor to 
make deposit would be considered. Virginia Manor, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 
261 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1978). 
Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel condemnation when property is 
appropriated to the power of eminent domain or when the appropriating agency 
refuses to make payment for the property taken. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 
N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Mandamus proper to compel condemnation. Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission; 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949). Baird v. Johnson, 230 Iowa 
161, 297 N .W. 315 (1941). 
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145. Jury trial. 
Counsel in condemnation cases should not argue to jury about governmental 
unit paying for project, but should direct their efforts toward central issue 
of difference in value of property taken before and after condemnation. Perry 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 180 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1970). 
There is no constitutional protection in respect to jury trial available 
to state highway commission in condemnation case if commission fails to demand jury trial. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 122 N.W.2d 
323 (Iowa 1963). 
Owner entitled to jury trial on appeal. Kirby v. Chicago etc. Co., C. 
C. , 106 F. 551 ( 1901) . 
Not violation of due process to refuse jury trial. 'In re Bradley, 108 
Iowa 476, 79 N.W. 280 (1899). 
Owner entitled to jury trial on appeal without moving to set aside 
proceedings. Sigafoos v. Talbot, 25 Iowa 214 (1863). 
Owner entitled to jury trial on appeal. O.A.G. 1930, p. 59. 
146. Jury questions. 
No question of fact was presented for jury as to assessment of damages 
for the taking of right of access. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Question of damages for jury. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (1939). 
Where access made more difficult jury question on damages. Nalon v. 
Sioux City, 216 Iowa 1041, 250 N.W. 166 (1933). 
Removal of lateral support, question of damages for jury. Hathaway v. 
Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953). 
147. Pleading. 
Permitting late amendment to petition of landowner who alleged lost 
access to lots fronting on platted but unopened street did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 
1971). 
Allowing landowners in condemnation case to amend their petition was 
within sound discretion of trial court. Jones v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Where alternative relief asked damages for taking proper. Birk v. Jones 
County, 221 Iowa 794, 226 N.W. 553 (1936). 
Owner may controvert necessity of taking by answering application for 
condemnation. Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
148. Evidence - admissibility of evidence. 
Evidence of "comparable sales" not inadmissible on grounds the sales 
occurred after the date of condemnation. Booras v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission for Use and Benefit of State, 207 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1973). 
Generally, evidence of business profits is inadmissible as an independent 
element of damage or as relevant in determining the value of land because it 
is too uncertain and depends upon too many contingencies. Twin-State 
Engineering & Chemical Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575 
(Iowa 1972 J. 
In order to assure just compensation to the condemnee, evidence 
descriptive of the injury resulting to the leaseholder by condemnation should 
be considered in determining the fair and reasonable value of the lease 
interest. Id. 
Error to permit introduction of evidence by condemnor relative to 
acquisition of other land for use in same development program. Thornberry v. 
State Bd. of Regents, 186 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1971). 
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Admission of evidence concerning sales of nearby farmland was within 
trial courts discretion. Perry v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 180 N.W.2d 
417 (Iowa 1970). 
Presence of metal deposits in land is proper element to consider in 
valuing property condemned. Townsend v. Mid-America Pipe Line Co., 168 N.W.2d 
30 (Iowa 1969). 
In proceeding to condemn realty for highway purposes, admitting evidence 
of enhancement of value by making of improvement is proper. Redfield v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 397 (1961). 
In condemnation proceedings, evidence of recent sales of comparable 
properties should be admitted, where evidence shows similarity 1n all major 
respects. Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 
413 (1959). . 
Testimony as to monthly net income derived by lessee from operation of 
service station abutting on highway and gross income from abutting cafe was 
inadmissible. Wilson v. Iowa State Hiqhway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 
N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Striking out of improper testimony of valuation witness of commission 
that farm of owners was worth more after construction of new highway than 
before taking cured damage to owners because of such testimony. Trachta v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Present or near 0 future wants of community is basis for admission of value 
testimony. U.S. v. Foster, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 (1942), certiorari denied, 63 
S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. U.S. v. Buescher, C. C. A., 131 
F.2d 3 (1942), certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. 
Testimony of value for industry improper where no use other than farm 
shown. Id. 
Disturbing of peace, quiet and privacy by stopping of passers-by 
admissible. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (1939). 
Obstruction to access a taking where fence erected across highway. 
Graham v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 594, 258 N.W. 902 (1935). 
Undesirable points after taking as well as good points prior to taking 
may be shown. Randall v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 
685 (1932). 
Testimony of viaducts in other city improper where conditions not the 
same. Western Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367 
(1913). 
Witnesses not limited to present use but may testify as to reasonable 
probable future use. Lough v. Minneapolis etc. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 
(1902). 
Sale of land similiarly situated where differences pointed out 
admissible. Town of Cherokee v. Sioux City etc. Co., 52 Iowa 279, 3 N.W. 42 
(1880). 
149. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Statutes relating to filing notice of appeal to district court in 
condemnation proceedings must be presumed constitutional. Harrington v. City 
of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
Statutes delegating power of eminent domain are strictly construed. 
Aplin v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Under 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 41(20) Burden on owner to show flooding a 
permanent condition. Goodman v. U.S., C. C. A., 113 F.2d 914 (1940). 
Unusual changes not presumed contemplated when land acquired from 
abutters. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Absent allegation and proof no presumption vacation of alley hostile to 
abutters. Hubbell v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 {1919). 
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150. Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
Must show total lack of public use to enJ01n condemnation. Heinz v. 
Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. 783 (1941). 
151. Instructions and interrogatories. 
Instruction providing that "the law provides that a fair and just 
compensation means the payment of such a sum of money to the owner of the 
property taken or appropriated that will serve to make the owner whole" was 
not objectionable. Booras v. Iowa State Hi9hway Commission for Use and 
Benefit of State, 207 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1973). 
Not error to instruct jury that the "fair and reasortable market value" 
before and after taking was standard for measuring damages, not withstanding 
condemnor's contention that omission of word "cash" implied that credit 
transaction could be considered. Stortenbecker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 
Iowa 1073, 96 N.W.2d 468 (1959). 
Instruction that mere colorable compliance not enough is not 
objectionable. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1948), motion denied, 
32 N.W.2d 798. 
Where no claim of unlawful use, instruction that use is lawful properly 
refused. Cutler v. State, 224 Iowa 686, 278 N.W. 327 (1938). 
"Just compensation" defined as sum as would make landowner whole not 
prejudicial. Witt v. State, 223 Iowa 156, 272 N.W. 419 (1937). 
Right of owner to remain in undisturbed possession and value before and 
after proper. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 
N.W. 883 (1937), 118 A. L. R. 862. 
Term "value" not prejudicial where other instructions refer to fair and 
reasonable market value. Hoeft v. State, 221 Iowa 694, 266 N.W. 571 (1936), 
104 A. L. R. 1008. 
Fixing of damages without regard to crossing proper. Lough v. 
Minneapolis etc. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
Fair market value of land condemned and difference in value before and 
after erroneous as confusing. Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 
(1898). 
In change of street grade cost of restoring property less benefits 
erroneous. Stewart v. Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61, 50 N.W. 219 (1891). 
Submission of interrogatories on value of separate parcels properly 
refused. Winklemans v. Des Moines etc. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
152. Setting aside verdict and new trial. 
To justify new trial because of misconduct of jurors, it must appear that 
misconduct was calculated to influence verdict and that it is reasonably 
probable that it did so. Townsend v. Mid-America Pipe Line Co., 168 N.W.2d 30 
(Iowa 1969). 
Affidavits of jurors that during consideration of case several jurors 
argued that elements of damage which had been withdrawn from their 
consideration by instruction should be considered in fixing damages to be 
awarded could be considered to impeach verdict. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Court has same power over verdict in condemnation as in other cases. 
Campbell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 222 Iowa 544, 269 N.W. 20 (1936). 
Verdict which is inadequate, excessive or result of passion or prejudice 
may be set aside. Id. 
Reopening case tried without jury for material testimony not error. Fair 
v. Ida County, 204 Iowa 1046, 216 N.W. 952 (1927). 
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153. Conclusiveness and effect of award or judgment. 
Relevant matters overlooked by the condemnation commission can and should 
be brought before the district court in an appeal petition. Wilkes v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 172 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1969). 
Assessing tribunal presumed to consider all foreseeable uses affecting 
value. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Damages are assessed once and for all and include all injuries. Lage v. 
Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Judgment fixing block boundaries not res judicata against abutting 
property owner. Long v. Wilson, 119 Iowa 267, 93 N.W. 282 (1903), 60 L. R. A. 
720, 97 Am. St. Rep. 315. 
154. Award or judgment, effect. 
Where road established and order of non-assessment of damages, none need 
be paid. McCrory v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 248, 7 Clarke 248 (1858). Connolly v. 
Griswold, 7 Iowa 416, 7 Clarke 416 (1858). 
Compensation paid only where fixed by jury. Connolly v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 
416, 7 Clarke 416 (1858). 
155. Amendment of award or judgment. 
Where amount of interest merely matter of computation, court could add. 
Beal v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 209 Iowa 1308, 230 N.W. 302 (1930). 
156. Costs, fees and expenses. 
Trial court's refusal to fix and award attorney fees to condemnees in 
connection with first and second trials, on ground that ultimate recovery 
could not be determined until case had been finally disposed of on appeal, was 
not error. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 
1971). 
Attorney fee award deemed not excessive. Perry v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 180 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1970). 
Where owner appealed, motion to require government to print record at its 
expense properly denied. Goodman v. U.S., C. C. A., 113 F.2d 914 (1940). 
Attorney fees and expenses not within ".iust compensation." Welton v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930). 
Attorney fees not included in "just compensation." Iowa Electric Co. v. 
Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
Attorney fees not to be taxed except where expressly authorized. Nichol 
v. Neighbour, 202 Iowa 406, 210 N.W. 281 (1926). 
157. Review. 
The court must decide whether taking by eminent domain is constitutional. 
Simpson v. Low-rent Housing Agency of Mt. Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1974). 
Right of appeal in condemnation case is purely a creature of I.C.A. § 
472.18, and if an appeal is to be taken, notice thereof must be given in 
substantial compliance with statute. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 261 
Iowa 174, 153 N.W.2d 489 (1967). 
Supreme Court could assume in absence of contrary assertion that 
provision of this section requiring just compensation for taking homes and 
provision of I.C.A. ~ 364.15 requiring payment of amount of injury or damage 
resulting from change in established street grade would be complied with. 
Gardner v. Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
The right to appeal or to have a judicial determination of damages in 
condemnation case, although provided by constitution, is limited by reasonable 
and proper statutory procedure for protecting an appeal to the district 
court. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
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Certiorari is available in condemnation cases involving jurisdictional 
questions, substantial departure from statutory requirements, and other 
illegalities by lower tribunal, board or commission. Aplin v. Clinton County, 
256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error in striking testimony of 
witness that location of new highway would give ready access to all parts of 
city. Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413 
(1959). 
Where trial court sat as trier of fact as well as law in condemnation 
case, its findings had effect of special verdict, anG if supported by 
substantial evidence, they were binding upon Supreme Court on appeal. 
Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 39, 99 N.W.2d 284 (1959). 
In absence of evidence of permanent flooding of land petition properly 
dismissed. Goodman v. U.S., C. C. A., 113 F.2d 914 (1940). 
Manner of construction properly excluded where testimony amply disclosed 
it to jury. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 
269 (1930). 
Verdict not upset where conflicting evidence. Id. 
Question of value after condemnation omitting reference to exclusion of 
benefits no cause for complaint by condemnor. Moran v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 (1937). 
Award of $4,680 for 15.71 acres from tract of 310 acres purchased by 
owner nine months prior to condemnation for $6,500 grossly excessive. 
Campbell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 222 Iowa 544, 269 N.W. 20 (1936). 
Discretion of city council as to public purpose interfered with only if 
abused. Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
Instruction by county judge to condemnation jury not disturbed where no 
prejudice shown. City of Des Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa 153 (1866). 
158. Abandonment of proceedings. 
In connection with trial in district court of appeal in condemnation 
proceeding, condemnor may, by express waiver or abandonment, proceed to 
condemn less property than was originally listed in notice of condemnation. 
Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
159. Personal property. 
A condemnee is entitled to compensation for damage to, destruction of, or 
reduction in value of personal property even if it is not located on the 
condemned land, as long as it was used in connection with a business operated 
on that land. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Due process requires that those holding liens or encumbrances of record 
on personal property which may be damaged, destroyed or reduced in value by 
condemnation proceedings against real estate be given notice of the 
proceedings. Id. 
Cost of moving from condemned premises certain personal property, the 
market value of which was not reduced because of the move, was not a 
"reduction in value" within I.C.A. ~ 472.14. Skaff v. Sioux City, 120 N.W.2d 
439 (Iowa 1963). 
160. Jurisdiction. 
The district court has appellate jurisdiction only in condemnation 
cases. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
Failure to notify sheriff of appeal to district court in condemnation 
proceeding would defeat jurisdiction of district court to proceed with the 
review. Id. 
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161. Notice of proceedings. 
Where plaintiffs were shown to hold record legal title to personal 
property alleged to have been damaged, destroyed, or reduced in value pursuant 
to condemnation, provision of this section stating that private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made 
required that plaintiffs be compensated for any damage sustained, and to that 
end, they were entitled to notice of the condemnation proceedings. Forst v. 
Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
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CHAPTER 17A 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
17A.1 Citation and Statement of Purpose 
1/2 In genera 1. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
1. Notice and Hearing. 
City Council not required to make findings of fact ig conjunction with 
overruling of objections asserted at public hearing on proposed public 
improvement of project. Dunphy v. City Council of City of Creston, 256 N.W.2d 
913 (Iowa 1977). 
"Fair day in court" not defeated by fact that hearing is before same 
administrative authority which lawfully conducted prehearing investigation or 
preferred charges. Cedar Rapids Steel Transp., Inc. v. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 160 N.W.2d 825 (Iowa 1968). 
Administrative agency generally required, even apart from any statutory 
mandate, to make findings of fact on issues presented in any adjudicatory 
proceeding. Id. 
Administrative bodies may act within the limits of their legislative 
authority without giving notice or providing hearing unless statute so 
requires or unless some constitutional right is transgressed thereby. Zwingle 
Independent School Dist. v. State Bd. of Public Instruction, 160 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1968). 
2. Delegation of ~owers. 
Presence or a sence of procedural safeguards is important in determining 
whether delegation of legislative power to administrative bodies is 
reasonable. Elk Run Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co. of Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 311 
(Iowa 1968). 
Propriety of delegation of legislative power to administrative bodies. 
Id. 
3. Disclosure of records. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4. Judicial Review. I 
If on review of administrative order, case is heard de novo in trial 
court, it is generally considered de novo on appeal. Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 
981, 157 N.W.2d 336 (1968). 
17A.2 Definitions 
1/2 In genera 1. 
State Civil Rights Commission is administrative agency governed by 
provisions of state administrative procedure act. Sommers v. Iowa Civil 
Rights Commission, 337 N.W.2d 470 (1983). 
Neither administrative procedure act nor case law interpreting it 
precludes agency from later reconsidering its own findings made at prehearing 
conference. Chicago and North Western Transportation Company v. Iowa 
Transportation Regulation Board, 322 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 1982). 
Agency or agency member's failure or refusal to respond to discovery is 
"agency action". Christensen v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 292 N.W.2d 429 
(Iowa 1980). 
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Plaintiff landowners, seeking to permanently enjoin condemnation of 
easement, could not avoid doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Kerr v. Iowa Public Service Co., 274 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1979). 
"Reassignment" of an administrative agency from one larger unit of state 
government to another does not affect the validity of the agency's 
administrative rules. O.A.G. June 17, 1g8Q. 
1. Arencf. 
oca pension board not a board "of the state" despite origin in state 
law, thus not an "agency" and not subject to administrative procedure act. 
Benson v. Fort Oodge Police Pension Board of Trustees, 312 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 
1981). 
Commerce Commission's order overruling a motion to dismiss utility's 
petition for an electric transmission line franchise was "agency action". 
Richards v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 270 N.W.2d 616 {Iowa 1978). 
City council not required to make findings of fact in conjunction with 
its overruling of objections asserted at public hearing on proposed public 
improvement project. Dunphy v. City Council of City of Creston, 256 N.W.2d 
913 (Iowa 1977). 
2. Rules. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
3. Statutory authority. 
Rules. O.A.G. March 27, 1969. 
For additional citations, see I.C.A. 
4. Internal matters, rules. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Prior law, submission of proposed rules. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
6. Contested case. 
Defined. Oliver v. Teleprompter Corp., 299 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1980). 
For additional citations, see I.C.A. 
17A.3 Public Information - Adoption of Rules - Availability of Rules and 
Orders 
1/2. In aeneral. 
An a judication under Administrative Procedure Act can result only by 
following procedures outlined therein. Young Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa· 
Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1979). 
1. Disclosure and public inspection of records. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
2. Validit~ of rules. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.4 Procedure for Adoption of Rules 
1. In Seneral. 
Su section one relating to request that agency issue statement of reasons 
for and against adoption of rules is not subject to time constraint when filed 
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prior to adoption of rules, that is, section does not require concise 
statement at time rule is adopted. Iowa Bankers Association v. Iowa Credit 
Union Department, 335 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1983). 
Department of Social Services' decision to release nursing home Medicaid 
payment cost reports did not violate statutory procedures since they did not 
make a rule when it decided to release the reports but applied statute which 
details requirements for examination of records to a particular report. 
Craigmont Care Center v. Department of Social Services, 325 N.W.2d 918 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1982). 
Where supreme court upheld subrule taxing auto repair services on cars by 
auto dealers, dealers association and repair companies, who challenged 
validity of subrule, were not entitled to attorney's fees, their cross appeal 
challenging sufficiency of attorney fee award in district court was moot. 
Iowa Auto Dealers Assn. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1981). 
Department of Revenue had burden in action by dealers association and 
dealer for judicial review, to establish that the portion of the rule objected 
to was not unreasonable or otherwise beyond authority delegated to it. Id. 
An agency rule has a binding effect of law, whereas decision of contested 
case is but of precedential value. Young Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa 
Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1979). 
Objections made pursuant to Chapter 17A must be made before a rule 
becomes effective. O.A.G. Dec. 6, 1979. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Statutory authority. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Notice and hearing. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
4. Amendment of rules. 
Amendment to a statute or regulation may indicate either an intent to 
change the existing law or merely clarify it, depending upon the 
circumstances. Hutchison Nursing Home, Inc. v. Burns, 236 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 
1975). 
5. Interpretation of rules by courts. 
Administrative rules seeking to implement statutes must be finally 
interpreted by courts. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Johnson, 247 Iowa 
583, 73 N.W.2d 820 (1956). 
6. Prior law, submission of proposed rules. 
A policy or guideline which constituted a "standard of general 
application" in this section fell within the definition of a rule, and such 
rule should have been submitted for review unless such policy was one of 
internal application only. O.A.G. Dec. 5, 1969. 
Departmental rules submitted by the Iowa State Highway Commission to the 
Attorney General were approved except the rule which would limit the issuance 
of annual permits to Iowa based license vehicles only, since such rule would 
unconstitutionally discriminate against movers in interstate commerce. O.A.G. 
Jan. 8, 1969 (No. 69-1-6). 
Proposed administrative rules had to be submitted to the departmental 
rules review committee and to the Attorney General in the style and form 
.prescribed by the Code Editor before the forty-five and thirty day periods 
provided for in this chapter begin to run. O.A.G. Oct. 9, 1967. 
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7. Parole revocation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
8. Review. 
Civil Rights Commission's adoption of rule involving employment 
policies. Davenport Community School District v. Iowa Civil Rights 
Commission, 277 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1979). 
Trial court excessively restricted its review to the test of whether the 
action was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion. Schmitt v. Iowa Dept. of Social Services, 262 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 
1978). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.5 Filing and Taking Effect of Rules 
1. In genera 1. 
Objections made pursuant to Chapter 17A must be made before a rule 
becomes effective. O.A.G. Dec. 6, 1979. 
Attorney General's failure to pass upon validity of agency rule before 
formal adoption thereof did not estop state agency from questioning validity 
of rule. Iowa Dept. of Revenue v. Iowa Merit Employment Commission, 243 
N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1976). 
"Temporary rules" may be promulgated and filed without conforming to the 
procedure prescribed for the adoption of permanent rules or rules other than 
"temporary rules". O.A.G. June 28, 1963. 
17A.6 Publications 
1. Construction and application. 
Code Editor is required to keep and index all rules and not simply those 
that became effective after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
1975. O.A.G. Oct. 3, 1979. 
17A.7 Petition for Adoption of Rules 
1. In general. 
The purpose of this section is to enable interested persons to initiate 
reasoned consideration by agency as to whether rules should be issued, amended 
or repealed. Community Action Research Group v. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 275 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1979). 
17A.8 Administrative Rules Review COlllllittee (No Annotations) 
17A.g Declaratory Rulings by Agencies 
1. In genera 1. 
Agency should have discretion to abstain from ruling on merits of 
petition where issue raised has been settled by change in circumstances. 
Women Aware v. Reagen, 331 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1983). 
This section governing issuance of declaratory rulings by administrative 
agencies contemplates declaratory ruling by agencies on purely hypothetical 
sets of facts and contemplates that such rulings will be subject of judicial 
review. City of Des Moines v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753 
(Iowa 1979). 
17A.10 Infonnal Settlements - Waiver (No Annotations) 
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17A.11 Presiding Officer - Administrative Hearing Officers 
Two hearings of revocation or suspension are both contested cases within 
the meaning of section 17A.2, but collateral estoppel will ordinarily preclude 
relitigation, a board may delegate to a hearing officer the authority to 
preside over any evidentiary hearing relating to any remaining factual 
issues. O.A.G. (Schantz), September 1, 1981. 
17A.12 Contested Cases - Notice - Hearing - Records 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.13 Subpoenas - Discovery 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.14 Rules of Evidence - Official Notice 
1. In general. 
Unsubstantiated references to person failing polygraph test insufficient 
alone to warrant conclusion that person allowed false report made without 
informing authorities of falsity. Herring v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, 
341 N.W.2d 65 (Iowa 1983). 
Agencies are not bound by rules of evidence, hearsay is generally 
admissible at administrative hearing. It was not error to admit hearsay 
evidence on claim for unemployment. McConnell v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service, 
327 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 1982). 
17A.15 Final Decisions - Proposed Decisions - Conclusiveness - Review by the 
Agency 
1. In general. 
Exhaustion rule does not prevent judicial review unless remedy exists for 
claimed wrong and statutes require that remedy be exhausted before resorting 
to court. Leaseamerica Corporation v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 847 
(Iowa 1983). 
17A.16 Decisions and Orders - Rehearing 
1. In general. 
Where employee seeking unemployment benefits sought rehearing of decision 
denying benefits but did not mail notice to employer, authority of agency to 
determine controversy was lost. Cunningham v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 
319 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1982). 
Even though unemployment compensation claimant was told that she did not 
need to give notice to employer by agency, department cannot waive notice and 
department is not estopped to deny its authority. Id. 
Jurisdiction challenge of agency to render decision on rehearing because 
of defective notice can be raised at any stage in proceeding, special 
appearance is appropriate for this purpose. Id. 
Construction of provision of employment security law providing an 
application for rehearing filing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
is that if judicial review is desired petition must be filed pursuant to 
requirements of the act, and does not impose a duty to apply for rehearing 
precedent to seeking judicial review of an adverse decision. Kehde v. Iowa 
Department of Job Service, 318 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1982). 
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17A.19 
Where commissioner did not separately state facts and conclusions of law 
in deciding workers compensation claim, but court could work backward from 
deputy commissioner's summary statement to deduce what must have been his 
legal conclusions, and reject assignment of error based on commisioner's 
failure. Ward v. Iowa Dept.of Transportation, 304 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa ·1981). 
Workman's compensation claimant may be awarded cost of appeal in spite of 
benefit denial where commissioner failed to separately state facts and 
conclusions of law. Id. 
Application for rehearing of administrative decision denied when not 
ruled on by agency. Ford Motor Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Transp. Regulation Bd., 
282 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1979). 
17A.17 Ex Parte Conmunications and Separation of Functions 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.18 Licenses 
1. In general. 
A contested revocation case decision becomes final when all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted. O.A.G. April 27, 1979. 
17A.19 Judicial Review 
1. In general. 
In general, rules of statutory construction and interpretation govern 
rules and regulations of administrative agencies. Messina v. Iowa Department 
of Job Service, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). 
Rules and regulations of agencies must be construed with statute to 
harmonize, using common sense. Id. 
Although agency's decision must be supported by evidence in record made 
before agency when that record is reviewed as a whole, substantial evidence is 
that which a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to reach conclusion, even if 
court draws contrary inference. Id. 
Supreme Court gives administrative tribunals reasonable range of 
discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules. Dameron v. Neumann 
Brothers Inc., 339 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1983). 
Administrative agency's rule not valid if violates any seven criteria of 
subdivision 8 of this section governing judicial review. Sommers v. Iowa 
Civil Rights Commission, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). 
State Administrative Procedure Act provides means of judicial review by 
district court action of state's Civil Rights Commission. Id. 
Interpretation of statute for judicial review of agency is question of 
law, Supreme Court is final arbiter. Iowa Banker's Association v. Iowa Credit 
Union Department, 335 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1g33). 
Test to determine if litigant is "aggrieved or adversely affected" 
thereby entitled to appeal, is if party demonstrated specific interest in 
subject matter of agency decision and shown injuriously affected. Id. 
County attorney was not agency within meaning of Iowa Administrative 
Procedure Act. Iowans for Tax Relief v. Campaign Finance Disclosure 
Commission, 331 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1983), appeal denied 104 S. Ct. 220 (1983). 
County lacked standing on constitutional issue of whether review of 
county budgetary process by state appeal board was lawful, whether board's 
reduction of budget was unconstitutional as delegation of special lawmaking, 
and whether board's failure to adopt rules denied county due process. Polk 
County v. Iowa State Appeal Board, 330 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1983). 
33 
17A.19 
To interpret statute, standard for judicial review of agency in contested 
proceeding is usually whether supported by evidence in record. In such case, 
court may give weight to agency's interpretation, but is not bound. Sullivan 
v. Iowa Departmental Hearing Board of Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Department, 
325 N.W.2d 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
Administrative Procedure Act applies to Chapter 247A work release 
revocation and the APA is exclusive means for challenging revocation. 
Dougherty v. State, 323 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1982). 
In denying unemployment benefits, review by Court of Appeals limited to 
determining whether district court made errors of law in exercising its power 
of review of agency action. Woods v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 315 
N.W.2d 838 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). 
Court of Appeals can reverse or modify agency action only if unsupported 
by evidence in record before agency, when record is reviewed as a whole. 
Court limited to record made before hearing officer. Gipson v. Iowa 
Department of Job Service, 315 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). 
Fact that agency can draw two inconsistent conclusions from evidence, 
does not mean one of the conclusions is unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Id. 
Judicial review provisions of Administrative Procedure Act provide 
exclusive means for challenging agency action. Benson v. Fort Dodge Police 
Pension Board of Trustees, 312 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1981). 
Where review obtained by certiorari without compliance with procedural 
requisites of Administrative Procedure Act, district court without jurisdiction if act applies. Id. 
Local pension board not a board "of the state" despite origin in state 
law, thus not an "agency" and not subject to Administrative Procedure Act. 
Id. 
Employer and insurer not precluded from making claim in their answer that 
claimant's decedent was not their employee at time of fatal auto collision in 
spite of not filing cross petition for judicial review within requisite 30 
days. Ross v. Ross, 308 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 1981). 
After district court acted in appellate capacity to correct errors of 
law, the Court of Appeals was limited to question of whether district court 
correctly applied the law. Iowa Civil Rights Commission v. Woodbury County 
Co111T1unity Action Agency, 304 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). 
Where first sentence of subsection 3 of this section requires petition 
for judicial review of agency within 30 days after agency's final decision in 
contested case where second sentence of same provision provides a petition for 
review other than a decision in contested case can be filed anytime petitioner 
was aggrieved or adversely affected. There was no implied 30 day period of 
limitations for situations covered by the second sentence. Oliver v. 
Teleprompter Corporation, 299 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1980). 
When damaged car can be repaired in as good a condition as before injury, 
insurer must pay reasonable cost of repair, plus reasonable value of use of 
the car while being repaired, with ordinary diligence not exceeding value of 
car before injury, insurer cannot only pay diminution in value of car caused 
by accident unless and until repair is undertaken. Aetna Casualty and 
Insurance Company v. Insurance Department of Iowa, 299 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1980). 
This section, governing judicial review of agency action provides 
exclusive means of such review. Northbrook Residents Ass'n v. Iowa State 
Dept. of Health, Office for Health Planning and Development, 298 N.W.2d 330 
(Iowa 1980). 
Statute governing appeals of administrative decisions prescribes 
conditions and such procedures which are jurisdictional and with which 
petitioner must comply before invoking relief from district court for 
review. Neumeister v. City Development Bd., 291 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1980). 
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17A.19 
Both before and after enactment of this section governing judicial review 
of administrative decisions, the Supreme Court was obligated to review record 
as a whole to determine reasonableness of agency findings. Hawk v. Jim Hawk 
Chevrolet - Buick, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1979). 
"Agency action" for purposes of this section providing exclusive means of judicial review of agency action includes declaratory ruling or refusal to 
issue such ruling. Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d 286 
(Iowa 1979). 
This section provides exclusive means of judicial review of agency 
action. Id. 
Whether administrative rule is within authority of agency promulgating it 
is subject to judicial review. Hiserote Homes, Inc. v. Riedemann, 277 N.W.2d 
911 (Iowa 1979). 
Rule should be held to be within agency's power to adopt when a rational 
agency could conclude that the rule is within its delegated authority. Id. 
"Substantial rights" language in this section governing judicial review 
of agency rulings has no bearing on person or party's standing to obtain judicial review. City of Des Moines v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 
N.W.2d 753 (Iowa 1979). 
Judicial review of administrative proceedings is a right conferred by 
statute. Kerr v. Iowa Public Service Co., 274 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1979). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Only a clear showing of irreparable injury from anticipated agency action 
justifies judicial intervention prior to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. Iowa Indus. Com'r v. Davis, 286 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1979). 
Monetary losses caused by litigation expenses ordinarily are insufficient 
to justify judicial intervention prior to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. Id. 
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has never been thought 
to be absolute; if agency is incapable of granting the relief sought during 
subsequent administrative proceedings, a fruitless pursuit of these remedies 
is not required. Salsbury Laboratories v. Iowa Dept. of Environmental 
Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1979). 
When the legislature has given an administrative agency jurisdiction to 
entertain a particular controversy, the jurisdiction is exclusive and must be 
exhausted before resort to courts, unless contrary intent is clearly · 
manifested by legislature. Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 
905 (Iowa 1975). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
Defined. Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 
1975). 
This doctrine presupposes an ability of administrative agency to 
adjudicate issues of law or fact which are alleged to be appropriate for 
administrative resolution. Id. 
4. Driver's license revocation. 
For annotations, see 1.C.A. 
5. Jurisdiction. 
Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act providing for judicial 
review of agency action are jurisdictional and must be met. Iowa Indus. 
Com'r. v. Davis, 286 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1979). 
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Failure to timely file application for judicial review of ruling of the 
Transportation Regulations Board. Ford Motor Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Transp. 
Regulations Bd., 282 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1979). 
Once resolution of controversy has been delegated to administrative 
agency, district court has no ori~inal authority to declare rights of 
parties. Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d 286 (Iowa 
1979). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
6. Nature of review. , 
Courts do not hear contested cases under Administrative Procedure Act de 
novo. Cook v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service, 299 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1980). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
7. Substantial evidence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
8. Taxation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Intermediate judicial review. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Agency action. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Approval of annexation petition by city development committee was "agency I 
action". Neumeister v. City Development Bd., 291 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1980). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
11. Additional evidence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
12. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Burden is on party attacking validity of an agency's rule to make a clear 
and convincing showing that the rule is ultra vires. Hiserote Homes, Inc. v. 
Riedemann, 277 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1979). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
13. Summary judgment. 
Motioni'or summary judgment not proper means by which to dispose of 
petition for judicial review involving contested case under Administrative 
Procedure Act. Young Plumbing Co. v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 276 
N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1979). 
14. 
For anno at1ons, see t.C.A. 
15. Stay. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Time for proceedings. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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17A.33 
17. Workers' compensation cases. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Civil rights complaints. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.20 Appeals 
Court of Appeal's review of determination of industrial commission in 
workers compensation case is limited to whether commission is supported by 
evidence in record when reviewed as a whole. Beck v. Rounds, 332 N.W.2d 109 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
1. Construction and application. 
Supreme Court's scope of review. Caterpillar Davenport Emp. Credit Union 
v. Huston, 292 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1980). Community Action Research Group v. 
Iowa State Commerce Commission, 275 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1979). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
17A.21 Inconsistency with Federal Law (No Annotations) 
17A.22 Agency Authority to Implement Chapter (No Annotations) 
17A.23 Construction 
Review by district court and supreme court de nova where complaint filed 
before Civil Rights Commission on January 16, 1975 was proceeding in process 
on July 1, 1975. Therefore review provisions of administrative procedure act 
were inapplicable. First Judicial District Department of Correctional 
Services v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 315 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 1982). 
17A.24 - 17A.30 Reserved 
17A.31 Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Analysis {No Annotations) I 17A.32 Time Limit Applicable to Emergency Rules {No Annotations) 
17A.33 Review by Administrative Rules Review Cannittee (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 23 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS AND B<JfDS 
23.1 Tenns Defined 
1. Construction and application. 
Public competitive-bids are not required for a contract between an area 
solid waste disposal unit organized pursuant to section 455B.76 and a 
contractor where a contract will not involve the expenditure of public 
funds. O.A.G. Oct. 23, 1978. , 
City was authorized to enter into joint project with power company and 
others for generating electricity. Sampson v. City of Cedar Falls, 231 N.W.2d 
609 (Iowa 1975). 
The purpose of budget law to provide economy and fair prices. Carlson v. 
Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
Reconstruction of a county plat book system is not a public 
improvement. O.A.G. Oec. 6, 1974. 
Although sections lllA.6 governing acquisition of real estate by county 
conservation boards subjects all expenditures in excess of $5,000.00 to the 
requirements of this section et. seq., the latter applies to public 
improvements, which, as defined in this section, does not include the 
acquisition of real estate. O.A.G. Sept. 30, 1969. 
Supervisors may, subject to Highway Commission approval, determine 
whether anticipatory certificates should be issued. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
Section 23.2 does not control type of advertising required by section 
309.40, 311.5. O.A.G. 1938, p. 731. 
Requirement of competitive bidding does not prohibit board of control 
from hiring superintendent. O.A.G. 1938, p. 38. 
Municipal contract to replace machinery not a contract contemplated in 
section 23.2. O.A.G. 1928, p. 330. 
Park board subject to restrictions of this section. O.A.G. 1928, p. 378. 
State board of education must comply if cost is more than $5,000.00. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 110. 
23.2 Notice of Hearing 
1. Construction and application. 
When time is computed from a particular day, or act is to be performed 
within specified period, first day is excluded and last day of specified 
period is included. Central Nat. Ins. Co. v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 
294 F. Supp. 1396 (1968). 
Contract for street improvement not void on ground that it exceeded 
estimate of cost by more than 10%. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 240 Iowa 681, 
3776 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
Where no public improvement contract, school district was merely property 
owner. Schumacher v. Clear Lake, 214 Iowa 34, 239 N.W. 71 (1931). 
Reconstruction of a county plat book system not a public improvement 
requiring public hearing or competitive bids. O.A.G. Dec. 6, 1974. 
Public hearing required when school district utilizes services of 
construction manager. O.A.G. July 30, 1974. 
Chapter 23 does not require contracts for work on public improvement 
exceeding $5,000.00. O.A.G. May l, 1973. 
Use of "design-build" method of obtaining bids for schools is not 
prohibited. O.A.G. Nov. 7, 1972. 
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23.2 
Gift of money for construction of auditorium placed in schoolhouse fund 
to be treated as public money. O.A.G. Nov. 24, 1971. 
Provisions of section 332.7, requiring written contract for building 
where cost of labor and materials exceeds $2,000.00, do apply to contracts for 
the erection of 2-car garage and tool shed. O.A.G. July 15, 1968 (No. 68-7-
10). 
Board of regents delegating statutory duties relating to contracts for 
capitol improvements. O.A.G. July 12, 1966. 
Publication of notice must strictly conform to statute involved. O.A.G. 
1934, p. 365. 
Park board subject to restrictions of this section. O.A.G. 1928, p. 378. 
Municipal contract to replace machinery not a contract contemplated in 
section 23.2. O.A.G. 1928, p. 330. 
State board of education must comply if cost is more than $5,000.00. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 110. 
Code of 1923 governs city in writing contract for bridge construction. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 72. 
2. Municipality. 
State Fair Board is a municipality if improvements are determined to be 
in the interest of the state. O.A.G. Oct. 12, 1965. 
Under "municipality" definition, section 23.2 does not control type of 
advertising required by sections 309.40, 311.5. 
3. Buildings. 
This section not applicable to construction of industrial buildings under 
act authorizing city to construct for purpose of securing and developing 
industry. Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5 (1965). 
Removal of two supervisors for exceeding cost limitation not warranted 
when legalizing act passed and the Comptroller and Attorney General 
consulted. Dwyer v. Sullivan, 230 Iowa 945, 299 N.W. 411 (1941). 
Installment payment of cost of construction not authorized. O.A.G. 1940, 
p. 538. 
4. Street improvements and repairs. 
Street improvement contract costing more than $5,000.00 held not within 
budget requirements. Schumacher v. Clear Lake, 214 Iowa 34, 239 N.W. 71 
(1931). 
Engaging contractor for work on street improvement costing more than 
$5,000.00 per day not within budget requirements. Carlson v. Marshalltown, 
212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
Distinction exists between "construction work" and "repairs" in suit to 
recover by contractor. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 
N.W. 705 (1930). 
5. Sewer improvement and repairs. 
Payment to a city may be made upon completion of improvement from county 
general fund by resolution of board of supervisors. O.A.G. August 19, 1964. 
6. Public utility contracts. 
Taxpayer could not complain of failure to pay total contract price where 
contract required payment of 90% on contract and balance on completion. Poor 
v. Town of Duncombe, 231 Iowa 907, 2 N.W.2d 294 (1942). 
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7. Form and contents of notice. 
Notice of hearing on joint project sufficient even though notice did not 
state cost of project or how cost would be paid. Sampson v. City of Cedar 
Falls, 231 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1975). 
8. Publication of notice. 
- Notice of hearing may be published either in county where improvement to 
be made or seat of state board of education. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 105. 
Notice of hearing on plans and specifications and on hearing of necessity 
may be published in same notice. O.A.G. 1928, p. 190. 
Contract not void on ground that it exceeded 10% of estimated cost. 
Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 240 Iowa 681, 37 N.W.2d 310 '(1949). 
9. Elections. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Use of word "extend" in election does not invalidate election. Johnson I 
v. Inc. Town of Remsen, 215 Iowa 1033, 247 N.W. 552 (1933). 
23.3 Objections - Hearing - Decision 
1. Construction and application. 
Property owners not subject to special assessment for street improvement 
could not object to resolution of necessity. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 240 
Iowa 681, 37 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
Construction manager superintending construction and letting bids for 
specific parts of construction. O.A.G. May 17, 1974. 
Park board subject to restrictions of this section. O.A.G. 1928, p. 378. 
2. Bonds. 
This section not repealed by implication by chapter dealing with rights 
of cities and towns to issue general obligation bonds. Town of Mechanicsville 
v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 517, 111 N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
3. Sewer improvements and repairs. 
Payment to city for sewer improvement to county home made from county 
general fund by resolution of board of supervisors. O.A.G. August 19, 1964. 
4. Errors and irregularities. 
Alleged erroneous reason for State Board of Appeal's determination that 
improvement contract was not to best interest of municipality. Town of 
Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 517, 111 N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
5. Injunction. 
Injunction will lie only if proceedings are absolutely void. Husson v. 
City of Oskaloosa, 240 Iowa 681, 37 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
6. Estoppel. 
Record of city council's vote sufficient even though on role cards 
specially prepared for that purpose. Nixon v. Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 
N.W. 239 (1908). 
Legality of bonds in hands of innocent holder may be questioned by 
taxpayers though no objection to their issuance. McPherson v. Foster Bros., 
43 Iowa 48 (1876). 
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23.4 Appeal 
1. Construction and application. 
Director of budget not superior of, or a court of appeal in. 
administration of municipal affairs. Carlson v. Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 
236 N.W. 421 (lg31). 
2. Jurisdiction. 
State Appeal Board had jurisdiction to disapprove proposed street 
improvement contract. Town of Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 
517, 111 N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
Jurisdiction where cost of improvement by municipality to be paid for in 
whole or in part by use of taxable .funds or issuance of bonds payable from 
taxation. O.A.G. June 26, 1963. 
3. Notice of appeal. 
Notice of appeal must be "served on" not merely filed with town clerk. 
Incorporated Town of Casey v. Hogue, 204 Iowa 3, 214 N.W. 729 (lg27). 
4. Parties. 
OWners of property in municipality were interested objectors. Town of 
Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 517, 111 N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
5. Appearance. 
Appearance before state budget director does not confer jurisdiction on 
director. Incorporated Town of Casey v. Hogue, 204 Iowa 3, 214 N.W. 729 
(1927). 
6. Injunction. 
InJunct1on will lie only if proceedings are absolutely void. Husson v. 
City of Oskaloosa, 240 Iowa 681, 37 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
7. Decisions of Appeal Board. 
Alleged erroneous reason for State Board of Appeal's determination that 
improvement contract was not to best interest of municipality. Town of 
Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 517, 111 N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
Decision of State Appeal Board final and cannot be challenged by 
certiorari. Independent School Dist. Cedar Rapids, Linn County, v. State 
Appeal Bd., 230 Iowa 924, 299 N.W. 440 (1941). 
8. Dismissal of apeeal. 
Motion to d1sm1ss appeal from judgment adverse to property owners 
sustained. Town of Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Bd., 253 Iowa 517, 111 
N.W.2d 317 (1962). 
Return of party serving notice may be impeached on motion to dismiss 
appeal. Incorporated Town of Casey v. Hogue, 204 Iowa 3, 214 N.W. 729 (1927). 
23.5 lnfonnation Certified to Appeal Board (No Annotations) 
23.6 Notice of Hearing on Appeal 
1. Construction and application. 
Notice of hearing on joint project sufficient even though notice did not 
state cost of project or how cost would be paid. Sampson v. City of Cedar 
Falls, 231 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1975). 
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Insufficient signers on notice of appeal voids appeal. Incorporated Town 
of Casey v. Hogue, 204 Iowa 3, 214 N.W. 729 (1927). 
1929 amendment of Code of 1927 merely struck out surplusage. O.A.G. 
1930, p. 129. 
23.7 Hearing and Decision 
1. Construction and application. 
Director of budget not supervisor of, or court of appeal in, 
administration of municipal dffairs. Carlson v. City of Marshalltown, 212 
Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
Construction of a sewage disposal lagoon is an improvement to be 
constructed under the provisions of this chapter. O.A.G. Oct. 28, 1965. 
2. Plans and specifications - in general. 
Requirement of competitive bidding does not prohibit board of control 
from hiring superintendent. O.A.G. 1938, p. 38. 
Engineer and budget director required to keep within standard plans and 
specifications and the director may reject entire plans. O.A.G. 1925, 1926, 
p. 480. 
3. Approval of plans and specifications. 
Budget director's approval of plans held final decision as regards 
validity. Johnson v. Incorporated Town of Remsen, 215 Iowa 1033, 247 N.W. 552 
(1933). 
Approval of highway commission required before contract for a bridge on 
secondary road becomes effective. O.A.G. 1925, 1926, p. 480. 
4. Changes in plans and specifications. . 
Changes by budget director in plans and specifications should be 
consistent with standard plans and specifications. O.A.G. 1925, 1926, p. 480. 
5. Advertisement for bids - in general. 
Statutory provision for advertisement is mandatory. Johnson v. 
Incorporated Town of Remsen, 215 Iowa 1033, 247 N.W. 552 (1933). 
6. Time of advertisement. 
Advertisement for and opening bids prior to budget director's approval 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
not invalidating. Johnson v. Incorporated Town of Remsen, 215 Iowa 1033, 247 I 
N.W. 552 (1933). 
7. Bids. 
Judicial notice taken of provisions for extension of time. Miller v. 
Incorporated Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 276 N.W. 826 (1938). 
Rejection of all bids and renegotiation at lower figure with bidder not 
invalidating. Johnson v. Incorporated Town of Remsen, 215 Iowa 1033, 247 N.W. 
552 (1933). 
23.8 Enforcement of Performance 
1. Construction and application. 
This section applies only where contract let for an improvement. O.A.G. 
1925, 1926, p. 400. 
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23.13 
2. Appeal. 
Appeal to budget director does not lie for failure to build according to 
certain plans and specifications. O.A.G. 1925, 1926, p. 400. 
23.9 Nonapproved Contracts Void 
1. In genera 1. 
Taxpayer and user of electricity could maintain certiorari and injunction 
without showing special damage. Poor v. Incorporated Town of Duncombe, 231 
Iowa go7, 2 N.W.2d 2g4 (1g42). 
Amount of prospective tax increase immaterial to right to sue. Miller v. 
City of Des Moines, 143 Iowa 4og, 122 N.W. 226 (190g). 
23.10 Witness Fees - Costs (No Annotations) 
23.11 Report on Canpletion (No Annotations) 
23.12 Issuance of Bonds - Notice 
1. Construction and application. 
Supervisors may, subject to highway commission approval, determine 
whether anticipatory certificates should be issued. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
Statutes regarding publication of notice must be strictly construed. 
O.A.G. 1934, p. 365. 
This section refers only to creating original indebtedness and not to 
funding or refunding bonds. O.A.G. 1g30, p. 372. 
County road bonds may be refunded at any time at lower interest without 
giving statutory notice. O.A.G. 1930, p. 353. 
2. Jurisdiction of Appeal Board. 
Jurisdiction where cost of improvement by municipality to be paid for in 
whole or in part by use of taxable funds or issuance of bonds payable from 
taxation. O.A.G. June 26, 1963. 
3. Borrowing money. 
Contract by city to pay one who has assumed debt of city not a "borrowing 
of money." Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 221, 1 Wall. 221, 17 L. Ed. 
519 (1863). 
4. Petition. 
Petition by city electors for special election on question of issuance of 
flood protection improvement bonds could not constitute a petition of 
taxpayers for hearing before the State Appeal Board. Kochen v. Young, 252 
Iowa 389, 107 N.W.2d 81 (1961). 
23.13 Objections 
1. Construction and a lication. 
upervisors may, su ect to highway commission approval, determine 
whether anticipatory certificates should be issued. O.A.G. 1g3a, p. 838. 
Withdrawal of signatures of objectors does not affect status of appeal 
after appeal is perfected. O.A.G. 1g25, 1926, p. 485. 
2. Jurisdiction of Appeal Board. 
Jurisdiction of appeals where cost of improvement initiated by 
municipality to be paid for in whole or in part by use of taxable funds or 
issuance of bonds payable from taxation. O.A.G. June 26, 1g63. 
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No jurisdiction of either appeals involving improvements or bonds payable I 
out of special assessment. Id. 
23.14 Notice of Hearing 
1. Construction and application. 
Supervisors may, subject to highway commission approval, determine 
whether anticipatory certificates should be issued. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
23.15 Decision 
1. Construction and application. 
Supervisors may, subject to highway commission approval, determine 
whether anticipatory certificates should be issued. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
23.16 Bonds and Taxes Void 
1. Construction and application. 
Purpose of law is to secure economy and fair prices for construction work 
paid out of public funds. Carlson v. City of Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 236 
N.W. 421 (1931). 
23.17 Unpaid Revenue Bonds - Effect 
1. Construction and application. 
Intent of this section permitting municipality to issue revenue bonds was 
to permit issuance of revenue bonds notwithstanding existence of other 
unmatured revenue bonds. Douglass v. Iowa City, 218 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1974). 
23.18 Bids Required - Procedure 
1. In general. 
Public competitive-bids are not required for a contract between an area 
solid waste disposal unit organized pursuant to section 455B.76 and a 
contractor where the contract will not involve the expenditure of public 
funds. O.A.G. October 23, 1978. 
Not necessary to submit to voters question of whether courthouse should 
be remodeled when estimated probable cost does not exceed $50,000 and funds 
are available. O.A.G. September 19, 1973. 
Chapter 23 does not require contracts for work on public improvement 
exceeding $5,000. O.A.G. May 1, 1973. 
Use of "design-build" method of obtaining bids for schools is not 
prohibited. O.A.G. Novemeber 7, 1972. 
Gift of money for construction, received in the schoolhouse fund, must be 
treated as public money. O.A.G. November 4, 1971. 
Municipality has authority to include code of fair practices in its 
contract specifications. O.A.G. September 2, 1971. 
Requirements of this section as to bid security are not available for 
contracting procedures under chapter 397, relating to contracting procedures 
for utility projects. O.A.G. November 24, 1965. 
State Fair Board is a municipality - board need not hold hearings or let 
bids for certain improvements. O.A.G. October 12, 1965. 
2. Insurance. 
Governmental subdivisions not required to let bids for fire and casuality 
insurance, although it may be recognized as good business practice to do so. 
O.A.G. July 11, 1973. 
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23.21 
·3. County plat book system. 
Reconstruction of a county plat book system not a public improvement 
within chapter 23. O.A.G. December 6, 1974. 
4. Actuarial services. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
23.19 Sale of Municipal Bonds Without Hearing or Contract (No Annotations) I 23.20 Bid Bonds (No Annotations) 
23.21 Bid Preference Under Certain Conditions (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 25 
a.AIMS AGAINST THE STATE AND BY THE STATE. 
25.1 Receipt, Investigation, and Report 
1. Construction and application. 
Tort Claims Act providing for the filing, passing upon and paying claims 
against State on account of damages to or loss of property or for personal 
injury or death by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any State employee 
acting within scope of his employment waives State's immunity as to class of 
claims for which it provides redress, but has no application to action for 
breach of contract. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1g68). 
Statute relating to operation of motor vehicle while intoxicated did not 
contain an appropriation whereby claims of private treatment centers could be 
paid by the state. O.A.G. September 21, 1966. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
25.2 Examination of Report - Approval or Rejection - Payment 
1. Construction and application. 
Where state appeal board approves claims for refund of monies illegally 
exacted as motor vehicle registration fees, this section provides for the 
payment of such claims from the road use tax fund. O.A.G. April 4, 1967. 
State appeal board's authorization to approve claims for refunds does not 
include authority to approve payment of interest thereon. O.A.G. July 22, 
1969. 
2. Intergovernmental Claims. 
U.S. department of labor procedures to recover from State Department of 
Public Safety. O.A.G. September 29, 1969. 
3. Tort claims. 
Tort Claims Act providing for the filing, passing upon and paying claims 
against State on account of damages to or loss of property or for personal 
injury or death by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any State employee 
acting within scope of his employment waives State's immunity as to class of 
claims for which it provides redress, but has no application to action for 
breach of contract. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Tort claims filed under the provisions of ch. 25A, as amended, may not be 
paid from the primary road fund nor any allocation thereof. O.A.G. March 2, 
1970. 
Claims for highway construction included in the enumeration in this 
section, and which had been approved by the state appeal board may be paid 
from the primary road fund if such claims are otherwise legally payable. Id. 
If the claim relates to support of the highway commission for engineering 
and administration of highway work or maintenance of the primary road system, 
it is authorized by this section, and is otherwise legally payable, that part 
of the primary road fund allocated by the general assembly to be spent by the 
highway commission for support, engineering, and administration of highway 
work, and maintenance of the primary road system is available for the payment 
of such claims, provided, however, such allocation has not reverted. Id. 
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25.3 Filing with General Assembly - Testimony 
1. Construction and application. 
Tort Claims Act providing for the filing, passing upon and paying claims 
against State on account of damages to or loss of property or for personal 
injury or death by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any State employee 
acting within scope of his employment waives State's immunity as to class of 
claims for which it provides redress, but has no application to action for 
breach of contract. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Provisions of this section with respect to time of filing of report of 
Appeal Board is directory and not mandatory. O.A.G. February 1, 1955. 
25.4 Assistant Attorney General - Salary (No Annotations) 
25.5 Testimony - Filing with Board (No Annotations) 
25.6 Claims by State Against Municipalities (No Annotations) 
25.7 Claims Refused - Effect 
1. In genera 1. 
Tort Claims Act providing for the filing, passing upon and paying claims 
against State on account of damages to or loss of property or for personal 
injury or death by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any State employee 
acting within scope of his employment waives State's immunity as to class of 
claims for which it provides redress, but has no application to action for 
breach of contract. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
25.8 limitation on Claims to be Considered 
Consideration and allowance of claims. O.A.G. February 1, 1955. 
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CHAPTER 25A 
STATE TORT Q.AIMS ACT 
25A.l Citation and Applicability 
1. Validity. 
Denial of plaintiff's right to bring action against state for breach of 
contract did not deprive plaintiff of any right protected by federal 
constitution. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Iowa Tort Claims Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative 
power. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
2. Construction and agplication. 
Tort Claims Act a rogates sovereign immunity for tort claims against 
state with certain exceptions. Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank and Trust Company, 
340 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1983). 
Since Iowa Tort Claims Act is based on Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
Supreme Court assumes that legislature intended Iowa act to have same meaning 
as federal statute. Id. 
Federal decisions interpreting Federal Tort Claims Act are entitled to 
great weight when interpreting Iowa Tort Claims Act. Id. 
Under this act, state may be sued in tort only in manner and to extent to 
which legislature has given consent. Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 
1980). 
Procedures prescribed in State Tort Claims Act must be exhausted before 
state court has jurisdiction over claim against state and its agencies. Jontz 
v. Mahedy, 293 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1980). 
Same exhaustion requirement applies where private suit is sought against 
state employee. Id. 
Federal interpretations of phrase, which is in Federal Tort Claims Act 
and which consists of the words "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an 
employee, may be utilized in interpreting the same phrase in State Tort Claims 
Act. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
By enacting legislation governing tort liability of governmental 
subdivisions, legislature impliedly repealed previous statute requiring filing 
of notice of unliquidated claims against county. Dan Dugan Transport Co. v. 
Worth County, 243 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 1976). 
Breach of contract action against the state would not lie in absence of 
state's consent. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Iowa Tort Claims Act does not create a new cause of action, but gives 
recognition to and a remedy for a cause of action already existing. Graham v. 
Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
Member of board of architectural services while performing services for 
state fell within the purview of this chapter. O.A.G. August 30, 1976. 
3. Purpose of act. 
Tort Claims Act does not create a new cause of action but simply provides 
jurisdictional foothold for pursuing rights or causes already existing. 
Seiber v. State, 211 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1973). 
Iowa Tort Claims Act disclosed no intent on General Assembly's part to 
waive existing governmental immunities of those entities or subordinate units 
of the state commonly classified as political subdivisions. Graham v. 
Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
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25A.1 
4. Operational effect. 
Supreme Court would not overrule cases concerning common law governmental 
immunity. Barrad v. Jefferson County, 178 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1970). 
5. Federal tort claims. 
State court interpreting this chapter is guided by interpretation given 
by federal courts to identical statutory language in Federal Tort Claims 
Act. Saxton v. State, 206 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1973). 
6. Respondeat superior. 
Under Iowa Tort Claims Act, the rule of respondeat superior becomes 
applicable. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
7. Access to state property. 
It is an administrative decision of the state agency involved, to allow 
or deny access by the public, across the property occupied by that agency, and 
state could be liable to a· licensee for injuries. O.A.G. July 26, 1972. 
Provision of standard form of license that the state of Iowa, has 
licensee, shall hold the United States harmless from any and all claims 
arising out of activities of the state on leased property conducted 
exclusively for the benefit of the state denied the power of the state to 
assume obligations of the United States and violates const. art. 7, ~ 1. 
0.A.G. June 19, 1967. 
8. Actions against public employees. 
Volunteers performing services for area agencies which receive federal or 
state funds from the Commission on Aging are not state employees for purposes 
of this act. O.A.G. February 28, 1978. 
9. Injunctions. 
This act does not abrogate the right, under proper circumstances, to 
injunctive relief against state highway commission. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969). 
10. Appropriations. 
Tort claims were not "debts contracted" as that term was used in the 
constitution, and are therefore not unconstitutional. Graham v. Worthington, 
259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
11. Disbursement of funds. 
Disbursement of funds under Iowa Tort Claims Act for torts committed 
prior to effective date of the Act would not constitute payment of money the 
subject matter of which was not provided for by any previously enacted law 
which would be in violation of canst. art.3, ~ 31. Graham v. Worthington, 259 
Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
12. Review. 
Review by Court of Appeals under Tort Claims Act is not de novo but is on 
errors of law assigned, in light most favorable to trial court's findings. 
Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
Supreme Court's review of judgment upholding Iowa Tort Claims Act in its 
entirety and denying injunctive relief would be de novo. Graham v. 
Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
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13. Jurisdiction. I 
If one of enumerated exceptions to state liablity set out in Tort Claims 
Act applies, a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of the claim 
and it must be dismissed. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
14. Amendment 
Amendment requ1r1ng tort claims against state employees be presented to 
state appeal board prior to court action. Jones v. Bowers, 256 N.W.2d 233 
(Iowa 1977). 
15. NegliSence in general. 
Muste causal connection between ne9ligence and plaintiffs' injuries. 
Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
16. Alcoholic beverages. 
Recovery not precluded in action based on state's negligence in design 
and construction of highway. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
17. Prisoners, injuries to. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
25A.2 Definitions 
1. Construction and ap§lication. 
Alleged willful an wanton conduct on part of defendant magistrate did 
not fall within provisions of the State Tort Claims Act. Jontz v. Mahedy, 293 
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1980). 
Duty of state to indemnify its employee does not extend to actions based 
on willful and wanton conduct. Id. 
Federal interpretations of phrase which is within the Federal Tort Claims 
Act and which consists of the words "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of 
an employee, may be utilized in interpreting the same phrase in State Tort 
Claims Act. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
Final construction and interpretation of Iowa statutory law is for Iowa 
Supreme Court. Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1969). 
2. Employees of the state. 
Nati ona 1 guard pilot of nat i ona 1 guard p 1 ane was "emp 1 oyee of state." 
Morrison v. State, 179 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1970). 
Individual members of the Air Quality Commission protected from personal 
liability. O.A.G. September 29, 1976. 
Member of board of architectural services while performing services for 
state, upon request of state, with or without compensation, falls within 
purview of section 25A.1 et seq. O.A.G. August 30, 1976. 
One who performs services for the State, upon request of the State, 
without compensation, may fall within the purview of this chapter for purposes 
of employee defenses and indemnification. O.A.G. July 27, 1976. 
Paid and volunteer workers fall within the provisions of the Iowa Tort 
Claims Act. O.A.G. September 22, 1965. 
Residents and fellow physicians and dentists of the University Hospitals 
and interns and residents of the College of Veterinary Medicine are employees 
of the state and generally covered by the provisions of this chapter. O.A.G. 
June 23, 1977. 
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25A.3 
3. Claim. 
Claims resulting from negligent investigation by Department of Criminal 
Investigation agents is not a tort under Iowa Tort Claims Act. Smith v. 
State, 324 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1982). 
General rule that possessor of property is not obligated to eliminate 
known and obvious dangers does not apply to city to keep its thoroughfares and 
public places safe for public use. Such rule likewise does not negate State's 
obligation to maintain primary roads. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 
1976). . . 
Accumulated water in "frost heave" - state's negligence in failing to 
eliminate hazard after a notice thereof. Id. 
Tort Claims Act has no application to action for breach of contract. 
Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Iowa Tort Claims Act makes no distinction between employee driving a 
state-owned vehicle or a private vehicle but only requires that the claim 
arise while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. O.A.G. 
May 17 , 1965 • 
4, State agency. 
This act does not abrogate the right, under proper circumstances, to 
injunctive relief against State Highway Commission. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969). 
Political subdivisions of state such as cities and counties were neither 
agencies of the state nor corporations as those terms were employed and 
defined in Iowa Tort Claims Act, and such were not included within its clear 
intent and purpose. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 
(1966). 
25A.3 Adjustment and Settlement of Claims 
1. In general. 
Amendment of chapter 25A effective July 1, 1975, requiring claims against 
state employees to be presented to state appeal board prior to court will be 
retroactively applied to bar motorist seeking contribution against state 
troopers for injuries in auto accident on September 28, 1973. Jones v. 
Bowers, 256 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 1977). 
Negligence of state in maintaining drop-off between edge of pavement and 
shoulder without adequate warning of such condition. Stanley v. State, 197 
N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1972). 
2. Claims. 
Tort Claims Act has no application to action for breach of contract. 
Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
3. Exhaustion of remedies. 
Action by landowner against Iowa State Highway Commission for damages for 
commissions alleged tortious interference with landowners contract to sell 
adjoining tract of land, said to have occurred because of commission's refusal 
to grant access to frontage road, could be brought only under Tort Claims Act 
after administrative remedies had been exhausted. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
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25A.4 District Court to Hold Hearings 
1. In Tener a 1. 
Ru es defining commencement of suit and identification of person to be 
served. Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1980). 
Tort Claims Act has no application to action for breach of contract. 
Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
Under Iowa Tort Claims Act, rule of respondeat superior becomes 
applicable. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
2. Exhaustion of remedies. 
State Appeal Board has "primary" or "exclusive" jurisdiction of tort 
claims against state. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies may properly be invoked where tort 
claimants against state do not "in the first instance" submit their claims to 
the board for consideration and disposition. Id. 
Action by landowner against Iowa State Highway Commission for damages for 
commissions alleged tortious interference with landowner's contract to sell 
adjoining tract of land. Id. 
3. Negligence. 
Posting of "bump" sign in vicinity of frost heave in highway did not 
excuse state from performing its duty to repair such defect. Ehlinger v. 
State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
Duty of governmental body to maintain streets or highways includes duty 
to repair. Id. 
General rule that possessor of property is not obligated to eliminate 
known and obvious dangers does not apply to city's mandatory duty to keep its 
thoroughfares and public places safe for public use they were designed to 
serve. Id. 
Such rule likewise does not negate state's obligation to maintain primary 
roads. Id. 
Failure to warn of impaired highway conditions where repair site marked 
only by saw horse 10 feet from construction area. Weisbrod v. State, 193 
N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1971). 
4. Damages. 
Personal injury action by automobile passenger paralyzed from chest down 
as result of highway accident. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
Shortened life expectancy used to reduce damages. Id. 
Sick and infirm person entitled to increased damages which are natural 
and proximate result of wrongful act. McBroon v. State, 226 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 
1975). 
4.5. Punitive damages. 
"Subject matter" within section 25A.8 providing that final judgment there 
under shall be complete bar to any action by claimant against a state employee 
by reason of the same subject matter includes action for punitive damages. 
Speed v. Beurle, 251 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1977). 
5. Evidence. 
Hospital breached obligation to obtain patient's informed consent. 
Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
On appeal from award of damages to plaintiff in tort action against 
State, Supreme Court would view evidence in light most favorable to judgment 
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25A.5 
and construe trials court's findings liberally in order to support result 
reached. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
Evidence supported trial court's finding, in action by automobile 
passenger or damages sustained when vehicle left road after encountering water 
which had accumulated in "frost heave" that State was negligent in failing to 
eliminate hazard after notice thereof. Id. 
Traumatic effect of loss of hand by prisoner. McBroon v. State, 226 
N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1975). 
6. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Faced with trial court's adverse holding in action under the Tort Claims 
Act, plaintiff must demonstrate state's negligence as a matter of law if he is 
to prevail. Barnard v. State, 265 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1978). 
Evidence in automobile passenger's action against state for damages for 
injuries sustained when automobile left highway after encountering water which 
had accummulated in "frost heave" supported finding that state did not carry 
its burden of proof on issue of passengers contributory negligence. Ehlinger 
v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
7. Findings. 
Action against state to recover for personal injuries, tried to court 
under tort claims act. Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1972). 
8. Review. 
Review by court of appeals under tort claims act is not de novo but is on 
errors of law assigned. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
Supreme Court's standard of review of trial courts noninjuring case under 
tort claims act was assigned errors at law. Wernimont v. State, 312 N.W.2d 
568 (Iowa 1981). 
Under proper circumstances, punitive damages are allowable against 
governmental subdivision in tort actions. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978). 
Determination that plaintiff sufficiently answered state's written 
interrogatories was not reversible error. McBroon v. State, 226 N.W.2d 41 
(Iowa 1975). 
On appeal from denial of claim under Iowa Tort Claims Act, review of 
supreme court is not de novo but is only on errors assigned. DeYarman v. 
State, 226 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1975). 
Alleged negligence in construction and maintenance of shoulder abutting 
highway. Id. 
In claim under Iowa Tort Claims Act, trial court's findings of fact are 
binding on Supreme Court if supported by substantial evi cience. Id. 
'.!% 
9. A lcoho 1 i c beverages. '\"; 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
25A.5 When Suit Pennitted 
1. In general. ,. . -~. 
District court had subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to 
withdraw claim before state appeal board because their complaint substantially 
complied with withdrawal requirements. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1982). 
State of Illinois was not a "person" for 14th Amendment suit seeking a 
bar of negligence against it in an Iowa court. Struebin v. State, 322 N.W.2d 
84 (Iowa 1982). 
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Amendment of chapter 25A requires that tort claims against state 
employees be presented to State Appeal Board prior to court action. Jones v. 
Bowers, 256 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 1977). 
Tortious or wrongful interference with contractual relations is 
actionable under Iowa law. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
Landowner could not recover damages from state highway commission because 
of its alleged interference with contractual relations by failing to grant 
access to frontage road. Id. 
Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies may properly be invoked where tort 
claimants against state do not "in the first instance" submit their claims to 
board for consideration and disposition. Id. 
Suit may not be brought under Iowa Tort Claims Act until the 
administrative remedy is exhausted. Weisbrod v. State, 193 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 
1971). 
Tort Claims Act has no application to action for breach of contract. 
Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
25A.6 Applicable Rules 
1. In general. 
Tort claims not "debts contracted" as that term was used in the 
constitution. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
2. Petition. 
Petition alleging false and unlawful arrest and detention of minor by 
town's police officer. Strong v. Town of Lansing, 179 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1970). 
25A.7 Appeal 
1. Construction and application. 
On appeal from denial of claim under Iowa Tort Claims Act, review of 
Supreme Court is not de novo but is only on errors assigned. OeYarman v. 
State, 226 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1975). 
In claim under Iowa Tort Claims Act, trial courts findings of fact are 
binding on supreme court if supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
25A.8 Judgment as Bar 
1. In general. 
"Subject matter" within section 25A.8 providing that final judgment 
thereunder shall be complete bar to any action by claimant against state 
employee by reason of the same subject matter includes action for punitive 
damages. Speed v. Beurle, 251 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1977). 
25A.9 Compranise and Settlement (No Annotations) 
25A.10 Award Conclusive on State (No Annotations) 
25A.11 Payment of Award 
1. Construction and application. 
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Tort claims filed under the provisions of this chapter, as amended, may 
not be paid from the primary road fund nor any allocation thereof. O.A.G. I 
March 2, 1970. 
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2. Amount. 
. Damage award not clearly insufficient. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 
(Iowa 1976). 
Reasonableness. Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1972). 
3. Future costs. 
Warranted allowance. Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1972). 
4. Evidence. 
Personal injury action by automobile passenger. Ehlinger v. State, 237 
N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
25A.12 Report by Comptroller (No Annotations) 
25A.13 Limitation of Actions 
1. In general. 
Ident1f1cation of person to be served - commencement of suit. ·Hansen v. 
State, 298 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1980). 
Landowner could not recover damages from state highway commission because 
of its alleged interference with contractual relations by failing to grant 
access to frontage road where before instituting its court action against 
commission, landowner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Charles 
Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
25A.14 Exceptions 
1. Construction and application. 
Department of Transportation design and placement of freeway guardrail 
and decisions over the years not to update were made at operational level and 
judged according to state's duty to use care in making freeway reasonably 
safe. Butler v. State, 336 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1983). 
Statutory provisions for disability pension and death benefits for 
specified peace officers serve the same purpose of workers compensation and 
are exclusive of the right to sue employer. Goebel v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
267 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1978). 
If one of enumerated exceptions to state liabilities set out in Tort 
Claims Act applies, a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of the 
claim and it must be dismissed. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). 
Tort Claims Act is not a waiver of sovereign immunity in all instances 
and state or its agency is subject to suit only in manner and to extent to 
which consent has been given. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1977). 
Tort Claims Act does not create a new cause of action but simply provides 
jurisdictional foothold for pursuing rights or causes already existing. 
Seiber v. State, 211 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1973). 
In enacting State Tort Claims Act provision exempting state from 
liability in certain cases. Use of "abuse or process" was clerical error 
which would be reformed to read "abuse of process" and state could not be held 
liable for tortious conduct of its agents in attempting wrongful eviction. 
Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 207 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1973). 
Claim arising out of "deceit." Saxton v. State, 206 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 
1973). . 
Though decision to keep highway open during construction was a 
discretionary one for which no liability would attach, negligence in carrying 
out that policy could not be excused on grounds that the negligent acts were 
performed in the exercise of discretion within the meaning of exemption in the 
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Tort Claims Act; in particular, negligence in creating and maintaining a 
dropoff of ten to twelve inches between edge of new pavement and shoulder and 
in failing to give adequate warning of such condition was not within such 
exemption. Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1972). 
Legislature has not made actionable a claim against state resulting from 
statements or representations which allegedly induced persons to act to their 
detriment. Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1969). 
In view of fact that State Tort Claims Act, and particularly this 
section, does not preclude a suit against the individual, even though the acts 
complained of may have .been performed in the line of duty, insurance coverage 
may be obtained. O.A.G. Nov. 28, 1969. 
2. Appropriations. 
Tort claims were not "debts contracted" as that term was used in the 
Constitution. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (1966). 
3. Discretionary function. 
Statutory exception to Tort Claims Act, including discretionary function 
exception, are jurisdictional defenses. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 
1977). 
Evidence supported trial court's finding, in action by automobile 
passenger for damages sustained when vehicle left road after encountering 
water which had accumulated in "frost heave" that state was negligent in 
failing to eliminate hazard after notice thereof. Ehlinger v. State, 237 
N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
Policy determination of highway commission not to post "deer crossing" 
signs along highways of state and particularly at point in highway where 
decedent's automobile collided with deer involved the exercise of discretion 
at the planning stage and came within exception of this section of tort claims 
act. Seiber v. State, 211 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1973). 
4. Malicious prosecution. 
Vander Linden v. Crews, 231 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1975). 
5. Highways. 
Provision of this section that "the provisions of this chapter shall not 
apply to .•. any claim based upon ..• the exercise of performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ••• " was not preclusive 
of plaintiffs' right to recover against state on theory that automobile 
collision arose from state's negligence, in light of fact that the negligence 
claims did not focus on decision to build highway, but on alleged negligence 
of state in implementing that decision. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 
1977). 
6. Summary judgment. 
State's motion for summary judgment based on assertions that plaintiff's 
specifications of negligence in regard to highway were barred by discretionary 
function exception to state liability. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 
1977). 
Entry of summary judgment for state in Tort Claims Act action, on jurisdictional ground of discretionary function exception, was improper, 
appropriate disposition being dismissal. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 
1977). 
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7. Inmates. 
If prisoner's heart attack resulted from prison work, survivors are 
entitled to workmans compensation for injuries or death because of improper 
care after attack but would not be titled to seek relief in tort. Heumphreus 
v. State, 334 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1983). 
If prisoner's heart attack did not result from prison work, but would 
have occurred anyway, survivors not entitled to workmans compensation, but 
entitled to try to establish tort liability for death resulting from alleged 
negligent care of prisoner. Id. 
8. Dismissal. 
If state is covered by one of statutory exceptions under Tort Claims Act, 
trial court must dismiss the action. Butler v. State, 336 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 
1983). 
9. Misrepresentation. 
Misrepresentation exception in Iowa Tort Claims Act did not bar action 
against state by farmers who alleged sustained damages in lost grain when 
company went bankrupt and they sustained damages as result of breach of 
statutory duties of licensing, inspection, bonding and general regulation of 
grain company by state commerce commission and who did not base action on 
conTTiunication of misinformation by commission. Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank and 
Trust Company, 340 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1983). 
10. Any claim based on enforcement of chapter 4550. {No Annotations) 
25A.15 Attorney's Fees and Expenses 
1. Construction and application. 
Iowa legislature could not control federal court by directing hearing be 
held upon matter of attorney fees. State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, 
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (1968). 
25A.16 Remedies Exclusive 
1. Construction and ae~lication. 
Procedures prescr1 ed in State Tort Claims Act must be exhausted before 
state court has jurisdiction over claim against state and its agencies. Jontz 
v. Mahedy, 293 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1980). 
Same exhaustion requirement applies where private suit sought against 
state employee. Id. 
Alleged willful and wanton conduct did not fall within provisions of 
State Tort Claims Act. Id. 
Actions under State Tort Claims Act must be brought against state, not 
agency or officer alleged to have been guilty of wrongful conduct. Jones v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 207 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1973). 
This act does not abrogate the right, under proper circumstances, to 
injunctive relief against state highway commission. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969). 
25A.17 Adjustment of Other Claims (No Annotations) 
25A.18 Extension of Time (No Annotations) 
25A.19 Claims Before Appeal Board (No Annotations) 
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25A.20 Liability Insurance 
1. In general. 
25A.23 
Additional insurance charges are not reimbursable expense for those state 
employees who use their private automobiles on state business. O.A.G. May 17, 
1965. 
25A.21 Employees Defended and Indemnified 
1. In general. 
Alleged willful and wanton conduct did not fall within prov1s1ons of 
State Tort Claims Act. Jontz v. Mahedy, 293 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1980). 
Duty to indemnify does not extend to actions based on willful and wanton 
conduct. Id. 
Members of soybean promotion board and beef cattle association are not 
state employees covered by this chapter. O.A.G. March 17, 1980. 
An employee of the Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Department is afforded 
liability protection. O.A.G. Feb. 8, 1978. 
The phrase "tort claim or demand" in this section encompasses every type 
of action for damages, including those which are statutory in origin, other 
than actions for breach of contract. O.A.G. Dec. 29, 1976. 
This section to be broadly construed to achieve goal of protecting state 
employees from liability while in performance of their duties. Id. 
25A.22 Actions in Federal Court 
1. In general. 
Eleventh amendment claim could not be decided on motion to dismiss in 
civil rights complaint that defendent state official acted willingly and 
wantonly. Health Care Equalization Committee of Iowa Chiropractic Soc. v. 
Iowa Medical Soc., 501 F. Supp. 970 (O.C. 1980). 
This section to be broadly construed to achieve goal of protecting state 
employees from liability while in performance of their duties. O.A.G. Dec. 
29' 1976. 
25A.23 E""loyee Liability (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 28E 
JOINT EXERCISE CF GOVERNM:NTAL POWERS 
28E .1 Purpose 
1. Validity. 
Legal creation of a new body corporate and politic to jointly exercise 
and perfonn powers and responsibilities of cooperating governmental unit would 
not be unconstitutional so long as the new body politic is doing only what its 
cooperating members already have power to do. Goreham v. Des Moines 
Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 17g N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970). 
2. In general. 
Pursuant to~ 613A.2, agency or board established pursuant to Chapter 28E 
may be held liable for its torts and those of its officers, employees and 
agents acting within the scope of their employment. O.A.G. March 13, 1980. 
Pursuant to Chapter 28E agreement between Kossuth County and several 
cities in Kossuth County, money which is reimbursed to Kossuth County 
Secondary Road Fund by the cities is a portion of the Kossuth County 
engineer's total salary set by the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors, not in 
addition thereto. O.A.G. April 17, 1979. 
Any overpayment to the county engineer could be legalized by the 
legislature. Id. 
Governing board operating under Chapter 28E is generally required to 
comply with the open meeting law of this state. O.A.G. Nov. 27, 1978. 
Legislature may delegate to a properly-created entity the authority to 
exercise legislative power. Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid 
Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970). 
This chapter authorizes cities and towns to do jointly what they are 
empowered to do individually, whether it be construed to be a proprietary 
enterprise or a governmental function. O.A.G. March 16, 1967. 
This chapter is not invocable where other statutes expressly provide for 
cooperation on specific projects. O.A.G. Jan. 18, 1966. 
3. Assessors offices. 
Offices of city assessor and county assessor may be combined by 
appropriate ordinance. O.A.G. Sept. 30, 1971. 
4. Planning. 
Public monies controlled by regional planning commission need not be 
placed in public depositories. O.A.G. Nov. 18, 1974. 
County regional planning commission formed under Chapter 473A may join 
a multi-county regional planning commission under Chapter 28E. O.A.G. July 
30, 1973. 
5. Sewage and waste. 
Members of board of directors of county area solid waste agency protected 
under provisions of Chapter 613A. O.A.G. Dec. 11, 1975. 
Contracts between sanitary sewer districts are permissible under Chapter 
28E. O.A.G. July 25, 1974. 
County can contribute money to fund a legal entity created under ~ 28E.1 
et. seq. for a governmental purpose authorized by law without holding an 
election; limitation of ~ 345.1 does not apply to a P.ublic facility owned by 
an entity other than the county; no statutory authority for a council of. 
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government created under § 28E.1 et. seq. to hold an election to authorize the 
expenditure of funds for a solid waste disposal facility. 0.A.G. Feb. 19, 
1974. 
Joint agreement establishing sanitary disposal system authorized by§ 
28E.1 et. seq. O.A.G. Feb. 3, 1971. 
6. Road and street improvements. 
Section 309.68, Code 1966, relating to intercounty highways does not 
authorize the construction of a road entirely within one county, and there 
appears to be no other express provision for the joint cooperation of 
adjoining counties under§ 28E.1 et. seq., Code 1966, in the construction and 
maintenance of such a roaa. O.A.G. May 6, 1969. 
A city which controls its own bridge funds and a county may enter into an 
agreement under this chapter to construct a bridge and approaches under 
certain circumstances. O.A.G. Sept. 18, 1967. 
This chapter authorizes city and county to improve a road which is on the 
boundary of the city and the county, and which is one-half in the city and 
one-half in the county. O.A.G. Sept. 22, 1966. 
7. Parking. 
Joint agreement may be entered into by city and county to provide off-
street parking on courthouse grounds. O.A.G. June 15, 1970. 
City and county may enter into joint venture to establish off-street 
parking. O.A.G. June 29, 1966. 
8. Jails. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Flood control. 
No express powers of municipal corporations to cooperate with or defer to 
the natural resources council in flood control projects. O.A.G. Jan. 18, 
1966. 
10. Housing. 
Agreement creating Southern Iowa Regional Housing Authority complies with 
the applicable statutory provisions. O.A.G. Oct. 14, 1974. 
Two or more municipalities may join together or cooperate by agreement in 
a low-rent housing project. O.A.G. Oct. 17, 1972. 
11. Police and fire protection. 
Public agencies may create law enforcement communications commissions 
without approval of the Department of Public Safety. O.A.G. July 27, 1976. 
Township trustees may divide the annual tax levee it receives for fire 
protection in order to pay the benefited fire districts and cities providing 
fire protection to the township under a section 28E.4 agreement. O.A.G. May 
25, 1976. 
Counties lack authority to contribute revenue sharing funds to local fire 
fighting agencies, but "public agencies" may enter contracts for the joint 
performance of governmental services of mutual benefit under Chapter 28E. 
O.A.G. Sept. 18, 1974. 
Authority of police officers may extend beyond the limits of the 
municipalities by which they are employed when they are temporarily assigned 
to duty in another municipality. O.A.G. April 28, 1972. 
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28E.1 
12. Recreation and entertainment facilities. 
Where a city enters into a 28E agreement with another public agency for 
the construction and administration of a theater, auditorium and the like, it 
may contribute funds for the facility. O.A.G. Feb. 9, 1976. 
State Conservation Commission may contract with a county conservation 
board to pay from the conservation fund a portion of the cost of developing 
snowmobile trails. O.A.G. Nov. 19, 1974. 
County conservation boards may participate with a town or other local 
unit of government in the establishment of a recreational area upon land in 
which either has sufficient interest to establish such a project. O.A.G. July 
30, 1974. 
County may agree to work jointly with a private agency or expend funds as 
authorized by section 332.3 to obtain services of such private agency in 
developing a plan for implementing recommendations for health, recreation and 
social needs and services. O.A.G. Nov. 14, 1973. 
School board and city council had authority to enter into lease from 
school district to city for land to be used as playground or recreation 
center. O.A.G. Sept. 17, 1968 (No. 68-9-8). 
13. Health and education. 
School district may contract with county and state highway commission to 
pay a portion of the cost of installation and energy for light fixtures placed 
at the entrance to its school property. O.A.G. April 27, 1971. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
14. Hospitals. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
15. Private agencies. 
Public funds may not be spent to support voluntary programs provided by 
nonprofit private agencies; however, the services provided by such agencies 
may be obtained under agreements where joint exercise of governmental power is 
warranted. O.A.G. Sept. 1, 1976. 
County board of supervisors may enter into agreement with private agency 
for construction and maintenance of secondary road under jurisdiction of 
county board. O.A.G. June 4, 1971. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Agreements with foreign states. 
This chapter permits an Iowa Soil Conservation District to enter into an 
agreement with an agency of another state with like powers for the joint 
exercise of governmental powers granted to such agencies. O.A.G. April 3, 
1970. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Board members and employees. 
Intergovernmental agreement creating solid waste agency was not contrary 
to public policy because of conflict of interests to extent that it permitted 
elected officials of member municipalities to serve on governing board of such 
agency. Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 
N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970). 
The position of mayor and executive director of an intergovernmental 
agency, of which the mayor's municipality is a member, may be incompatible 
and, if so, the prior position is ipso facto vacated. O.A.G. April 28, 1976. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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18. Administrative powers. 
Administrative officials should be able to exercise their judgment free 
from objectionable pressure of conflicting interest. Goreham v. Des Moines 
Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1970). 
Public monies controlled by regional planning commissions do not have to 
be placed in public depositories. O.A.G. Nov. 18, 1974. 
Political subdivisions having the power to purchase motor vehicles may 
arrange with the state car dispatcher for the latter to purchase vehicles on 
their behalf. O.A.G. July 29, 1971. 
A joint planning commission, such as the Central Iowa Regional Planning 
Commission, may own and lease a public transit building, maintenance and 
equipment facilities to the Iowa Regional Transit Corporation. O.A.G. March 
17' 1971. 
Joint exercise of mutually possessed powers and exercise by one agency of 
the power of the other in accordance with contract. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
19. Eminent domain. 
Where implementing agreement between city and state highway commission 
concerning highway construction project within city specified that city should 
condemn property and take title in name of city and initial disbursement of 
funds for project was to come from city treasury, condemnation commission 
which assessed damages was properly constituted. Halweg v. City of Sioux 
City, 189 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1971). 
Section 28F.ll is not the exclusive authority for the grant of power of 
eminent domain to a Chapter 28E public agency and in many cases is not 
applicable. O.A.G. Dec. 9, 1974. 
20. Taxation and bonds. 
This chapter provides authority for the state and local governments to 
enter into agreements with one or more public or private agencies for joint or 
cooperative actions pursuant to its provisions, and this includes authority to 
allocate tax funds for implementing such plans or purpose. O.A.G. Nov. 14, 
1973. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
21. Federal funds. 
Municipalities have authority to receive and distribute federal funds 
pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition 
Policies Act of 1970. O.A.G. Oct. 14, 1971. 
Cities and towns may accept federal funds available under the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964. O.A.G. Feb. 18, 1966. 
28E.2 Definitions 
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1. In genera 1. . I 
Cities and towns may accept federal funds available under the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964. O.A.G. Feb. 18, 1966. 
2. Counties. I 
Chapter 520 does not permit counties to exchange reciprocal or 
interinsurance contracts; however, ch. 28E does authorize counties to form an 
indemnification pool from which claims against the counties entering the pool 
may be paid. O.A.G. August 12, 1977. 
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28E.3· Joint Exercise of Powers 
1. In general. 
The exercise of the official powers of a peace officer is limited to that 
geographical and political unit comprising his or her bailiwick,.unless 
expressly expanded by statute. O.A.G. July 3, 1979. 
Joint exercise of mutually possessed powers and exercise by one agency of 
the power of the other in accordance with contract. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.4 Agreement with Other Agencies 
1. In general. 
A county attorney under agreement in chapter 28E, may handle child 
support recovery for another county, but this agreement may not commit full 
time of county attorney to recovery duties. O.A.G., April 2, 1980. 
An entity created by this section may not create another entity under 
Chapters 28E or 403A. O.A.G. April 25, 1974. 
2. Private agencies. 
Public funds may not be spent to support voluntary programs provided by 
nonprofit private agencies; however, the services provided by such agencies 
may be obtained under agreements where joint exercise of governmental power is 
warranted. O.A.G. Sept. 1, 1976. 
3. Law enforcement. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.5 Specifications 
1. In general. 
Section 28F.11 is not the exclusive authority for the grant of power of 
eminent domain to a Chapter 28E public agency and in many cases is not 
applicable. O.A.G. Dec. 9, 1974. 
Section 309.68, relating to intercounty highways, does not authorize the 
construction of a road entirely within one county, and there appears to be no 
other express provision for the joint cooperation of adjoining counties under 
i 28E.1 et. seq. in the construction and maintenance of such a road. O.A.G. 
lilay 6, 1969. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
,28E.6 Additional Provisions 
1. In general. 
Joint exercise of mutually possessed powers and exercise by one agency of 
the power of the other in accordance with contract. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.7 Obligations not Excused 
1. In general. 
Public monies controlled by regional planning commissions do not have to 
be placed in public depositories. O.A.G. Nov. 18, 1974. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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28E.8 Filing and Recording 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.9 Status of Interstate Agreement 
1. In general. 
This chapter permits an Iowa Soil Conservation District to enter into an 
agreement with an agency of another state with like powers for the joint 
exercise of governmental powers granted to such agency, including the 
furnishing of financial or other aid. O.A.G. April 3, 1970. 
Regional Air Pollution Control Charter should be amended and approved by 
the State Air Pollution Control Commission before the local jurisdiction can 
sign such charter. O.A.G. Jan. 31, 1969 (No. 69-1-10). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.10 Approval of Statutory Officer 
1. In General. 
Pu lie agencies may create law enforcement communications commissions 
without the approval of the depa~tment of public safety. O.A.G. July 27, 
1976. 
Regional Air Pollution Control Charter should be amended and approved by 
the State Air Pollution Control Commission before the local jurisdiction can 
sign such charter. O.A.G. ·Jan. 31, 1969 (No. 69-1-10). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.ll Agency to Furnish Aid 
1. In genera 1. 
Where a city enters into a 28E agreement with another public agency for 
the construction and administration of a theater, auditorium and the like, it 
may contribute funds for the facility. O.A.G. Feb. 9, 1976. 
Assistant county attorney prevented from being employed as legal counsel 
by a public solid waste agency created under Chapter 28E, since Chapter 28E 
contemplates that the participating governmental units will provide legal 
service. O.A.G. May 22, 1973. 
Cities have authority to cooperate with community action councils and may 
spend funds available under section 404.10 (13), authorizing municipal 
enterprises, subject to certain conditions. O.A.G. April 26, 1966. 
28E.12 Contract with Other Agencies 
1. In Jeneral. 
Audicial district department of correctional services may not act as 
its own administrative agent. After designating a county as administrative 
agent, the district department may enter into an agreement with the county 
pursuant to sections 905.4 and 905.5 under which the department performs the 
functions of administrative agent. O.A.G., December 12, 1980. 
The county attorney under chapter 28E may handle child support recovery 
for another county but cannot commit full time support recovery duties. 
O.A.G., April 2, 1980. 
State Conservation Commission may contract with a County Conservation 
Board to pay from the conservation fund a portion of the cost of developing 
snowmobile trails. O.A.G. November 19, 1974. 
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28E.19 
County conservation boards may participate with a town or other local 
unit of government in the establishment of a recreational area upon land in 
which either has sufficient to establish such a project. O.A.G. July 30, 
1974. 
Contracts between sanitary sewer districts are permissable under ch. 
28E. O.A.G. July 25, 1974. 
School district may contract with the county and the state highway 
commission to pay a portion of the cost of installation and energy for light 
fixtures placed at the entrance to its school property. O.A.G. April 27, 
1971. 
Joint excercise of mutually possessed powers authorized as well as 
exercise by one agency of the power of the other in accordance with 
contract. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
This section provides sufficient authority for cities to contract with 
the state highway commission authorizing the latter to act as its agent under 
terms of proper agreement in order to acquire the right of way necessary to 
the relocation of streets and local service roads. Id. 
City and county may enter into agreement to construct a bridge and 
approaches under certain conditions. O.A.G. September 18, 1967. 
If this chapter authorizes city and county to improve a road which is on 
the boundary of the city and the county and which is one-half in the city and 
one-half in the county. O.A.G. September 22, 1966. 
28E.13. Powers are Additional to Others 
1. In general. 
Joint planning commission, such as central Iowa regional planning 
commission, may own and lease a public transit building, maintenance and 
equipment facilities to the Iowa regional transit corporation. O.A.G. March 
17. 1971. 
Section 28E.12 provides sufficient authority for cities to contract with 
the state highway commission authorizing the latter to act as its agent under 
terms of proper agreement in order to acquire the right of way necessary to 
the relocation of streets and local service roads. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
28E.14 No Limitation on Contract (No Annotations) 
28E.15 District Agency 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.16 Election for Bonds (No Annotations) 
28E.17 Transit Policy - Joint Agreement - City Debt 
1. In general. 
Cities can share use of municipal transit system through chapter 28E. 
O.A.G. March 28, 1980. I 28E.18 Shared Use of Facilities (No Annotations) 
28E.19 Joint County Indigent Defense Fund (No Annotations) 
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I 65 
I • -
28E.29 
UNIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT 
28E.21 Definition 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28E.22 Referendum for Tax (No Annotations) 
28E.23 Budget (No Annotations) 
28E.24 Revenue and Tax Levies (No Annotations) 
28E.25 Expansion of District (No Annotations) 
28E.26 City Civil Service and Retirement (No Annotations) 
I 
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28E.27 Duration of Agreements for Law Enforcement Purposes (No Annotations) I 
28E.28 Public Safety C011111ission (No Annotations) 
28E.29 Amana - Additional Law Enforcement (No Annotations) I 
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72.4 
CHAPTER 72 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
72.1 Contracts for Excess Expenditures - Exception for Coal 
1. Evasion of limitations. 
Limitation on maximum amount may not be circumvented by splitting 
contracts. O.A.G. 1928, p. 163. 
2. Securities. 
Where public body has outstanding securities up to the legal limit, they 
may not be refunded by sale of refunding securities, but may be done by 
exchange of refunding securities for those outstanding where holders will 
surrender them for the refunding securities. O.A.G. 1936, p. 10. 
3. No-dama~e provision. 
Notwit standing no-damage provision in a public construction contract, a 
delay may be so extreme as to be a kind not contemplated. Dickinson Co., Inc. 
v. Iowa State Dept. of Transp., 300 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1981). 
Where construction contract contained no damage provision and contractor 
showed delay was expected, and on basis of past dealings contractor did not 
anticipate a two year delay, but there was no evidence that two year delays 
were unknown or uncommon in highway construction, record was not sufficient to 
make jury question on contractor's claim that delay was not of kind 
contemplated by parties. Id. 
72.2 Executive Council ma,y Authorize Indebtedness 
1. Construction and application. 
Bil Is for demurrage charges should be sworn to endorsed by officer in 
charge of state institution, and passed on by board of control prior to 
payment. O.A.G. 1906, p. 70. 
72.3 Divulging Contents of Sealed Bids (No Annotations) 
72.4 Penalty (No Annotations) 
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73.6 
CHAPTER 73 
PREFERENCE FCR IOWI PRODUCTS AND LABCR 
73.1 Preference Authorized - Conditions 
1. Construction and application. 
Compliance by municipalities with the preference for Iowa products, 
produce, coal and labor statutorily required by ch. 73 not prevented. O.A.G. 
April 17, 1979. 
Preference to home over out-of-town concern not required. O.A.G. 1934, 
p. 371. 
Statute mandatory only where goods equal and available in Iowa at no 
extra cost. O.A.G. 1g34, p. 318. 
Statute does not require purchase of inferior goods. O.A.G. 1928, p. 
199. 
2. Federal grants. 
Use of federal grant must conform to its conditions. O.A.G. 1934, p. 
357. 
3. Contracts for public improvement. 
Section does not apply to contracts for public improvement. Keokuk Water 
Works Co. v. City of Keokuk, 224 Iowa 718, 277 N.W. 291 (1938). 
73.2 Advertisements for Bids - Fonn 
1. Construction and application. 
No bids required where equipment not adapted to use of Iowa coal. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 506. 
Ordinance restricting bids to local contractor invalid. O.A.G. 1934, -
371. 
Strict construction of section not required. O.A.G. 1928, p. 199. 
2. S~ecifications, sufficiency of. 
pec1f1cab ans ca 1 ling for trade name product "or equal" proper. Keokuk 
Water Works Co. v. City of Keokuk, 224 Iowa 718, 277 N.W. 291 (1938). 
73.3 Iowa labor (No Annotations) 
73.4 •Person" Defined (No Annotations) 
73.5 Violations (No Annotations) 
73.6 Iowa Coal 
1. Construction and application. 
The Iowa preference law was not applicable to the award of the 1982-83 
University of Iowa coal contract because use of Iowa coal would have 
materially increased the cost of coal. O.A.G., August 10, 1982. 
Purchasing board should consider efficiency in light of this chapter. 
O.A.G. 1940, p.330. 
Purchase of other than Iowa coal authorized where equipment so adapted. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 506. 
Where annual need exceeds $300, this section must be complied with. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 457. 
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73.11 
73.7 Bids and Contracts 
1. Construction and application. 
Language of this section requires a "good and sufficient" performance 
bond to support bids for coal contracts. O.A.G. July 7, 1975. · 
Purchasing board should consider efficiency in light of this chapter. 
O.A.G. 1940, p. 330. 
"Lowest responsible bidder" refers to bidder for Iowa coal. O.A.G. 1938 
p. 499. 
Transportation charges are part of cost in applying $300 test. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 457. 
73.8 Name of Producer and Mine (No Annotations) 
73.9 Violations - Remedy (No Annotations) 
73.10 Exceptions (No Annotations) 
73.11 Inconsistency with Federal Law (No Annotations) 
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111.9 
CHAPTER 111 
CONSERVATION AND PUBLIC PARKS 
111.3 Duties as to Parks 
1/2. Validity 
Vesting state conservation commission with power to select sites for and 
establish state parks does not constitute improper "delegation of legislative 
power." Mathiasen v. State Conservation Commission, 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W.2d 
158 (1g55). 
1. Construction and application. 
Fact that state park project involved primarily construction of an 
artificial lake did not preclude condemnation of land for such project. 
Mathiasen v. State Conservation Commission, 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W.2d 158 
(1955). 
2. Establishment. 
Selection of proper sites for state parks within sound discretion of 
administrative bodies authorized by legislature. Mathiasen v. State 
Conservation Commission, 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W.2d 158 (1955). 
111.7 Eminent D<111ain 
1/2. Validity. 
Vesting state conservation commission with power to select sites for and 
establish state parks does not constitute improper "delegation of legislative 
power." Mathiasen v. State Conservation Commission, 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W.2d 
158 (1955). 
1. Construction and application. 
Selection of proper sites for state parks within sound discretion of 
administrative bodies authorized by legislature. Mathiasen v. State 
Conservation Commission, 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W.2d 158 (1955). 
Fact that state park project involved primarily construction of 
artificial lake did not proclude condemnation of land for such project. Id. 
Board of park commissioners of Boone could condemn real estate for park 
purposes. Herman v. Board of Park Commissioners of Boone, 200 Iowa 1116, 206 
N.W.2d 35 (1925). 
Board of conservation could agree with park commission of city which was 
willing to issue bonds for acquisition of land for state to be repaid to city 
over a period of years. O.A.G. 1934, p. 340. 
2. Approval of executive council. 
Better practice is to obtain approval of executive council before 
expending funds for acquisition of real estate. O.A.G. 1936, p. 136. 
111.8 Highways 
1. Construction and application. 
Prior to building highway through park, it is necessary to have approval 
of executive council. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 171. 
111.9 Condemnation Statutes 
See § 471,1 et seq. 
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111.35 
111.20 State Department of Transportation - Duties (No Annotations) 
111.21 County Engineer - Duties (No Annotations) 
111.22 Surveys and Plats (No Annotations) 
111.23 Compensation (No Annotations) 
111.27 Management by Municipalities 
1. Construction and application. 
Camping spaces on state-owned land maintained by county conservation 
board pursuant to agreement section 111.49 are subject to two week limit, may 
not be extended by board rule under section lllA.5. O.A.G., December 18, 
1980. 
Final authority for management of a state-owned area which a municipality 
has agreed to care for and maintain pursuant to this section remains vested in 
state conservation commission. O.A.G. February 7, 1973. 
State may enter into management agreements with counties in regard to 
park lands, but not in regard to lands obtained through expenditure of fish 
and game funds and these management agreements are subject to the approval of 
the executive council. O.A.G. December 20, 1962. 
111.32 Sale of Park Lands - Conveyances to Cities or Counties 
1. Construction and a~~lication. 
Chapters 111 and8 in direct conflict as to procedure for sale of 
state-owned land in or along meandering streams. Chapter 111 governs the 
disposition of such lands. Repeal of chapter 568 does not affect title to 
privately owned islands in Iowa streams. O.A.G., April 3, 1975. 
On recommendation of Conservation Commission and approval of executive 
council, sovereign lands of the Missouri River bed was transferred to Sioux 
City. O.A.G., 1938. 
A person purchasing part of the bed of a lake was charged with knowledge 
that the lake was to be drained, not entitled to damages as owner of land so 
purchased because of subsequent drainage. Higgins v. Board of Supervisors of 
Dickinson County, 188 Iowa 448, 176 N.W. 268 (Iowa 1920). 
The executive council cannot dispose or sell state property except as 
authorized by legislature. O.A.G., 1906. 
2. Procedure. 
If county has conservation board, county board of supervisors cannot sell 
county park lands without determination by county conservation board that 
lands for sale are no longer needed for park. O.A.G., May 9, 1974. 
By majority of Conservation Commission, state lands not desirable for 
conservation purposes may be sold in name of state, signed by Governor, 
Secretary of State, and sealed by State of Iowa. O.A.G., 1940. 
3. Easements. 
State easements under jurisdiction of Fish and Game Commission and Board 
of Conservation can be granted to federal government but safest way to proceed 
in sale of land would be by legislative enactment. O~A.G., 1936. 
111.34 Powers in Municipalities (No Annotations) 
111.35 Prohibited Destructive Acts (No Annotations) 
111.36 Speed Limit (No Annotations) 
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111.80 
111.37 Excessive Loads (No Annotations) 
111.38 Parking (No Annotations) 
MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT 
111.58 Use by Cities, Counties and State Department of Transportation (No 
Annotations) 
WATER RECREATIONAL AREAS [NEW] 
111.59 Powers in Municipalities (No Annotations) 
111.60 Application for Permit (No Annotations) 
111.61 Petition (No Annotations) 
111.62 Copy to Resources Council (No Annotations) 
111.63 Hearing - Notice (No Annotations) 
111.64 Time and Place (No Annotations) 
111.65 Objections (No Annotations) 
111.66 Filing (No Annotations) 
111.67 Examination - Testimony 
· 111.68 Final Order - Condition (No Annotations) 
111.69 Costs and Fees (No Annotations) 
111.70 Permit (No Annotations) 
111.71 Public Access and Use (No Annotations) 
111.72 Sale of Permit (No Annotations) 
111.73 Records (No Annotations) 
111.74 Extension of Permit (No Annotations) 
111.75 Condemnation of Land (No Annotations) 
111.76 Contracts with Local Authorities (No Annotations) 
111.77 Prohibited near Borders of State (No Annotations) 
111.78 Method not Exclusive (No Annotations) 
111.79 Public Outdoor Recreation and Resources Fund (No·Annotations) 
111.80 Public Outdoor Recreation and Resources Advisory Council (No 
Annotations) 
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305A.l Appointment 
305A.9 
CHAPlER 305A 
STAlE ARCHAE!l..OGIST [NEW] 
(No Annotations) I 305A.2 Duties (No Annotations) 
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305A.3 Agreements with Federal. Departments (No Annotations) 
305A.4 Definitions 
Title of act: an Act to authorize the state highway commission to enter 
into agreements for removal and preservation of historical archaeological and 
paleontological remains disturbed are to be disturbed by highway 
construction. Acts 1965 (61 G.A.) ch. 258. 
305A.5 State Department of Transportation Contracts (No Annotations) 
305A.6 Federal Funds (No Annotations) 
305A.7 Reinterring H1111an Remains (No Annotations) 
305A.8 Cemetery for Ancient Remains (No Annotations) 
.305A.9 Authority to Deny Permission to Disinter H11Ran Remains (No 
Annotations) 
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306.1 
CHAPTER 306 
ESTABLISMNT, ALTERATION AND VACATION OF HIGHWAYS 
306.1 Roads and Streets 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Primary and Interstate Roads 2 
Secondary Roads 3 · 
Validity 1/2 
1/2. Validity. 
State statutes available for use in condemnation for secondary road 
purposes, providing for notice to condemnees and opportunity to be heard, do 
not violate state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa 367 F. Supp. 39 
(N.D. Iowa 1973). 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
Federal funds use for bridge over river for purposes of federal statute 
requiring condemnation procedure during course of project whereby federal 
funds are used did not mean that road project for which plaintiff's land was 
condemned involved use of federal funds where project was discrete from road 
building for which land was taken. Cahill v. Cedar County Iowa, 419 US 806 
(N.D. Iowa 1973). 
Where closing a portion of secondary highway not part of a construction 
program board of supervisors not required to consult trustees of township. 
Bricker v. Iowa County Bd. of Sup'rs, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
Bridge considered integral part of road on which located. Larsen v. 
Pottawattamie County, 173 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1970). 
Status of local secondary road or highway a question of law for court; 
not fact question for jury. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1969). 
No person has vested right to keep highways open. Hinrichs v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1115, 152 N.W.2d 248 (1967). 
County has no duty to plow secondary road designated "snowmobile route" 
and could not be held liable for injuries. O.A.G. Oct. 14, 1974. 
Designation by owner and acceptance by public sufficient to establish 
road as part of secondary road system. O.A.G. March 3, 1955. 
State park roads are extensions of secondary roads and subject to 
concurrent jurisdiction of State Highway Commission and State Conservation 
Commission. O.A.G. Nov. 13, 1963. 
2. Primary and interstate roads. 
White citizens have no standing to assert state statutes for condemnation 
for secondary roads, statute provides that all U.S. citizens have same right 
in every state as enjoyed by white citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold and convey personal property. Cahill v. Cedar County Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 
39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
Safety rest areas part of the public highways of Iowa. O.A.G. Jan. 16, 
1968. 
Iowa State Highway Commission has exclusive authority to control access 
to those portions of National Interstate and Defense Highway System located 
within corporate limits of cities or towns. O.A.G. Oct. 27, 1965. 
Commission may also control access on extensions of Iowa primary highways 
within corporate limits of cities or towns in cooperation with the cities or 
towns. Id. 
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306.4 
3. Secondary Roads. 
State statutes available for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 367 F. 
Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). . 
Highway retained status of local secondary road absent formal steps by 
board of supervisors. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1969). 
Despite participation in maintenancy by county board of supervisors, city 
or town retains chief responsibility over street which is an extension of a 
secondary road. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
County may not ma.intain a road as part of its secondary road system 
unless legally a "public road." O.A.G. April 21, 1969. 
City and county may enter into agreement under chapter 28E to construct 
bridge and approaches. O.A.G. Sept. 18, 1967. 
Strip of land used as access by public to cemetery part of secondary road 
system and must be maintained by board of supervisors. O.A.G. Jan. 25, 1966. 
305.2 Definitions 
306.3 Definitions of Tenns 
1. Construction and application. 
State's statutory duties for primary road system and common law duty to 
make highways safe for traveling must be judicially reviewed on basis of torts 
to act as reasonable and prudent Department of Transportation would act in 
circumstances. State's reasonableness must be balanced according to danger 
imposed by outmoded device, increase in safety of new device or design, cost 
of upgrading, available resources, other known hazard to motorist, including 
other needs of highway system. Butler v. State, 336 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1983). 
County has duty to establish, maintain, repair and rebuild secondary 
roads and bridges; county has power to vacate as well as establish roads. 
Mulkins v. Board of Supervisors of Page County, 330 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1983). 
Requirements of section 313.2 of Iowa Code for implementation of Iowa 
roads and streets (306.1-8) have not been met through enactment of chapters 
36, 46, 61, 232, acts of 66 General Assembly, First Session. O.A.G., 
January 5, 1976. 
The national guard of the state of Iowa is entitled to the services of 
the highway commission in the improvement of roads upon Camp Dodge 
reservation. O.A.G. May 19, 1971. 
306.4 Jurisdiction of Systems 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Contracts 8 
Dedication 6 
Delegation of Authority 9 
Effect of Control 10 
Joint Improvements 7 
Review 2 
Rights-of-Way 5 
State Park Roads 4 
Unreasonable Exercise of Power 3 
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1. Construction and application. 
County has power and duty to establish, repair, and rebuild secondary 
roads and bridges. County may vacate as well as establish roads. Mulkins v. 
Board of Supervisors, Page County, 330 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 1983). 
Rural subdivision road plans are to be approved by county engineer as 
well as board of supervisors. Spencer's Mountain, Inc. v. Pottawattamie 
County, 285 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa 1979). 
D.O.T. has exclusive jurisdiction over primary road system including 
highway location and design. Curtis v. Board of Sup'rs of Clinton County, 270 
N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1978). 
Counties have statutory duty to keep bridges and their approaches which 
form part of any secondary road system within their boundaries in a reasonably 
safe condition. Larsen v. Pottawattamie County, 173 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1970). 
State has full authority and power over public highways. Tott v. Sioux 
City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
Counties can only close public roads under their jurisdiction and 
control. Dedication and acceptance is required for a street in an 
unincorporated village to be public. O.A.G. March 25, 1980. 
Any portion of a secondary road not vacated or closed must be maintained 
continuously by county boards of supervisors. O.A.G. March 21, 1980. 
Board of supervisors can close secondary road bridges over railroad 
crossings. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
Iowa state highway commission may authorize telephone company to place 
underground cable along untraveled portion of highway without consent of 
abutting landowner who holds underlying fee. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Highway commission and board or commission concerned have concurrent jurisdiction of highways on or adjacent to state lands. O.A.G. 1953, p. 20. 
Reimbursement of county road fund for money advances for farm-to-market 
construction limited to amount actually spent. O.A.G. 1952, p. 102. 
2. Review. 
Highway Commission has discretion in design and location of public 
highways, and courts may interfere only when there is an abuse of 
discretion. A & S, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1258, 116 
N.W.2d 496 (1962). 
3. Unreasonable exercise of power. 
Design of highway within the authority of the Highway Commission, to be 
interfered with only if so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be beyond police 
power of the state. A & S, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253, Iowa 
1258, 116 N.W.2d 496 (1962). 
4. State park roads. 
Operating overloaded truck is illegal operation under section 321.475, 
damage to secondary bridge may be recovered by board of supervisors. O.A.G., 
March 13, 1970. 
Subject to concurrent jurisdiction of State Highway Commission and State 
Conservation Commission. O.A.G. Nov. 13, 1963. 
5. Rights-of-way. 
State Conservation Commission may cause removal of privately owned 
cottages of railroad employees located on railroad rights of way, owned in fee 
by state, but on which railroad had easement for use, because presence of 
cottages constituted misuse of easement even though railroad had leased right 
of way to employees to keep weeds and brush under control, eliminate fire 
hazards, and prevent vandalism. O.A.G., December 7, 1965. 
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306.8 
6. Dedication. 
In view of dedication and acceptance by public, strip of land used as 
access by public to cemetery part of secondary road system and must be 
maintained by board of supervisors. O.A.G. Jan. 25, 1966. 
Duty of board of supervisors to repair and maintain public road dependent 
upon acceptance and dedication. Id. 
7. Joint improvements. 
Chapter 28E authorizes city and county to improve a road which is one-
half in the city and one-half in the county. O.A.G. Sept. 22, 1966. 
8. Contracts. 
Failure of highway commission to have site prepared and construction 
company's loss of profits --- Damages. Hallet Constr. Co. v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 261 Iowa 290, 154 N.W.2d 71 (1967). 
County board of supervisors may enter into agreement with private agency 
for construction and maintenance of secondary road. O.A.G. June 4, 1971. 
9. Delegation of authority. 
County held liable in tort where authority over secondary roads had been 
delegated to it. Symnonds v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262 
(Iowa 1976). 
State can delegate control of public highways within municipality to 
municipal authorities. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 
(1968). 
10. Effect of control. 
County was not relieved of liability on theory that word "authorized" in 
statute governing erection of stop signs at crossings was merely 
discretionary. Symmonds v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262 
(Iowa 1976). 
306.5 Continuity of Systems in Municipalities, Parks and Institutions 
2. Construction and application. 
Authority in county board of supervisors to aid cities and towns in 
street repair. O.A.G. May 6, 1974. 
306.6 Functional Classification Board 
1. Construction and application. 
State legislators serving on state classification review board may not 
receive compensation under this section for per diem and expenses occurred in 
performance of official duties as members of board. O.A.G., August 6, 1980. 
Classification board must file notice of proposed classification in 
office of county engineer. O.A.G. June 7, 1971. 
306.7 Functions Changed or New Roads Added 
306.8 Transfer of Jurisdiction 
1. In genera 1. 
Transfer of control between two jurisdictions despite absence of 
agreement - Money transferred need not be used for repair of transferred 
road. O.A.G. July 2, 1979. 
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306.9 Diagonal Roads 
1. Construction and application. 
Where land owners filed contested case complaint with Department of 
Transportation on July 26, 1976 challenging selection of route for highway and 
proceedings in such matter were still pending after September 1, 1g77, 
decision on highway location was not finalized as of September 1, 1977, and 
was subject to this section relating to protection of farm land in relocation 
of highway. Pundt Agriculture Inc. v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 291 
N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1980}. 
306.10 Power to Establish, Alter or Vacate 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Easements 2 
Municipalities 3 
1. Construction and application. 
County has power and duty to establish, maintain, repair, and rebuild 
secondary roads and bridges; county has power to vacate as well as establish 
roads. Mulkins v. Board of Supervisors of Page County, 330 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa 
1983). 
Certiorari would not lie to challenge county board of supervisors 
resolution regarding location of freeway overpass in light of fact that board 
lacked authority to decide location, thus did not exercise judicial function 
in adopting resolution. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors of Clinton County, 270 
N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1978). 
An established highway may be abandoned by the public and its rights 
therein lost. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1976). 
State has full authority and power over public highways. Tott v. Sioux 
City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968}. 
Courts will not say what roads should or should not be built. Polk 
County v. Brown, 260 Iowa 301, 149 N.W.2d 314 (1967). 
Fee title to streets in unincorporated villages remains with the abutting 
landowner, subject to an easement for the street. O.A.G. August 1, 1980. 
Dedication and acceptance required for street or road in unincorporated 
village to be public. O.A.G. March 25, 1980. 
Duty of county board of supervisors to maintain road extends to any 
portion of road not vacated and closed. O.A.G. March 21, 1980. 
Vacation proceedings required when board of supervisors determines unsafe 
bridge will neither be repaired nor replaced. O.A.G. Feb. 4, 1976. 
Vacation proceedings not required for unopened and unaccepted streets in 
an unincorporated village plat. O.A.G. May 29, 1975. 
County vacating a road not required to return roadbed to "farmable 
condition". O.A.G. June 15, 1970. 
2. Easements. 
Abandonment. Polk County v. Brown, 260 Iowa 301, N.W.2d 314 (1967). 
Vacating a secondary road also constitutes formal closing. O.A.G. July 
25, 1963. 
Roads and highways established by statute, by dedication, or by 
prescription. O.A.G. March 3, 1955. 
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306 .13 
3. Municipalities. 
City not permitted to open street upon which it has allowed another to 
make valuable improvements. Sioux City v. Johnson, 165 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 
1969). 
State can delegate control of public highways within municipality to 
municipal authorities. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 
(1968). 
306.11 Hearing - Place - Date 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Review 3 
Time of Appeal 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Hearing must be genuine, not a sham. Bricker v. Iowa County Bd. of 
Sup'rs, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
County boards of supervisors authorized to grant permits for mining coal 
underlying a secondary road. O.A.G. Sept. 26, 1979. 
Prerogative of closing secondary road bridges over railroad crossings 
rests with board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
Vacation constitutes formal closing. O.A.G. July 25, 1963. 
2. Time of appeal. 
In condemnation of property for highway purposes, aggrieved party has 30 
days within which to give notice and perfect his appeal. Ross v. Linn County 
Bd. of Sup'rs, 182 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1970). 
3. Review. 
Board did not fail to provide hearing of substance. Bricker v. Iowa 
County Bd. of Sup' rs, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
306.12 Notice - Service 
1. Construction and aptlication. 
Failure to adviseandowner of right to claim damages - order of board 
denying compensation invalid - necessity of filing claim for damages. Miller 
v. Warren County, 285 N.W.2d 190 (Iowa 1979). 
Vacating of highways - notice of time and place of hearing - to whom 
sent. O.A.G. 1952, p. 99. 
Interested parties entitled to notice include property owners who will 
sustain special damages. Hansell v. Massey, 244 Iowa 969, 59 N.W.2d 221 
(1953). 
305.13 Notice - Requirements 
1. Construction and application. 
Highway Commission and County Board of Supervisors not authorized to 
exchange land; subsequently adopted legislation is prospective in application, 
does not make prior agreement valid. O.A.G., October 16, 1972. 
1970 admendment requires alternative access facility be provided where 
abutting property denied direct access through board or commission; 
expenditure of primary road funds for purpose is not violation of statute or 
Iowa Constitution; amendment does not change method of acquiring property but 
merely describes another area considered when highway construction is 
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306 .16 
undertaken; where proper, land may be acquired by easement. O.A.G., Nov. 20, I 
1970. 
306.14 Objections - Claims for Damages 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Evidence 2 
1. Construction and application. 
"Land abutting on road" - defined. Braden v. Bd. of Sup' rs of 
Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 (lg68). 
As to who are interested parties. Hansell v. Massey, 244 Iowa 969, 59 
N.W.2nd 221 (1953). 
Vacation terminates interest of county in land. O.A.G. August 1, 1980. 
Vacation constitutes formal closing. O.A.G. July 25, 1963. 
2. Evidence. 
Evidence supported decision of county board of supervisors to close 
secondary highway after bridge collapsed. Bricker v·. Iowa County Board of 
Supervisors, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
Where two tracks of land were inaccessible to each other except by 
passage over secondary road and bridge, there was severance of the two 
portions of land and landowners could recover damages. Braden v. Board of 
Supervisors of Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 (1968). 
Evidence sustained finding that trees materially obstructed highway. 
Carstensen v. Clinton County, 250 Iowa 487, g4 N.W.2d 734 (1959). 
306.15 Purchase and Sale of Property 
1. In genera 1. 
Owners of land which abutted secondary road failed to allege facts in 
admendment in petition establishing right to open secondary road or allow 
damages. Christensen v. Board of Supervisors of Woodbury County, 253 Iowa 
978, 114 N.W.2d 897 (1962). 
Statement in acts 1959 (58 G.A.N.) chapter 204 that section 306.5 to 
306.11 on power to establish, alter or vacate highways, should be considered 
as amendment to section 3068.6, pertains exclusively to procedure, does not 
affect question of vacation of part of secondary road nor payment for such 
vacation. Id. 
Vacation proceedings required when board of supervisors determines unsafe 
bridge will neither be repaired nor replaced. O.A.G. Feb. 4, 1976. 
County board of supervisors and the Highway Commission are not authorized 
to trade land. O.A.G. August 7, 1969. 
County board - methods to acquire land. Id. 
Vacation of secondary road constitutes formal closing. O.A.G. July 25, 
1963. 
No authority to make conveyance for flowage easements over county-owned 
property. O.A.G. Dec. 26, 1962. 
306.16 Final Order 
Index to Notes 
In General 1 
Damages 2 
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306.17 
1. In genera 1. 
Land abutting road, as in section 306.8, providing that person owning 
land abutting road which is proposed to vacate and close has right to file 
claim for damages, means land adjoining, coming together with, meeting or 
touching roadway. Braden v. Board of Supervisors of Pottawattamie County, 261 
Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1968). 
District court retains jurisdiction over appeal where board fails to 
notify property owners of its decision to deny damages. Christensen v. Bd. of 
Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 251 Iowa 1259, 105 N.W.2d 102 {1960). 
County board of supervisors not legally required to replace or vacate 
road. O.A.G. August 10, 1978. 
Vacation proceedings required where bridge determined unsafe. O.A.G. 
·Feb. 4, 1976. 
2. Damages. 
Right to file claim. Braden v. Bd. of Sup' rs of Pottawattamie County, 
261 Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 (1968). 
Damages recoverable for "severance" of two portions of land. Id. 
306.17 Appeal 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Damages 3 
Time of Appeal 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Substantial evidence supports a decision of county board of supervisors 
to close highway after bridge collapsed. Bricker v. Iowa County Board of 
Supervisors, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
Statement in acts 1959 (58 G.A.) chapter 204 that sections 306.5 -
306.11, on power to establish, alter or vacate highway, should be considered 
as amendment to section 306A.6, pertaining to procedure and does not affect 
question of vacation of part of secondary road nor payment for such 
vacation. Christensen v. Board of Supervisors of Woodbury County, 253 Iowa 
978, 114 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa 1962). 
Appeal as a means of getting the matter of damages before the trial court 
as an original proceeding for an original judgement. Christensen v. Bd. of 
Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 251 Iowa 1259, 105 N.W.2d 102 (1960). 
Appeal properly brought against board of supervisors of defendant county 
rather than against county itself. Id. 
2. Time of appea 1. . 
Appeal allowed where board failed to notify property owners of decision 
to deny damages. Christensen v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 251 Iowa 
1259, 105 N.W.2d 102 (1960). 
3. Damages. 
Right to file claim for "land abutting on road." Braden v. Bd. of Sup' rs 
of Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 (1968). 
Failure to allege facts entitling allowance of damages. Christensen v. 
Bd. of Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 253 Iowa· 978, 114 N.W.2d 897 {1962). 
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306.18 Establisllnent 
1. Construction and application. 
County may not maintain road unless legally a "public road." O.A.G. 
April 21, 1969. 
Roads and highways established by statute, by dedication, or by 
prescription. O.A.G. March 3, 1955. 
306.19 Purchase or Condemnation of Right of Way - Procedure - Closing 
Driveway - Alternative Access 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Damages 5 
Evidence 4 
Instructions 3 
Severance 2 
Validity 1/2 
1/2. Validity. 
Statutes available for use in condemnations for secondary road purposes, 
providing for notice to condemnees and opportunity to be heard, do not violate 
the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. 
Iowa 1973). 
1. Construction and application. 
Remittitur not appropriate in condemnation cases. Booras v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission for Use in Benefit of State, 207 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1973). 
Changing natural course of stream to join river - relocation of the 
channel of the stream on private land - permit from the Natural Resources 
Council. Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Commission on Behalf of State, 
202 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1972). 
Authority to purchase rather than condemn land. Rhodes v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 416, 94 N.W.2d 97 (1959). 
Condemnation of private real estate for future highway uses proper absent 
bad faith, fraud, are manifest abuse of power. O.A.G. April 24, 1970. 
Acquiring site for maintenance facility. O.A.G. Sept. 24, 1969. 
Acquiring land for fairground purposes when "necessary". O.A.G. August 
7, 1969. 
County board of supervisors and Highway Commission not authorized to 
trade land. Id. 
Necessity of right of way for improving or graveling secondary roads. 
O.A.G. Jan. 17, 1955. 
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2. Severance. I 
Severance - operatively inaccessible one to the other - damages 
recoverable. Braden v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 
157 N.W.2d 123 (1968). 
3. Instructions. I 
Fair and just compensation - payment to make the owner whole. Booras v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission for Use in Benefit of State, 207 N.W.2d 566 
(1973). 
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306.22 
4. Evidence. 
Land enhanced in value by contemplated improvement. Booras v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission for Use in Benefit of State, 207 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1973). 
5. Damages. (No Annotations). 
306.20 Cemeteries (No Annotations) 
306.21 Plans, Plats and Field Notes Filed 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Rejection of Plat 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Approval of rural subdivision road plans by county engineer mandatory. 
Spencer's Mountain, Inc. v. Pottawattamie County, 285 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa 1979). 
No abuse of discretion by county engineer. Id. 
Courts will not interfere in planning and construction of highways. 
Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Commission on Behalf of State, 202 N.W.2d 
38 (Iowa 1972). 
Plat request meeting all state, county and municipal subdivision 
regulations should be approved. O.A.G. Oct. 30, 1979. 
City's authority to impose requirements on rural subdivisions. O.A.G. 
April 20, 1979. 
Adoption of subdivision ordinances - notice and hearings. O.A.G. Nov. 
15, 1978. 
Final plat of rural subdivision bearing board approval and meeting 
requirements of county zoning ordinance may be recorded despite disapproval by 
county engineer. O.A.G. June 16, 1978. 
Board of supervisors cannot compel county engineer to approve a 
subdivision plat. O.A.G. May 18, 1978. 
Board of supervisors disapproves road in plat - dedication precluded. 
O.A.G. Oct. 23, 1g69. 
Board of supervisors may approve a plat and at the same time disapprove 
roads in the plat. O.A.G. Oct., 1964. 
2. Rejection of plat. 
Authority to reject. O.A.G. Oct. 29, 1964. 
306.22 Sale of Unused Right of Way 
1. In genera 1. 
Procedures for conducting sale. O.A.G. July 8, 1980. 
Necessity to acquire land - procedure. O.A.G. August 7, 1969. 
Board of supervisors and Highway Commission not authorized to trade 
land. Id. 
Sale of unused right of way with restrictions. O.A.G. March 26, 1970. 
Highway Co111Tiission's enlisting services of a real estate broker. O.A.G. 
March 5, 1970. 
Executive council's lack of power to adjudicate claim of third party 
adverse to approval of the sale of land. O.A.G. March 8, 1965. 
2. Notice. 
Only "interested parties" are entitled to notice of final hearing in 
proceedings to vacate highways. Hansell v. Massey, 244 Iowa 969, 59 N.W.2d 
221 {1953). 
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306.23 Notice - Preference of Sale I 
1. Construction and application. 
The State Highway Commission exercised discretion in arbitrary and I 
capricious manner. Charles Gabus Ford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 
N.W.2d 63g (Iowa 1974). 
306.24 Conditions 
Index to Notes I 
In General 1 
Evidence 4 
Objections 2 
Restrictions and Reservations 6 I 
Title Conveyed 5 
Use Interfering with Highway 3 
1. In general. 
State's restrictive authority not arbitrary and unreasonable. Fort I 
Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 344, 131 
N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
Sale with restrictions of unused right of way. O.A.G. March 26, 1970. 
2. Objections. I 
Signers of remonstrances objecting to vacation of highway. Hansell v. 
Massey, 244 Iowa 969, 59 N.W.2d 221 (1953). 
3. Use interfering with highway. I 
Definite rules for future use of property could not be established 
through declaration of party's rights under deeds containing restrictions 
prohibiting use of property which interferes with public highway. Fort Dodge, 
D.M. and S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corporation, 256 Iowa 1344, 131 
N.W.2d 515 (1965). I 
No preexisting highway access rights in vendor where he consented to 
restriction in deed prohibiting his interference with public highway. Id. 
4. Evidence. 
Specific performance suit involving merchantability of title - I 
interference with highway use by traveling public. Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. 
v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
5. Title conveyed. 
Police power exercised in conveying title with restrictive provisions. I 
Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 
131 N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
6. Restrictions and reservations. 
Conditions in deed rendered title unmerchantable. Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. I 
Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 (1965). . 
306.25 Execution of Conveyance 
1. In general. I 
Highway Commissions in listing real estate broker. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
Highway Commission's authority to convey property by patent, not warranty 
deed. O.A.G. Jan. 21, 1965. 
M I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
306.27 
306.26 Payment of Damages and Right of Way Cost - Proceeds of Sale 
1. Construction and application. 
Sale with restrictions of unused right of way - disposition of money 
received. O.A.G. March 26, 1970. 
County not to maintain road unless legally a "public road." O.A.G. April 
21, 1969. 
Roads and highways established by statute, by dedication, or by 
prescription. O.A.G. March 3, 1955. 
2. Severance. 
Two portions of a given tract of land operatively inaccessible - damages 
recoverable. Braden v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 
157 N.W.2d 123 (1968). 
306.27 Changes for Safety, Economy, and Utility 
Index to Notes 
Actions for Damages 6 
Changing Course of Highway 3 
Construction and Application 1 
Diverting Waters 2 
Proceedings for Change 5 
Widening Highway 4 
1. Construction and application. 
Change in "natural course" of stream - No power to acquire easement for 
relocation of stream's channel. Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Co1T111ission 
on Behalf of State, 202 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1972). 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1968). 
County board of supervisors - Powers. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2nd 
754 (Iowa 1968). 
Within board's discretion to change course if purpose to prevent 
encroachment on highways. O.A.G. July 12, 1956. 
Presumption that notice was given of board of supervisors intent to 
vacate a road. Paul v. Mead, 234 Iowa 1, 11 N.W.2d 706 (1943). 
No notice necessary if abutter appears and files claim for damages. 
Furgason v. Woodbury County, 212 Iowa 814, 237 N.W. 214 (1931). 
Despite this statute a road cannot be constructed through an orchard or 
ornamental ground without consent of the owner. Hoover v. Highway Commission, 
207 Iowa 56, 222 N.W. 438 (1928). 
This statute does not require abandonment of any road, however, notice to 
abutter is required if it is to be abandoned. Polk v. Irwin, 190 Iowa 1340, 
181 N.W. 689 (1921). 
Application of power to abandon. O.A.G. 1938, p. 808. 
This statute does not govern power of abandonment of roads. O.A.G. 1938, 
p. 677. 
2. Diverting waters. 
Evidence held to support injunction. Schwab v. Behrendt, 234 Iowa 1068, 
15 N.W.2d 692 (1944). 
County liable for damages resulting from cutting down banks of drainage 
ditch in improving highway. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 
N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
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Doctrine of estoppel by laches. Thomas v. Cedar Falls, 223 Iowa 229, 272 
N.W. 79 (1937). 
Where grader ditch along road was used for drainage for 10 years and 
supervisors desire to return water to natural course they could do so. 
Schwartz v. Wapello County, 208 Iowa 1229, 227 N.W. 91 (1929). 
Where, without objection abutter permitted grade to be established for 
twelve years held to have consented. Geneser v. Healey, 124 Iowa 310, 120 
N • W. 66, ( 1904) • 
When diverted channel may be held to be natural channel. Mier v. Kroft, 
80 N.W. 521 (Iowa 1899). 
Road supervisors liable for diversion of stream by negligent construction 
of crossing thereover. McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868). 
Where well dried up due to diversion of stream county not liable if 
change accomplished according to law. O.A.G. 1932, p. 140. 
3. Changing course of highway. 
What constitutes lawful change in course. Harding v. Board, 213 Iowa 
560, 237 N.W. 625 (1931) and Jenkins v. Highway Commission, 205 Iowa 523, 218 
N.W. 258 (1928). 
Road changed to avoid bridging a stream need not be constructed on 
immediate bank of stream. Stahr v. Carter, 116 Iowa 380, 90 N.W. 64 (1902). 
Board has no authority to summarily relocate road to location shown by 
plats where road has been open and used, even though it may not be on location 
originally ordered. O.A.G. 1932, p. 68. 
4. Widening highway. 
This section confers jurisdiction to widen roads. Carstens v. Keating, 
210 Iowa 1326, 230 N.W. 432 (1930). O_.A.G. 1919-20, p. 270. O.A.G. 1919-20, 
p. 261. 
5. Proceedings for change. 
Filing of a claim for land taken on relocation does not bar subsequent 
condemnation proceeding. Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341, 195 N.W. 363 
(1923) 
Petition for establishment or relocation need not follow statutory 
language as long as it follows statutory form in substance and discloses 
action desired. Polk v. Irvin, 190 Iowa 1340, 181 N.W. 689 (1921). 
Final order of board of supervisors stating conditions suspends taking of 
effect of order till compliance. State v. Kinney, 39 Iowa 226 (1874). 
6. Actions for damages. 
Pleading. Valentine v. Board, 206 Iowa 840, 221 N.W. 517 (1928). Polk 
v. Fremont County, 197 Iowa 755, 197 N.W. 893 (1924). 
Release of water trapped by road which was improperly discontinued. 
Martin v. Schwertley, 155 Iowa 347, 136 N.W. 218 (1912). 
306.28 Appraisers 
Index to Notes 
Appointment of Appraisers 2 
Construction and Application 1 
1/2. Validity. 
State statutes avaliable for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County Iowa, 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
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306.29 
Statutes for condemnation of secondary roads do not specify elements to 
be considered in determining compensation and does not constitute denial of 
due process. Id. 
1. Construction and application. 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup' rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1 g68). 
Procedure under Chapters 471, 472, necessary to condemn land to provide 
material for improvement of highway. O.A.G. 1g53, p. 84. 
Count for mandamus to appraise damages for highway change properly 
stricken were cause of action for damages has not been abandoned. Valentine 
v. Board, 206 Iowa 840, 221 N.W. 517 (1928). 
Statutory remedy of landowner for damages in relocation and alteration 
held adequate. Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341, 1g5 N.W. 363. 
Board not authorized to fix damages at less than appraisal in absence of 
statute. Daniel v. Clarke County, 194 Iowa 601, 190 N.W. 25 (1922). 
2. Aipointment of ap5raisers. 
ppraisers muste residents of county, but their property need not be 
located in county where the proceedings are had. O.A.G. 1g28, p. 42. 
Board of supervisors may appoint appraisers when for any reason those 
originally vested with such authority fail to appoint them. O.A.G. 1923-24, 
p. 204. 
306.29 Notice 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Evidence of Notice 4 
Failure to Serve Notice 2 
Sufficiency of Notice 3 
1/2. Validity. 
Statutes whereby board of supervisors condemns right of way for secondary 
roads without affording condemnees procedural advantages available under 
statute, do not violate constitutional requirement that all laws of general 
nature have uniform operation. Cahill v. Cedar County Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 39 
(N.D. Iowa 1973). 
1. Construction and application. 
Defendant not estopped claim board had jurisdiction, where defendant 
predicated motion to dismiss plaintiff's former appeal on lack of jurisdiction 
of ward. Witham v. Union Co., 202 Iowa 557, 210 N.W. 535 (1926). 
Consideration by board of claim filed after required 10 day period waives 
failure to file timely notice. Witham v. Union County, 198 Iowa 359, 196 N.W. 
605 (1924). 
2. Failure to serve notice. 
Owner, on whom no notice was served and who did not enter an appearance, 
held not bound by condemnation proceedings. Gibson v. Union Co., 208 Iowa 
314, 223 N.W. 111 (1929). 
Letter informing board of.supervisors that owner claimed board had no 
authority to proceed not voluntary appearance since owner not served with 
notice. Id. 
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3. Sufficiency of notice. I 
Notice held insufficient. Witham v. Union Co., 198 Iowa 359, 196 N.W. 
605 (1924). 
4. Evidence of notice. 
Presumption that notice was given. Paul v. Mead, 234 Iowa 1, 11 N.W.2d 
706 (1943). 
Extrinsic evidence admissible to show notice where sufficiency is 
challenged. Butterfield v. Pollick, 45 Iowa 257 (1876). 
306.30 Service of Notice 
1/2. Validity. 
Statutes whereby board of supervisors may condemn secondary road right of 
way without affording condemnees procedural advantage under statute, do not 
violate constitutional requirement that all laws of general nature have 
uniform operation. Cahill v. Cedar County Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 
1973). 
~G.31 Qual1f1cat1on and Assessment 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application lA 
In General 18 
Validity 1/2 
1/2. Validity. 
The state statutes available for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
lA. Construction and application. 
Fact that road viewers were duly sworn can be shown by official 
certificate of the testimony of officer who administered the oath. Dollarhide 
v. Muscatine County, 1 Greene 158 (1848). 
Ag~eement need only be reached by two of three appraisers. O.A.G. 1923-
24, p. 200. 
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Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
18. In general. 
1 432 (Iowa 1968). 
306.32 Hearing Adjourrunent 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application lA 
In General 18 
Validity 1/2 
I 
1/2. Validity. I 
State statutes available for use in condemnations ·for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
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306.34 
lA. Construction and application. 
Board not authorized to fix damages at lesser sum than appraisal. Daniel 
v. Clarke County, 1g4 Iowa 601, 190 N.W. 25 (1922). 
lB. In general. 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1968). 
306.33 Hearing on Objections 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application lA 
In General lB 
Validity 1/2 
1/2. Validity. 
State statututes available for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
lA. Construction and application. 
Filing of claims for land taken on relocation does not bar subsequent 
condemnation proceeding. Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341, 195 N.W. 363 
(1923). 
lB. In general. 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1968). 
306.34 Hearing on Claims for Damages 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application lA 
In General lB 
Modification of Award of Damages 2 
Validity 1/2 
1/2 Validity. 
State statutes available for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa; 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
lA. Construction and application. 
Where relocation was on owner's same land, damage is not restricted to 
amount exceeding damage for old highway when the land reverts. Burgess v. 
Bremer County, 189 Iowa 168, 178 N.W. 389 (1920). 
1B. In genera 1. 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1968). 
2. Modification of award of damages. 
Reduction of appraisement in effect a rejection of Bd. of Sup' rs 
appraisement. Burrow v. Woodbury County, 200 Iowa 787, 205 N.W. 460 (1925). 
There must be statutory authority for board to reduce appraisement. 
Daniel v. Clarke County, 194 Iowa 601, 190 N.W. 25 (1922). 
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306.35 Appeals 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application lA 
Decision for Review 3 
In General lB 
Proceedings for Review 2 
Validity 1/2 
I 
I 
306.37 
I 
I 
1/2. Validity. I 
State statutes available for use in condemnations for secondary road 
purposes do not violate the state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 
367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973). 
lA. Construction and application. I 
Where larger amount than that appraised was awarded on appeal, no 
attorneys' fees could be recovered. Nichol v. Neighbour, 202 Iowa 406, 210 
N.W. 281 (1926). 
Owner, from whom no land is taken, but who was an abutter on road vacated I 
has no right of appeal from refusal of the Bd. of Sup'rs to allow his claim 
for damages. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 211. 
lB. In general. 
Taxing of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1968). 
2. Proceeding for review. 
Where petition on appeal failed to designate action appealed from and 
plaintiff was not a party to original proceeding, his appeal properly 
dismissed. Gibson v. Union Co., 208 Iowa 314, 223 N.W. 111 (1929). 
Procedure on appeal in a proceeding to relocate a road governed by this 
chapter. Nichol v. Neighbour, 202 Iowa 406, 210 N.W. 281 (1926). 
Plaintiff need not file bond before he can appeal the award of damages. 
O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 180. 
3. Decision on review. 
Discretion of trial court. Polk v. Irwin, 190 Iowa 1340, 181 N.W. 689 
(1921). 
306.36 Damages on Appeal - Rescission of Order (No Annotations) 
306 .37 Tender of Dilllages 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Warrants 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Count for mandamus to appraise damage due to road change properly 
stricken where count in damages was not abandoned. Valentine v. Board, 206 
Iowa 840, 221 N.W. 517 (1928). 
When auditor issues warrants in favor of claimants, board has right to 
order construction forces to enter and improve. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 206. 
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306.44 
2. Warrants. 
Board of supervisors could order auditor to issue warrants to each 
claimant for amount of damages. O.A.G., 1918, p. 504. 
306.38 Rental of Acquired Property Pending Use (No Annotations) 
306.39 Flooding Highways - Federal Water Resources Projects (No Annotations) 
306.40 Easements Conveyed (No Annotations) 
306.41 Temporary Closing for Construction 
1. Construction and application. 
Gross negligence under this section is higher degree of negligence rather 
than different kind. Sechler v. State, 340 N.W.2d 75g (Iowa 1983). 
Authority to grant permits for mining of coal underlying secondary 
road. O.A.G. Sept. 26, 1979. 
Any number road is limited in interpretation to any "posted" number 
road. O.A.G. Jan. 20, 1976. 
Board of supervisors has prerogative of closing secondary road bridges 
over railroad crossings. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
306.42 Transfer of Rights of Way (No Annotations) 
306.43 Jurisdictional Transfer Limits (No Annotations) 
306.44 Study of Road Systems (No Annotations) 
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306A.3 
OV\PTER 306A 
CONTROLLED-ACCESS HIGIWAYS [NEW] 
306A.1 Declaration of Policy. 
1. In general. 
Commerce commission retains jurisdiction to determine controversies 
between railroads and highway authorities dealing with railroad crossings. 
Chicago R.I. & P.R. Coe v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 182 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 
1970}. 
This chapter controlling when in conflict with Chapter 489. Iowa Power & 
Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 
(lg62}. 
Landowner not deprived of right of access - no compensation allowed. 
Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (195g). 
Regulation of means of access not a "taking". Wilson v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize telephone company to place 
underground cable along untraveled portion of highway without consent of 
abutting landowner holding underlying fee. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
306A.2 Definition of a Controlled-Access Facility 
1. In genera 1. 
Controlled-access highway through land did not deprive owner of right of 
access - no compensation allowed. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959}. 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize telephone company to place 
underground cable along untraveled portion of highway without consent of 
abutting landowner who holds underlying fee. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Iowa State Highway Commission has exclusive authority to control access 
to those portions of national interstate and defense highway system located 
within corporate limits of cities or towns. O.A.G. Oct. 27, 1965. 
Commission may also control access on extensions of Iowa primary highways 
within corporate limits of cities or towns in cooperation with the cities or 
towns. Id. 
306A.3 Authority to Establish Controlled-Access Facilities 
Index to Notes 
In General 1 
Denial of Access 4 
Eminent Domain 5 
Police Power 3 
Utility Facilities 2 
1. In genera 1. 
Condemnation commission assessing damages was properly constituted. 
Halweg v. City of Sioux City, 189 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1971). 
Only right of city to control access to primary highways within corporate 
limits is in cooperation with state highway commission. Linge v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 150 N.W.2d 642 (1967). 
Highway Commission's regulation of access to highway must be 
reasonable. Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 
Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
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306A.3 
Highway authority's right to regulate includes building and maintenance, 
traffic, and use restriction. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 (1962). 
Erection of electric transmission lines over or across public highways 
outside of cities. Id. 
Deprivation of reasonable or free and convenient access to highway by 
state highway co11111ission. Iowa State Highway Co11111ission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 
869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
Highway commission may relocate existing secondary road without consent 
of county board of supervisors when relocation is a realignment to eliminate 
grade crossings done in conjunction with construction of a controlled-access 
primary highway. O.A.G. August 6, 1971. 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize telephone company to place 
underground cable along untraveled portion of highway without consent of 
abutting landowner who holds underlying fee. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Iowa State Highway Co11111ission has exclusive authority to control access 
to those portions of national interstate and defense highway system located 
within corporate limits of cities or towns. O.A.G. Oct. 27, 1965. 
The commission may also control access on extensions of Iowa primary 
highways within corporate limits of cities or towns in cooperation with the 
cities or towns. Id. 
2. Utility facilities. 
Utility facilities may not be constructed along controlled-access 
interstate highways without consent of the state highway commission. Iowa 
Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 
425 (1962). 
3. Pol ice power. 
It is within Iowa Department of Transportation's police power to 
construct uncut medians in front of gasoline service station. Ginn Iowa Oil 
Company v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 506 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Iowa 
1980). 
Control of access to highway is necessary exercise of police power. Fort 
Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Co11111unity Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 
N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
4. Denial of access. 
Department of Transportation may eliminate median in front of gas station 
despite station owner's testimony that people would jump the median, make 
illegal turns, or run out of gas causing hazardous road conditions. Ginn Iowa 
Oil Company v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 506 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Iowa 
1980). 
It was within power of Department of Transportation to construct highway 
median without cut for service station despite service station owner's 
reliance on original plan. Id. 
State highway commission exercised discretion in arbitrary and capricious 
manner in refusing to grant landowner access to frontage road. Charles Gabus 
Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
Landowner not entitled to access to his land at all points between it and 
the highway. Means of ingress and egress. Linge v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 150 N.W.2d 642 (1967). 
Highway access not denied where inconvenience and circuity of travel for 
some customers. Fort Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Co11111unity Stores Corp., 
256 Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
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306A.5 
5. Eminent Domain. 
City and commission's authority to take or damage homes for a purpose of 
widening public street. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 
(1966). 
306A.4 Design of Controlled-Access Facility 
1. Construction and application. 
Deprivation of right of access to land. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959). 
Regulation of means of access not a "taking". Wilson v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Reasonable or free and convenient access to property cannot be denied 
without just compensation. Id. 
Number and location of access connections with highway must be 
reasonable. Id. 
landowners not entitled to access to their properties from all points 
along highway. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 
N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
Iowa State Highway Commission has exclusive authority to control access 
to those portions of national interstate and defense highway system located 
within corporate limits of cities or towns. O.A.G. Oct. 27, 1965. 
Commission may also control access on extensions of Iowa primary highways 
within corporate limits of cities or towns in cooperation with the cities or 
towns. Id. 
306A.5 Acquisition of Property and Property Rights 
Index to Notes 
Authority of Highway Commission 2 
Compensation 6 
Construction and Application 1 
Instructions 5 
Property Acquired 4 
Right of Access 3 
Severance 7 
1. Construction and application. 
City estopped from asserting right to public use of street - adverse 
possession. Sioux City v. Johnson, 165 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1969). 
Taking right of access to highway by eminent domain is compensable, 
however, taking through exercise of police power is not compensable. Fort 
Dodge, D.M. & S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 
N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
State highway commission's right to regulate means of access to abutting 
property from highway. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 
82 N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
Absent bad faith, fraud, or manifest abuse of power, Iowa State Highway 
Commission may condemn private real estate for future highway uses. O.A.G. 
April 24, 1970. 
Authority under 306A to expand the concept of primary extension to 
include relocations, or reconstructions or establishments of local service 
streets. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
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306A.6 
2. Authority of Highway Commission. 
Authority of state highway commission to determine whether limitations 
placed upon number and location of access connections with highway are 
reasonable. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 24g Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 
161 (1958). Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 
755 (1957). 
Deprivation of reasonable or free and convenient access to highway by 
State Highway Commission. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 
869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
3. Right of access. 
Where controlled-access highway is put through land, the controlled-
access character of the highway is relevant in condemnation proceedings on 
issue of damages resulting from severance. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959). 
Reasonable access was afforded to owners of restaurant and service 
station. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 
(1958). 
Denial of reasonable or free and convenient access to highway a question 
of fact and not of law. Id. 
Leasee of premise abutting highway has all the rights of access thereto 
of an owner. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 
755 (1957). 
4. Proeerty acquired. 
Evidence as to loss of revenue from commercial property abutting on 
highway due to detour of traffic inadmissable. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958). 
Executive council may use power of eminent domain in acquiring site for 
maintenance facility. O.A.G. Sept. 24, 1969. 
5. Instructions. 
Highway commission entitled to instruction that establishment of highway 
did not deprive landowners of right of access. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959). 
6. Compensation. 
Where a portion of railroad taken for highway crossing, compensation is 
diminution in value of property for railroad use. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Coe v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 182 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1970). 
Taking of reasonable access to highway. is compensable. Fort Dodge, D.M. 
& S. Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 N.W.2d 515 
(1965). 
7. Severance. 
Two portions of tract operatively inaccessible - damages recoverable. 
Braden v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Pottawattamie County, 261 Iowa 973, 157 N.W.2d 123 
(1968). 
306A.6 New and Existing Facilities - Grade-Crossing Eliminations 
Index to Notes 
In General 1 
Closing Roads 3 
Damages 2 
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306A.8 
1. In general. 
Construction of bridges to span existing gulley and creek for controlled-
access highway with grant of private interconnecting route to property owners 
under bridges did not constitute "grade separation". Hinrichs v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1115, 152 N.W.2d 248 (lg67). 
Vacation became effective on date board of supervisors, after hearing, 
entered order. Christensen v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 253 Iowa 978, 
114 N .W. 2d 897 ( 1962}. 
This section is procedural. It does not grant owners of land abutting on 
vacated secondary roads a new remedy. Id. 
State highway commission may close off state and county roads at their 
intersections with controlled-access facilities under the authority granted by 
these special statutes. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 
473, 93 N.W.2d 60 {1959). 
Prohibition of crossing of highway not a "taking" within the law of 
eminent domain. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 
N.W.2d 755 (1957). 
Realignment to eliminate grade crossings done in conjunction with the 
construction of a controlled-access primary highway. O.A.G. August 6, 1971 .. 
2. Damages. 
Primary extension includes relocations, or reconstructions, or 
establishments of local service streets. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
Failure to allege facts which established right to open secondary road or 
to allowance of damages. Christensen v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Woodbury County, 253 
Iowa 978, 114 N.W.2d 897 (1962). 
3. Closing Roads. 
DOT has power to close county roads at right-of-way boundary line of a 
freeway. Curtis v. Board of Sup' rs of Clinton County, 270 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 
1978). 
306A.7 Authority of Local Units to Consent 
1. Construction and application. 
Implementing agreement between city and State Highway Commission 
concerning highway construction. Halweg v. City of Sioux City, 189 N.W.2d 623 
(Iowa 1971). 
Highway Commission's agreement with United States that federal 
regulations would govern. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 (1962). 
This section permits, but does not coerce, agreeements concerning 
highway. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60 
(1959). 
Agreements between D.O.T. and cities to regulate parking. O.A.G. October 
12, 1978. 
Cities and State Highway Commission may enter into joint public 
improvement project. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
Section 306A.8 Local Service Roads 
Index to Notes 
In General 1 
Authority of Highway Commission 2 
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306A.11 
1. In general. 
Occupants of dwelling deprived of free and convenient access to 
highway. Iowa State Highway Corrrnission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 
(1957). 
Primary extensions include relocations, or reconstructions, or 
establishments of local service streets. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
2. Authority of highway commission. 
Commission's discretion exercised in arbitrary and capricious manner. 
Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
limitation upon number and location of access connections with highway. 
Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2nd 755 (lg57). 
306A.9 Repealed 
Acts 1965 (61 G.A.) Ch. 25g, Sec. 1. 
306A.10 Notice to Relocate - Costs Paid by State 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Costs 2 
Reimbursement and Compensation 3 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Utility poles andines to be relocated at owner's cost. Iowa Elec. 
light & Power Co. v. Iowa State Highway Corrrnission, 231 N.W.2d 5g7 (Iowa 
1975). 
Injunction placed on condemnation proceedings. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. 
v. Iowa State Highway Corrrnission, 182 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1g70). 
Commerce commission retains jurisdiction over a controversy dealing with 
railroad crossings. Id. 
Highway authorities supervision over utility facilities. Iowa Power & 
light Co. v. Iowa State Highway Corrrnission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 (1962). .. 
Costs of relocating public utility facilities part of construction of 
highways. Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 113 N.W.2d 755 (1962). · 
Costs for relocating a utility facility. O.A.G. September 13, 1g72. 
2. Costs. 
Public utilities have right to use highway rights of way, and legislature 
can regulate use and require relocation at utilities' costs. Edge v. Brice, 
253 Iowa 710, 113 N.W.2d 755 (1962). 
Reimbursement to utilities for nonbetterment costs of relocating 
facilities. O.A.G. September 13, 1972. 
3. Reimbursement and compensation. 
Iowa State Highway Commission's obligation to reimburse utility. O.A.G. 
June 25, 1g55. 
306A.11 What Costs Included 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Utility poles andines to be relocated at owner's cost. Iowa Elec. 
light & Power Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 231 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 
1975). 
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306A.13 
Relocation of utility facility - credit to be given to state. O.A.G. 
September 13, 1972. 
Reimbursement to utilities for the nonbetterment costs of relocating 
facilities. Id. 
306A.12 Limitation on Reimbursement (No Annotations) 
306A.13 Definition 
1. In general. 
Iowa State Highway Commission obligated to reimburse utility. O.A.G. 
June 25, 1965. 
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OIAPTER 3068 
OUTOOOR ADVERTISING ALCJ46 INTERSTATE HIGllWAYS [NEW] 
3068.1 Definitions (No Annotations) 
3068.2 Advertising Prohibited - Exceptions (No Annotations) 
3068.3 Rules 
1. In genera 1. 
Highway commission could promulgate rules more restrictive than those 
applicable in the general non-interstate highway systems of the state. O.A.G. 
June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-2). I 3068.4 Purchase of Existing Signs (No Annotations) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3068.5 Removal After Notice (No Annotations) 
3068.6 Simple Misdemeanor 
1. In general. 
Advertising devices, including those mounted upon trailers, are 
prohibited from being placed upon right of way of any public highway. O.A.G. 
September 26, 1972. 
3068.7 Federal Agreements (No Annotations) 
3068.8 Funds Accepted (No Annotations) 
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306C.17 
OIAPITR3~C 
IOWI\ JIJIKYARD BEAUTIFICATION AND BILLBOARD CONTROL [NEW] 
306C.l Definitions 
1. Construction and application. 
Pol1t1cal campaign signs not exempted. O.A.G. July 21, 1972. 
306C.2 Junk}tards Prohibited - Exceptions (No Annotations) 
306C.3 Junk}tards Lawfully in Existence (No Annotations) 
306C.4 Requirements as to Screening (No Annotations) 
306C.5 Acquisition of Land for Screening or Removal (No Annotations) 
306C.6 Nuisance-Injunction (No Annotations) 
306C.7 Interpretation (No Annotations) 
306C.8 Agreements with the United States Authorized (No Annotations) 
306C.9 Compensation (No Annotations) 
306C.10 Definitions 
1. Construction and application. 
Advertising devices prohibited from being placed upon right of way. 
O.A.G. September 26, 1972. 
Political campaign signs not exempted. O.A.G. July 21, 1972. 
306C.ll Advertising Prohibited (No Annotations) 
306C.12 Nonvisible from Highway (No Annotations) 
306C.13 Control by Department of Transportation (No Annotations) 
306C.14 Existing Signs - Six-Year Limit (No Annotations) 
306C.15 Acquisition of Signs 
1. In general. 
Nonconformities existing as of effective date of Act. Iowa Dept. of 
Transp. v. Nebraska - Iowa Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). 
306C.16 Compensation (No Annotations) 
306C.17 Condemnation (No Annotations) 
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306C.23 
306C.18 Permit Required 
1. Construction and application. 
Requisite forms filed untimely. Iowa Dept. of Transp. v. Nebraska - Iowa 
Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). 
Erection of new advertising devices within industrial or commercial 
areas - permit required. O.A.G. July 26, 1972. 
306C.19 Removal After Notice 
1. In genera 1. 
Uncompensated removal of billboards for noncompliance with permit 
requirements. Iowa Dept. of Transp. v. Nebraska - Iowa Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 
6 (Iowa 1978). 
306C.20 Bonus Funds Agreements (No Annotations) 
306C.21 Information Centers (No Annotations) 
306C.22 Political Signs (No Annotations) 
306C.23 Special Event Signs (No Annotations) 
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307.10 
OIAPTER 307 
DEPARTIENT <F TRANSP<JffATION [NEW] 
307.1 Definitions (No Annotations) 
307.2 Department of Transportation (No Annotations) 
307.3 Transportation Camiission 
1. Authority of commission. 
Absent fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary abuse of discretion conferred by 
statute, courts have no power to control highway commission. Harvey v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1229, 130 N.W.2d 725 (1965). 
Contracts of commission should be signed by all members unless a 
resolution is passed by them authorizing chairman to sign on behalf of 
commission. O.A.G. 1950, p. 137. 
2. Compatibility of offices. 
Offices of Iowa State Highway Commissioner and Judicial District 
Nominating Commissioner are not incompatible. O.A.G. September 20, 1973. 
307.4 Conflict of Interest (No Annotations) 
307.5 Vacancies on Camiission (No Annotations) 
307.6 Canpensation - Camiission Members (No Annotations) 
307.7 C<11111ission Meetings (No Annotations) 
307.8 Expenses (No Annotations) 
307.9 Removal fran Office (No Annotations) 
307.10 Duties of C<11111ission 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 2 
Length of Vehicles 3 
Validity 1 
1. Validity. 
Conditions attached to DOT rule establishing sixty-five foot length 
limitation for trucks outside of statutory grant of authority and thus ultra 
vires. Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 
1977). . 
This section delegating to transportation commission power to adopt truck 
length rules is not unconstitutional. O.A.G. January 20, 1976. 
2. Construction and application. 
Highway Division of DOT to make initial recommendations regarding 
location of highway. Pundt Agriculture, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 2g1 
N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1980). 
DOT commission empowered to make decision regarding which alternative to 
be adopted. Id. 
Reorganization of divisions within DOT permitted. O.A.G. March 19, 1976. 
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307.24 
Transportation commission's adopting proposed rule extending maximum 
length of double bottom trucks to sixty-five feet. O.A.G. January 16, 1g76. 
No passage or positive action concerning the comprehensive transportation 
plan is required of the general assembly. O.A.G. May 15, 1975. 
Offices of city councilmen and county supervisor are incompatible with 
office of transportation commissioner. O.A.G. July 17, 1975. 
3. Length of Vehicles. 
Advisability of sixty-five· foot truck length a legislative, not a judicial concern. Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510 
(Iowa 1977). 
General assembly may approve, disapprove, or take no action with respect 
to DOT rules regulating truck lengths. It may not modify or amend such 
rules. O.A.G. February 23, 1977. 
307.11 Director of Transportation - Qualifications - Salary (No Annotations) 
307.12 Duties of the Director 
1. Construction and application. 
One is an employee of the officer or department which hires him. O.A.G. 
March 12, 1976. 
307.13 Reassignment of Personnel (No Annotations) 
307.14 Divisions of the Department 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Reorganization ofivisions within the DOT permitted. O.A.G. March 19, 
1976. 
307.15 Transportation Regulation Board (No Annotations) 
307.16 Vacancies on Board (No Annotations) 
307.17 Compensation of Board Members {No Annotations) 
307.18 Duties of Board Members (No Annotations) 
307.19 Proceedings (No Annotations) 
307.2D Enforcement (No Annotations) 
307.21 A~inistration Division (No Annotations) 
307.22 Planning Division (No Annotations) 
307.23 General Counsel Division 
1. In general. 
This section not intended to reduce the department's control over its own 
affairs or litigation. Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transp., 251 
N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1977). 
307.24 Highway Division (No Annotations) 
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307.25 Public Transportation Division 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Reorganization of ivisions within the DOT permitted. O.A.G. March 19, 
1976. 
307.26 Railroad Transportaton Division 
1. Construction and application. 
General and special purposes of this section enumerating duties and 
responsibilities of railroad transportation division, are for a general plan 
of safety rather than determination of liability. Hines v. Illinois Central 
Gulf Railroad, 330 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1983). 
This section was not intended to provide before the fact determinations 
of dangerous railroad crossings nor change common law priciples concerning 
liability. Id. 
Provision of this section governing railroad transportation division 
duties and responsibilities that crossings shall not be found particularly 
hazardous for any purpose unless the department has determined it particularly 
hazardous does not lift railroad's responsibility to warrant by temporary or 
transitory situation. Plaintiff alledging that crossing was extra hazardous 
because second train blocked view, preventing motorists from seeing oncoming 
train, was entitled to prove extra hazardous nature of crossing. Sullivan v. 
Chicago North Western Transportation Co., 326 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1982). 
DOT has no authority to enter into agreement resulting in State's 
acquiring ownership of all or a portion of a railroad branch line. O.A.G. 
July 19, 1976. 
307.27 Transportation Regulation and Safety Division (No Annotations) 
307.28 Prorating Departmental Costs (No Annotations) 
307.29 Collection of Delinquent Railway Taxes - Compranise (No Annotations) 
307.30 Federal Tax Canplfance (No Annotations) 
307.31 - 307.34 Reserved. 
307.35 Inspectors to Perfonn Several Functions (No Annotations) 
307.36 Project Needs - Retention of Property (No Annotations) 
307.37 Odometer law Enforcement (No Annotations) 
307.38 Public Transit loan (No Annotations) 
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307A.2 
CHAPTER 307A 
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION [NEW] 
307A.l Definitions (No Annotations) 
307A.2 Duties 
Index to Notes 
Actions by or Against Commission 8 
Assistants and Employees 7 
Authority of Commission 3 
Bid Proposals 9 
Compensation 5 
Construction and Application 2 
Contracts 6 
Duties in General 4 
Employees 6 
Excess Motor Vehicle Size and Weight Regulations 10 
Validity 1 
1. Validity. 
This section not unconstitutional as an attempt to confer legislative 
power on administrative body. Mcleland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232, 201 
N.W.2d 401 (1924). 
2. Construction and application. 
General Assembly empowered highway division of DOT to make 
recommendations regarding location of highway. Pundt Agriculture, Inc. v. 
Iowa Dept. of Transp., 291 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1980). 
DOT is empowered to make decision regarding which alternative should be 
adopted. Id. 
Highway commission cannot be interfered with in performing official 
duties for state except in case of some illegality. Hoover v. Highway 
Commission, 207 Iowa 56, 222 N.W 438 (1928). 
Effect of new laws on prior decisions. Post v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 
183, 191 N.W. 129 (1922), rehearing overruled, 196 Iowa 183, 194 N.W. 245 
(1922). 
Road use tax money may be used for bikeway construction. O.A.G. January 
14, 1977. 
Offices of city councilmen and county supervisor are incompatible with 
office of transportation commissioner. O.A.G. July 17, 1975. 
Director of budget has no authority to relax, change or modify standard 
specifications of highway commission. O.A.G. 1925 - 26, p. 480. 
· Member of commission authorized by executive council to attend out-of-
state meeting of American Association of Highway Officials entitled to per 
diem. O.A.G. 1925 - 26, p. 479. 
3. Authority of commission. 
Highway commission possesses only powers conferred by statute. 
Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Commission on behalf of State, 202 N.W.2d 
38 (Iowa 1972). 
Members of highway commission need not personally conduct every pre road-
closing meeting. Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1115, 
152 N.W.2d 248 (1967). 
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Absent fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary use of discretion, courts have no 
power to control highway commission's exercise of authority. Harvey v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1229, 130 N.W.2d 725 (1965). 
Courts may not require highway commission to pay public funds without 
statutory authority. Batcheller v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 101 N.W.2d 
30 (Iowa 1960). 
Injunction lies to restrain commission from enforcing criminal laws which 
it has no authority to enforce. Merchants Motor Freight v. Highway 
Commission, 239 Iowa BBB, 32 N.W.2d 773 (1948). 
Highway commission is an agency of state. State v. Fitch, 236 Iowa 208, 
17 N.W.2d 380 (1945). 
Authority to aid in construction of viaducts on highways in cities is not 
without liability for property taken or damaged. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 
232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
State highway commission is not a governing body in any county but merely 
an agency of state for certain purposes. Fuller, etc. v. Shannon, etc., 205 
Iowa 104, 215 N.W. 611 (1927). 
Highway commission's duty and authority to advise counties concerning 
snowmobile signs. County board of supervisors must limit snowmobile routes to 
roadways where operation is "without unduly interfering with or constituting 
an undue hazard to conventional motor vehicle traffic," O.A.G. November 7, 
1974. 
Iowa State Highway Commission has exclusive authority to control access 
to those portions of national interstate and defense highway system located 
within corporate limits of cities or towns. O.A.G. October 27, 1965. 
Commission may also control access on extensions of Iowa primary highways 
within corporate limits of cities or towns in cooperation with the cities or 
town. Id. 
Commission could construct building to house equipment and employees and 
may pay for such expenditures from maintenance fund. O.A.G. 1938, p. 814. 
Commission could release interest in invention in exchange for license to 
use without royalty payments. O.A.G. 1950, p. 137. 
4. Duties in general. 
Commission had no authority to enforce laws relating to registration and 
license of vehicles. Merchants, etc., v. Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 
N.W.2d 773 (1948). 
Under this section commission has no power to issue warrants. Fuller, 
etc. v. Shannon, etc., 205 Iowa 104, 215 N.W. 611 (1927). 
National Guard of Iowa entitled to services of highway commission. 
O.A.G. May 19, 1971. 
Preservation and disposition of abstracts of title to highway lands is 
for commission to determine. D.A.G. 1938, p. 143. 
Commission can reimburse county for gravel taken from county pit, which 
gravel was used on primary roads. O.A.G. 1925 - 26, p. 265. 
5. Compensation. 
Concerning retroactive overtime pay. O.A.G. September 25, 1968. (No. 
68-9-23). 
6. Contracts. 
Approval by appropriate resolution of the highway commission. O.A.G. 
February 13, 1956. 
Board of supervisors had no power to contract with commission for 
construction on secondary roads, with a view to procuring federal aid 
authorized for "farm to market roads." O.A.G. 1938, p. 624. 
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307A.5 
Commission must approve contract for bridge on secondary roads costing 
over $2000 before it becomes effective. O.A.G. 1925 - 26, p. 480. 
7. Assistants and employees. 
Employee of highway commission may also be member of board of engineering 
examiners. O.A.G. 1934, p. 1168. 
8. Actions by or against commission. 
Legal proceedings against highway commission performing its official 
duties. Batcheller v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 101 N.W.2d 30, (Iowa 
1960). 
An individual incurring personal liability cannot claim immunity merely 
because he is officer of state. Bachman v. Highway Commission, 236 Iowa 778, 
20 N.W.2d 18 (1945). 
Highway commission, except as authorized by statute, has no capacity to 
sue. State v. Fitch Co., 236 Iowa 208, 17 N.W.2d 380 (1945). 
Action against commission is in effect an action against State. Long v. 
Highway Commission, 204 Iowa 376, 213 N.W. 532 (1927). 
9. Bid proposals. 
Unreasonable restriction to require bidders to submit certified check 
drawn on a solvent Iowa bank with bid proposals. O.A.G. May 27, 1965. 
10. Excess motor vehicle size and weight regulations. 
Regulation by Iowa State Highway Commission for issuance of permits. 
O.A.G. December 7, 1965. 
307A.3 Federal Donations 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Commission has aut ority to lease or erect structures for care of 
government property. O.A.G. 1919 - 20, p. 271. 
Commission may permit board of control to use highway equipment received 
from the U.S. in building and maintaining institutional roads. O.A.G. 1919 -
20, p. 267. 
307A.4 Federal Appropriations 
1. In general. 
Under procedure proposed for viaduct no funds were available from U.S. to 
pay damages to abutting owners. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 
N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Contract for a town to pay a sum to county for street improvement in 
order to obtain federal aid was not ultra vires or void. Humboldt County v. 
Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1924). 
Billboards, signs and junkyards outside the right-of-way on lands 
adjacent to public highways are not part of the highways and the 1942 anti-
diversion amendment prevents use of primary road funds for purchasing same. 
O.A.G. February 16, 1972. 
307A.5 State-Owned Lands - Assessment 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
The last paragrap of this section setting a monetary limit on 
assessments upon state property is ambiguous. O.A.G. May 3, 1976. 
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307A.6 Repealed by Acts 1976 (66 G.A.) Ch. 1176. Sec. 6 
307A.7 Materials and Equipment Revolving Fund (No Annotations) 
307A.8 Longevity Pay Prohibited 
1. In general. 
Entitlement to longevity pay earned as highway patrol officer not 
transferrable upon employment transfer to highway commission. O.A.G. October 
31, 1973. 
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307B.1 Short Title 
1. Validity. 
3078.13 
CHAPTER 307B 
RAILWAY FINANCE AUTHORITY [NEW] 
Iowa Railway Finance Authority Act does not create local or special law 
or irrational classification of taxing character in violation of equal 
protection and uniform taxation clauses. Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., 334 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 1983). 
Resident county tax payer had standing to challenge constitutionality of 
Iowa Railway Finance Authority Act. Id. 
2. In General. 
Iowa railway finance authority act does not have retrospective 
application and gives collection authority to Department of Transportation for 
delinquent property taxes owed by railroad after June 2, 1980 and were unpaid 
for 60 days. Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., 
334 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 1983). 
This chapter promotes a public purpose and is constitutional. O.A.G. 
November 28, 1980. I 307B.2 Declaration of Necessity and Purpose (No Annotations) 
307B.3 Legislative Findings (No Annotations) 
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307B.4 Definitions (No Annotations) 
307B.5 Iowa Railway Finance Authority (No Annotations) 
307B.6 Governing Board - Staff (No Annotations) 
307B.7 Powers of the Authority (No Annotations) 
307B.8 Duties of Governing Board (No Annotations) 
307B.9 Bonds 
1. Validity. 
This chapter promotes a public purpose and is constitutional. O.A.G. 
November 28, 1980. 
307B.10 Refunding of Bonds (No Annotations) 
3078.11 Security for Bonds (No Annotations) 
3078.12 Payment of Bonds - Non-Liability of State 
1. Validity. 
Issuance of railway finance bonds does not create a public debt and is 
not an extension of the state's credit. O.A.G. November 28, 1980. 
307B.13 Remedies of Bondholders and Noteholders (No Annotations) 
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307B.14 Authority as Public Instrumentality (No Annotations) 
307B.15 Powers not Restricted - law Complete in Itself (No Annotations) 
307B.16 limitation of liability (No Annotations) 
307B.17 Exemption from Construction and Bidding Requirements for Public 
Buildings (No Annotations) 
307B.18 liberal Interpretation (No Annotations) 
307B.19 Governmental Agencies (No Annotations) 
307B.20 Bond Anticipation Notes (No Annotations) 
307B.21 Investment and Obligations (No Annotations) 
307B.22 Notice (No Annotations) 
307B.23 Special Railroad Facility Fund (No Annotations) 
307B.24 Acquisition of Abandoned Right of Way (No Annotations) 
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Title of Act: 
308.9 
CHAPTER 308 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER PARKWAY [NEW] 
This is an act to authorize the establishment of a Mississippi River 
Parkway Planning Commission to act for the State of Iowa in cooperation with 
the federal agencies and the Iowa State Highway Commission in the location, 
planning and construction of the Mississippi River parkway and to authorize 
the appointment of the Parkway Planning Commission. 
308.1 Planning Conmission (No Annotations) 
308.2 Assent to Federal Act (No Annotations) 
308.3 Definitions (No Annotations) 
308.4 Transportation Conmission Authority (No Annotations) 
308.5 Jurisdiction and Control (No Annotations) 
308.6 Transferring Jurisdiction (No Annotations) 
308.7 Duties of the State Conservation Conmission (No Annotations) 
308.8 Agreements Authorized (No Annotations) 
308.9 Establishing Locations for the Highway (No Annotations) 
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308A.3 
OIAPTER 308A 
RECREATIONAL BIKEllAYS [NEW] 
308A.1 Conservation and Transportation C01111issions to Cooperate (No 
Annotations) 
308A.2 Funds (No Annotations) 
308A.3 Certain Elevated Structures Prohibited - Exception (No Annotations) 
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309.3 
OfAPTER 309 
SECONDARY ROADS 
SECONDARY ROAD AND BRIDGE SYSTEMS IN GENERAL 
309.l Definitions (No Annotations) 
309.2 Repealed. Acts 1951 54(G.A.) Ch. 103, Sec. 22 I 309.3 Secondary Bridge System 
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Index to Notes 
Actions 16 - 21 
Damages 21 
Instructions 20 
Jury Questions 19 
Pleadings 17 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 18 
Bridge as Personalty 2 
Cities, Construction and Maintenance of Culverts by 4 
Construction and Application 1 
Construction and Maintenance of Bridges and Culverts 3 
Cities 
Contractors, Liability for Injuries 7 
Damages 21 
Ditches 8 
Expense of Construction and Maintenance 10 
Funds 11 
Injunction 15 
Instructions 20 
Joint City-County Bridges 22 
Jury Questions 19 
Liability 
Cities 5 
Counties 6 
Maintenance of Bridges and Culverts 3 
Mandamus 13 
Nuisance, Abatement of 14 
Pleadings 17 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 18 
Sidewalks 9 
Taxes 12 
1. Construction and application. 
Counties may assist certain cities or towns with bridge problems. O.A.G. 
June 4, 1973. · 
Secondary bridge system includes both bridges and culverts. Under 343.11 
washed out bridges and culverts can be repaired or reconstructed. O.A.G. 
1936, p. 278. 
Bridge or state road in state park is not part of county bridge system. 
O.A.G. 1934, p. 169. 
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2. Bridge as personalty. I 
On vacation of highway, title to bridge remains in county. O.A.G. 1930, 
p. 333. 
3. Construction and maintenance of bridges and culverts. 
Counties have statutory duty to maintain bridges and approaches forming 
part of secondary road system within their boundarys. Larsen v. Pottawattamie 
County, 173 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1970). 
Board of supervisors prerogative to close secondary road bridges over 
railroad crossings. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
County's primary responsibility over bridge within corporate limits of 
the municipality. O.A.G. March 30, 1973. 
County's construction and payment for bridge located at right angle to 
corporate limits of town. O.A.G. March 10, 1966. 
Resolution of necessity, publication and hearing may not extinguish 
easement. Bartels v. Woodbury, 174 Iowa 82, 156 N.W. 303 (1916). 
County and its revenue subject to legislative control. Slutts v. Dana, 
138 Iowa 244, 115 N.W. 1115 (1908). 
Board of supervisors has no authority to construct and pay for culverts 
36 inches or less in diameter in cities and towns not controlling their own 
bridge levees. O.A.G. 1930, p. 325. 
Where city does not control it's own bridge fund, construction and 
maintenance is to be undertaken by county. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 265. 
Alleys in cities and towns. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 192. 
4. Construction and maintenance by cities. 
Owner of property adjacent to street is justified in building with 
reference to established grade. Demour v. Lyons City, 44 Iowa 276 (1876). 
City may be liable for negligent construction. Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 
Iowa 308 (1875). 
5. Liability of cities. 
Honest error in judgement by engineer may not create liability on part of 
city. Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa 308 (1875). 
Negligent work created liability by city. Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene 
373 (1854). 
In absence of negligence, city may not be liable for damages. Creal v. 
Keokuk, 4 Greene 47 (1853). 
6. Liability of counties. 
County not liable for harm to crops from overflow of ditch along 
highway. Van de Walle v. Tama County, 198 Iowa 1330, 201 N.W. 44 (1924). 
Decision under law prior to 1913 was held not controlling. Post v. Davis 
County, 196 Iowa 183, 191 N.W. 129 (1922), rehearing overruled, 196 Iowa 183, 
194 N.W. 245 (1922). 
County not liable for constructing too small a culvert. Packard v. 
Voltz, 94 Iowa 277, 62 N.W. 757 (1895). 
7. Contractors, liability for injuries. 
Contractor held independent contractor liable for negligent injury. Kehm 
v. Silts, 222 Iowa 826, 270 N.W. 388 (1937). 
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309.3 
8. Ditches. 
Adjoining owner has no right to have highway ditches enlarged. Pate v. 
Rogers, 193 Iowa 726, 187 N.W. 451 (1922). 
Ten years maintenance of ditch by county gives no one prescriptive right 
to have it for ever maintained. Wilson v. Duncan, 74 Iowa 491, 38 N.W. 371 
(1888). 
9. Sidewalks. 
Board of supervisors has duty to maintain and repair sidewalks which are 
part of bridges in cities of second class. O.A.G. 1919 - 20, p. 248. 
10. Expense of construction and maintenacne period. 
Cost of construction of approaches to bridges to be built on secondary 
road extension in city not controlling its own bridge levy should be borne by 
county. O.A.G. 1932, p. 134. 
City should pay cost of culvert under access road in city. O.A.G. 1923 -
24, p. 200. 
Entire cost of building fill borne by county. O.A.G. 1918, p. 519. 
Expense of bridges and culverts should be borne by county. O.A.G. 1918, 
p. 320. 
11. Funds. 
County boards of supervisors may spend farm-to-market road funds for road 
and bridge construction without submitting their resolution to the voters. 
O.A.G. May 21, 1965. 
Cost of replacing unsafe bridge on local county road. O.A.G. 1g39, p. 
445. 
12. Taxes. 
County had no right to levy tax for bridge within city limits. City of 
Keokuk v. Kennedy, 156 Iowa 680, 137 N.W. 914 (1912). 
13. Mandamus. 
Improper remedy to cause board of supervisors to build or improve road. 
O.A.G. 1936, p. 351. 
14. Nuisancet abatement of. 
Change o natural drainage abated by self help. Schofield v. Cooper, 126 
Iowa 334, 102 N.W. 110 (1905). 
15. Injunction. 
Township not restrained from maintaining culvert in natural course of 
drainage. Herman v. Drew, 216 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 277 (1933). 
Size of culvert in discretion of officers. Ehler v. Stier, 205 Iowa 678, 
216 N.W. 637 (1927). 
Grading of highway enjoined to prevent destruction of natural drainage. 
Estes v. Anderson, 204 Iowa 288, 213 N.W. 566 (1927). 
Decree directing that road be maintained so as to not divert natural 
drainage. Pate v. Rogers, 193 Iowa 726, 187 N.W. 451 (1922). 
Construction of inadequate culvert enjoined. Bartels v. Woodbury County, 
174 Iowa 82, 156 N.W. 303 (1916). · 
Injunction and not warranted where extra small expenditure would be 
satisfactory. Wilson v. Duncan, 74 Iowa 491, 38 N.W. 371 (1888). 
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16. Actions. 
Rights of parties determined by contract. Owens v. Butler County, 40 
Iowa 190 (1875). 
17. Pleadings. 
Striking amendment to answer pleading ordinance as to improvements not 
error. Farley v. City of Des Moines, 199 Iowa 974, 203 N.W. 287 (1925). 
18. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Burden of proof is on property owner in suit for flood of premises. 
Farley v. City of Des Moines, 199 Iowa 974, 203 N.W. 287 (1925). 
19. Jury questions. 
Matters involving reasonableness of length of time are for jury. Ross v. 
Clinton, 46 Iowa 606 (1877). 
20. Instructions. 
City not liable except for negligent construction. Walters v. 
Marshalltown, 145 Iowa 457, 120 N.W. 1046 (1909). 
21. Damages. 
Operating overloaded truck is illegal operation and damage to secondary 
bridge may be recovered. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Must not be too remote. Dubuque, etc. v. City and County of Dubuque, 30 
Iowa 176 (1870). 
22. Joint city-county bridges. 
City and county may enter into agreement to construct a bridge. O.A.G. 
Sept. 18, 1967. 
309.4 to 309.6 Repealed Acts 1g57 (57 G.A.) ch. 139, § 1. Eff. July 4, 1957. 
309.7 Repealed 
Acts 1957 (57 G.A.) ch. 13g, § 1; Act 1981 (69 G.A.) ch. 117, § 1097. 
See~ 331.422 (12, 13). 
1. Construction and application. 
County boards of supervisors have only such powers as are conferred or 
implied by statute. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa 1968). 
Levy by counties which control their own bridge levies. O.A.G. June 4, 
1973. 
309.8 - 309.9 Repealed Acts 1957 (57 G.A.) ch. 139, §1; Act 1981 (69 G.A.) 
ch. 117, ~1097; see §331.425(7). 
s1097; see~ 331.425 (7). 
309.10 Use of Fann-to-Market Road Fund (No Annotations) 
309.11 System Abolished (No Annotations) 
309.12 Construction of Tenns (No Annotations) 
309.13 to 309.15 Repealed Acts 1957 (57 G.A.) ch. 139, ~ 1. Eff. July 4, 
1957. 
309.16 Duty of Department (No Annotations) 
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309.17 
COUNTY ENGINEER 
309.17 Engineer - Tenn 
Index to Notes 
Abolishment of the Office 5 
Construction and Application 2 
Contracts 7 
Repeal 8 
Salary 6 
Termination of Tenure 3 
Validity 1 
Workmen's Compensation 4 
1. Validity. 
Section held valid. McKinley v. Clarke County, 228 Iowa 1185, 293 N.W. 
449 (1940). 
2. Construction and ap~lication. 
All county officia s must furnish individual bonds. Blanket bonds would 
have to be made by legislature. O.A.G. Oct. 8, 1968 (No. 68-10-15). 
Engineer to supervise works and have responsibility for performance. 
O.A.G. 1948, p. 150. 
Appointment of engineer in 1933 for 1934 held valid. Hahn v. Clayton 
County, 218 Iowa 543, 255 N.W. 695 (1934). 
Supervisors must appoint registered civil engineer. O.A.G. 1934, p. 64. 
3. Termination of tenure. 
Action for breach of contract, defamation and deprivation of civil 
rights. Blessum v. Howard County Bd. of Sup' rs, 295 N.W.2d 836 (Iowa 1980). 
Soldiers' Preference Law, Section 70.6, applicable to county engineers. 
Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa 543, 255 N.W. 695 (1934). 
4. Workmen's compensation. 
Engineer held to not. be "employee" under workmen's compensation law. 
McKinley v. Clarke County, 228 Iowa J.185, 293 N.W. 449 (1940). 
County engineer could not, by delegating power to supervise, bar employee 
from workmen's compensation benefits. Schroyer v. Jasper County, 224 Iowa 
1391, 279 N.W. 118 (1939). 
5. Abolishment of office. 
Supervisors have no authority to abolish this office. O.A.G. 1934, p. 
58. 
6. Salary. 
Engineer and assistant to be paid from general fund. O.A.G. 1925-26, 
p.196. 
7. Contracts. 
Corporation in which county engineer is majority stockholder prohibited 
from bidding on contracts for highway construction, maintenance, etc. o;A.G. 
March 5, 1970. 
Engineer may not take contracts for work in other counties. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 257. 
Circumstances where supervisors may temporarily supplant, by contract, 
the services of the engineer. O.A.G. 1953, p. 108. 
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8. Repeal. 
Not repeal of Soldiers' Preference Law. Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa 
543, 255 N.W. 695 (1934). 
309.18 Canpensation - Duties - Bonds 
Index to N ates 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Construction and Application 1 I 
Contracts 2 
Costs of Engineering 4 
Drainage Engineer, Employment as 3 
Extra Compensation 7 
Liability 5 I 
Warrants 8 
Workmen's Compensation 6 
1. Construction and application. 
Final authority for secondary road maintenance rests with the county I 
board of supervisors, which establishes policy for and accepts the 
recommendations of the county engineer. O.A.G. Sept. 27, 1979. 
Engineer's salary set by board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 17, 1979. 
Board of supervisors cannot compel county engineer to approve a 
subdivision plati authority relative to such rule conferred upon him by 1 I 306.21 is discre•ionary. O.A.G. May 18, 1978. 
Workers' compensation for employees of county engineer's office paid from 
secondary road fund. O.A.G. August 30, 1976. 
Salary paid from general fund. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 196. I 
Supervision and responsibility for good faith performance of road work 
and engineer. O.A.G. 1948, p. 150. 
Liability on accident policy, risks not incident to occupation. Rommel 
v. National etc. Ass'n., 183 Iowa 776, 166 N.W. 455 (1918). 
2. Contracts. I 
Engineer may not contract for road work in other counties. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 257. 
3. Drainage engineer. 
Employment of county engineer as, improper. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 635. 
4. Costs of engineering. 
Could be paid from proceeds of bonds. O.A.G. 1930, p. 52, 53. 
5. Liability. 
County officials and agents have the same immunity as county. 
Swartzwelker v. Iowa So. Utilities Corp., 216 Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
6. Workmen's compensation. 
Engineer held not "employee" under workmen's compensation law. McKinley 
v. Clarke County, 228 Iowa 1185, 293 N.W. 449 (1940). 
236. 
7. Extra compensation. 
No extra compensation for locating transmission lines. O.A.G. 1940, p. 
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309.22 
8. Warrants. 
Not to be issued against general fund where there are no funds therein 
unless purpose is within exceptions of s 343.11. O.A.G. 1930, p. 253. 
309.19 Adjacent Counties Joining in Employment 
1. Construction and application. 
Board of supervisors does not have power to hire or discharge county road 
employees without the engineer's approval; however, the supervisory 
responsibility of the county engineer should not be undercut. O.A.G. March 5, 
1969. 
309.20 Engineers - Itemized Account 
1. Construction and application. 
County engineer could only be allowed seven cents per mile. O.A.G. 1932, 
p. 70. 
Engineer should keep accounting showing maintenance and construction work 
done in each township. O.A.G. 1930, p. 324. 
309.21 Supervision of Construction and Maintenance Work 
1. In genera 1. 
Final authority for secondary road maintenance rests with county board of 
supervisors, which establishes policy for and accepts the reconmendations of 
the county engineer. O.A.G. Sept. 27, 1979. 
Supervision and responsibility for good faith performance of road work in 
engineer. O.A.G. 1948, p. 150. 
Contracts by Highway Commission and by supervisors for secondary road 
construction contemplating federal farm-to-market aid prohibited. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 624. 
2. Workmen's compensation. 
Engineer not "employee." McKinley v. Clarke County, 228 Iowa 1185, 293 
N.W. 449 (1940). 
County engineer could not, by delegating power to supervise, bar employee 
from workmen's compensation benefits. Schroyer v. Jasper County, 224 Iowa 
1391, 279 N.W. 118 (1938). 
3. Liability. 
County officials and agents have same immunities as county. Swartzwelker 
v. Utilities Corp., 216 Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
309.22 Construction Project - Progress Report by Engineer 
Index to Notes 
Anticipatory Certificates 7 
Approval by Highway Commission 4 
Board of Approval 3 
Construction and Application 1 
Expenses 5 
Funds 10 
Liability of Counties 8 
Machinery, Compensation for Use of 6 
Mandamus 9 
Program 2 
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1. Construction and application. 
Board of supervisors decision to close portion of secondary highway not 
part of construction program - board not required to consult trustees of 
township. Bricker v. Iowa County Bd. of Sup' rs, 240 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1976). 
County authorized to place traffic control devices on road not relieved 
of liability on theory that word "authorized" ends statute governing erection 
of stop signs at dangerous grade crossings was merely discretionary. Id. 
Factors to be considered by Highway Commission in withholding approval of 
county farm-to-market road project. O.A.G. March 28, 1962. 
Procedure in adopting program. O.A.G. 1g40, p. 454. 
2. Program. 
Binding only as to period fixed in the program. O.A.G. 1936, p. 529. 
Disapproval of program by Highway Commission renders entire program 
·subject to review by board. O.A.G. 1936, p. 465. 
Unused funds at end of three year program revert to general secondary 
road fund for redistribution. O.A.G. 1934, p. 337. 
3. Board of approval. 
Each member equal. O.A.G. 1938, p. 141. 
Program cannot be changed by supervisors. O.A.G. 1938, p. 42. 
Board must reconvene when property owners refuse to donate right of 
way. O.A.G. 1932, p. 79. 
4. Approval by Highway Commission. 
No authority in Highway Commission to recall a review of county's 
secondary road construction program with respect to the priority of 
construction of farm-to-market road. O.A.G. March 26, 1958. 
Priority of improvements of secondary roads within sound discretion of 
board of supervisors - not to be interfered with unless power abused. Id. 
Highway Commission's authority to approve county's secondary road 
program's conformance to standard plans and specifications. Id. 
Plans for construction on street or road which is continuation of trunk 
system must be approved by commission. O.A.G. 1940, p. 163. 
Board must secure approval of Highway Commission prior to expenditure of 
65% of construction fund on local roads. O.A.G. 1938, p. 793. 
Board of supervisors may readopt uncompleted three year program without 
approval by Board of Approval. O.A.G. 1938, p. 759. 
5. Expenses. 
Cost of replacing unsafe bridge on local county road from 35% fund unless 
over drainage ditch under 309.10. O.A.G. 1938, p. 445. 
6. Machinery, compensation for use of. 
In absence of agreement township cannot receive compensation from county 
for use of township machinery. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 661. 
7. Anticipatory certificates. 
Issuance of. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
8. Liability of counties. 
County not held liable for injuries caused by ne9ligent construction. 
Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa 81, 152 N.W. 12 (1915). 
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309.34 
9. Mandamus. 
Will lie to compel supervisors to build bridge over drainage ditch 
crossing highway. Robinson v. Bd., 222 Iowa 663, 269 N.W. 921 (1936). 
10. Funds. 
Secondary road fund's existence begins July 4, 1957. O.A.G. June 17, 
1957. 
309.23 Review by Department in.Operation of Program (No Annotations) 
309.24 Unifonn and Unified Plan Required (No Annotations) 
309.25 Material Considerations for Fann-to-Market Roads 
1. Construction and application. 
Factors considered by Highway Commission in approval of county farm-to-
market road project. O.A.G. March 28, 1962. 
Purpose of this section and following sections to provide local self 
government with a plan of checks and balances, the board to confer with the 
township trustees, adopt a sound program, with the final check and approval of 
the program by the Highway Commission. O.A.G. March 26, 1958. 
Priority of improvement of secondary roads lies in discretion of 
supervisors. O.A.G. 1951, p. 11. 
Determination of road location - board's discretion. Id. 
Judgement of court not to be substituted for judgement of board unless 
board failed to consider certain factors. Id. 
309.26 Provisional Selection of Roads (No Annotations) I 309.27 Report of Engineer 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1. Construction and application. 
Each member of Board of Approval has equal voice. O.A.G. 1938, p. 141. 
309.28 Rec0111Rendations (No Annotations) 
309.29 Map Required (No Annotations) 
309.30 Additional Estimates (No Annotations) 
309.31 to 309.33 Repealed Acts 1957 (57 G.A.) ch. 139 § 1. Eff. July 4, 
1957. 
309.34 Record Required 
1. Construction and application. 
Recording requirements of this section and section 309.43 are not 
satisfied by enrolling the road information in the minutes of the county board 
of supervisors. O.A.G. Nov. 17, 1977. 
Highway Commission approval of plans, specifications, surveys and reports 
for improvement of county roads required. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 311. 
121 
309.39 
309.35 Surveys Required 
1. Construction and application. 
Survey must be made where cost estimate exceeds $1,000.00 per mile. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 768. 
Plan of construction and surveys to justify it are necessary. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 711. 
2. Public letting. 
A public letting required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
309.36 Nature of Survey 
1. Construction and application. 
Standard of grading and drainage prescribed. O.A.G. 1950, p. 145. 
This section should be read with section 309.35 and section 309.37. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 768. 
309.37 Details of Survey 
1. Construction and application. 
Standard of grading and drainage prescribed. O.A.G. 1950, p. 145. 
Sections 309.35, 309.36, 309.37 must be considered together. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 768. 
Plan of construction and surveys to justify it are necessary. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 711. 
2. Public letting. 
A public letting required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
309.38 Existing Surveys (No Annotations) 
309.39 Contracts and Specifications 
Index to Notes 
Acceptance of Work 10 
Actions 14, 15 
Damages 15 
Assignments 5 
Bids 2, 3 
Rejection 3 
Breach of Contract or Performance 8, 9 
Change in Contract or Specifications 7 
Construction and Application 1 
Contracts 4 
Damages 15 
Estoppel or Waiver, Performance or Breach of Contract 9 
Payment 12 
Plans and Specifications 6, 7 
Change in Contract or Specifications 7 
Performance or Breach of Contract 8, 9 
Estoppel or Waiver 9 
Prior Laws, Construction of 13 
Rejection of Bids 3 
Specifications and Plans 6, 7 
Subcontractors' Rights 11 
Waiver, Performance or Breach of Contract 8, 9 
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309.39 
1. Construction and application. 
Certain requirements in discretion of board of supervisors. O.A.G. 1940, 
p. 465. 
Financial statement need not be filed prior to opening of bids, but must 
be filed prior to award. O.A.G. 1938, p. 761. 
Depth of ditches for authorities to decide. O.A.G. 1938, p. 184. 
2. Bids. 
Work in two counties on same road may be awarded to different contractor 
in each county. O.A.G. 1932, p. 53. 
3. Rejection of bids. 
Where right to reject exists, motive, in absence of fraud or conspiracy, 
is immaterial. Mortland v. Poweshiek County, 156 Iowa 720, 137 N.W. 1oog 
(1912). 
4. Contracts. 
Contractor held not employee. Grennell v. Cass County, 193 Iowa 6g7, 187 
N.W. 504 (1922). 
Board not personally liable for failing to let to lowest bidder. 
Mortland v. Poweshiek County, 156 Iowa 720, 137 N.W. 1009 (1912). 
Fraudulent contract. Van Buren County v. Amer. Surety Co., 137 Iowa 4go, 
115 N.W. 24 (1908). 
5. Assignments. 
Assignee acquires no greater right than assignor. Monona County v. 
O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (lg27). 
6. Plans and specifications. 
Advertisements should be definite and explicit. Gjellefald v. Hunt, 202 
Iowa 212, 210 N.W. 122 (1926). 
Bridge built on defective plan. Holland v. Union County, 68 Iowa 56, 25 
N.W. 927 (1885). 
7. Change in contract or specifications. 
Engineer, hired by board to superintend construction, has no authority to 
change specifications. Modern etc. Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 
N.W. 536 (1905). 
Consent to change by board in individual capacity does not ratify change 
in contract. Mallory v. Montgomery County, 48 Iowa 681 (1878). 
8. Performance or breach of contract. 
Material alteration may be fraud. Modern etc. Co. v. Van Buren County, 
126 Iowa 606, 102 N.W. 536 (1905). 
9. Esto,eel or waiver. 
Pub 1c use of bridge does not waive breach of contract for its 
construction. Modern etc. Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 N.W. 536 
(1905). 
10. Acceptance of work. 
Limitation on recovery by contractor. Mallory v. Montgomery County, 48 
Iowa 681 (1878). 
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11. Subcontractors' rights. I 
Charged with notice of provisions of the contract. Modern etc. Co. v. 
Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 N.W. 536 (1905). 
12. Payment. 
Installment payments for road machinery held improper and warrants 
void. Harrison County v. Ogden, 133 Iowa 9, 110 N.W. 32 (1906). 
Improper payment is no waiver by county. Modern etc. Co. v. Van Buren 
County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 N.W. 536 (1905). 
Issuance of warrants for work done· in prior years. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 
66. 
13. Prior laws, construction of. 
Theulen v. Viola Tp., 139 Iowa 61, 117 N.W. 26 (1908). 
Long v. Boone County, 36 Iowa 60 (1872). 
14. Actions. 
Rights of parties determined by the contract. Owens v. Butler County, 40 
Iowa 190 (1875). 
15. Damages. 
Violation of the contract. Modern etc. Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 
606, 102 N.W. 536 (1905). 
309.40 Advertisement and Letting 
Index to Notes 
Advertisement for Bids 4 
Completion of Contract 7 
Construction and Application 1 
Fraud 8 
Prior Laws, Construction of 9 
Public Letting of Contracts 6 
Purchase in Large Quantities 2 
Splitting up Projects or Purchases 5 
Waiver of Requirements 3 
1. Construction and application. 
County has authority to acquire materials which will be furnished for 
individual road projects, in lieu of including same as contract bid items when 
advertising a letting. O.A.G. Sept 15, 1976. 
"Contracts" and "projects" have same meaning. O.A.G. 1940, p. 47. 
This section only contemplates construction. O.A.G. 1938, p. 188. 
"Materials therefor" defined. O.A.G. 1938, p. 115. 
"Local" pits and quarries defined. O.A.G. 1938, p. 29. 
Gasoline may be purchased as needed on bid basis. O.A.G. 1934, p. 81. 
County may construct bridge if at lower cost than low bid. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 278. 
Cost-plus percentage basis improper. O.A.G. 1918, p. 508. 
2. Purchase in large quantities. 
County can maintain supply depot for jobs estimated at less than 
$1,500.00. O.A.G. 1930, p. 276. 
Statutory amount may not be exceeded. O.A.G. 1918, p. 506. 
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309.41 
3. Waiver of requirements. 
Emergency created by flood, no basis for waiver. O.A.G. 1936, p. 216. 
4. Advertisement for bids. 
Supervisors subject to removal for failure to advertise. State v. 
Garretson, 207 Iowa 627, 223 N.W. 390 (1929). 
No statutory duty of supervisors to advertise prior to purchase of road 
machinery and equipment. O.A.G. 1940, p. 47. 
Kind of advertising in discretion of board of supervisors in absence of 
statute. O.A.G. 1938, p. 731. . 
Requirement for advertising cannot be avoided by omitting engineer's 
estimate. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
This section does not require supervisors to purchase materials for 
secondary road maintenance by advertising for bids. O.A.G. 1936, p. 45. 
Bids could be rejected if county could do the work at less cost by day 
labor. O.A.G. 1932, p. 206. 
67. 
Cannot separate stages of work to avoid advertising. O.A.G. 1932, p. 98. 
Cannot purchase in small amounts to avoid advertising. O.A.G. 1932, p. 
Where advocate expenses will be excessive, advertising should be 
required. O.A.G. 1932, p. 11. 
No advertising necessary in case of road machinery. O.A.G. 1930, p. 237. 
Rejection of unsatisfactory bids pennitted. O.A.G. 1918, p. 511. 
5. Splitting up projects or purchases. 
May not split up project to avoid advertising for bids. O.A.G. 1940, p. 
157. O.A.G. 1940, p. 118. O.A.G. 1940, p. 47. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. O.A.G. 
1938, p, 179. O.A.G. 1932, p. 98. O.A.G. 1930, p, 285. O.A.G. 1928, p. 163. 
6. Public letting of contracts. 
Construction and material contracts for secondary roads and bridges 
within purview of this section must be advertised. O.A.G. August 29, 1972. 
No personal liability on part of board of supervisors for failure to 
accept low bid. Mortland v. Poweshiek County, 156 Iowa 720, 137 N.W. 1009 
(1912). 
Public letting required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
Where estimate exceeded statutory sum, advertising and public letting 
required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 115. O.A.G. 1938, p. 29. 
Projects should not be split up to avoid advertising. O.A.G. 1932, p. 
206. 
Responsibility of bidder is essential. O.A.G. 1928, p. 296. 
7. Completion of contract. 
New contract requires readvertising. O.A.G. 1918, p. 527. 
8. Prior laws, construction of. 
Theulen v. Viola Tp., 139 Iowa 61, 117 N.W. 26 (1908). 
309.41 Optional Advertisement and Letting 
1. Construction and application. 
"Materials therefor" means material for road and bridge construction 
generally. O.A.G. 1938, p. 115. 
Public letting required where statutory sum is exceeded. O.A.G. 1938, p. 
29. 
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Bids could be rejected if county could do the work at less cost by day I 
labor. O.A.G. 1932, p. 206. 
Where aggregate expenses will exceed statutory sum, advertising should be 
required. O.A.G. 1932, p. 11. 
2. Cost-plus basis. 
Improper. O.A.G. 1918, p. 508. I 
309.42 Approval of Road Contracts 
1. Construction and application. I 
Cannot purchase in small lots to avoid public letting and approval of 
commission. O.A.G. 1930, p. 285. 
City's and county's joint exercise of governmental powers to construct 2. Joint city-county contracts. I 
bridge and approaches. O.A.G. Sept. 18, 1967. 
309.43 Record of Bids 
1. Construction and application. 
Recording requirements satisfied. O.A.G. Nov. 17, 1977. 
309.44 Repealed Acts 1949 {53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 8. Eff. July 4, 1949. 
Subject matter of repealed section 309.44 is now covered by section 314.7. 
309.45 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 6. Eff. July 4, 1949. 
Subject matter of repealed section 309.45 is now covered by section 314.5. 
ANTICIPATION OF FUNDS 
309.46 Construction Fund Anticipated 
1. Construction and aeplication. 
Certificates ment1oned in section 309.46 et. seq. are not included in 
those mentioned in section 312.9. O.A.G. 1940, p. 112. 
The 35% construction fund that may be taken from funds anticipated. 
O.A.G. 1930, p. 189. 
2. Issuance of certificates. 
Board of supervisors authorized to pass on issuance of anticipatory 
certificates. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
Anticipatory certificates for secondary road construction purposes 
authorized under certain conditions. O.A.G. 1932, p. 252. 
3. Anticipatory warrants. 
Expenditure of entire proceeds of anticipatory warrants on trunk system 
authorized. O.A.G. 1930, p. 189. 
4. Bonds. 
Secondary road construction fund cannot be pledged to pay secondary road 
bonds. O.A.G. 1930, p. 155. 
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309.62 
309.47 Anticipatory Resolution 
1. Construction and application. 
Anticipatory certificates for secondary road construction purposes 
authorized under certain conditions. O.A.G. 1932, p. 252. 
309.48 Recitals 
1. Construction and application. 
Supervisors may determine whether anticipatory certificates should be 
issued. O.A.G. 1938, p. 838. 
Amount of anticipatory certificates that can be issued limited. O.A.G. 
1932, p. 252. 
309.49 Consecutive N1111bering and Payment (No Annotations) 
309.50 Execution (No Annotations) 
309.51 Taxation (No Annotations) 
309.52 Duty of Treasurer (No Annotations) 
309.53 Registration of Certificate Holders (No Annotations) 
309.54 Registration of New Holder (No Annotations) 
309.55 Terminating Interest (No Annotations) 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
309.56 Project Plans 
1. Construction and application. 
Submission of plans and specifications, surveys and reports to Highway 
Co111T1ission required. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 311. 
309.57 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 2. 
Subject matter·of repealed section is now covered by section 314.1. 
309.58 Action on Bond - Limitation (No Annotations) 
309.59 to 309.60 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~~ 4, 5. 
Subject matter of repealed section 309.59 is now covered by section 314.3. 
Subject matter of repealed section 309.60 is now covered by section 314.4. 
309.61 Advance Payment of Payrolls (No Annotations) 
309.62 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 9. 
Subject matter of repealed section 309.62 is now covered by section 314.8. 
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309.65 
309.63 Gravel Beds 
1. Validity. 
Merritt v. Peet, 237 Iowa 1200, 24 N.W.2d 757 (1946). 
2. Construction and application. 
Board of supervisors has this power solely. O.A.G. 1936, p. 214. 
340. 
County has power to purchase or condemn for borrow pit. O.A.G. 1930, p. 
Cannot condemn lands outside county or in cities and towns. O.A.G. 1925-
26, p. 420. 
Township has right to gravel from county pit without payment therefore. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 394. 
Purchase from county road fund of gravel for township roads not 
authorized. Id. 
3. Condemnation proceedings. 
Within discretion of the board of supervisors. O.A.G. 1936, p. 214. 
l111Tiaterial that land condemned is not gravel pit. O.A.G. 1928, p. 370. 
Condemnation procedure, limit of cost $10,000 without submitting to 
voters. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 289. 
4. Contracts. 
Construction and damage to remaining land. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 
232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
5. Purchase of gravel or gravel beds. 
Board of supervisors may purchase gravel secured or in its natural 
state. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 420. 
Cannot purchase gravel beds in cities or towns. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 199. 
Five acres and cost of $10,000 is maximum purchase. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 
266. 
6. Liability on implied contract. 
I 
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Implied promise to pay value of sand and gravel used and not for 1· 
restoration of land. Harrison v. Palo Alto County, 104 Iowa 383, 73 N.W. 872 (1898). 
7. Roadway. 
Use of roadway to pit did not establish a public highway. Merritt v. 
Peet, 237 Iowa 1200, 24 N.W.2d 757 (1946). 
8. Mortgagor, recovery by. 
Measure of damages for removal of gravel. Bates v. Humboldt County, 224 
Iowa 841, 227 N.W. 715 (1938). 
309.64 Repealed Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 103, ~ 22. 
For new provisions relating to highways, enacted coincident with this 
repeal, see section 306.1 et. seq. 
309.65 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 10. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.9. 
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309.67 
309.66 Use of Gravel Beds 
1. Construction and application. 
Supervisors could not grade private road despite offer to pay. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 837. 
Supervisors may permit persons, cities and towns to take gravel, without 
charge, for road or street improvement. O.A.G. 1938, p. 189. 
Improper to use county gravel for private roads. O.A.G. 1932, p. 53. 
309.63, 309.66 do not authorize supervisors to buy gravel for township 
road use out of county road fund. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 394. 
2. Township's rights. 
Township has right to gravel from county pit. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 394. 
Township need not pay county for gravel used on township roads. O.A.G. 
1923-24, p. 123. 
3. Disposal of surplus. 
Supervisors could dispose of surplus sand for commercial purposes. 
O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 259. 
Material in gravel pit not practicable for roads and streets may be 
sold. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 197. 
309.67 Duties of County Board of Supervisors and the County Engineer 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Care Required of County 6 
District Supervisor, Liability of 9 
Duty to 
Inspect 2 
Repair 3 
Increased Distance Traveled during Repairs, 
Compensation for 4 
Injunction 10 
Judicial Supervision· 5 
Liability of County 8 
Warning of Danger 7 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty runs to all those rightfully using roads - breach by either 
negligent commission or omission. Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 
1977). 
This section inapplicable for alleged pollution of artificial farm 
pond. Conrad v. Board of Sup'rs of Lee County, 199 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1972). 
County boards of supervisors have only power conferred are implied by 
statute. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa 1968). 
Where grade interupted natural flow, county required to open grade and 
allow escape of water. Droegmiller v. Olson, 241 Iowa 456, 40 N.W.2d 292 
(1950). 
Supervisors duty to maintain continuously in best condition practicable 
and remove obstruction, including snow, from secondary roads extends to any 
portion of a road not vacated and closed. O.A.G. March 21 1980. 
Final authority for secondary road maintenance and board of supervisors, 
which establishes policy for and accepts the recommendations of the county 
engineer. O.A.G. September 27, 1979. 
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Workers' compensation for employees of county engineer's office may be 
paid from secondary road fund. O.A.G. August 30, 1976. 
County has no duty to plow secondary road designated snow mobile route. 
No liability for injuries. O.A.G. October 14, 1974. 
County may not maintain a road as part of secondary road system unless 
such road is legally a "public road." O.A.G. April 21, 1969. 
Board of supervisors does have power to hire or discharge county road 
employees without the engineer's approval; however, the supervisory 
responsibility of the county engineer should not be undercut. O.A.G. March 5, 
1969. 
Supervision and responsibility for good faith performance of work in 
engineer. O.A.G. 1948, p. 150. 
Contracts may be ratified if supervisors would have had authority to 
enter into such contract. O.A.G. 1932, p. 2. 
In removal of gravel, consideration must be given to lateral support of 
land of adjacent owner. O.A.G. 1913-14, p. 141. 
2. Duty to inspect. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Duty to discover defects caused by elements. Brooks v. Van Buren County, I 
155 Iowa 282, 135 N.W. 1110 (1912). 
3. Duty to repair. 
Counties have statutory duty to keep in safe condition all bridges and 
their approaches located upon or which form part of any secondary road system I 
located within their boundaries. Larsen v. Pottawattamie County, 173 N.W.2d 
579 (Iowa 1970). 
Prerogative of closing secondary road bridges over railroad crossings 
rests with board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
A strip of land used as access by public to cemetery part of secondary I 
road system and must be maintained by board of supervisors. O.A.G. January 
25, 1966. 
County under no obligation to repair drainage tile installed by private 
party across farm-to-market road. O.A.G. March 17, 1961. 
Conditions for board to be charged by this section with duty of repair I" 
and maintenance of road. O.A.G. March 3, 1955. 
County required to repair bridge if road supervisor failed to do so. 
Roby v. Appanoose County, 63 Iowa 113, 18 N.W. 711 (1884). 
County bridges which county is required to repair. Chandler v. Fremont 
1 County, 42 Iowa 58 (1875). Soundness of fund for construction of bridge not material to duty to repair. Moreland v. Mitchell County, 40 Iowa 394 (1875). 
4. Increased distance, compensation. 
No provision for payment to rural mail carriers or extra mileage during I 
construction. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 242. 
5. Judicial supervision. 
That there may be an abuse of discretion is insufficient grounds to I 
restrain board of supervisors. Denison v. Watts, 97 Iowa 633, 66 N.W. 886 {1896). 
6. Care required of county. 
County's duty to keep county roads open, in repair and free from nuisance I 
did not extend beyond persons using road to persons outside road and owning 
property adjoining. Conrad v. Board of Sup' rs of Lee County, 199 N.W.2d 139 ( Iowa 197 2) • 
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7. Warning of danger. 
Duty owed to the traveling public is to warn of danger. Owens v. Iowa 
County, 186 Iowa 408, 16g N.W. 388 (1918). 
8. Liability of county. 
Cause of action against county engineer and members of board of 
superviors for injuries - breach of duty to maintain county road in proper 
condition. Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 1977). 
Violation of duty to maintain roads in safe condition results in 
liability to users of road. Conrad v. Board of Sup'rs. of Lee County, 1gg 
N.W.2d 13g (Iowa 1972). 
Costs of restoring polluted pond to original condition assessed. Id. 
Prior decision held not controlling. Post v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 183, 
191 N.W. 129 (1922), rehearing overruled, 196 Iowa 183, 1g4 N.W. 245 (1922). 
County not liable for harm caused by obstruction left by contractor. 
Grennell v. Cass County, 193 Iowa 697, 187 N.W. 504 (1922). 
9. District supervisor - liability. 
Not liable for damages resulting from defects where repairs involve 
extraordinary expenditures. Wilson & Gustin v. Jefferson County, 13 Iowa 181 
(1862). 
10. Injunction. 
Where grade interrupted natural flow, county required to open grade and 
allow escape of water. County entitled to injunction against maintenance of 
dike by land owner. Droegmiller v. Olson, 241 Iowa 456, 40 N.W.2d 292 (1950). 
Road supervisor could enjoin construction of dike which would cause water 
to flow on road. Myers v. Priest, 145 Iowa 81, 123 N.W. g43 (1909). 
309.68 Intercounty Highways 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Joint city-county bridges 3 
Withdrawal from undertaking 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Greene.County secondary road funds may be used to assist in the opening 
of a connecting road in Guthrie County. O.A.G. June 15, 1970. 
This section does not authorize the construction of a road entirely 
within one county. O.A.G. May 6, 1969. 
Public highway on corporate line, duty to maintain on city and county. 
O.A.G. 1g39, p. 346. 
Improvement of inter-county highway. O.A.G. 1928, p 375. 
2. Withdrawal from undertaking. 
Agreement by adjoining counties to construct bridge binding on both, and 
neither could withdraw without the other county's consent. Bremer County v. 
Walstead, 130 Iowa 164, 106 N.W. 352 (1906). 
3. Joint city-county bridges. 
City and county may enter into agreement to construct bridge and 
approaches under certain circumstances. O.A.G. September 18, 1967. 
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309.69 Enforcement of Duty 
1. Construction and application. 
Highway comm1ss1on could not advance primary road funds in a city for 
city project with agreement to reimburse by city. O.A.G. 1938, p. 769. 
Highway commission has no authority to contract for construction of 
secondary road projects with view to procuring federal farm-to-market aid. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 624. 
Highway commission empowered to determine all matters relating to 
improvement of county bridge or culvert on a township road. O.A.G. 1925-26, 
p. 106. 
2. Contracts. 
When widening of primary road extension in city authorized, two contracts 
may be required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 769. 
309.70 - 309.71 Repealed Acts 1982 (69 G.A.) ch. 1110, ~ 12. 
309.72 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 11. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.10. 
309.73 Repealed Acts 1981 (69 G.A.) ch. 117, ~ 1097; see~ 331.441 (2"B")(2). 
309.74 Width of Bridges and Culverts 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Contracts 5 
Duties of Travelers 6 
Notice to County 7 
Repairs 4 
Wider Bridges 3 
Width of Bridges in General 2 
1. Construction and application. 
No negligence in the fact that a bridge was constructed with a central 
truss. Shannon v. Council Bluffs, 194 Iowa 1294, 190 N.W. 951 (1922). 
Bridge maintained by city is within definition of streets and 
sidewalks. Sachs v. Sioux City, 109 Iowa 224, 80 N.W. 336 (1899). 
Minimum width of bridges must be complied with. Gould v. Schermer, 101 
Iowa 582, 70 N.W. 697 (1897). 
Supervisors had no authority to construct bridge over navigable lake 
owned by state. Snyder v. Foster, 77 Iowa 638, 42 N.W. 506 (1889). 
Width prescribed is mandatory. O.A.G. 1938, p. 115. 
2. Width of bridaes in general. 
Should be wi e enough to permit passage of all vehicles and farm 
machinery drawn on the highways. Quinton v. Burton, 61 Iowa 471, 16 N.W. 569 (1883). 
Contract by supervisors for bridge only 14 feet wide did not render the 
action void. Mallory v. Montgomery County, 48 Iowa 681 (1878). 
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3. Wider Bridges. 
No prohibition against bridges wider than minimum specified. Rusch v. 
City of Davenport, 6 Iowa 443, 6 Clarke 443 (1858). 
4. Repairs. 
Whole width of bridge must be kept in repair. Rusch v. City of 
Davenport, 6 Iowa 443, 6 Clarke 443 (1858). 
5. Contracts. 
Contractor's right of action not avoided because contract was for bridge 
less than 16 feet wide. Mallory v. Montgomery County, 48 Iowa 681 (1878). 
6. Duties of tr ave 1 ers. 
To avoid colliss1ons with trusses and guard rails of bridges. Shannon v. 
Council Bluffs, 194 Iowa 1294, 190 N.W. 951 (1922). 
7. Notice to county. 
Notice may be amended to change insufficient width. Magee v. Jones 
County, 161 Iowa 296, 142 N.W. 957 (1913). 
309.75 Definitions 
1. Construction and a lication. 
count~~~:ems~tn e ~Ri9iQ~ Ri~gt~~~. ty3fi0~~~~uI~4~ ~o~dH:w~i~g~ ~YgB6J. 
Statutory limitations on expenditures do not apply to bridge expenditures 
from farm-to-market road. O.A.G. 1944, p. 123. O.A.G. 1954, p. 157. 
2. Authorization from Voters. 
Voters can authorize construction of a bridge in excess of some fixed by 
statuc8~st~O~t~on1 ~h9e~g~s~·o~4~tatutory amount may be authorized by board of 
electors of county. O.A.G. 1918, p. 305. 
3. Resolutions. 
Agreements by adjoining counties to construct a bridge binding on each. 
Bremer County v. Walstead, 130 Iowa 164, 160 N.W. 352 (1906). 
No statutory authority for supervisors to pay for construction of a 
bridge in another county. O.A.G. 1922, p. 228. 
. 309.16 - 309.18 Repealed Acts 1963 (60 G.A.) ch. 186, ~ ~ 1-3. 
309.79 Bridge Specifications 
1. Construction and application. 
The prerogative of closing secondary road bridges over railroad crossings 
rests with board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 5, 1974. 
Engineer and budget director required to keep within standard plans and 
specifications. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 480. 
309.79, 309.80 give highway commission supervision over plans for county 
bridges and culverts. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 311. 
2. A~proval of highway commissioner. 
rior to effectiveness of contract for bridge on secondary road. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 480. 
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3. Contracts. 
Changes must be consistent with plans and specifications adopted. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 480. 
309.80 Repealed Acts 82, ch.1110, ~ 12; see ~ 309.42. 
309.81 Record of Plans 
1. In fienera l. 
Pu lie letting necessary. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
309.82 Record of Final Cost 
1. In general. 
Public letting necessary. O.A.G. 1938, p. 711. 
309.83 Repealed Acts. 1978 (67 G.A.) ch. 1108, ~ 24. 
309.84 Repealed by Act 82, ch.1104, ~61. 
309.85 - 309.88 Repealed by Act 81, ch. 117, ~ 1097. 
309.89 Repealed by Act 81, ch. 117, ~ 1097; see~ 331.441(2"c")(3). 
309.90 Repealed. Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 12. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.11. 
309.91 Repealed. Act 81, ch. 117, ~ 1097. 
309.92 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 3. 
For provisions similar to those repealed, see section 314.2. 
COUNTY SECONDARY ROAD BUDGETS [NEW] 
309.93 Itemized Statement. Former section 309.93, Acts 1947 (52 G.A.) ch. 
163, ~ 5, was repealed by Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 129, § 1. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 311.7. 
309.94 Review by Department (No Annotations) 
309.95 Amendments 
1. In general. 
Workers' compensation for employees of the county engineer's office may 
be paid from secondary road fund. O.A.G. August 30, 1976. 
309.96 Operation of Budgeted Program (No Annotations) 
309.97 Construction of Law (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 310 
FARM-TO-MARKET ROADS 
310.1 Definitions (No Annotations) 
310.2 Supervisors Agreement 
1. Construction and application. 
Highway commission lacked authority to contract for construction of 
secondary road projects with view towards federal aid authorized for farm-to-
market roads. O.A.G. 1938, p. 624. 
2. Contracts. 
County may legally enter into agreement with the state of Iowa to 
construct a local farm-to-market road to primary standards. O.A.G. April 30, 
1971. 
Counties may enter into agreements and arrangements with state or federal 
authorities assigning a portion of their share of the farm-to-market road fund 
to used to match federal funds for highway planning. O.A.G. July 16, 1963. 
Where a town agreed to pay certain sum to county for street improvements, 
to obtain federal aid agreement was not ultravires or void. Humboldt County 
v. Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1924). 
3. Actions. 
County was real party in interest in an action to compel levy of tax for 
highway improvements. Humboldt County v. Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 
53 (1924). 
310.3 Funds 
1. Construction and application. 
Judgment against county cannot be paid from fund provided for by this 
section and section 310.4. O.A.G., November 3, 1980. 
Neither the secondary road research fund nor any other road use tax fund 
may be used to pay for a Tesearch project insurance survey to determine the 
risks and the insurance needs of the several counties. O.A.G. March 6, 1972. 
Use of funds for secondary road research authorized. O.A.G. May 26, 
1955. 
Refunds should be credited to fund from which payments were made. O.A.G. · 
1928, p. 44. 
310.4 Use of Fund 
1. Construction and application. 
Judgment against county cannot be paid from fund provided for by ~ 310 3 
and this section. O.A.G., November 3, 1980. • 
A county may legally enter into an agreement with the state of Iowa to 
construct a local farm-to-market road to primary standards. O.A.G. April 30, 
1971. 
A county board of supervisors may lawfully establish, construct and/or 
maintain extensions of secondary roads in cities and towns, using county road 
funds to finance the work. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
City or town retains chief responsibility for maintenance of street which 
is an extension of a secondary road. Id. 
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Counties may enter into agreements and arrangements with state or federal 
authorities assigning a portion of their share of the farm-to-market road fund 
to be used to match federal funds for highway planning such as traffic counts 
and research. O.A.G. July 16, 1963. 
Farm-to-market funds may not be used for re-rocking or re-graveling a 
farm-to-market road. O.A.G. May 9, 1956. 
Advancement of county road funds for farm-to-market construction -
reimbursement required. O.A.G. 1952, p. 102. 
Approval and concurrence of highway commission required. Id. 
310.5 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 122, ~ 11. 
310.6 Accounts by Department (No Annotations) 
310.7 Treasurer's Monthly Statement (No Annotations) 
310.8 Quarterly Statement to County Engineer (No Annotations) 
310.9 Projects Approved by Department 
1. Construction and application. 
Approval of claims is subject to discretion of highway commission. 
O.A.G. 1948, p. 160. 
310.10 Farm-to-Market Road System Defined 
1. Construction and application. 
County board of supervisors may lawfully establish, construct and/or 
maintain extensions of secondary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. March 5, 
1970. 
City or town retains chief responsibility for maintenance of street which 
is an extension of secondary road. Id. 
Highway commission's withholding approval of county farm-to-market road 
project resolutions - factors to be considered. O.A.G. March 28, 1962. 
There is contemplated a separate program for farm-to-market roads. 
O.A.G. 1940, p. 403. 
310.11 Participating County - Funds Reserved 
1. Construction and application. 
State highway commission's withholding approval of county farm-to-market 
road project resolutions - factors to be considered. O.A.G. March 28, 1962. 
Approval of claims is subject to discretion of highway commission. 
O.A.G. 1948, p. 160. 
310.12 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 127, ~ 5. 
310.13 Surveys, Plans and Estimates 
1. In general. 
State highway commission's withholding approval of county farm-to-market 
road project resolutions - factors to be considered. O.A.G. March 28, 1962. 
310.14 Bids - Department or County Supervisors 
1. Construction and application. 
Approval of claims is subject to discretion of highway commission. 
O.A.G. 1948, p. 160. 
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310.26 
310.15 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, § 2. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.1. 
310.16 Claims Charged to County Allotment (No Annotations) 
310.17 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 4. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.3. 
310.18 Partial Payments During Construction (No Annotations) 
310.19 Supervision and Inspection of Work {No Annotations) 
310.20 Supervisors Resolution to State Treasurer 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Transfer of Funds 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Funds in a county farm-to-market road fund may be accumulated. O.A.G. 
May 21, 1965 . 
County local road tax funds may be accumulated. Id. 
Augmenting farm-to-market funds from future share of road use tax funds 
authorized. O.A.G. 1954, p. 157. 
2. Transfer of funds. 
Local funds (local road tax funds) may be transferred into the farm-to-
market road fund for accumulation. O.A.G. May 21, 1965. 
310.21 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 6. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.5. 
310.22 Right of Way - ffm1 Acquired 
1. Construction and application. 
Payment for right of way acquired by county out of secondary road fund 
does not bar reimbursement by highway commission following prompt submission 
of claim. O.A.G. 1951, p. 66. 
County can acquire right of way or request highway commission to do so. 
0.A.G. 1940, p. 323. 
310.23, 310.24 Repealed Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 103, § 22. 
For new provisions relating to highways, enacted coincident with this 
repeal, see section 306.1 et. seq. 
310.25 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 125, ~ 7. 
Subject matter of repealed section is now covered by section 314.5. 
310.26. Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 127, ~ 5. 
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1. Construction and application. 
County may or may not surface secondary road with concrete pavement when 
petitioned under this section. O.A.G. Oct. 14, 1976. 
Selection of roads - petition. O.A.G. 1950, p. 131. 
Use of farm-to-market funds for one-half cost authorized subject to 
approval of Highway Commission and Bureau of Public Roads. O.A.G. 1950, p. 
120. 
Change in construction program from three year to one year program not 
required but existing program must be modified to include new work under this 
section. O.A.G. 1950, p. 105. 
2. Preference. 
Deposits to secure priority must be made in cash. O.A.G. 1952, p. 48. 
Preference applied to that 35% of construction fund supervised by board 
of approval concerning selection of roads. D.A.G. 1950, p. 131. 
Petition for surfacing filed under section 311, Code 1950, which road 
includes bridges not in service at time of filing entitled to no preference. 
O.A.G. 1950, p. 152. 
No limit to number of petitions that may be granted preference so long as 
funds for doing work are available. O.A.G. 1950, p. 105. 
3.. Donations. 
Deposit of required donation bars establishment of assessment district. 
O.A.G. 1950, p. 131. 
4. Road construction. 
Surfacing requirement made by board could be modified by it. O.A.G. 
1950, p. 152. 
Permanent grade required before surfacing. O.A.G. 1950, p. 145. 
5. Payment for road. 
Use of farm-to-market funds to grade and pay for one-half of surfacing 
authorized when road part of farm-to-market system. O.A.G. 1950, p. 120. 
6. Subscriptions and assessments. 
All abutting landowners must subscribe and pay proportionate share of 50% 
of cost where petition signed by 70-5% of abutting and adjacent landowners. 
See opinion. O.A.G. 1950, p. 131. 
7. Petition. 
Signer of petition cannot withdraw after filing even though not acted 
on. O.A.G. 1950, p. 131. 
8. Percentage of owners. 
Percentage of owners determined by area owned - not lineal frontage. 
O.A.G. 1954, p. 46. 
9. Refunds. 
Funds in hands of county treasurer for payment of cost of improvement are 
not subject to payment of proportionate refunds following completion of 
project and determination of final cost, which is lower than engineer's 
estimated cost. O.A.G. June 16, 1955. 
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311.8 County Engineer's Report 
·1. Construction and application. 
Engineer must advise board on permanent grade and drainage upon filing of 
petition. O.A.G. 1950, p. 145. 
311.9 Publicly Owned Real Estate (No Annotations) 
311.10 Estimate and Apportionment - Presumption 
1. Construction and application. 
Funds in hands of county treasurer for payment of improvement not subject 
to payment of proportionate refunds following comp~etion of project at cost 
lower than engineer's estimate cost. O.A.G. June 16, 1955. 
311.11 Hearing - Notice (No Annotations) 
311.12 Publication of Notice (No Annotations) 
311.13 Errors in Notice or Apportionment Record (No Annotations) 
311.14 Appearance (No Annotations) 
311.15 Hearing - Adjournment - Order (No Annotations) 
311.16 Final Hearing - Assessment Levied 
1. Interest. 
Interest commences 20 days following adoption of resolution. O.A.G. 
1950, p. 152. 
311.17 Assessments over $10.00 - Waiver (No Annotations) 
311.18 Assessment Delinquent - Penalties (No Annotations) 
311.19 Assessment $10.00 or Less (No Annotations) 
311.20 Variation Between Estimated and Actual Cost (No Annotations) I 311.21 Procedures (No Annotations) 
I 
I 
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311.22 Road Graded and Drained (No Annotations) 
311.23 Payment of Construction Costs (No Annotations) 
311.24 Appeal from Assessment 
1. Construction and application. 
Payment of cost of improvement not subject to payment of proportionate 
refund following completion of project at cost lower than engineer's estimated 
cost. O.A.G. June 16, 1955. 
311.25 Appeal Docketed (No Annotations) 
311.26 Assessments Certified to County Treasurer (No Annotations) 
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311.27 Each District Separate Unit (No Annotations) 
311.28 Certificates Anticipating Assessments (No Annotations) 
311.29 Sale of Certificates (No Annotations) 
311.30 Certificates Registered - Payment (No Annotations) 
311.31 Previous Assessments not Invalidated (No Annotations) 
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321.2 
CHAPTER 312 
ROAD USE TAX FUND 
312.l Fund Created 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Use of Fund 2 
1. Construction and application. 
A judgment against a county cannot be paid from the fund provided for by 
this section and section 312.2. O.A.G., November 3, 1980. 
Pledge of state's general credit not improper. Frost v. State, 172 
N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969). 
Billboards, signs and junkyards outside the right-of-way on lands 
adjacent to public highways not part of highways - primary road funds may not 
be used for purchasing same. O.A.G. Feb. 16, 1972. 
2. Use of fund. 
Bikeways properly constructed using road use tax money. O.A.G. Jan. 14, 
1977. 
Neither secondary road research fund nor any other road use tax fund may 
be used to pay for a research project insurance survey to determine the risks 
and insurance needs of the several counties. O.A.G. March 6, 1972. 
Safety rest areas part of public highways - no prohibition against use of 
primary road fund for construction. O.A.G. Jan. 16, 1968. 
312.2 Allocations from Fund 
Index to Notes 
Alleys 2 
Construction and Application 1 
Safety Rest Areas 3· 
Validity 1/2 
1/2 Validity. 
Subdivision nine authorizing expenditure of road use tax funds is 
constitutional. O.A.G. April 26, 1979. 
1. Construction and application. 
A judgment against a county cannot be paid from the fund provided for by 
section 312.1 and this section. O.A.G., November 3, 1980. 
Pledge of state's general credit not improper. Frost v. State, 172 
N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969). 
Functional classification and jurisdiction of highways bill does not 
require a change in distribution of the road use tax fund. O.A.G. May 17, 
1973. 
Refunds made in error from the general fund may be corrected. O.A.G. May 
26, 1972. 
Neither secondary road research fund nor any other road use tax fund may 
be used to pay for a research project insurance survey to determine the risks 
and insurance needs of the several counties. O.A.G. March 6, 1972. 
Billboards, signs and junkyards outside the right-of-way on lands 
adjacent to public highways not a part of highways - primary road funds not to 
be used for purchasing same. O.A.G. Feb. 16, 1972. 
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Road use tax funds allocated to cities and towns cannot be used for 
sidewalk construction which is not part of a street construction project. 
O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Sums credited to primary road fund for expenses incurred by secondary and 
urban road departments cannot be used for secondary road research expenses. 
O.A.G. May 15, 1963. 
Primary road fund available for development of roads surfaced with gravel 
or crushed rock. O.A.G. 1953, p. 72. 
2. Alleys. 
Not the same as highway. O.A.G. June 4, 1973. 
Road use tax funds may not be used by cities and towns for construction 
or maintenance of alleys. O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
3. Safety rest areas. 
Part of public highways - no prohibition against use of primary road fund 
for construction. O.A.G. Jan 16., 1968. 
312.3 Apportionment to Counties and Cities 
Index to Notes 
Census 2 
Construction and Application 
Use of Funds 3 
1. Construction and application. 
Apportionment based on federal census. Harp v. Abrahamson, 248 Iowa 222, 
80 N.W.2d 505 (1957) •. 
2. Census. 
Effect of correction of U.S. Census Bureau mistake. O.A.G. May 8, 1970. 
Cities and towns may have one federal census taken each decade to be used 
in apportionment of road use tax fund and liquor control fund. 
O.A.G. Jan. 19, 1967. 
3. Use of funds. 
Safety rest areas part of public highways - no prohibition against use of 
primary road fund for construction. O.A.G. Jan. 16, 1968. 
312.4 Treasurer's Report to the Department of Transportation (No 
Annotations) 
312.5 Division of Fann-to-Market Road Funds 
1. Construction and application. 
County boards of supervisors may spend farm-to-market road funds for road 
and bridge construction without submitting their resolution to the voters. 
O.A.G. May 21, 1965. 
In distributing equalization farm-to-market funds under this section it 
is not necessary to take into consideration the additional mileage added by 
counties to farm-to-market system in 1956. O.A.G. July 17, 1958. 
Use of the equalization farm-to-market fund referred to in this section 
is not limited to the original farm-to-market system referred to in section 
310.10, but may be expended on additions to the farm-to-market system since 
the enactment of that law. O.A.G. May 9, 1956. 
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312 .7 
Highway Commission is authorized under section 310.34 to set aside out of 
the receipts in the farm-to-market funds enumerated in section 310.3, the one 
and one-half percent for secondary road research prior to allocation of the 
funds to the counties as provided in this section. O.A.G. May 26, 1955. 
Advancement of county road funds for farm-to-market roads authorized 
providing approval and concurrence obtained from Highway Commission. O.A.G. 
1952, p. 102. 
312.6 Limitation on Use of Funds 
Index to Notes 
Alleys 3 
Construction and Application 1 
Engineering Expenses 2 
Parking 4 
Sidewalks 6 
Traffic Control Signals 5 
1. Construction and application. 
State authorized to use road use tax fund in payment of preliminary 
engineering services. Slapnicka v. City of Cedar Rapids, 139 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 
1965). 
A municipality may use street funds to erect a garage and house to 
maintain road construction and maintenance machinery and equipment. O.A.G. 
June 2, 1969. 
Road use tax funds may be used for maintenance of roads and streets. 
O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
Road use tax funds may be used for payment of street bonds. Id. 
Narrow uses to which road use tax money may be put. Id. 
2. Engineering expenses. 
Necessary to and part of construction. O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
3. Alleys. 
Road use tax funds not to be used by cities and towns for construction 
of. O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
4. Parking. 
Permissible expenditure of road use tax funds for repair, surfacing, 
maintenance, etc. Douglass v. Iowa City, 218 N.W.2d 908 ((Iowa 1974). 
Road use tax funds not to be used for acquisition or improvement of real 
estate for parking purposes. Id. 
Road use tax funds not available for on or off-street parking. O.A.G. 
Dec. 13, 1961. 
5. Traffic control signals. 
Road use tax funds not available therefor. O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
6. Sidewalks. 
Road use tax funds not to be used where sidewalk not part of a street 
construction project. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Road use tax funds not available for sidewalk purposes. O.A.G. Dec. 13, 
1961. 
312.7 Balance Maintained in Fund (No Annotations) 
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312.8 Amana Colonies (No Annotations) 
312.9 Repealed Acts 1978 (67 G.A.) ch. 1108, § 24. 
312.10 Repealed Acts 1978 (67 G.A.) ch. 1108, § 24. 
312.11 Accounts of Expenditures (No Annotations) 
312.12 Program Submitted (No Annotations) 
312.13 Repealed. Acts 1973 (65 G.A.) ch. 205, § 2; Acts 1974 (65 G.A.) ch. 
1096, § 53. Eff. June 13, 1974. 
312.14 Cities to Submit Report (No Annotations) 
312.15 When Funds not Allocated (No Annotations) 
312.16 Definition (No Annotations) 
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313.2 
CHAPTER 313 
; 
IM>ROV9ENT IF PRI~RY ROADS 
313.1 Federal and State Cooperation 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 2 
Validity of Fuel Tax Law 1 
Wage Scale 3 
Widening Projects 4 
1. Validity of fuel tax law. 
Valid. 
2. Construction and application. 
Authority of Highway Commission is plenary and court will interfere only 
in case of manifest abuse of such power and authority. Porter v. Highway 
Commission, 241 Iowa 1208, 44 N.W.2d 682 (1950). 
Cost of manpower and equipment to assist in flood prevention should be 
reimbursed to primary road fund. O.A.G. May 12, 1969. 
No authority in Highway Commission to require payment of prescribed 
minimum wage scale on non-federal participation highway construction 
projects. O.A.G. July 26, 1968 (No. S68-7-5}. 
Highway Commission has no authority except by statute. Merchants Motor 
Freight v. Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 N.W.2d 773 (1949). · 
State may delegate power over highways to Highway Commission. Iowa Ry & 
Light Corp. v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), followed State v. 
Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467 (Iowa 1g30), and Central States 
Electric Co. v. Pocahontas County, 231 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1930). 
Use of part of primary road fund for statewide highway planning proper. 
O.A.G. 1g40, p. 235. 
2. Wage scale. 
Highway Commission authorized to fix minimum wage scale where federal 
funds used. O.A.G. 1936, p. 548. 
3. Widening projects. 
Use of primary road fund for widening authorized. O.A.G. 1938, p. 518. 
313.2 •Road Systems• Defined - Roadside Parks 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Rights-of-Way 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Regarding functional classification system. O.A.G. Jan 5, 1976. 
Highway Commission and county board of supervisors not authorized to 
exchange land. O.A.G. Oct. 16, 1972. 
County board of supervisors agreement with Highway Commission to accept 
road into county secondary road system - excessive traffic count. O.A.G. June 
24, 1965. 
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313.22 
Primary road funds usable to widen approach to city viaduct. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 518. 
Cost of bridge on primary road in town could be paid from primary road 
fund. O.A.G. 1922, p. 214. 
I 
I 
I 
3. Bonds, use of proceeds of. I 
City may pledge its credit for taking or damaging of homes for purposes 
of widening public street and relocating primary highway. Gardner v. Charles 
City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1956). 
4. Salvage. 
Sections 391.6 and 391.7 apply where highway commission is permitted to 
extend primary road system through a city or town. O.A.G. 1938, p. 199. 
5. Billboards and Advertising Signs. 
Jurisdiction of highway commission not extended to cover primary road 
extensions. O.A.G. 1940, p. 180. 
6. Liability of cities. 
City has duty of street maintenance. Smith v. Algona, 232 Iowa 362, 5 
N.W.2d 625 (1942). 
7. Reconstruction and improvement. 
Action to restrain allegedly illegal diversion of surface water onto land 
owners land. Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 521, 94 
N.W.2d 773 (1959). 
City or town retains chief responsibility for maintenance of a street 
which is an extension of a secondary road. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
County board of supervisors may lawfully establish, construct and/or 
maintain extensions of secondary roads in cities and towns. Id. 
8. Widening streets. 
City and commission authorized to damage homes for purposes of widening 
public street and relocating primary highway. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 
Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
9. Review. 
City and commission authorized to take or damage homes for purpose of 
widening public street and relocating primary highway - owners not entitled to 
judicial review. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). . 
10. Pleading. 
Mere conclusions that proposed acts of city were unreasonable, 
unnecessary, arbitrary, and unjust. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 
144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
313.22 Paving of Whole Street by Department 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1/2 
Eminent Domain 1 
1/2. Construction and application. 
Condemnation commission was properly constituted pursuant to section 
472.4. Halweg v. City of Sioux City, 189 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1971). 
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313.36 
Chapter 306A authorizes the state highway commission to expand the 
concept of primary extension to include relocations, or reconstructions or 
establishments of local service streets. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
1. Eminent domain. 
City and commission authorized to take or damage homes for purpose of 
widening public street and relocating primary highway. Gardner v. Charles 
City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
313.23 Reimbursement by City 
1. Construction and application. 
Chapter 306A authorizes the state highway commission to expand the 
concept of primary extension to include relocations, or reconstructions or 
establishments of local service streets. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
Highway commission could not expend primary road fund in city for city 
project. O.A.G. 1938, p. 769. 
313.24 Separated Cities (No Annotations) 
313.25 Repealed. Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 103, ~ 22. 
313.26 Repealed. Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 103, ~ 22. 
313.27 Bridges, Viaducts, Etc., on Municipal Primary Extensions 
1. Construction and application. 
City could be assessed for benefits derived from construction of culvert 
by drainage district within city limits. Drainage Dist. No. 119, Clay County 
v. Incorporated City of Spencer, 268 N.W. 2d 493 (Iowa 1978). 
"Bridges" do not include "culverts." Id. 
Highway commission has authority to relocate extension of primary highway 
in city without obligation of placing abandoned route in any specified 
condition of repair. O.A.G. March 30, 1973. 
313.28 Temporary Primary Road Detours (No Annotations) 
313.29 Detours located in City (No Annotations) 
313.30 to 313.34, inc., Code 1946, transferred to sections 313.59 to 313.65, 
inclusive. 
313.35 Repealed Acts 1949 (53 G.A.) ch. 225, ~ 7. 
313.36 Maintenance - limitation in Cities 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Duty of Care 4 
Maintenance 2 
Patrolmen 3 
Snow and Ice Removal 6 
Weather Information 5 
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1. Construction and apglication. 
State's statutoryuty to make highways safe must be judicially reviewed 
on tort requirement to act as reasonable and prudent Department of 
Transportation would act, reasonableness requires fact finder to balance 
danger of outmoded device, increase in new device safety or design, cost, 
available resources, and other hazards which pose danger to motorists. Butler 
v. State, 336 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1983). 
Statutory duty requires highways be maintained in a safe condition and 
the traveling public be warned of conditions endangering travel, whether 
caused by a force of nature or by act of third persons. Koehler v. State, 263 
N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1978). 
State has duty to place proper barriers, railings, guards and danger 
signals at obstructions in dangerous places on a highway when necessary for 
travelers' safety and performance of that duty is measured by a reasonableness 
standard in light of totality of circumstances. Id. 
2. Maintenance. 
Duty of reasonable care with respect to proper maintenance of extensions 
of primary road system in city. Smith v. City of Algona, 232 Iowa 362, 5 
N.W.2d 625 (1942). 
3. Patrolmen. 
As to recovery of workmen's compensation. Schroyer v. Jasper County, 224 
Iowa 1391, 279 N.W. 118 (1938). 
4. Duty of care. 
States required to exercise ordinary care to maintain highways in safe 
condition and to warn traveling public of conditions endangering travel, 
whether cause by a force of nature or by the act of third persons. Hunt v. 
State, 252 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1977). 
Rule that possessor of property is not obligated to eliminate known and 
obvious dangers does not apply to city's mandatory duty to keep its 
thoroughfares and public places safe. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 
1976). 
Evidence supported trial court's finding that state was negligent in 
failing to eliminate hazard after notice thereof. Id. 
5. Weather information. 
Those who have the duty to maintain highways are required to make 
reasonable use of weather information to anticipate adverse road conditions. 
Hunt v. State, 252 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1977). · 
6. Snow and ice removal. 
No negligence in failing to remove snow drift from public highway. 
Koehler v. State, 263 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1978). 
Reasonable length of time within which state must remove large quantities 
of snow and ice from public highways depends on facts and circumstances of 
each case and is generally a question for jury. Id. 
313.37 Road Equipment 
Authority and responsibility for purchase, assignment, control and sale 
of all state owned motor vehicles. O.A.G. December 15, 1969. 
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Release of interest in paving machine patents - procedure. O.A.G. 1950, I 
p. 137. 
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313.67 
Contracts with foreign corporations for purchase of road material or 
·equipment subject to restrictions in section 494.9. O.A.G. 1934, ·p. 390. 
2. Use of equipment. 
Highway commission may permit use of machinery acquired from the U.S. at 
state institutions. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 267. 
313.38 to 313.40 Repealed Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 107, ~ 9. 
For provisions relating to primary roads, enacted coincident with this 
repeal, see ~ ~ 313.4, 313.6, 313.8, 313.14, 313.18, 313.20, 313.27, and 
313.36. 
313.41 Repealed Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 165, ~ 26. 
313.42 Definition (No Annotations) 
MARKINGS FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
313.43 Lateral or Detour Routes in Cities and Towns (No Annotations) 
313.44 Standard Markings Required (No Annotations) 
313.45 Cost (No Annotations) 
313.46 to.313.57 Repealed Acts 1951 (54 G.A.) ch. 103, ~ 22. 
For new provisions relating to highways, inacted coincident with this 
repeal, see section 306.l et. seq. 
313.58 Repealed Acts 1978 (67 G.A.) ch. 1108, ~ 24. 
INTERSTATE BRIDGES - GIFT OR PURCHASE I 313.59 Gift of Bridge to State - Acceptance (No Annotations) 
I 
I 
313.60 Indebtedness Payed (No Annotations) 
313.61 Taxes Forgiven (No Annotations) 
313.62 Highway C<Xllllission Authority (No Annotations) 
313.63 Action by Adjoining State (No Annotations) 
313.64 Financial Statement Annually (No Annotations) 
313.65 Approval of Taxing Bodies (No Annotations) 
~ 313.66 Mississippi Bridges Purchased (No Annotations) 
313.67 Scenic and Improvement Fund (No Annotations) 
I 
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313A.39 
313A.36 Purposes of Power Granted 
1. Construction and application. 
Revenue bonds issued by highway commission to finance interstate toll 
bridge acquisitions not subject to taxation by or within state. O.A.G. April 
26, 1972. 
313A.37 Failure to Pay Toll - Penalty (No Annotations) 
313A.38 Independent of Any Other Law (No Annotations) 
313A.39 Construction 
1. Construction and application. 
Invalidity of certain sections of this chapter would not destroy the 
entire act. Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969). 
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314.5 
CHAPTER 314 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS FOR HIGIWAYS 
314.1 Bidders' Statements of Qualifications - Basis for Awarding Contracts 
1. Construction and application. 
Construction and material contracts for secondary roads and bridges 
withing purview of section 309.40 must be advertised and let at a public 
letting. O.A.G. August 29, 1972. 
Supervisors may reject bids and proceed to construction in accordance 
with this section. Id. 
Construction of a sewage disposal lagoon is an improvement requiring a 
contract to be let after bidding. O.A.G. October 28 1965. 
Advancement of county road funds for farm-to-market construction limited 
in reimbursement to funds actually expended. O.A.G. 1952, p. 102. 
314.2 Interest in Contract Prohibited 
1. Construction and apelication. 
Contracts entered into between highway commission and legislators may be 
invalidated by the commission. O.A.G. May 31, 1972. 
A corporation in which the county engineer is a majority stockholder is 
prohibited from bidding on contracts for highway construction, maintenance, 
etc. in his own county as well as in other counties. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
Contract involving a direct or indirect interest to the contracting 
supervisor would be prohibited by this section. O.A.G. June 22, 1965. 
Direct interest prohibited, indirect interest depends on facts in each 
case. O.A.G. June 16, 1955. 
314.3 Claims - Approval and Payment 
1/2. In general. 
Notarization requirement. O.A.G. March 25, 1968. 
314.4 Partial Payments (No Annotations) 
314.5 Extensions in Certain Cities 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Street Improvements 2 
1. Construction and application. 
Authority to relocate extension of primary highway in city without 
obligation of placing abandoned route in any specified condition of repair. 
O.A.G. March 30, 1973. 
County board of supervisors may improve secondary road extension lying 
entirely in a city, but the boards act cannot bind future boards to 
appropriate for the same project. O.A.G. July 27, 1962. 
A town is not authorized to let a contract for town and county work 
within town to be reimbursed by county. O.A.G. May 31, 1962. 
Duty to repair and maintain secondary road extensions discretionary in 
board of supervisors. O.A.G. 1950, p. 176. 
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2. Street ·improvements. 
County board of supervisors have authority to aid cities and towns in 
street repair if streets are secondary road extensions. O.A.G. May 6, 1974. 
City or town retains chief responsibility for maintenance of a street 
which is an extension of a secondary road. O.A.G. March 5, 1970. 
Agreement between town and its county whereby town may have advantages of 
county facilitites and services regarding street improvements. O.A.G. May 31, 
1962. 
314.6 Highways along City Limits (No Annotations) 
314.7 Trees - Ingress or Egress - Drainage 
Index to Notes 
Construction and Application 1 
Drainage 2 
Ingress and Egress 4 
Trees 3 
1. Construction and application. 
Courts are not denied right to grant landowners mandatory injunctive 
relief against state highway commission for floodin~. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 196g). 
Test of whether reasonable ingress and egress has been destroyed based on 
length of time used. Perkins v. Palo Alto County, 245 Iowa 310, 60 N.W.2d 562 (1953). 
2. Drainage. 
Property owner relief for highway construction causing excess water 
draining over plaintiff's land. Rosendahl Levy v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 171 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1969). 
Highway construction causing substantial change in contour of land, loss 
of top soil, taking away absorption of drainage water by percolation, and 
causing water on landowner's property violated this section, landowner's 
entitled to relief. Id. 
Landowner's anticipation of drainage problems did not preclude action in 
equity for injunction against state highway commission for highway 
construction causing surface water to drain over landowner's property in 
excessive and accelerated quantities. Id. 
Landowners entitled to injunctive relief where construction of highway on 
hill caused substantial drainage problems. Illegal diversion of surface water 
onto landowners' land. Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 
521, 94 N.W.2d 773 (1g5g). 
Digging of extension ditch along roadside authorized when volume of water 
not increased. Morrow v. Harrison County, 250 Iowa 725, 64 N.W.2d 52 (1954). 
Acquiescence of landowner to existence of roadside ditch converts it into 
natural water course. Perkins v. Palo Alto County, 245 Iowa 310, 60 N.W.2d 
562 (lg53). 
Drainage by landowners authorized where connections with highway ditch 
are made in accordance with specifications furnished by highway authorities. 
O.A.G. January 3, 1974. 
3. Trees. 
Material obstruction to highway and interference with improvement and 
maintenance. Carstensen v. Clinton County, 250 Iowa 487, 94 N.W.2d 734 (1959). 
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315.15 
4. Ingress and egress. 
Street closing preventing access to restaurant owners' property not a 
"taking" of property as contemplated by the constitution. Blank v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1128, 109 N.W.2d 713 (1961). 
314.8 Government Markers Preserved (No Annotations) 
314.9 Entering Private land 
1. In general. 
Argument that highway commission should have same right of entry as that 
given condemnors for electric transmission lines under section 489.15 is 
matter for legislature and not court. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Hipp, 
259 Iowa 1082, 147 N.W.2d 195 (1966). 
Highway commission did not have right to enter upon or explore land 
before proceedings to acquire it. Id. 
314.10 State line Highways (No Annotations) 
314.11 Use of Bridges by Utility Companies (No Annotations) 
314.12 Borrow Pits - Top Soil Preserved (No Annotations) 
~ 314.13 Definitions (No Annotations) 
315.15 Flight Strips. Repealed by Acts 1970 (63 G.A.) ch. 1030, ~ 5. 
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OIAPTER 316 
RELOCATION CF PERSONS DISPLACED BY HIGHWAYS (NEW) 
316.l Definitions (No Annotations) 
316.2 Effect upon Property Acquisition (No Annotations) 
316.3 Declaration of Policy {No Annotations) 
316.4 Moving and Related Expenses {No Annotations) 
316.5 Replacement Housing for Haneowner (No Annotations) 
316.6 Replacement Housing for Tenants and Certain Others (No Annotations) 
316.7 Relocation Assistance Advisory Services (No Annotations) 
316.8 Housing Replacement by Department as Last Resort (No Annotations) 
316.9 Rules Adopted 
1. Construction and application. 
The Iowa relocation assistance act provides for payments separate from 
and in addition to just compensation payable in condemnation proceedings. 
O.A.G. November 20, 1970. 
Adjustments in such relocation assistance payments are required to 
prevent unjust enrichment when a property has been condemned, and departmental 
rules may be formulated as provided in this section. Id. 
316.10 Applicable to Other than Federal-Aid Highways (No Annotations) 
316.11 Acquistions by Other State Agencies and Political Subdivisions 
1. Construction and application. 
The Iowa traveling library may do all things to comply with section 316.1 
et. seq. O.A.G. August 31, 1972. 
316.12 Payments not to be Considered as Income (No Annotations) 
316.13 A<ininistration (No Annotations) 
316.14 Funding (No Annotations) 
316.15 Federal Grants (No Annotations) 
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317.1 Noxious Weeds 
1/2. In general. 
317.3 
CHAPlER 317 
WEEDS 
Section 319.14 relating to changes in right-of-way does not prevent the 
burning or spraying of right-of-way, nor does chapter 317 prevent such actions 
although they may be restrained by the board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 9, 
1980. 
1. Cities and towns, duties of. 
Destruction of noxious weeds in corporate limits by city mandatory. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 802. 
Weed law does not apply to extermination of ordinary types of weeds. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
2. Streets and alleys. 
Board of supervisors have authority to cut ordinary weeds in streets and 
alleys. O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
3. Vacant lots. 
Supervisors have no authority to mow other than noxious weeds. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 408. 
317.2 State Botanist 
1. Construction and application. 
County weed commissioner may not also be employed as solid waste disposal 
program head. O.A.G. April 2, 1g75_ 
317.3 Weed C00111issioner 
1. Construction and application. 
County boards of supervisors have only such powers as are expressly 
conferred by statute or impliedly conferred. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 
754 (Iowa 1g68). 
County weed commissioner and deputy not entitled to receive reimbursement 
for mileage expense incurred commuting from residence to county courthouse. 
O.A.G. September 12, 1g80. 
Duty of board of supervisors to prescribe weed eradication program. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
Weed law does not apply to extermination of ordinary types of weeds. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
2. Township weed commissioners under prior law. 
O.A.G. 1940, p. 161. O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. O.A.G. 1930, p. 161. 
3. Cities or towns, weed commissioners. 
Whether or not city should appoint weed commissioner was in discretion of 
counsel. O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
Weed commissioner paid from general fund. Township commissioner paid 
from county treasury. O.A.G. 1930, p. 139. 
4. Duties of weed commissioners. 
In case of failure of property owner to act. O.A.G. 1938, p. 762. 
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5. Expense of destroyin, weeds. 
Payable from genera fund of highway commission or county. O.A.G. 1938, 
p. 497. 
I 
I 
I 
6. Liability for commissioners' acts. I 
County not liable to landlord or tenant for loss due to sraying. O.A.G. 
1940, p. 398. 
317.4 Direction and Control 
1/2. In general. 
Statute providing that weed commissioner has authority to enter any land 
in his county to perform duties circumscribed by specific authority for 
purpose of destroying weeds. Lingle v. Crawford County, 315 N.W.2d 814 (Iowa 
1982). 
1. Program. 
Duty of board of supervisors to prescribe weed eradication program. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
2. Expense. 
Payable from general fund of highway commission or county. O.A.G. 1938, 
p. 4g7. 
317.5 Weeds in Abandoned Cemeteries (No Annotations) 
317.6 Entering Land to Destroy Weeds - Notice 
1. Construction and application. 
Weed eradicating equipment may not be used on private lands except as 
prescribed in this chapter. O.A.G. 1g49, p. 206. 
Notice required is that under section 317.14. O.A.G. 1938, p. 762. 
317.7 Report to Board 
1. Construction and application. 
Mandatory duty imposed to make annual report to board of supervisors. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
"Tract" means any contiguous quantity of land· owned by a person or 
company. O.A.G. 1930, p. 179. 
317.8 Duty of Secretary of Agriculture (No Annotations) 
317.9 Duty of Board to Enforce 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty of board of supervisors to prescribe weed eradication program. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
317.10 Duty of Owner or Tenant 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty of owner of fee title to land occupied by waste banks of drainage 
ditch to eradicate weeds thereon. O.A.G. 1948, p. 191. 
Weed law does not apply to destruction of other types of weeds within 
cities and towns. O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
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2. Cities and towns, weeds in. 
Destruction of weeds mandatory. O.A.G. 1938, p. 802. 
Authority of township trustees and city council to compel destruction. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 295. 
3. Railroad right of way. 
Privately owned land intervening between highwa,y and railroad right of 
way must be kept weed free by private owner. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 148. 
Where railroad right of way parallels highway with no intervening 
privately owned land duty is on railroad. O.A.G. 1916, p. 34. 
4. Highways, weeds on, duty of landowner, default by landowner. 
O.A.G. 1932, p. 56. O.A.G. 1930, p. 179. O.A.G. 1913-14, p. 217. 
5. Ditches, weeds in. 
Duty of landowner extends to ditches. O.A.G. 1930, p. 152. 
6. Expense. 
Payable from general fund of highway commission or county. O.A.G. 1938, 
p. 497. 
7. Actions for damages. 
Against adjoining landowners for letting noxious weeds grow on his 
land. Harndon v. Stulz, 124 Iowa 734, 100 N.W. 851 (1904). 
8. Injuncton. 
Against permitting continuance of growth of weeds on private property. 
Harndon v. Stulz, 124 Iowa 734, 100 N.W. 851 (1904). 
317.11 Weeds on Roads or Highways 
1. Construction and application. 
Destruction of weeds is governmental function of county. O.A.G. 1948, p. 
242. 
56. 
Landowners duty to keep highways free from weed.growth. O.A.G. 1932, p. 
Authority in township trustees and city council to compel destruction of 
weeds. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 295. 
317.12 Weeds on Railroad or Public Lands and Gravel Pits 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Authority in towns ip trustees and city council to compel destruction of 
weeds. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 295. 
Where railroad parallels highway with no privately owned land between 
duty is on railroad. O.A.G. 1916, p. 34. 
317.13 Program of Control 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty of board of supervisors to prescribe weed eradication program. 
0.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
Authority in township trustees and city council to compel destruction of 
weeds. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 295. 
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317.14 Notice of Program 
1. Construction and application. 
Notice required by section 317.6 is notice under this section. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 762. 
317.15 loss or Damage to Crops 
1. Construction and application. 
Weed commissioner has authority to destroy weeds despite the fact that 
damage to crops may result. O.A.G. 1g40, p. 202. 
317.16 Failure to Comply 
1. Construction and application. 
Weed eradicating equipment may not be used on private lands except as 
prescribed in this chapter. O.A.G. 1948, p. 206. 
"Forthwith" means within a reasonable time. O.A.G. 1g38, p. 762. 
2. Cities and towns. 
Destruction of weeds in cities and towns required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 802. 
3. Damage to crops. 
Weed commissioner has authority to destroy weeds despite the fact that 
damage to crops may result. O.A.G. 1940, p. 202. 
4. Assessments for destroying weeds. 
Addition of an amount equal to 25 per cent of actual cost of 
destruction. O.A.G. 1948, p. 242. 
317.17 Additional Noxious Weeds 
1. Construction and application. 
Cost assessed to defaulting landowner. O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
317.18 Order for Destruction on Roads 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
Weed law not applicable to destruction of other types of weeds in cities 
and town. O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
2. liability of counties. 
Destruction of weeds a governmental function of county. O.A.G. 1g48, p. 
242. 
317.19 Road Clearing Fund 
1. Construction and application. 
Destruction of weeds a governmental function of county. O.A.G. 1948, p. 
242. 
317.20 levy for Equipment and Materials - Use on Private Property 
1. Construction and application. 
Weed eradicating equipment may not be used on private lands except as 
prescribed in this chapter. O.A.G. 1948, p. 206. 
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Expense of weed eradication payable from general fund of highway 
commission or county. O.A.G. 1938, p. 497. 
2. Cities and towns. 
Destruction of weeds in cities and towns required. O.A.G. 1938, p. 802. 
Weed law not applicable to destruction of other types of weeds in cities 
and towns. O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
3. Assessment of cost of destruction. 
Addition to assessment of an amount equal to 25 per cent of actual cost 
of destruction. O.A.G. 1948, p. 242. 
Assessment to be against each lot, tract or partial in accordance with 
the platting. O.A.G. 1940, p. 191. 
Cost assessed against defaulting landowner where new weeds are declared 
noxious. O.A.G. 1938, p. 766. 
Cost of destruction of weeds not assessed to abutting owner but payable 
from secondary road maintenance fund. O.A.G. 1932, p. 93. 
Adjoining in case of primary road must cut weeds. O.A.G. 1930, p. 179. 
317.21 Cost of Such Destruction 
1. Construction and application. 
Where board of supervisors did not comply with certain requirements, 
county treasurer could not assess the property under section 443.12 to realize 
the cost of the destruction of weeds. O.A.G. July 18 1963. 
Weed law not applicable to ordinary weeds within cities and towns. 
O.A.G. 1938, p. 408. 
317.22 Duty of Highway Maintenance Personnel 
1. Construction and application. 
Weed law not applicable to ordinary weeds within cities and towns. 
O.A.G. 1g33, p. 408. 
317.23 Duty of County Attorney (No Annotations) 
317.24 Punisllnent of Officer 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Destruction of wee s a governmental function of county. O.A.G. 1948, p. 
242. 
317.25 Teasel Prohibited (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 319 
OOSTRUCTIONS IN HIGHWAYS 
319.l Removal 
Index to Notes 
Abatement of Obstruction 16 
Acquiescence 12 
Actions for Removal of Obstructions 17 
Construction and Application 1 
Damages 24 
Dikes 10 
Estoppel 13 
Evidence 20 
Expense of Removal 11 
Fences 9 
Injunction 15 
Instructions 22 
Judgment or Decree 25 
Jury Questions 21 
Limitation of Actions 18 
Mandamus 14 
Motives in Removing Obstructions 5 
Obstructions in General 3 
Pleadings 19 
Poles on Highways 8 
Proximate Cause 23 
Repeal 2 
Review 26 
Right to Obstruct Highway 4 
Snow 6 
Water 7 
1. Construction and application. 
Violation of duty to maintain roads in safe condition results in 
liability to users of the road. Conrad v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Lee County, 199 
N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1972). 
Board of supervisors has authority to remove obstructions. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 291. 
Not duty of county attorney to remove obstructions. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 
500. 
Jurisdiction of road supervisor is over roads in his district. O.A.G. 
1909, p. 239. 
2. Repeal. 
This statute did not repeal Code section now 657.2. State v. Berry, 12 
Iowa 58 (1861). 
3. Obstructions aenerally. 
Obstruct1onet1ned. Koehler v. State, 263 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1978). 
Excavation in highway an obstruction. Patterson v. Vale, 43 Iowa 142 
(1876). 
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4; Right to obstruct highway. 
Fences on right-of-way give owner no right to encroach. Dickson v. Davis 
County, 201 Iowa 741, 205 N.W. 456 (1925). 
Cannot obstruct highway because it is less than statutory width. State 
v. Robinson, 28 Iowa 514 (1870). 
5. Motives in removing obstructions. 
Notice of county authorities immaterial. Rabiner v. Humboldt County, 244 
Iowa 1190, 278 N.W. 612 (1938). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6. Snow. I 
Duty of township trustees to remove snow. O.A.G. 1928, p. 297. 
7. Water. 
Owner could not compel change to divert water collected by her. I 
Brightman v. Hetzel, 183 Iowa 385, 167 N.W. 89 (1918). 
8. Poles on highways. 
Highway authorities have right to determine whether utility facilities 
shall be placed upon and along rights-of-way of such roads. Iowa Power & I 
Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 
(1962). 
Authority of railroad commissioners to grant franchise and designate 
routes. Iowa Ry. & Light Corp. v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), 1 followed State v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467 (Iowa 1930), and Central States Electric Co. v. Pocahontas County, 231 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1930). Relocation of poles by highway officials authorized. O.A.G. 1928, p. 
184. 
9. Fences. 
Authority and duty of highway officials to remove fences in right-of-
way. Richardson v. Derry, 226 Iowa 178, 284 N.W. 82 (1939). Quinn v. Baage, 
138 Iowa 426, 114 N.W. 205 (1907). 
Notice to owner required. Cook v. Gaylord, 91 Iowa 219, 59 N.W. 30 
(1894). 
Owner may move fence up to right-of-way line. State v. Schieb, 47 Iowa 
611 (1878). 
Owner may not fence travelled road even though it is obstructed by 
natural means. State v. McGee, 40 Iowa 595 (1875). 
Direct obstruction of highway prohibited. Mosher v. Vincent, 39 Iowa 607 
(1874). 
10. Dikes. 
May be a public nuisance. Meyers v. Priest, 145 Iowa 81 (1909). 
1. Expense of removal. 
Borne by owner. O.A.G. 1938, p. 318. 
12. Acquiescence. 
Doctrine has no application to obstructions. Richardson v. Derry, 226 
Iowa 178, 284 N.W. 82 (1939). 
13. Estof pel. 
Coun y not estopped by continued use of right-of-way of adjoining 
owner. Knight v. Acton, 187 Iowa 597, 173 N.W. 30 (1919). Brightman v. 
Hetzel, 183 Iowa 385, 167 N.W. 89 (1918). Quinn v. Monona County, 140 Iowa 
105, 117 N.W. 1100 (1908). Bigelow v. Ritter, 131 Iowa 213, 108 N.W. 218 
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(1906}. Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co., 97 Iowa 342, 62 N.W. 231 (1896). Miller 
v. Schenk, 78 Iowa 372, 43 N.W. 225 (1889). 
14. Mandamus. 
Within board's discretion as to how to remove dust as obstruction on 
highway. Shannon v. Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 255 Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 
(1963). 
Appropriate remedy to compel authorities to remove obstructions. Cook v. 
Gaylord, 91 Iowa 219, 59 N.W. 30 (1894). Patterson v. Vale, 43 Iowa 142 
(1876). Larkin v. Harris, 36 Iowa 93 (1872). 
15. Injunction. 
Interest in abating must be special. Rider v. Narigon, 204 Iowa 530, 215 
N.W. 497 (1927). Livingston v. Cunningham, 188 Iowa 254, 175 N.W. 980 
(1920). Bryan v. Petty, 162 Iowa 62, 143 N.W. 987 (1913). Bradford v. Fultz, 
167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925 (1914). 
By county. Webster County v. Wasem Plaster Co., 188 Iowa 1158, 174 N.W. 
583 (1919). 
To prevent closing of a highway. Long v. Wilson, 186 Iowa 834, 173 N.W. 
76 (1919). 
Against an individual. Ford v. Doolittle, 157 Iowa 210, 138 N.W. 397 
(1912). 
By district road superintendent. Myers v. Priest, 145 Iowa 81, 123 N.W. 
943 (1909). 
One who obstructs a highway cannot have injunction against another 
party. Brutche v. Bowers, 122 Iowa 226, 97 N.W. 1076 (1904}. 
Availability in case of special injury. Houghan v. Harvey, 33 Iowa 203 
(1872}. Ewell v. Greenwood, 26 Iowa 377 (1869). 
16. Abatement of obstruction. 
By persons suffering therefrom. Arbaugh v. Alexander, 151 Iowa 552, 132 
N.W. 179 (1911). 
17. Actions for removal of obstructions. 
By road ·supervision of township. Ford v. Doolittle, 157 Iowa 210, 138 
N.W. 397 (1912). 
Obstruction of access to abutter's premises. Miller v. Schenck, 78 Iowa 
372, 43 N.W. 225 (1889). 
Special injury necessary. Brant v. Plumer, 64 Iowa 33, 19 N.W. 842 
(1884). 
18. Limitations of actions. 
Statute of limitations does not run against city or county with respect 
to encroachments. Richardson v. Derry, 226 Iowa 178, 284 N.W. 82 (1939). 
Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa 426, 114 N.W. 205 (1907). 
19. Pleadings. 
Petition must describe location of obstruction. Sloan v. Rebman, 66 Iowa 
81, 23 N.W. 274 (1885). 
20. Evidence. 
Dedication. City v. McCurnin, 180 Iowa 510, 163 N.W. 345 (1917). 
Encroachment of fence on highway. Meyers v. Wonick, 180 Iowa 286, 163 
N.W. 203 (1917). 
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21. Jury questions. 
Reasonable time to remove obstructions a jury question. Mosher v. 
Vincent, 39 Iowa 607 (1874). I 
22. Instructions. (No Annotations) 
23. Proximate cause. (No Annotations) I 
24. Damages. 
Duty of board of supervisors and engineer of county to maintain county I 
roads in proper condition runs to all those rightfully using the roads and a 
breach of that duty can occur either by negligent commission or omission. 
Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 1977). 
25. Judgment or decree. (No Annotations) 
26. Review. (No Annotations) 
319.2 Fences and Electric Transmission Poles 
Index to Notes 
Actions for Removal of Obstructions 7 
Construction and Application 1 
Evidence 8 
Injunction 6 
Jury Questions 9 
Mandamus 5 
Notice 3 
Obstructions 2 
Relocation of Poles 4 
Review 10 
1. Construction and application. 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize telephone company to place 
underground cable along untraveled portion of highway without consent of 
abutting landowner who holds underlying fee. O.A.G. March 13, 1970. 
Removal of transmission line poles during road improvement authorized. 
O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 182. 
Authority of county and township officials to remove signs affirmed. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 291. 
2. Obstructions. 
What constitutes a direct obstruction (fence). Mosher v. Vincent, 39 
Iowa 607 (1874). 
3. Notice. 
Statutory notice must be given. Harbacheck v. Moorland Telephone Co., 
208 Iowa 552, 226 N.W. 171 (1929). 
Fences not part of boundary fences may be removed without notice. Davis 
v. Pickerell, 139 Iowa 186, 117 N.W. 276 (1908). 
Notice not required where obstruction is not direct. Blackburn v. 
Powers, 40 Iowa 681 (1875). 
Fence may not be taken out without notice even if it is in right-of-way 
line if not a direct obstruction. Mosher v. Vincent, 34 Iowa 478 (1874). 
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4. Relocation of poles. 
Authority and Highway Commission to determine whether utility facilities 
shall be placed upon and along rights-of-way of controlled-access highways. 
Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 
N.W.2d 425 (1962). 
Highway officers authorized to relocate poles despite federal regulation 
of company. O.A.G. 1928, p. 184. 
No authority in county or township to pay for relocation of poles. 
O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 182. 
5. Mandamus. 
Reasonable notice to remove obstruction from highway a question of 
fact. Cook v. Gaylord, 91 Iowa 291, 59 N.W. 30 (1894). 
6. Injunction. 
Showing of establishment of highway by county road records. Davelaar v. 
Marion County, 224 Iowa 669, 277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
7. Actions for removal of obstructions. 
Officials having duty to remove obstructions may show unlawful 
obstruction due to void vacation of road. Heery v. Roberts, 186 Iowa 61, 170 
N.W. 405 (1919), rehearing denied, 186 Iowa 61, 172 N.W. 161 (1919). 
8. Evidence. 
Board of supervisors in action to remove a fence as an obstruction must 
show that it had jurisdiction to establish the highway. Davelaar v. Marion 
County, 224 Iowa 669, 277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
9. Jury questions. 
Reasonable time to remove fence question for jury. Mosher v. Vincent, 39 
Iowa 607 (1874). 
10. Review. 
New matter on appeal not considered. Davelaar v. Marion County 224 Iowa 
669, 277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
319.3 Notice 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
By registered mai - ineffective. Harbacheck v. Moorland Telephone Co., 
208 Iowa 552, 226 N.W. 171 (1929). 
Reconstruction of highway - removal of poles and lines. O.A.G. June 29, 
1950. 
Authority of county and township officials to remove signs. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 291. 
319.4 Refusal to Renove 
1. Construction and application. 
Reconstruction of highway - removal of poles and lines. O.A.G. June 29, 
1950. 
County engineer not an employee of county for workmen's compensation 
purposes. McKinley v. Clarke County, 228 Iowa 1185, 293 N.W. 449 (1940). 
O.A.G. 1950, p. 176. 
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2. Injunction. 
Based on adverse possession against highway officials will not lie. 
Richardson v. Derry, 226 Iowa 178, 284 N.W. 82 (1939). 
Board of supervisors must show it had jurisdiction to establish road in 
an action to enjoin the board from removing a fence. Davelaar v. Marion 
County, 224 Iowa 669, 277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
Injunction may issue to prevent improper removal of fence. Bolton v. 
McShane, 67 Iowa 2D7, 25 N.W. 135 (1885). 
319.5 New Lines 
1. Construction and application. 
Legislature did not intend for county to make expensive surveys. O.A.G. 
1940, p. 374. 
Duty of engineer is to designate location of lines in highway. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 318. 
2. County engineer's powers. 
Fixing of location lines on the highway - extent of power. Iowa Ry. & 
Light Corp. v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), followed in State 
v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467 (Iowa 1930). 
3. A~tlication for local line. 
atute directory can be waived. Swartzwelter v. Iowa So. Utilities 
Corp., 216 Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
On primary highways application must be made to Highway Commission. 
O.A.G. 1936, p. 525. 
4. Location of poles. 
Must not overhang adjoining private land. Iowa Ry & Light Corp. v. 
Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), followed in State v. Central 
States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467 (Iowa 1930) and Central State Electric Co. 
v. Pocahontas County, 231 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1930). 
If poles overhang on private land, company is not trespasser if it obeyed 
orders of engineer. Brammer v. Iowa Telephone Co., 182 Iowa 865, 165 N.W. 117 (1917). 
Engineer does not merit extra compensation for locating lines. O.A.G. 
1940, p. 236. 
Written memo of designation of location should be filed with auditor. 
O.A.G 1938, p. 318. 
5. Survey by engineer. 
At expense of applicant. O.A.G. 1938, p. 318. 
Survey need not be made by engineer - alternative method of relocation. 
O.A.G. 1930, p. 224. 
6. Expenses. 
Expenses incident to locating line cannot be charged to owner of line. 
O.A.G. 1940, p. 236. O.A.G. 1940, p. 364. 
7. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Presumption that written application was filed for relocation of lines. 
Swartzwelter v. Iowa etc. Corp., 216 Iowa 1060, 259 N.W. 121 (1933). 
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8. Evidence. 
Danger of electric wires stretched across street judicially noticed. 
Incorporated Town of Ackley v. Central States Electric Co., 204 Iowa 1246, 214 
N.W. 879 (1927). 
319.6 Cost of Removal - Liability 
1. Construction and application. 
Generally, utility poles and lines must be relocated at owner's cost. 
Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 31 N.W.2d 
5g7 (Iowa 1975). 
Notice to remove does not imply a promise to pay for removal. Hall v. 
Union Co., 206 Iowa 512, 219 N.W. 929 (1928). 
Owner of obstruction must pay cost of removal. O.A.G. 1938, p. 318. 
2. Injunction. 
Showing legal establishment of road by county road records. Davelaar v. 
Marion County, 224 Iowa 669, 277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
3. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
An action to enjoin removal of fence must show jurisdiction in it to 
establish the highway. Davelaar v. Marion County, 224 Iowa 669, 277 N.W. 744 
(1938). 
4. Evidence. 
Testimony and plat of surveyor. Davelaar v. Marion County, 224 Iowa 669, 
277 N.W. 744 (1938). 
319.7 Duty of Road Officers 
1. Construction and application. 
Improvement should not conflict with natural drainage. Herman v. Drew, 
216 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 277 (1933). 
2. Liability of officer. 
Duty of board of supervisors and engineer of county to maintain county 
roads in proper condition runs to all those rightfully using the roads and a 
breach of that duty can occur either by negligent commission or omission. 
Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 1977). 
3. Mandamus. 
Order requiring board to perform its duty and remove an obstruction could 
not direct manner of removal. Shannon v. Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 255 
Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
This statute mandatory. Ruffcorn v. Chatburn, 166 Iowa 611, 147 N.W. 
1110 (1914). 
4. Injunction. 
Decision of road supervisor to remove trees may be reviewed. Bills v. 
Belknap, 36 Iowa 583 (1873). 
319.8 Nuisance 
1. Construction and application. 
No liability for negligent performance of duties of construction and 
maintenance under this section. Swartzwelter v. Iowa etc. Corp., 216 Iowa 
1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
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Meaning of term "nuisance". Stokes v. Sac City, 151 Iowa 10, 130 N.W. 
786 (1911). 
Owner of the obstruction must pay for its removal. O.A.G. 1938, p. 318. 
2. Ordinances. 
Imposing penalty for obstructing streets does not contravene state law. 
Pugh v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916). 
3. Pi~elines, crossing roads or along roads. 
U timate authority in legislature. O.A.G. 1930, p. 346. 
4. Private persons, remedy of. 
Remedy only when suffering and injury distinct from that of the public. 
Ingram v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 38 Iowa 669 (1874). 
5. Election between acts of obstruction. 
If no motion to elect is made, prosecutor not limited to one specific 
act. State v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 77 Iowa 442, 42 N.W. 365 (1889). 
6. Mandamus. 
Order requiring board to perform its duty and remove dust as an 
obstruction could not direct how removal should be accomplished. Shannon v. 
Missouri Vi'l__ Limestone Co., 255 Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
------sel:l'.Ton ·::s!ii':-rlslrldr1datory. Ruffcorn v. Chatburn, 166 Iowa 611, 147 N.W. 
1110 (1914). 
7. Evidence. 
When petition for a road need not be produced or offered in evidence. 
State v. Lane, 26 Iowa 223 (1868). 
319.9 Injunction to Restrain Obstructions 
1. Construction and application. 
Officers having duty to prevent obstruction could enjoin obstruction. 
Phillips v. Crawford, 199 Iowa 443, 179 N.W. 937 (1920), modified in other 
respects, 191 Iowa 443, 182 N.W. 604 (1920). 
County could maintain suit to enjoin interference with removal of 
obstruction. Webster Co. v. Wasem Plaster Co., 188 Iowa 1158, 174 N.W. 583 
(1919). 
2. Parties. 
In suit by township trustees to enJ01n an obstruction, defendant could 
not adjudicate legal boundaries of the highway without impleading all parties 
in interest. Phillips v. Crawford, 191 Iowa 443, 179 N.W. 937 (1920), 
modified in other respects, 191 Iowa 443, 182 N.W. 604 (1920). 
3. Decree. 
Township trustees could not recover attorney fees. Phillips v. Crawford, 
191 Iowa 443, 182 N.W. 604 (1920). 
319.10 Billboards and Signs 
Only expressed power given to city to abate billboards is found in 
section 657.2, subs. 7, and when construed with this section, relates only to 
the abatement of nuisances. Stoner McCray v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 
1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956). 
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319.15 
Jurisdiction of Highway Commission in respect to signs does not extend 
. into cities and towns. O.A.G. 1940, p. 180. 
319.11 Enforcement (No Annotations) 
319.12 B1llbotrds, Reflectors end S1gns Proh1b1ted 
1. Construction and application. 
Advertising devices, including those mounted upon trailers, are 
prohibited from being placed upon right-of-way of any public highway. O.A.G. 
Sept. 26, 1972. 
Definition of billboard or advertising signs. O.A.G. 1940, p. 180. 
319.13 Right and Duty to Remove 
1. Construction and application. 
Jurisdiction of Highway Commission in respect to signs does not extend 
into cities and towns. O.A.G. 1940, p. 180. 
319.14 Permit Required 
1. In general. 
This section does not prevent the burning or spraying of right-of-way, 
nor does Chapter 317 prevent such actions although they may be restrained by 
the board of supervisors. O.A.G. April 9, 1980. 
319.15 Definition (No Annotations) 
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320.04 
CHAPTER 320 
USE (F HIGHWAYS FOR SIDEWALKS. SERVICE l'AINS OR CAffiEWAYS 
320.1 Construction of Sidewalks in Certain School Districts 
1. Construction and application. 
County board of supervisors is without authority to install a sidewalk 
within a city or town leading to a schoolhouse located within the boundaries 
of the city or town. O.A.G. Dec. 30, 1963. 
320.2 Assessment of Costs 
1. Construction and application. 
Expense of improving streets and sidewalks can be imposed on abutting 
property. Gatch v. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 718, 18 N.W. 310 (1884). 
2. Effect of assessment by council. 
Ratification of construction by council. Brewster v. City of Davenport, 
51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 (1879). 
3. City charter provisions, levy of special assessments against lots for 
improvement of sidewalks. City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff, 20 Iowa 396 (1866). 
4. In~ unction against co 11 ect ion. 
l'fen city has no power to impose sidewalk assessments. 1.0.0.F. v. Town 
of Monona, 180 Iowa 62, 161 N.W. 78 (1917). 
320.3 Repairs (No Annotations) 
320.4 Water and Gas Mains, Sidewalks, and Cattleways 
1. In general. 
After the Court of Appeals decided that county was without authority to 
grant local water association easements, the legislature granted the county 
authority to grant such easements, Schwarzkopf v. Sac County Board of 
Supervisors, 341 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1983). 
Neither county or landowner who used bridge could be required to remove 
debris lodged against the bridge. Adams County v. Rider, 205 Iowa 137, 218 
N.W. 60 (1928). 
2. Pipe lines. 
Crossing or along roads. Ultimate authority in legislature. O.A.G. 
1930, p. 364. 
3. Cattleways. 
Presumption that county officials would repair cattleways to make road 
safe. Licht v. Ehlers, 234 Iowa 1331, 13 N.W. 688 (1944). 
Bridge used as cattleway gives no prescriptive right to have opening 
maintained. Roberts v. Madison County, 183 Iowa 915, 167 N.W. 644 (1918). 
Permission by supervisors for construction of cattleway must be complied 
with in all respects. Davis v. Pickerell, 139 Iowa 186, 117 N.W. 276 (1908). 
Owner of land may be required to keep cattleway in repair. O.A.G. 1911-
12, p. 380. 
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320.08 
4. Injunction. 
Against closing a cattleway. Bartels v. Woodbury, 174 Iowa 82, 156 N.W. 
303 (1916). 
320.5 Tenn of Grant (No Annotations) 
320.6 Conditions - Dilnages 
1. In general. 
Neither county nor landowner using bridge as a causeway could be required 
to remove debris lodged against bridge. Adams County v. Rider, 205 Iowa 137, 
218 N.W. 60 (1928). 
2. Cattleways. 
Subsequent owner may be required to keep in repair. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 
380. 
320.7 Failure to Maintain (No Annotations) 
320.8 Penalty (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 321 
K:ITOR VEHICLES AND LAW OF ROAD 
321.145 Disposition 
1. In general. 
FUNDS 
Statutory provisions authorizing expenditure of motor vehicle fees and 
fuel taxes for removal of abandoned vehicles from areas other than public 
highways is unconstitutional. O.A.G. August 23, 1g14. 
Assignment of restricted deposits of county treasurer in bank of 
automotible registration fees to state treasurer will not be accepted as it is 
duty of county treasurer to collect such funds. O.A.G. 1g34, p. 369. 
Duty of county treasurer to collect fees at time of registration and to 
honor drafts drawn by treasurer of state. O.A.G. 1g34, p. 108. 
2. Road use tax fund. 
Motor vehicle certificate of title fee and lien are encumberance notation 
fee to be placed in the general fund rather than the road use tax fund. 
O.A.G. April 13, 1971. 
Acts 1919 (38 G.A.) ch. 237, ~ 4, providing ultimate distribution of 
proceeds of motor vehicle license ¥ees to counties, without returning to each 
county exact sum collected therein was not taking of property without due 
process of law. Mcleland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401 
(1924), modified on other grounds, 199 Iowa 1232, 203 N.W. 1 (1924). 
321.146 Unexpended Balances Repealed by Acts 1977 (67 G.A.) ch. 60, § 25. 
Eff. August 15, 1977 
1. Construction and application. 
Where primary road fund was to be used on primary road system including 
bridges and where interstate bridge was part of public highway and was to 
become part of primary road system and would be taken over by Highway 
Commission, section 313A.7 of Interstate Bridge Act permitting Commission to 
advance funds from primary highway fund to pay for part of construction cost 
not met by revenue bonds and to spend moneys from annual primary fund receipts 
did not improperly create an indebtedness on part of state by pledging its 
general credit. Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1969). 
POWERS OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
321.236 Powers of Local Authorities 
1. In general. 
Official action of local authorities must be in legal session - as body 
where records of action may be duly preserved. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 
860 (Iowa 1969). 
Cities and towns have authority to regulate driving of vehicles within 
their corporate limits if such regulation is consistent with state statute. 
O.A.G. Feb. 3, 1971. 
2. Conflict with state law. 
Ordinance imposing penalty for obstructing street did not contravene 
state law. Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 5g3, 156 N.W. 892 (1916). 
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321. 236 
Ordinance held to contravene state law. O.A.G. 1938, p. 309. 
Ordinance requiring traffic to make inside left turn, would conflict with 
section 321.311. O.A.G. 1930, p. 355. 
3. Closing streets. 
City could not block street for coasting so as to make 
deliverin9 groceries thereon unlawful. Dennier v. Johnson, 
N.W. 745 (1932). 
4. Parking. 
presence of truck 
214 Iowa 770, 240 
Government official may not park contrary to state and local laws 
regulating parking while looking for a prospective law violator. O.A.G. Jan. 
5, 1968. 
Legality of parking meters. Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1291, 291 
N.W. 171 (1940), modified and rehearing denied, 229 Iowa 1291, 296 N.W. 352 
(1940). 
Ordinance prescribing method of parking. Trailer v. Schelm, 227 Iowa 
780, 288 N.W. 865 (1940). 
Council may prescribe by ordinance places of parking. O.A.G. 1916, p. 
222. 
5. Regulation of taxi cabs. 
Ordinance requiring application for license to operate in or about hotel 
or depot to have approval of owner, manager, or lessee endorsed thereon not 
unreasonable. Richart v. Barton, 193 Iowa 271, 186 N.W. 851 (1922). 
6. Buses. 
City has no implied power to grant interurban bus company the right to 
use street fronting mother's property for a stop to load passengers, baggage 
and freight. Gates v. City Council of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 1, 50 N.W.2d 578 
(1952). 
7. Traffic regulations in general. 
Public welfare offenses - burden of going forward with evidence. Iowa 
City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1g76). 
Presumption that supervisors performed duty as to erection and 
maintenance of signs. Arends v. De Bruyn, 217 Iowa 529, 252 N.W. 249 (1934). 
Reasonableness of ordinance. Switzer v. Baker, 178 Iowa 1063, 160 N.W. 
372 (1916). 
Signs should not be erected so as to obstruct street. O.A.G. 1916, p. 
222. 
8. Speed regulations. 
Prerequisites for validity of speed ordinance. State v. Clark, 1g5 Iowa 
1134, 1g5 N.W. 82 (1923). 
Presumption on appeal as to regularity of speed limit ordinances. 
Remington v. Machamer, 192 Iowa 1og0, 186 N.W. 32 (1922). 
9. Use of highways. 
Designation of highway as "through highway" must be by ordinance or 
regulation dul.y adopted by. local authorities. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 
860 (Iowa 1969). 
With the exception of single trip permits issued by the highway 
commission for moves on primary highway extensions, permits may be issued by 
the commission, counties and cities and towns but only for moves on that 
system of roads for which they are by law responsible to maintain. O.A.G. 
June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-3). 
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321.239 
Regulation by city of public use of highways under legislative investment 
of general regulatory power. Gates v. City Council of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 1, 
50 N.W.2d 578 (1952). 
10. Traffic control devices. 
Power to regulate erection of traffic control devices on primary roads 
and extensions. O.A.G. August 23, 1955. 
11. Ordinances in General 
City may promulgate ordinances in addition to, and consistent with 
section 321G.1 et. seq. O.A.G. March 7, 1972. 
Cities may enact ordinances not in conflict with statutes. City of 
Vinton v. Engledow, 140 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa 1966). 
Section of city ordinance varying penalty under statute invalid. O.A.G. 
July 5, 1962. 
12. Enforcement powers. 
Same authority as with other laws. O.A.G. 1916, p. 69. 
13. Careless driving. 
A city ordinance including negligence as basis for criminal prosecution 
for careless driving is invalid under section 321.235 and this section. 
O.A.G., May 3, 1967. 
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14. Authorized emergency vehicles. I 
Duty of driver of authorized emergency vehicle. O.A.G. January 5, 1968. 
15. Power not exercised. 
Determination of status of local secondary road or highway question of 
law for court, not one of fact for jury. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860 
(Iowa 1969) 
321.237 Posting Signs 
1. In general. 
Designation of highway as "through highway" must be by ordinance or 
regulation duly adopted by local authorities. Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 
860 (Iowa 1969). 
Driver of motor vehicle has right to assume that traffic sign was placed 
by legal authority, and to act accordingly. Geisking v. Sheimo, 252 Iowa 37, 
105 N.W.2d 599 (1960). 
Failure to erect sign boards of speed limit. Pilgrim v. Brown, 168 Iowa 
177, 150 N.W. 1 (1914). 
Signs and traffic signals properly paid for out of the public safety 
fund, not road use tax funds. O.A.G. December 13, 1961. 
2. Location and sufficiency of sign. 
Speed ordinance held invalid for failure to comply with statute. 
Incorporated Town of Decatur v. Gould, 185 Iowa 203, 170 N.W. 449 (1919). 
Purpose of provisions to warn motorists and protect public. Pilgrim v. 
Brown, 168 Iowa 177, 150 N.W. 1 (1914). 
321.238 Repealed Acts 84, ch. 1305, ~ 73. 
321.239 Counties may Restrict Parking of Vehicles 
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321.253 
1. Ingeneral. 
Defendent automobile sellers failure to comply with motor vehicle 
inspection law prevented him from escaping responsibility under owner's 
responsibility law, when a buyer was involved in accident while driving the 
car. Barnett v. Bowers, 284 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa 1979). 
321.249 School Zones 
1. In general. 
Permission of state highway commission required for certain acts. O.A.G. 
October 2, 1959. 
321.250 Discriminations (No Annotations) 
321.251 Rights of Owners of Real Property (No Annotations) 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS, AND Ml\RKINGS 
321.252 Department to Adopt Sign Manual 
1. Validity. 
Giving highway commission authority to carry out purposes of statute does 
not render statute unconstitutional. State v. Rivera, 260 Iowa 320, 149 
N.W.2d 127 (1967). 
2. In general. 
Tort 11ab1 lity can arise outside the confines of statute-mandated 
conduct. Wittrup v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 
1975). 
Under this section authorizing highway commission to place and maintain 
traffic control devices, legislature, not the commission, made it a crime to 
cross a yellow line while passing. State v. Rivera, 260 Iowa 320 149 N.W.2d 
127 (1967). 
County could fulfill responsibility with reference to limited load 
capacity bridges if motorists are advised of potential hazard by posted 
warning signs. O.A.G. October 4, 1977. 
Highway commission's duty to advise counties concerning snowmobile 
signs. Routes limited to roadways where operation will not interfere unduly 
with or constitute an undue hazard to conventional motor vehicle traffic. 
O.A.G. November 7, 1974. 
Any sign not a traffic sign, signal or marker is a billboard or 
advertising sign. O.A.G. 1940, p, 180. 
City has implied power to designate a "thr:ough street" as a special speed 
district. O.A.G. 1938, p. 596. 
3. Local powers. 
City council can neither enact nor enforce ordinance providing for yield 
signs rather than stop signs. O.A.G. September 25, 1957. 
State highway commission's power to regulate the erection of traffic 
control devices on primary roads and extensions. O.A.G. August 23, 1955. 
321.253 Department to Erect Signs 
Highway commission authorized by legislature to determine what signs are 
necessary to carry out provisions of this chapter. O.A.G. June, 1961. 
Highway commission has authority to control erection of traffic signals 
on primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. 
August 23, 1955. 
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Railroad not absolved from liability for failure to warn truck driver of 
low clearance under railroad bridge. Wittrup v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. 
Co., 226 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1975}. 
Cities have authority to place stop signs upon city streets and railroad 
crossings. O.A.G. September 30, 1974. 
321.254 Local Authorities Restricted 
Pemission required for placing certain signs upon highway. O.A.G. 
October 2, 1959. 
Highway commission has authority to control erection of traffic signals 
on primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. 
August 23, 1955. 
321.255 Local Traffic - Control Devices 
1. In general. 
Duty of "ordinary care under the circumstances" was owed by county to 
motorist with respect to placement of adequate warning signs on dangerous 
curb; signing duty of the county was not to be evaluated according to 
"reasonable" professional engineering judgement standard. Schmitt v. Clayton 
County, 284 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1979). 
Failure to place warning sign on hill indicating that road ended in a "T" 
intersection. Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1974). 
Cities have authority to place stop signs upon city streets and railroad 
crossings. O.A.G. September 30, 1974. 
Proper signing for purpose of limiting traffic. O.A.G. August 23, 1971. 
Public intersections segment a road into portions and signs should be 
posted accordingly. Id. . 
Word "highway" as used in section 321.326 was applicable to a through 
highway in Des Moines. Reynolds v. Aller, 226 Iowa 642, 284 N.W. 825 (1939). 
Movable stop signs must conform to the manual of uniform traffic control 
devices adopted by the state highway commission. O.A.G. October 2, 1959. 
City council can neither enact nor enforce an ordinance providing for 
yield signs rather than stop signs. O.A.G. September 25, 1957. 
Highway commission has authority to control erection of traffic signs on 
primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. 
August 23, 1955. 
2. Defective devices. 
Even if dangerous and ineffective in its operation, device would not 
constitute a nuisance. Gorman v. Adams, 143 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 1966). 
3. Warning devices, generally. 
Liability of railroad for failure to install warning device at 
particularly dangerous crossing. Symmonds v. Chicago, M., ST.P. & P.R. CO., 
242 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa 1976). 
County held liable in tort for authority over secondary road had been 
delegated to it. Id. 
County could fulfill its responsibility with reference to limited load 
capacity bridges if motorists were advised or warned of existing and potential 
hazards by posted warning signs. O.A.G. October 4, 1977. 
321.256 Obedience to Official - Control Devices 
1. In genera 1. 
Regarding city ordinance exempting emergency vehicle from ordinary rules 
of road. Rush v. Sioux City, 240 N.W.2d 431 (Iowa 1976). 
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321.259 
Collission of bicyclist and motorist. Davis v. Gatewood, 228 N.W.2d 84 
.(Iowa 1975). 
Motorist's collision in intersection with ambulance. Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 
N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974). 
Evidence of condition of road or street, presence and location of 
directional or warning signs, signals, markings, or devices, and other 
physical conditions existing at scene of accident or collission is 
admissible. Hartwig v. Olson, 261 Iowa 1265, 158 N.W.2d 81 {1968). 
321.257 Official Traffic Control Signal 
1. In general. 
Right turn against red light. O.A.G. April 21, 1971. 
"Pedestrian" defined. State v. Paul, 242 Iowa 853, 48 N.W.2d 309 (1951). 
2. Right of way. 
Pedestrian's right of way within interesection. State v. Jennings, 261 
Iowa 192, 153 N.W.2d 485 (1967). 
Contributory negligence of pedestrian did not excuse automobile driver of 
offense of failing to yield right of way to pedestrian lawfully within 
intersection. State v. Paul, 242 Iowa 853, 48 N.W.2d 309 (1951). 
3. Negligence. 
Railroad's negligence in failing to warn of low clearance. Wittrup v. 
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1975). 
Driver's failure to keep proper look out and failure to yield right of 
way. Coulthard v. Keenan, 129 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 1964). 
Neither pedestrian nor motorist required to anticipate negligence on part 
of other. Tobin v. Van Orsdol, 241 Iowa 1331, 45 N.W.2d 239 (1951). 
Lawful users of highway entitled to rely on obedience to traffic 
signals. Id. 
Pedestrian and curbliner entering intersection traveling in same 
direction. Gearhart v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 237 Iowa 213, 21 N.W.2d 569 
(1946). 
4. Questions for jury. 
Collision of motorist with ambulance - emergency vehicle conduct. Wetz 
v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974). 
321.258 Arrangement of Lights on Official Traffic Control Signals (No 
Annotations) 
321.259 Unauthorized Signs, Signals or Markings 
1. In general. 
Motorists may assume highway signs are placed by proper authority. King 
v. Gold, 224 Iowa 890, 276 N.W. 774 (1938). 
2. Disregard of unauthorized signs. 
Unauthorized traffic signals not meaningless. Geisking v. Sheimo, 252 
Iowa 37, 105 N.W.2d 5g9 (1960). 
3. Railroad signs or sianals. 
Railroad not preclu ed from placing clearance warnings on low railroad 
bridges - railroad not excused from failure to warn motorists of traffic 
hazard presented by low overhead bridge. Wittrup v. Chicago & Northwestern 
Ry. Co., 226 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1975). 
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321.285 
Railroads failure to erect barricade or warning sign near an apparent 
crossing._ Jasper v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 248 Iowa 1286, 84 N.W.2d " 
21 ( 1957). 
Placement of railroad traffic signal. Van Gordon v. City of Fort Dodge, 
216 Iowa 209, 245 N.W. 736 (1933). 
321.260 Interference with Devices, Signs, or Signals - Unlawful Possession 
(No Annotations) 
ACCIDENTS 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
321.285 Speed Restrictions 
1. Validity. 
Speed limit generally set by this section need not be posted to be 
enforceable. Exceptions to general speed limit must be posted to be in effect 
and enforceable. O.A.G., July 10, 1980. 
This section not unconstitutional. State v. Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 
N.W.2d 10 (1956). 
Necessity of posting speed limit for enforceability. O.A.G. July 10, 
1980. 
2. In general. 
Term "object" in this section in effect requiring that motorists at all 
times be able to stop vehicle within distance so that objects may be seen 
ahead can be a pedestrian. Nolte v. Case, 221 N.W.2d 741 (Iowa 1974). 
State highway commission has authority and jurisdiction to set speed 
limits on primary road extensions. O.A.G. July 30, 1973. 
In order to provide reasonable notice of the effective speed limit, 
highway commission must post speed signs at sufficient intervals along the 
affected primary highways. O.A.G. November 6, 1963. 
3. Construction and application. 
"Assured clear distance." State v. Mullenix, 299 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 
1980). Nolte v. Case, 221 N.W.2d 741 (Iowa 1974). 
Award of $72,731.95 to six year old plaintiff who suffered permanent 
injuries was not excessive. Schaben v. Kohles, 186 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1971). 
Legislative authority of state vested in general assembly - and county 
board of supervisors have only such powers as are expressly conferred or 
implied by statute. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa 1968). 
This section is essentially a speed regulation. Bonnett v. Oertwig, 234 
Iowa 864, 14 N.W.2d 739 (1944). 
Highway commission has authority to determine, after an engineering and 
traffic investigation, speed limits other than those set out in subsection 5 
of this section, upon any part of the primary road system. O.A.G. November 6, 
1963. 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
4. Standard of care. 
Ordinary prudent person under circumstances. Demers v. Currie, 139 
N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1966). 
Minimum rather than maximum. Christensen v. Kelley, 135 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 
1965). 
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321. 285 
Maintenance of proper lookout. Lauman v. Dearmin, 246 Iowa 697, 69 
N.W.2d 49 (1955). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
5. Control of vehicle. 
Motorist on a favored highway only required to proceed with such care and 
with his vehicle under such control as existing conditions which are known or 
which should be known to him, may require. Pitz v. Cedar Val. Egg & Poultry 
Co., 203 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1973). 
Defined. Tillotson v. Schwarck, 143 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1966). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
6. Speed - in general. 
Speed may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Schaben v. Kohles, 186 
N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1971). 
Showing the posted limit is sufficient to establish the speed limit 
element of a prima facie case of violation of this section. O.A.G. December 
3, 1976. 
Enactment of law to suspend and reduce maximum motor vehicle speed limits 
on state highways. O.A.G. January 30, 1974. 
Intention of legislature to confer on highway commission exclusive 
authority to alter speed limits. O.A.G. 1940, p. 306. 
7. Circumstances ·as controlling. 
"Assured cl ear di stance" changes as a motorist proceeds. Ruan Transport 
Corp. v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1974). 
Excessive or negligent speed depends entirely on surrounding 
circumstances. Campbell v. Martin, 136 N.W.2d 508 (Iowa 1965). 
7.5. Intersections, speed. 
Statutory duty to reduce speed at intersections. Wilson v. Jefferson 
Transp. Co., 163 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1968). 
7 .6 Curves, speed. 
Speed in approaching and traversing curve constituted, if established, 
negligence per se. Schmitt v. Clayton County, 284 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1979). 
8. Secondary roads. 
Board of county supervisors have power to reduce speed limits on 
secondary roads upon basis of an engineering and traffic investigation. 
O.A.G. March 27, 1970. 
Speed limit on secondary roads. O.A.G. July 20, 1964. 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
9. Violation of speed restrictions. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
10. Assured clear distance ahead - in general. 
"Assured clear distance" rule is not applicable where there are 
extraordinary or disconcerting circumstances affecting operator's judgment. 
Vanderheiden v. Clearfield Truck Rentals, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 527 (Iowa 19730). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
11. Duty imposed. 
Weather affects on "assured clear distance ahead." Ruan Transport Corp. 
v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1974). Coppola v. Jameson, 200 N.W.2d 877 
(Iowa 1972). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
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12. Visibility impaired. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
13. Reliance on conduct of others. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
14. Speed districts. 
Sparsely settled district 100 feet inside city limits held "suburban 
district." Howk v. Anderson, 218 Iowa 358, 253 N.W. 32 (1934). 
Speed to be observed in speed districts fixed by ordinance not dependent 
on placing of signs required by section 321.289. Waldman v. Sanders Motor 
Co., 214 Iowa 1139, 243 N.W. 555 (1932). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
15. Excuse for violation of statute. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
16. Local speed restrictions. 
Municipal speed restriction ordinances are not incorporated by reference I 
into this section. Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 117 N.W.2d 431 (1962). 
Cities and towns may establish speed limits in "through" streets. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 596. 
17. Sudden emergency. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 
18. War emergency. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
19. Negligence. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 
20. Contributory negligence. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 21. Proximate cause. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
22. Trial in general. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 
23. Pleading. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 24. Judicial notice. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
25. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. I 
26. Admissibility of evidence - in general. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
27. Statements, reports and records. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
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I 28. Weight and sufficiency of evidence - in general. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
29. Physical evidence. 
I For case citation, see I.C.A. 30. Assured clear distance ahead, weight and sufficiency of evidence. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 31. Questions for jury - in general. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
32. Speed in general. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 33. Fact as to speed. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 
34. Speed limits violated. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
35. Circumstances, speed affected by. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 36. Assured clear distance ahead, questions for jury. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
37. Credibility of witnesses. 
I For case citation, see I.C.A. 38. Contributory negligence in general. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 39. Obstructions, contributory negligence in striking. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
40. Stopped or stalled automobiles, contributory negligence of operator. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 41. Control of vehicle. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 
42. Instructions - in general. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
43. Speed in general. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
I 44. Contributory negligence, speed. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
45. Harmless or prejudicial error, instructions as to speed. 
I For case citation, see I.C.A. 46. Assured clear distance ahead, 'instructions. For case citation, see I.C.A. 
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47. Assumption of risk. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
48. Necessity for request. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
49. Applicability to pleadings and evidence. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
50. Review. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
51. Offenses and criminal prosecutions. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
52. Interstate highways. 
In light of the legislative history of prohibiting oversized vehicles 
from use of interstate highway system, highway commission could promulgate 
rules more restrictive than those applicable in the general non interstate 
highway systems. O.A.G. June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-2). 
53. Removal to federal court. 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
321.286 Truck Speed Limits 
1. In general. 
Enactment of a law to suspend and reduce maximum motor vehicle speed 
limits on state highways to 55 miles per hour. O.A.G. January 30, 1974. 
In light of the legislative history of prohibiting oversized vehicles 
from use of interstate highway system, highway commission could promulgate 
rules more restrictive than those applicable in the general non interstate 
highway systems of the state. O.A.G. June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-2). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
2. Fo 11 owing vehicles. (No Annotations) 
3. Evidence. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
4. Questions for jur~. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
5. Instructions. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
321.287 Bus Speed Limits (No Annotations) 
321.288 Control of vehicle 
For annotations, see I.C.A., section 321.288. 
321.289 Speed Signs - Duty to Install 
1. In general. 
The court will presume town officers properly performed duty to erect 
signs showing points at which rate of speed of automobiles changes and of 
maximum rate in district. Doherty v. Edwards, 227 Iowa 1264, 290 N.W 672 
(1940). 
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321. 294 
2. Failure to install signs regarding speed limits required by this section 
does not render the speed limit unenforceable. O.A.G. July 10, 1980. 
Speed to be observed in different speed districts fixed by ordinance is 
not dependent on placing of signs required by this section. Waldman v. 
Sanders Motor Co., 214 Iowa 1139, 243 N.W. 555 (1932). 
3. Questions for jury. (No Annotations) 
321.290 Special Restrictions 
1. In general. 
Exceptions to the general speed limits set pursuant to this section must 
be posted to be in effect and enforceable. O.A.G. July 10, 1980. 
State highway commission has authority and jurisdiction to set speed 
limits on primary road extensions. O.A.G. July 30, 1973. 
Highway commission has authority to determine, after an engineering and 
traffic investigation, speed limits other than those set out in subsection 5 
of section 321.285. O.A.G. November 6, 1g63. 
Authority of highway commission to declare speed limits. O.A.G. 1940, p. 
306. 
321.291 Infonnation or Notice 
1. In general. 
Whether motorist's violation of speed limit was only issue in operator's 
license revocation. Richard v. Holliday, 153 N.W.2d 473 (Iowa 1967). 
321.292 Civil Action Unaffected (No Annotations) 
321.293 Local Authorities may Alter Limits 
Exceptions to the general speed limits set pursuant to this section must 
be posted to be in effect and enforceable. O.A.G. July 10, 1980. 
State highway commission has power to regulate the erection of traffic 
control devices on primary roads and extensions of primary roads. O.A.G. 
August 23, 1955. 
2. Power to establish speed limits. 
State highway commission has authority and jurisdiction to set speed 
limits on primary road extensions. O.A.G. July 30, 1973. 
Cities have implied power to designate a sector or through streets as a 
special speed district. O.A.G. 1938, p. 596. 
3. Validity of ordinance. 
Ordinance on speed held valid though signs were placed within city 
limits. Pilgrim v. Brown, 168 Iowa 177, 150 N.W. 1 (1914). 
4. Operation and effect of ordinance. 
Held inapplicable to bicycle. Dice v. Johnson, 187 Iowa 1134, 175 N.W. 
38 (1919). 
Lesser speed than authorized by city does not of itself indicate 
carefulness. Livingstone v. Dole, 184 Iowa 1340, 167 N.W. 639 (1918). 
321.294 Minimum Speed Regulation 
For annotations, see I.C.A., section 321.294. 
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321.295 Limitation on Bridge or Elevated Structures 
1. In general. 
Exceptions to the general speed limits set pursuant to this section must 
be posted to be in effect and enforceable. O.A.G. July 10, 1980. 
MQtorists obligated to ~rive ~ith care col!llllensurate with road 470 conditions. Evans v. Muscatine Bridge Corp., 228 Iowa 811, 293 ~.W. (1g40). 
2. Questions for jury. 
Whether motorists should have seen truck is for jury. Graham v. Orr, 228 
Iowa 755, 292 N.W. 838 (1940). 
Operation of auto at reasonable rate for jury. Yance v. Hoskins, 225 
Iowa 1108, 281 N.W. 489 (1938). 
Question of control of truck for jury. Hawkins v. Burton, 225 Iowa 707, 
281 N.W. 342 (1938). 
321.296 Repealed Act 1976 (66 G.A.), ch. 1165, ~ 37. 
321.297 Driving on Right Hand Side of Roadway - Exceptions 
1. In genera 1. 
Truck and automobile collision within city limits of Cedar Rapids 
applicable under this section providing operator of vehicle must drive on 
right hand side of street. Golden v. Springer, 238 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1976). 
4. Duty to Travel on Right Hand Side. 
Trial court instruction in err when jury told that parking area of street 
is not part of roadway to determine statutory duty to drive on right side. 
Kearney v. Ahmann, 264 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1978). 
6. Excuse for Noncom~liance with Statute. 
Emergency is valid excuse for failing to obey statute. Bannon v. 
Pfiffner, 333 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1983). 
Not necessary that doctrine of legal excuse be pleaded before it may be 
instructed upon. Golden v. Springer, 238 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1976). 
8. Evidence. 
Lay witness allowed to testify in tractor and truck collision. Becker v. 
Goos, 310 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). 
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED 
321.342 Stop at Certain Railroad Crossings - Posting Warnings 
I 
I 
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I 
4. Warning devices. I 
Statute authorizing governmental units to erect stop signs at 
particularly dangerous highway-railroad grade crossings. Symmonds v. Chicago, 
M., St.P. & P.R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa 1976). 
Stop sign did not provide adequate additional warning of proximity of I 
railroad. Maier v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 244 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1975). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
321.344 Heavy Equipment at Crossing 
I 
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321.350 
1. Decisions in Other States. 
Under Iowa law crane operator guilty of contributory negligence in 
violation this section. Noe v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 263 N.E.2d 
889 (Ill. App. 2nd 1970). 
Crane operator's contributory negligence barred recovery for injures 
sustained when crane was struck by train. Id. 
321.345 Stop or Yield at Highways 
1. In general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A., section 321.345. 
Highway cormnission has authority to control erection of traffic signals 
on primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. 
August 23, 1955. 
Mandatory upon county board of supervisors to furnish, erect and maintain 
standard signs required for county trunk roads. O.A.G. 1932, p. 106. 
2. Duty of motorist to stop. (No Annotations) 
3. Duty of driver on through highway. (No Annotations) 
4. Erection of signs. 
Where primary highway is part of intersection, highway commission may 
place stop signs at all entrances to that intersection. State v. Wissler, 253 
Iowa 792, 113 N.W.2d 721 (1962). 
Board of supervisors creation of four way stop could not reverse 
procedure established by legislature. O.A.G. 1951, p. 68. 
For further annotations, see I.C.A., section 321.345. 
321.346 Cost of Signs (No Annotations) 
321.347 Exceptions 
1. In general. 
Highway commission has authority to control erection of traffic control 
signals on primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and 
towns. O.A.G. August 23, 1955. . 
Board of supervisors creation of four way stop could not reverse 
procedure established by legislature. O.A.G. 1952, p. 68. 
321.348 Limitations on Cities and Tmms 
1. In general. 
Highway cormnission has authority to control erection of traffic control 
signals on primary roads and extensions of primary roads in cities and 
towns. O.A.G. August 23, 1955. 
321.349 Exceptions 
1. Construction and aeplication. 
Erection of traffic control signals on primary road extensions without 
first securing permission of state highway cormnission. O.A.G. August 23, 
1955. 
Traffic control signals referred to in this section to be distinguished 
from speed detection devices. Id. 
321.350 Primary Roads as Through Highway (No Annotations) 
1~ 
321.369 
321.351 Repealed. Acts 1957 (57 G.A.) Ch. 139 ~ 1. 
321.352 Additional Signs - Cost 
1. In genera 1. 
Where signs erected on county trunk roads by county board of supervisors 
conflict with general statute relating to preference at intersections, such 
signs would govern. Rogers v. Jefferson, 224 Iowa 324, 275 N.W. 874 (1937). 
Local authorities may not, by ordinance, abrogate mandate of 
legislature. O.A.G. 1951, p. 68. 
STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING 
321.358 Stopping, Standing, or Parking 
1. In Tener a 1. 
11 egal parking constitutes "illegal obstruction." Knaus Trucklines v. 
Commercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa 1356, 29 N.W.2d 204 (1947). 
2. Parking regulations. 
Ordinance held to not prohibit parking of motor vehicles on streets. 
Griffin v. McNeil, 198 Iowa 1359, 201 N.W. 78 (1924). 
Right and duty of city to keep public streets free from nuisances. Pugh 
v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916). 
3. Prosecutions. 
Evidence that motorists' car had engine trouble aided in overcoming 
charge of unlawful obstruction of traffic. State v. Bethards, 32 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa 1948). 
Prosecution for willful parking and disobeying traffic officer. State v. 
Berg, 237 Iowa 356, 21 N.W.2d 777 (1946). 
4. Liabilit~ of motorist. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
5. Contributort negligence. 
For case citations, see I .C.A. 
6. Police cars. 
For case citations, see I .C .A. 
7. Pleading. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
8. Questions for jury. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
9. Instructions. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
321.369 Putting Glass, Etc. on Highway 
1. In genera 1. 
County attorney should prosecute violations. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 638. 
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321. 452 
2. Knowledge. 
Person has no duty to remove substance deposited upon highway before he 
is aware of its presence. Krueger v. Noel, 318 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982). 
3. Instructions. 
Jury instruction regarding personal injury action whereby motorcycle 
slipped on antifreeze on road. Krueger v. Noel, 318 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982). 
321.370 Removing Injurious Material 
1. Obstruction in streets. 
Contractor has no greater right than owner to obstruct street. Hatfield 
v. White Line Motor Freight Co., 223 Iowa 7, 272 N.W. 99 (1937). 
2. Knowledge. 
Knowledge of deposit of substance defined in statute is element of 
statute prohibiting deposit of destructive material on highway, until person 
has knowledge that he or his vehicle has deposited substance he is unaware of 
duty to remove. Krueger v. Noel, 318 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982). 
321.371 Clearing up Wrecks (No Annotations) 
SAFETY STANDARDS 
321.381 Scope and Effect of Regulations 
1. In general. 
Rule that nighttime operation of tractor on highway without rear red 
light constitutes negligence per se by both bailer for hire and bailee. 
Verhow v. Kraack, 195 N.W.2d 379 (Iowa 1972). 
Lawn type utility tractors not complying with safety standards in this 
section and§§ 321.382 and 321.383, cannot be driven on public streets or highways. O.A.G. May 3, 1967. 
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
SIZE, WEIGHT, AND LOAD 
321.452 Scope and Effect 
1. In general. 
Permits for movement of vehicles of excess size and weight. O.A.G. July 
9, 1968 (No. 68-7-2). 
Issuance of single trip permits by commission, counties and cities and 
towns. O.A.G. June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-3). 
Presumption that Nebraska has statute similar to this state. State v. 
Robbins, 235 Iowa 602, 15 N.W.2d 877 (1944). 
Purpose of this and related laws for safety on highways. Wood Bros. 
Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942). 
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321.453 Exceptions 
1/2. Validity. 
321.455 
Statutes establishing formulas for determination of maximum legal 
vehicular weights. State v. Wehde, 258 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1977). 
1. In general. 
This section provides certain exceptions from vehicle load limits and is 
not controlling over section 321.463 which specifies maximum load 
limitation. State v. Glenn, 234 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1975). 
This section establishing exceptions to motor vehicle load limitation 
section is exemption statute and as such must be strictly construed against 
one claiming exemption. State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa 1968). 
Permits for movement of vehicles of excess size and weight. O.A.G. July 
9, 1968 (No. 68-7-2). 
When permits may be issued by the commission, counties, and cities and 
towns for moves on primary highway extensions. O.A.G. June 28, 1968 (No. 68-
6-3). 
Purpose of this section to allow temporary moving of vehicles without 
penalty. O.A.G. 1940, p. 114. 
2. Road machinery. 
Tractor-scraper, which was used in road building, was "road machinery" 
which was exempt from statutory weight limitation while such vehicle was being 
driven to county road work site. State v. McDonald, 197 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 
1972). 
"Road machinery" defined. State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa 1968). 
Motor truck with underbody blade is road maintenance machinery and 
requires no permit. O.A.G. 1940, p. 309. 
3. Agricultural machinery. 
Movement of farm machinery on highway in tandem prohibited. O.A.G. 1952, 
p. 75. 
Moving of machinery from factory does not come within the exceptions of 
this chapter. Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 
(1942). 
Hay baler permanently mounted on truck is implement of husbandry and no 
permit required. O.A.G. 1940, p. 304. 
Combine is implement of husbandry. Worthington v. McDonald, 68 N.W.2d 89 
(Iowa 1955). 
4. Implements of husbandry. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
321.454 Width of Vehicles 
1. Construction and application. 
Purpose of this section to provide for safe highway travel. Wood Bros. 
Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942). 
Movement where road exceeds legal width to be in accordance with last 
clause of § 321.453. O.A.G. 1940, p. 114. 
321.455 Projecting Loads on Passenger Vehicles (No Annotations) 
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321.458 
321.456 Height of Vehicles 
1. Construction and application. 
Railroad retains obligation to warn of low clearance under railroad 
brid9e. Wittrup v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 
1975). 
321.457 MaximllD Length 
1/2. Validity. 
Subd. 6 of this section barring use of trucks longer than 60 feet on 
Iowa's interstate highways unconstitutionally burdened interstate corrrnerce. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel, 612 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
Delegation of power to transportation commission to adopt rules governing 
truck length not unconstitutional. O.A.G. January 20, 1976. 
1. In general. 
Subd. 6 of this section barring use of trucks longer than 6D feet on 
Iowa's interstate highways unconstitutionally burdened interstate corrrnerce. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kassel, 612 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
Purpose of this section is to promote safe travel on highways. Wood 
Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942). 
Delegation of power to transportation commission to adopt rules governing 
truck length not unconstitutional. O.A.G. January 20, 1976. 
Movements of train of farm equipment not contemplated if necessity does 
not demand such. D.A.G. 1952, p. 75. 
2. Overall length. 
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 101 Supreme Court 1309, only 
requires Iowa to allow 65' twin trailers on certain interstate highways. 
O.A.G., May 14, 1981. 
A device to provide supplemental axle to transfer and carry portion of 
load is not separate vehicle but integral part of main unit, maximum length 
35'. O.A.G., March 22, 1972. 
Motor truck drawing dolly coupled to semi trailer is combination of three 
vehicles coupled together as motor vehicle, subject to overall length 
limitation, inclusive of front and rear bumpers, of 6D'. D.A.G., May 4, 1971. 
A combination of a motor vehicle upon which is fastened a van box and 
also bears a portion of the weight of a semi trailer is a combination of three 
vehicles, maximum length 60'. O.A.G., April 29, 1970. 
"Combination of vehicles coupled together" - defined. O.A.G. March 22, 
1972. O.A.G. May 4, 1971. O.A.G. April 29, 1970. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
Includes load carried on vehicle and/or trailer. O.A.G. 1938, p. 523. 
3. A~peal. 
urden of proving timely appeal. State v. Nolte, 249 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 
1977). 
321.458 Loading Beyond Front 
1. Construction and application. 
Purpose of this section to promote safe travel on highways. Wood Bros. 
Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942). 
Crane not an integral part of truck. O.A.G. March 16, 1956. 
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321.459 Dual Axle Requirement 
1. Construction and application. 
This section contemplates each axle extending entirely across a 
vehicle. The 40" measurement applies only to tandem axle. O.A.G. 1940, p. 
455. 
321.460 Spilling Loads on Highways 
I 
I 
I 
1. In genera 1. I 
Action for injuries caused by spilling gravel. Lockwood v. Wiltgen, 251 
Iowa 484, 101 N.W.2d 724 (1960). 
2. Evidence. 
Evidence of crushed rock and water deposited on highway. Davidson v. 
Cooney, 259 Iowa 1278, 147 N.W.2d 819 (1967). 
3. ·Jury guestions. 
Crushed rock and water deposited on highway proximate cause of automobile 
injuries. Davidson v. Cooney, 259 Iowa 1278, 147 N.W.2d 819 (1967). 
321.461 Trailers and Towed Vehicles (No Annotations) 
321.462 Drawbars and Safety Chains (No Annotations) 
321.463 Maxim1.111 Gross Weight 
1/2. Validity. 
This section, establishing formulas for determination of maximum legal 
vehicular weights and fines to be assessed when weight limits are exceeded, is 
subject to traditional equal protection analysis. State v. Wehde, 258 N.W.2d 
347 (Iowa 1977). 
1. Construction and application. 
This section is a penal statute. State v. Glenn, 234 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 
1975). 
Tractor-scraper, which was used in road bu i1 ding was "road machinery" 
which was exempt from statutory weight limitations. State v. McDonald, 197 
N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1972). 
Purpose is safety and prevention of deterioration of highways. State v. 
Balsley, 242 Iowa 845, 48 N.W.2d 287 (1951). 
Purpose is for safety of travel on highways. Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. 
Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 655 (1942). 
School buses not exempt from weight restrictions. O.A.G. 1930, p. 300. 
2. Group of axles. 
Meaning axles contiguous and segregated by reason of use - not all 
axles. State v. Balsley, 242 Iowa 845, 48 N.W.2d 287 (1951). 
Maximum load on distance between axles. O.A.G. 1953, p. 89. 
3. Penalties are mandatory. 
Imposed on amount of excess weight over authorized weight. O.A.G. 1952, 
p. 125. 
4. Tolerances. 
Should be allowed before imposing fine. O.A.G. 1952, p. 125. 
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321. 471 
5. Review. 
State's appeal from decision sustaining demurrer properly taken to 
supreme court rather than district court. State v. Wehde, 258 N.W.2d 347 
(Iowa 1977). 
Whether defendant was in violation of this section specifying motor 
vehicle load limitations was a question for the jury. State v. Glenn, 234 
N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1975). 
6. Indictment and information. 
Information charging defendant with violation of this section qoverning 
maximum motor vehicle loads which contained reference to the section was 
sufficient to notify defendant of the charge against him. State v. Glenn, 234 
N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1975). 
321.464 Investigation as to Safety (No Annotations) 
321.465 Weighing Vehicles and Removal of Excess 
Peace officer may direct a vehicle to weiqh in at the nearest public 
scales, as defined in this section, but not at a private commercial scale, and 
a peace officer is not required to weigh the vehicle at the time and place of 
stopping. O.A.G. August 21, 1967. 
Peace officers of highway commission have authority to stop and weigh 
vehicles within corporate limits of cities and towns. O.A.G. 1946, p. 42. 
321.466 Increased loading capacity - Reregistration. 
1. In general. 
Tolerance for registration fee purposes not intended by legislature to 
establish tolerance for axle overload purposes. State v. Sands, 280 N.W.2d 
370 (Iowa 1979). 
Reciprocity provisions of Iowa code discussed. State v. Robbins, 235 
Iowa 602, 15 N.W.2d 877 (1944). 
License fee on common carriers charge for use of the streets for 
business. Solberg v. Davenport, 211 Iowa 612, 232 N.W. 477 (1930). 
Trailers less than 1000 lb. weight but hauling two tons subject to 
license fee. O.A.G. 1934, p. 691. 
2. Transportation of agricultural products. 
Meaning is products in original form. State v. Bauer, 236 Iowa 1020, 20 
N.W.2d 431 (1945). 
Not applicable to products treated or changed. O.A.G. 1951, p. 28. 
Tolerance allowed "raw farm" products does not include fish or butter. 
O.A.G. 1944, p. 29. 
321.467 to 321.470 Repealed Acts 1967 (62 G.A.) Ch. 285, ~ 1. Eff. July 1, 
1967. See now~ 321E.1 et. seq. 
321.471 Local Authorities may Restrict 
1. Construction and application. 
County boards of supervisors have only such powers as are expressly 
conferred by statute or impliedly conferred. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 
754 (Iowa 1968). 
Sign erected for the purpose of limiting traffic which states the 
substance of the ordinance authorizing it may be a proper sign under section 
321.472. O.A.G. August 23, 1971. 
Name of authorizing body need not appear on sign. Id. 
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321.475 
With the exception of single trip permits issued by the highway 
commission for moves on primary highway extensions, permits may be issued by 
the commission, counties and cities and towns but only for moves on that 
system of roads for which they are by law responsible to maintain. O.A.G. 
June 28, 1968. 
Municipality could not block street used for coasting, so as to make 
presence of truck thereon unlawful. Dennier v. Johnson, 214 Iowa 770, 240 
N.W. 745 (1932). 
Board of supervisors authority to prohibit operation of school buses, and 
milk and cream trucks. O.A.G. 1948, p. 173. 
School buses are not exempt from weight restrictions. O.A.G. 1930, 
p.300. 
321.472 Signs Posted 
1. Construction and application. 
A sign erected for the purpose of limiting traffic which states the 
substance of the ordinance authorizing it may be a proper sign under this 
section. O.A.G. August 23, 1971. 
The name of the authorizing body need not appear on the sign. Id. 
321.473 Limiting Trucks - Rubbish Vehicles 
1. In general. 
County could fulfill its responsibility with reference to limited load 
capacity bridges if motorists were advised or warned of existing and potential 
hazards by posted warning signs. O.A.G. October 4, 1977. 
Penalty provided in I.C.A. section 321.474, is not applicable to 
violations stated in this section. O.A.G. December 9, 1974. . 
The commission, counties and cities and towns may issue permits for moves 
on that system of roads for which they are by law responsible to maintain. 
O.A.G. June 28, 1968 (No. 68-6-3). 
Board of supervisors could prohibit school buses and milk and cream 
trucks from using the roads when such use might damage or destroy the road 
because of climatic conditions. O.A.G. 1948, p. 173. 
School buses not exempt from weight restrictions. O.A.G. 1930, p. 300. 
321.474 Department may Restrict 
1. In general. 
Penalty provided in this section not applicable to violations stated in 
I.C.A., section 321.473. O.A.G. December 9, 1974. 
Highway commission had no authority to make rule that no vehicle should 
stop on traveled portion of road unless disabled. Albrecht v. Waterloo Const. 
Co., 218 Iowa 1205, 257 N.W. 183 (1934). 
School buses are not exempt from weight restrictions. O.A.G. 1930, p. 
300. 
321.475 Liability for Damage 
1. In general. 
County board of supervisors could assign its cause of action against 
defendant for damages to bridge. Schmitter v. Kauffman, 274 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 
1979). 
Operating overloaded truck is "illegal operation" thereof under this 
section and damage to secondary bridge may be recovered. O.A.G. March 13, 
1970. 
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321.481 
Board of supervisors could prohibit school buses and milk and cream 
.trucks from using the road when to allow such miqht cause destruction or 
damage to the road because of climatic conditions. O.A.G. 1948, p. 143. 
2. Bridles. 
Neg igent destruction of bridge - damages recoverable. Schmitter v. 
Kauffman, 274 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1979). 
This section not basis for suit by highway commission to recover for 
negligent damage cost to bridge. State v. F. W. Fitch Co., 263 Iowa 208, 17 
N.W.2d 380 (1945). 
3. Assignment of claims. (No Annotations) 
321.476 Weighing Vehicles by Department 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Moving of farm mac inery from the factory does not come within exceptions 
of this chapter. Wood Bros. Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 1 N.W.2d 
655 (1942). 
2. Authority of commission. 
Enforcement of motor vehicle laws in general reserved to dept. of public 
safety. Merchants Motor Freight v. State Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 
N.W.2d 773 (1948). 
321.477 Employees as Peace Officers 
1. Construction and alplication. 
This section gran s power to enforce section 321.476. Merchants Motor 
Freight v. State Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 N.W.2d 773 (1948). 
2. Authority of employees of commission. 
Authority limited to matters of size, weight and load of vehicles. 
Merchants Motor Freight v. State Highway Corrmission, 239 Iowa 888, 32 N.W.2d 
773 (1948). 
May stop and weigh vehicles within corporate limits of cities and 
towns. O.A.G. 1946, p. 42. 
321.478 Bond (No Annotations) 
321.479 Badge of Authority (No Annotations) 
321.480 Limitation on Expense (No Annotations) 
321.481 No Impairment of Other Authority 
Enforcement of motor vehicle laws in general reserved to dept. of public 
safety. Merchants Motor Freight, v. State Highway Commission, 239 Iowa 888, 
32 N.W.2d 773 (1948). 
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321A.1 Definitions 
1. Validity. 
321A.1 
CHAPTER 321A 
MOTOR VEHIO.E FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
This chapter not applicable to mobile homes. Brown Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Fulton, 192 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 1971). 
Uninsured motorist policy did not violate public policy. Detrick v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 261 Iowa 1246, 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968). 
This section, which applies to all operators or owners of motor vehicles, 
is not discriminatory and does not constitute invalid class legislation. 
Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52, (1951). 
1.5. Construction and application. 
Owner of insured automobile allowed under financial responsibility 
statute to use vehicle without liability insurance and was free to purchase 
limited liability coverage provided by policy in effect when he sustained 
fatal injuries as a passenger in vehicle driven with his consent. Walker v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983). 
Financial responsibility statute does not require auto insurer to protect 
public from financially irresponsible motorist. Walker v. American Family 
Mutual Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983). 
Deceased's owner liability insurance with provision excluding bodily 
injury coverage to insured or member of family, was not invalid as contrary to 
public policy and did not preclude wrongful death suit by insured owner's 
estate. Walker v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 340 N.W.2d 599 
(Iowa 1983). 
Insurance clauses not purporting to reduce uninsured motorist insurance 
in two policies below statutory minimum were valid. McClure v. Employers Mut. 
Cas. Co., 238 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 1976). 
2. Release. 
Release barred plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action for personal 
injuries. Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 N.W.2d 305 (1959). 
3. Pureose. 
Uninsured motorist's policy, defining vehicle as one having no bond or 
policy in at least amount specified by financial responsibility law, did not 
afford excess coverage to persons injured with vehicle that had no policy in 
amount required by law although damage was in excess of latter amount. 
Detrick v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. 261 Iowa 1246, 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968). 
Purpose of motor vehicle financial responsibility act to protect public 
from financial irresponsibility of motorists upon streets and highways. Motor 
Vehicle Cas. Co. v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 254 Iowa 68, 116 N.W.2d 434 
(1962). 
4. Exclusions. 
Policy not issued to comply with law. Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973). 
5. Operator. 
Defined. Pfeiffer v. Weiland, 226 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1975). 
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321A.7 
321A.2 Director to Administer Chapter - Judicial Review 
1. Suspension of licenses. (No Annotations) 
2. Purpose. 
Purpose of motor vehicle financial responsibility act is to protect 
public from financial irresponsibility of motorists upon streets and 
highways. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 254 Iowa 
68, 116 N.W.2d 434 (1962). 
3. Review. 
Issue of driver's failure to comply with this act could not be raised on 
appeal when not presented to trial court. Goodsell v. State Auto. & Cas. 
Underwriters, 261 Iowa 135, 153 N.W.2d 458 (1967). 
321A.3 Director to Furnish Operating Record - Fees to be Charged and 
Disposition of Fees 
1. In general. 
Members of the public may obtain an abstract of the conviction and 
accident record of any person upon payment of one dollar. O.A.G. 1952, p. 
117. 
321A.4 Effect of Failure to Report Accidents (No Annotations) 
321A.5 Security Required Following Accident - Exceptions 
1. Validity. 
Privilege to operate motor vehicle on the highway is not a property 
right, and suspension of motorist's license without a hearing does not 
constitute a denial of motorist's property without a due process of law. 
Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951). 
2. In general. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
3. Notice by Insurer 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
4. Compromise and Settlement 
Election to settle an opposing claim and to buy a release from the other 
party constitutes a compromise of the entire controversy, absent any 
reservation of right to sue on the claim. Brown v. Hughes, 251 Iowa 444, 99 
N.W.2d 305 (1959). 
5. Accident Reports 
An accident occurring on private property must be reported to the 
department of public safety. O.A.G. September 5, 1962. 
321A.6 Exceptions to Requirement of Security 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
321A.7 Duration of Suspension (No Annotations) 
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321A.17 
321A.8 Application to Nonresidents, Unlicensed Drivers and Unregistered Motor I 
Vehicles (No Annotations) 
~-~ W111!1'1111 and Amount of Security (No Annotations) 
321A.10 Custody, Disposition and Return of Security (No Annotations) 
321A.ll Matters not to be Evidence in Civil Suits (No Annotations) 
321A.12 Courts to Report Nonpayment of Judgments (No Annotations) 
321A.13 Suspension for Nonpayment of Judgments - Exceptions 
1. In general. 
Suspension of drivers license authorized until judgment paid. O.A.G. 
December 31, 1968 (No. 68-12-21). 
321A.14 Suspension to Continue Until Judgments Paid and Proof Given 
Receipt of a discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain 
specified judgments. Perez v. Campbell, 91 S.CT. 1704 (1971). 
Suspension of drivers license authorized until judgment is paid. O.A.G. 
December 31, 1968 (No. 68-12-21). 
321A.15 Payments Sufficient to Satisfy Requirements (No Annotations) 
321A.16 Installment Payment of Judgments - Default (No Annotations) 
321A.17 Proof Required Upon Certain Convictions 
1. Validity. 
One whose drivers license was suspended for a conviction of violating 
drivers license restrictions must be required to prove financial 
responsibility for the future. O.A.G. December 16, 1974. 
2. In general. 
License re~ocation_p:r se law, ~ ~21:281, is distioct from OMVUI law, no 
license revocation provisions fQr convictign ynder 5 321.283, 321.560 ana 3216.7. No financial responsibility need e tiled under section 321A.17 for 
deferred judgment revocation under 321.261. O.A.G., December 24, 1981. 
Former Iowa resident who moves out of state with suspended license and 
registration must file proof of financial responsibility before driving in 
this state. February 22, 1965. 
3. Notice. 
Must be sent by registered certified mail to the licensee or served on 
him personally. O.A.G. July 27, 1959. 
4. Suspension of license. 
Prosecution for driving while operators license was under suspension. 
State v. Hoffer, 197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972). 
Operating a motor vehicle without a license, which is a violation that 
can be prosecuted under section 321A.32, does not result in suspension of the 
violator's license. O.A.G. December 9, 1968 (No. 68-12-3). 
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321A.30 
321A.18 Alternate Methods of Giving Proof 
1. Construction and application. 
Evidence would not support conviction for driving while license 
suspended, when defendant had previous notice of suspension for 90 days but as 
to whom it was as reasonable to believe he may have tolled the suspension by 
proving financial responsibility as not. State v. Hoffer, 197 N.W.2d 368 
(Iowa 1970). 
One whose driver's license was suspended for conviction of violating 
drivers license restrictions must be required to prove financial 
responsibility for the future. O.A.G. December 16, 1974. 
321A.19 Certificate of Insurance as Proof (No Annotations) 
321A.20 Certificate Furnished by Nonresident as Proof (No Annotations) 
321A.21 •Motor Vehicle Liability Policy• Defined 
1. In general. 
The provisions of this act do not void the provisions of a vouluntary 
insurance contract in those situations beyond the contemplation of the act, 
such as where the insured has never been involved in an accident. Western 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 200 N.W.2d 892 (Iowa 1972). 
"Automobile liability insurance" defined. Detrick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 261 Iowa 1246, 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968). 
2. Insurance. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
321A.22 Notice of Cancellation or Tennination of Certified Policy (No 
Annotations) 
321A.23 Chapter not to Affect Other Policies (No Annotations) 
321A.24 Bond as Proof (No Annotations) 
321A.25 Money or Securities as Proof (No Annotations) 
321A.26 Owner may give Proof for Others (No Annotations) 
321A.27 Substitution of Proof (No Annotations) 
321A.28 Other Proof may be Required (No Annotations) 
321A.29 Duration of Proof - When Proof may be Cancelled or Returned (No 
Annotations) 
VIOLATIONS OF PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER - PENALTIES 
321A.30 Transfer of Registration to Defeat Purpose of Chapter Prohibited 
1. In genera 1. 
Registration of a motor vehicles which has been transferred by bona fide 
sale, which vehicle is unregistered through suspension by operation of 
financial and safety responsibility law, may be accomplished on a form 
provided by the department. O.A.G. 1948, p. 135. 
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321A.39 
321A.31 Surrender of License and Registration (No Annotations) 
321A.32 Other Violations ·- Penalties 
1. In general. 
Suspension of operator's license applies only on roads open to use of the 
public as a matter of right. O.A.G. May 6, 1968 (No. 68-5-2). 
Criminal intent not required for a conviction. State v. Sonderleiter, 
251 Iowa 106, 99 N.W.2d 393 (1959). 
2. Driving without license. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
3. Proof of suspension. 
State v. Hoffer, 197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972). 
4. Default in payment of fine. (No Annotations) 
5. Evidence of financial responsibility. 
For case citations, see I.C.A. 
6. Review. 
Issue of driver's failure to comply with financial responsibility act 
which was not presented to trial court could not be raised on appeal. 
Goodsell v. State Auto & Cas. Underwriters, 261 Iowa 135, 153 N.W.2d 458 
(1967). 
For other citations, see I.C.A. 
321A.33 Exceptions 
1. In general. 
Convicted OMVUI operator arrested for driving while license suspended, 
not required to be charged under revocation of § 321.209 for OMVUI, was 
properly charged with serious misdemeanor provision of ~321A.32. State v. 
Kotz, 337 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1983). 
Section 321.174 is proper for charging person driving while license 
revoked pursuant to ~3218.7. O.A.G., May 17, 1973. 
The motor vehicle financial and safety responsibility act does not apply 
to authorized operator of a vehicle owned by United States, the state or any 
political subdivision or municipality, nor to such owner thereof. O.A.G. 
1948, p. 98. 
321A.34 Self-Insurers (No Annotations) 
321A.35 Past Application of Chapter 
For case citation, see I.C.A. 
321A.36 Chapter not to Prevent Other Process (No Annotations) 
321A.37 Uniformity of Interpretation (No Annotations) 
321A.38 Title of Chapter (No Annotations) 
321A.39 Liability Insurance - Statement (No Annotations) 
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327F.l 
CHAPTER 327F 
CONSTRUCTION AND IJ>ERATION OF RAILWAYS [NEW] 
327F.1 Crossing Railway, Canal, or Watercourse 
1. Construction and application. 
Violation of this chapter is criminal in nature and the action should be 
pursued by the county attorney. O.A.G. January 4, 1980. 
Railroad takes franchise subject to duty of making modifications 
necessary to carry road bed across such public improvements as drains 
thereafter established. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of 
Appanoose County, Iowa , 182 F. 291, 104 C.C.A. 573 31 L. R. A., N. S. 1117 
(1910). 
Quaere on right of junior railway to cross tracks of senior railway 
without condemnation. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Des Moines Western R. 
Co., 186 Iowa 270, 169 N.W. 637 (1918). 
Congressional acts held permissive, not mandatory. Richmond v. Dubuque & 
S. C. R. Co., 33 Iowa 422 (1872), motion denied, 82 U.S. 3, 15 Wall. 3, 21 L. 
Ed. 118, affirmed, 86 U.S. 584, 19 Wall. 584, 22 L. Ed. 173. 
2. Crossing another railroad. 
This section gave railroad right to cross tracks of another. Chicago, M. 
& St. P. Ry. Co. v. Old Colony Trust Co., 216 F. 577, 132 C. C. A. 581 (1914). 
Remedy for unfit or unsuitable railroad crossing. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. 
v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 186 Iowa 1207, 173 N.W. 288 (1919). 
Right of junior company to cross tracks of senior. Chicago Great Western 
R. Co. v. Des Moines Western R. Co., 186 Iowa 270, 169 N.W. 637 (191g) 
Crossing railway must bear expense. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Waterloo, 
C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 182 Iowa 550, 164 N.W. 208 (lg17), modified on other 
grounds, 165 N.W. 993. · 
Grade crossing held reasonably necessary and would not "unnecessarily 
impede travel" on plaintiff's road. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Ft. Dodge, D. 
M. & S. R. Co., 146 Iowa 666, 125 N.W. 672 (1910). 
Order requiring defendant to construct under crossing was proper. 
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 91 Iowa 16, 58 N.W. 
918 (1894). 
Under crossing required in view of serious disadvantages of grade 
crossing. Humeston & S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 
554, 38 N.W. 413. 
3. Contract for crossing. 
Railroad right of way has substantially of fee and contract by which 
another road is given crossing rights is based on valuable consideration. 
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Old Colony Trust Co., 216 F. 577, 132 C. C. A. 
581 (1914). 
Cost of system of switches at crossing apportioned between affected 
railroads. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City & N. R. Co., C. C., 81 F. 50 
(18g7). 
Contract between crossing railroads obviating disputes as to expense of 
maintaining flagmen etc., does not lack consideration in view of this 
section. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 182 Iowa 550, 
164 N.W. 208 (1917), modified on other grounds, 165 N.W. 993. 
4. Flooding adjoining lands. 
See Notes of Decision under~ 327F.2 Maintenance of bridges - damages. 
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5. Actions in general. 
Where petition to require railway, crossing at grade, to install 
interlocking switch was demurred to, such had effect of admitting certain 
facts pleaded but did not admit ill consequences plaintiff argued it 
apprehended therefrom. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. 
Co., 186 Iowa 1207, 173 N.W. 288 (1g1g). 
Where unnecessary interference with crossing exists equity may prescribe 
conditions of crossing. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. 
Co., 182 Iowa 550, 164 N.W. 208 (lg17), modified on other grounds, 165 N.W. 
gg3_ 
Construction of overhead crossing waived right to grade crossing. 
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., gl Iowa 16, 58 N.W. 
gl8 ( 18g4). 
6. In~unction. . 
W ere, without leave to make changes, defendant constructed grade 
crossing, plaintiff not bound to reimburse defendant prior to securing 
injunction. Humeston & S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 
554, 38 N.W. 413 (1888). 
327F.2 Maintenance of Bridges - Damages 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
Company requ1redo keep 1n repair culvert through embankment for 
drainage ditch in natural water course across right of way, but drainage 
district was chargeable with expense of constructing culvert. Mason City & 
Ft. D. R. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Wright County, 144 Iowa 10, 121 N.W. 39 
(1909). 
. This section inapplicable where railroad has properly taken care of water 
in right of way and built bridge because of construction of drainage 
district. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co. v. Board of Sup' rs of Wright County, 116 
N.W. 805 (Iowa 1908), reversed on other·grounds, 144 Iowa 10, 121 N.W. 39 (19Qg). 
Liability of railroad not extended for acts of persons not its agent or 
servants. Callahan v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 23 Iowa 562 (1868). 
2. Highway bridge. 
Railroad not required to construct and maintain railing on approach to 
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bridge strong enough to resist automobile striking it. Medema v. Hines, C. C. I 
A., 273 F. 52 (1921). 
3. Grade Crossing. 
Duty of railroad to construct and maintain reasonably safe crossings at 
points where track intersects highways. Monson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
Co., 181 Iowa 1354, 15g N.W. 57g (1916), rehearing denied and modified on 
other grounds, 165 N.W. 305. 
4. Flooding adjoining lands. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Duty to provide adequate water course. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
6. Obstructing natural flow of water. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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327F.2 
7. Unprecedented floods. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
8. ·cause of flooding in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Concurrent causes. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Easement of railroad. 
Mortgagee's lien subject to pre-existing easement of railroad maintaining 
bridge and embankment. Kellogg v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 204 Iowa 368, 213 
N.W. 253 (1927), rehearing denied, 204 Iowa 368, 215 N.W. 258. 
Physical facts held to constitute notice to landowner of easement of 
railroad in bridge for drainage. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 
1282, 211 N.W. 842 (1927). 
11. Defenses. 
In action against railroad for injury to growing crops caused by overflow 
due to acts of company, exercise of care by plaintiff necessary to recovery. 
Brous v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Iowa 701, 142 N.W. 416 (1913). 
One suing for damages for flooding his land cannot recover damages caused 
by himself, by construction of drains from other ponds, and such showing would 
merely reduce recovery. Steber v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 
N.W. 304 (1908). 
Fact that plaintiff dug ditches draining water to culvert complained of 
would not defeat recovery unless shown he augmented flow through the 
culvert. Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 12g Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 
(1906), 3 L.R.A., N.S., 973, 113 Am. St. Rep. 483. 
No defense to company that culvert was erected according to plans of 
skillful engineers. Houghtaling v. Chicago, G. W. R. Co., 117 Iowa 540, 91 
N.W. 811 (1902). 
Where company fully informed of injury not necessary that it be served 
with notice of nuisance and demand for abatement. Willitts. v. Chicago, 
B. & K. C.R. Co., 88 Iowa 281, 55 N.W. 313 (1893), 21 L.R.A. 608. 
12. Settlement of claims. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
13. Actions in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
14. Injunction. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
15. Pleading. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
16. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Admissibility of evide'nce. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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19. Trial. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
20. Instructions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
21. Measure of damages. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
22. Construing construction as a whole. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
23. Instructions already given. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Damages. 
In action for flooding, measure of damages was difference in market value 
before and after, not limiting values to part overflowed, but to farm as a 
whole. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 177 Iowa 328, 158 N.W. 676 
(1916). Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 934, 167 
N.W. 705 (1918). 
Measure of damages is difference in value immediately before and 
immediately after flooding. Sullens v Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 74 Iowa 
659, 38 N.W. 545 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
Only in case of permanent injury does difference in value before and 
after apply to entire tract. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 Iowa 35, 
179 N.W. 191 (1920). 
Measure of damages to leasehold is its difference in value before and 
after flooding. Straight Bros. Co. v Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 
934, 167 N.W. 705 (1918). 
Measure of damages to growing crops is value at time of injury, or value 
when matured less expenses of maturing and marketing same. Brous v. Wabash R. 
Co., 160 Iowa 701, 142 N.W. 416 (1913). 
Measure of damages for obstructing cattle passageway would be 
depreciation in entire farm. Hastings v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 148 
Iowa 390, 126 N.W. 786 (1910). 
Plaintiff entitled to fair and reasonable market value of crops 
destroyed. Delashmutt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 148 Iowa 556, 126 N.W. 359 
(1910). 
Measure of damages to growing crops is value at time of injury, or value 
when matured less expenses of maturing and marketing same. Tretter v. Chicago 
Great Western Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 375, 126 N.W. 339 (1910). 
Measure of damages to growing crops of owner of land differs from measure 
of damages where crops are grown on land of another. Jefferis v. Chicago & N. 
W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 124, 124 N.W. 367 (1910). 
Rule that damages is difference in fair market value of land with the 
crops before and value afterward does not apply to damages suffered by tenant 
from year to year. Wilson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 144 Iowa 99, 121 
N.W. 1102 (1909). 
Loss must be determined with reference to existing conditions. Blunck v. 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 115 N.W. 1013 (Iowa 1908), reversed on other grounds, 
142 Iowa 146, 120 N.W. 737. 
Measure of damages for overflow is difference in market value of land just before and just after overflow. Sullens v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co., 
74 Iowa 659, 38 N.W. 545 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
Measure of damages was rental value of premises. Hull v. Chicago, B. & 
P. R. Co., 65 Iowa 713, 22 N.W. 940 (1885). 
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Growing crops regarded as part of realty, this measure applied was value 
of land plus growing crops. Drake v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 
302, 19 N.W. 215 (1884), 50 Am. Rep. 746. 
327F.3 Catwalks and Handrails (No Annotations) 
327F.4 Rights of Riparian Owners 
1. Construction and application. 
Under this section fee owners of adjacent shore lands may construct piers 
and other convenient structures, but riparian owner holds only to high water 
mark. Hagula v. Mississippi River Power Co., D. C., 202 F. 776 (1913). 
"Riparian owner" is owner of land abutting river, and "littoral owner" is 
one whose land abuts a lake. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Const. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 
245 N.W. 131 (1932), 89 A.L.R. 1147. 
2. Control by governmental authorities. 
Authorities may build wharves and levees on bank of river below high 
water mark, and make other improvements without consent of, or compensation to 
adjacent proprietor. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224 
(1876) 
Bayous and sloughs of Mississippi river, not required in interests of 
corrrnerce, are subject to state or municipal control. Ingraham v. Chicago, D. 
& M. R. Co., 34 Iowa 249 (1872). 
3. Rights of riparian owners. 
Ownership of riparian lands by accretion is recognized. Rand v. Miller, 
250 Iowa 699, 95 N.W.2d 916 (1959). 
In suit to enjoin reconstruction of dam it was not shown to create a 
public nuisance. Shortell v. Des Moines Electric Co., 186 Iowa 469, 172 N.W. 
649 (1919). 
4. Structures permitted. 
Riparian proprietor had no right to erect, without legislative authority, 
a solid pier of masonry within navigable channel. Northwestern Union Packet 
Co. v. Atlee, C. C., Fed. Cas. No. 10,341, 2 Dill. 479, 12 Am. Law Reg., N.S., 
561, 7 Am. Law Rev. 752, 18 Int. Rev. Rec. 157, reversed on other grounds, 88 
U.S. 389, 21 Wall. 389, 22 L. Ed. 619 (1873). 
5. Liability of riparian owner. 
Where, without authority, riparian owner erected a pier in navigable 
channel he was liable for sinking of barge which collided with pier in 
night. Atlee v. Union Packet Co., 88 U.S. 389, 21 Wall. 389, 22 L. Ed. 619 (1874). 
372F.5 Railroad on Riparian Land or Lots 
1. Validity. 
This section not in conflict with U.S. statutes authorizing certain 
construction for protection of property. Davenport & N. W. Ry. Co. v. 
Renwick, 102 U. S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51 (1880). 
State could provide that railway could not appropriate land between high 
and low water mark without compensation to riparian owner. Renwick v. 
Davenport & N. W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. 
Ed. 51. 
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2. Necessity for compensating owner. 
Though improvements by riparian owner were unauthorized railroad could 
not appropriate such without compensation. Davenport & N. W. Ry. Co. v. 
Renwick, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51 (1880). 
3. Defenses to owner's claim. 
To entitle riparian owner to damages for appropriation of land on river 
bank of Mississippi or Missouri Rivers not necessary that he should have 
erected a pier or crib in front of his property. Renwick v. Davenport & N. W. 
R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
Riparian owner cannot recover damages for being deprived of access to 
stream by construction of railroad between high and low water marks. Tomlin 
v. Dubuque, B. & M. Ry. Co., 32 Iowa 106, 7 Am. Rep. 176 (1871). 
4. Actions. 
Whether improvements failing to comply with Act of Congress could be 
taken without compensation was "Federal question." Davenport & N. W. Ry. Co. 
v. Renwick, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51 (1880). 
In action for damages for construction of railroad between high and low 
water mark jury should consider entire premises leased though divided by 
street. Renwick v. Davenport & N. W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 
102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
327F.6 through 327F.38, Inclusive, Omitted. 
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CHAPTER 327G 
FENCES, CROSSINGS, SWITCHES, PRIVATE BUILDINGS, SPURTRACKS AND REVERSION [NEW] 
Division I. Fences, crossings and interlocking switches. 
3276.1 Definition (No Annotations) 
3276.2 Crossings - Signs 
1/2. Validity. 
This section requiring railroads to maintain cattle guards at all 
crossings not unconstitutional. Burchette v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 234 
N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1975). 
1. Construction and application. 
Requirement that large and distinct letters be visible from whatever 
direction travelers might approach. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kean, 365 F.2d 
785 (8th Cir. 1966). 
Extra hazardous crossing requires installation of additional signaling 
devices. Kuper v. Chicago and Northwestern Transp. Co., 290 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 
1980). 
Railroad takes its franchise subject to duty of making such modifications 
in its roadbed as may be necessary to carry road cross improvements such as 
highways thereafter established. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of 
Appanoose County, Iowa, 182 F. 291 (1910). 
Statute enlarging liability of railroad is of no avail to person injured 
prior to passage of such law. Payne v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 44 Iowa 236 (1876). 
2. Cattle guards. 
Where injury case was tried to court, question of negligence of railroad 
was for court. Warren v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 219 Iowa 723, 259 N.W. 115 
(1935). 
Pµrpose of cattle guard to deter and repel cattle from crossing it. 
Harsch v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 211 Iowa 1377, 232 N.W. 144 (1930). 
Action for death of child. Farrell v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 123 Iowa 
679, 99 N.W. 578 (1904). 
Question of whether cattle guard was out of order and thereby allowed 
steer on right of way was for jury. Black v. Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co., 122 
Iowa 32, 96 N.W. 984 (1903). 
Suit for grass loss due to failure to construct cattle guards. Raridan 
v. Central Iowa R. Co., 69 Iowa 527, 29 N.W. 599 (1866). 
Animal fatally inj~red in cattle guard. Meade v. Kansas City, St. J. & 
C.B.R. Co., 45 Iowa 699 (1877). 
After application, owner was justified in assuming cattle guards would be 
erected. Smith v. Chicago, C. & D.R. Co., 38 Iowa 518 (1874). 
3. Nature and sufficiency, cattle guards. 
Action for loss of horse which crossed cattle guard. O'Mara v. Newton & 
N.W.R. Co., 140 Iowa 1go, 118 N.W. 377 (1908). 
Cattle guard must extend clear across right of way and prevent animals 
from crossing. Heskett v. Wabash, ST.L. & P.R. Co., 61 Iowa 467, 16 N.W. 525 (1883). 
Evidence that cattle guard constructed like one in controversy, had 
proved sufficient, was properly rejected. Downing v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. 
Co., 43 Iowa 96 (1876). · 
215 
327G.2 
4. Duty to construct and maintain cattle guards. 
Company liable to maintain cattle guards under this section. Giger v. 
Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 80 Iowa 492, 45 N.W. 906 (1890). 
Requirement of cattle guards where company enters "fenced land" is same 
whether fenced land belongs to adjoining owner or is part of right of way. 
Robinson v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 67 Iowa 292, 25 N.W. 24g (1885). 
Cattle guards must be kept in repair. Miller v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. 
Co., 66 Iowa 546, 24 N.W. 36 (1885). 
Where land is afterwards improved and enclosed, cattle guards must be 
provided. Heskett v. Wabash, St.L. & P.R. Co., 61 Iowa 467, 16 N.W. 525 
(1883). 
Company held liable for damage to crops after being notified to construct 
cattle guard. Donald v. St. Louis, K.C. & N.Ry. Co., 44 Iowa 157 (1876). 
Injured party need not go on railway to repair cattle guard. Downing v. 
Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 43 Iowa 96 (1876). 
Provision applies to fences dividing lands of same owner. Smith v. 
Chicago C. & D.R. Co., 38 Iowa 518 (1874). 
This section does not create liability for failure to provide cattle 
9uards at private crossings. Bartlett v. Dubuque & S.C.R. Co., 20 Iowa 188. 
(1866). 
5. Proximate cause, cattle guards. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
6. Contributory negligence, cattle guards. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
7. Damages, cattle guards. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
8. Double damages, cattle guards. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Fences. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Warning signs. 
Intention of statute was to make failure to provide sign boards at 
highway crossings conclusive evidence of negligence. Field v. Chicago, B. & 
Q. Ry. Co., 14 F. 332 (1882). 
Statutory requirements for warnings at crossings are minimum standards. 
Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 356, 30 N.W.2d 120 (1948). 
Whether extra warnings and safe guards should be provided at peculiarly 
hazardous crossing question for jury. Hitchcock v. Iowa Southern Utilities 
Co. of Delaware, 233 Iowa 301, 6 N.W.2d 2g (1942). 
Failure to maintain signs or warning signals, if constituting negligence 
as a matter of law was not the proximate cause of injuries caused by collision 
on foggy night with railroad car occupying crossing. Dolan v. Bremner, 220 
Iowa 1143, 263 N.W. 798 (1936). 
This provision did not enlarge liability of company for casualty occuring 
before enactment took ef.fect. Payne v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 44 Iowa 236 
(1876). 
Failure to have warning sign at crossing was negligence. Correll v. 
Burlington C.R. & M.R. Co., 38 Iowa 120 (1874). 
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Railroad's failure to post warning sign did not render railroad strictly 
liable for injuries sustained by automobile driver. Bradwell v. Illinois 
Cent. Gulf R. Co., 562 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977). 
Sole purpose of statutes requiring railways to erect warning signs at 
crossings is to warn unwary travelers of the position of the railroad. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kean, 365 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1966). 
Additional signalling devices required at extra hazardous crossin9. 
Kuper v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 290 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1g80). 
Railroad's negligence in failing to provide a warning sign with large and 
distinct letters, and in permitting crossbuck to be placed in an inconspicuous 
manner. Plumb v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 249 Iowa 1187, 91 N.W.2d 380 
(lg58). 
11. Nature and sufficiency, warning signs. 
This section requires that railway erect crossing sign with large and 
distinct letters, giving notice of proximity of tracks. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 
v. Kean, 365 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1966). · 
Stop sign did not provide adequate warning of proximity of railroad. 
Maier v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 234 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1975). 
Installation of automatic crossing bells or other signals warning of 
approach of train is required only where crossing is more than ordinarily 
dangerous. Hammarmeister v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 254 Iowa 253, 117 N.W.2d 
463 (1962). 
Where driver of car testified that he knew where crossing was and used it 
for years it was nonmaterial that signal was not in proper repair. Dilliner 
v. Joyce, 233 Iowa 279, 6 N.W.2d 275 (1942). 
Sign helped to fairly warn approaching travelers. Hitchcock v. Iowa 
Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 233 Iowa 301, 6 N.W.2d 2g (1942). 
12. Contributory negligence, warning signs. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
13.· Evidence to show hazardous nature of crossing at nighttime - jury 
determination. 
Russell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 249 Iowa 664, 86 N.W.2d 843 
(1958). 
Negligence of railroad held to be proximate cause of injury. Chicago 
Great Western R. Co. v. Mackie, C. C. A., 60 F.2d 384 (1932). 
Instruction submitting issue of negligence without defining duty of 
railroad with respect thereto was erroneous. Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 378, 170 N.W. 452 (1919). 
Railroad company has right to cross streets of municipality without 
consent of city authorities. Morgan v. Des Moines Union R. Co., 113 Iowa 561, 
85 N.W. 902 (1901). 
Mandamus may lie to compel railroad to construct another crossing in city 
where other crossing is dangerous and causes delay and inconvenience because 
of switching. City of Ft. Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 Iowa 389, 
54 N.W. 243 (1893). 
Railroad not liable under this section for stock killed at crossing of 
road traveled by public as highway. Soward v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 33 Iowa 
386 (1872). 
To protect itself from liability, fences should be built to, and cattle 
guards erected at highway crossing. Andre v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 30 Iowa 
107 (1870). 
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14. Nature and sufficiency, safe crossings. I 
Railroad crossing only ordinarily dangerous. Harrrnanneister v. Illinois 
Cent. R. Co., 254 Iowa 253, 117 N.W.2d 463 (1962). 
Railroad not liable for accident resulting from defect in highway near 
crossing, where defect outside plank adjoining outer rail. Gable v. Kriege, I 
221 Iowa 852, 267 N.W. 86, 105 A. L. R. 539 (1936). 
Railroad required to make good and sufficient crossing where its track 
crosses highway. Herrstrom V. Newton & N. W.R. Co., 129 Iowa 507, 105 N.W. 
436 ( 1905) • I 
Railroad crossing street at grade may cross at angle if tracks are not 
laid in front of property belonging to others. Morgan v. Des Moines Union R. 
Co., 113 Iowa 561, 85 N.W. 902 (1901). 
Requirement of erecting warning signs not applicable to overhead 
crossings. City of Albia v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 102 Iowa 624, 71 N.W. I 
541 (1897). 
Court could require construction of overhead crossing where mandamus was 
petitioned for. City of Ft. Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 Iowa 
389, 54 N.W. 243 (1893). 
Where crossings at highways are constructed that they can be crossed with I 
reasonable safety and convenience, such are sufficient to protect company from 
liabilities for accidents alleged due to insufficient condition of crossing. 
Meeker v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 64 Iowa 641, 21 N.W. 120 (1884). 
15. Duty to construct and maintain, safe crossings. 
Railway company must construct and maintain such crossings. Chicago, St. 
P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Washington, C. A. Minn., 179 F.2d 548 (1950). 
Liability to sand, gravel, or cinder icy crossing discussed. 
Guttenfelder v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 243 Iowa 755, 52 N.W.2d 50 (1952). 
Railroad and city had duty to maintain viaduct in safe condition. Harris 
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. R. Co., 224 Iowa 1319, 278 N.W. 338 (1938). 
Spur track, constructed at expense of railway and coal yard proprietor 
he 1 d a joint enterprise and "operated" by rail road. Lane v. Interurban Ry. 
Co., 190 Iowa 738, 180 N.W. 895 {1921). 
Elevation of two or three inches between road surface and top of planks 
in crossing did not, as matter of law, make railroad negligent. Peterson v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 378, 170 N.W. 452 (1919). 
Duty of railroad to construct and maintain reasonably safe crossings. 
Monson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1354, 159 N.W. 679 (1916), 
rehearing denied and opinion modified on other grounds, 165 N.W. 305. 
Railroad had duty to construct crossing. Craig v. Wabash R. Co., 121 
Iowa 471, 96 N.W. 965 (1903). 
Absent legislation railroad not required to construct crossings over its 
right of way to extend or connect streets established after location and 
acquisition of right of way. City of Albia v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 102 
Iowa 624, 71 N.W. 541 (1897). 
Fact that there was a steep hill, impractical for loaded teams would not 
excuse failure to build crossing before hill graded. City of Ft. Dodge v. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 Iowa 389, 54 N.W. 243 (1893). 
Crossings become part of railroad itself to which right of public cannot 
be defeated by changes in ownership. Swan v. Burlington, C.R. & N. R. Co., 
72 Iowa 650, 34 N.W. 457 (1887). 
Company had duty to keep bridge and approaches in safe condition. City 
of Newton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 66 Iowa 422, 23 N.W. 905 (1885). 
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Highway must be placed in as good condition as before construction of 
crossing. Beatty v. Central Iowa R. Co., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W. 332 (1882). 
Road districts were not relieved from duty of maintaining highway in good 
condition. Farley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 42 Iowa 234 (1875). 
16. Obstruction at crossings. 
Evidence of obstruction of highway by trains and similar accidents were 
admissable to show knowledge of company of hazardous condition. Lindquist v. 
Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 120 (1948). 
That railroad authorized to operate across highway no defense against 
obstruction of highway. Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co., 97 Iowa 342, 66 N.W. 231 
(1895). 
Railroad liable for damage caused by obstruction outside the traveled way 
but within right of way of highway. Hanson v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co., 
94 Iowa 409, 62 N.W. 788 (1895). 
Erection or maintenance of obstruction may create liability in 
railroad. State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 88 Iowa 689, 56 N.W. 400 
(1893). 
Railroad liable for leaving carcass of cow on highway. Baxter v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co., 87 Iowa 488, 54 N.W. 350 (1893). 
Fact that obstruction of street necessary in switching cars no defense. 
State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 77 Iowa 442, 42 N.W. 365, 4 L. R. A. 298 
(1889). 
17. Bridges and culverts at crossings. 
Ridge in crossing shown to be safe to pass over at reasonable speed. 
Myers v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., C. C., 101 F. 915 (1900). 
Railroad required to construct and maintain necessary bridges and 
culverts incident to construction and maintenance of proper crossing over 
public highway. O.A.G. 1928, p. lgl. 
18. Approaches to crossing. 
Railroad required to maintain that part of crossing structure made 
necessary by existence of tracks and roadbed. Gable v. Kriege, 221 Iowa 852, 
267 N.W. 86, 105 A. L. R. 539 (1936). 
Approach to crossing situated on railroad right of way is a part 
thereof. See v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Iowa 443, 99 N.W. 106 (1904). 
Where approaches to railway at highway crossing not built exactly 
opposite each other, question for jury as to sufficiency of crossing. Meeker 
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 64 Iowa 641, 21 N.W. 120 (1884). Farley v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 42 Iowa 234 (1875). 
19. Knowledge of defective condition. 
Failure of automobile driver familiar with crossing and warning sign. 
Bradwell v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 562 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977). 
No warning as to existence of railway crossing is necessary when motorist 
has actual knowledge of the condition. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kean, 365 
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1966). 
Railroad charged with implied notice of defect which existed for years. 
Monson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1354, 159 N.W. 679 (1916), 
rehearing denied and opinion modified on other grounds, 165 N.W. 305. 
20. Contributory negligence, crossings. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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21. Road improvements at crossings. 
Where railroad has mere easement in right-of-way, it is not subject to 
special assessments for road improvements. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 302. 
22. Actions for negligence of railroad. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
23. Presumptions and burden of proof in actions for negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Evidence in actions for negligence. 
Admission of evidence of two prior accidents at crossing. Kuper v. 
Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 290 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1980). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
25. Questions for jury in actions for negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
26. Instructions in actions for negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
27. Review of actions for negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28. Sidewalks. 
Railroad has duty to maintain safe sidewalks at its railroad crossing. 
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Washington, C. A. Minn., 179 F.2d 548 
(1950). 
29. Flagman. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
30. Pleadings. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
31. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
3276.3 Railway Fences Required 
1. Construction and application. 
This section requires railroad companies to fence their right-of-ways. 
This obligation continues for as long as the right-of-way is owned by the 
railroad company regardless of whether the line has been abandoned or the 
tracks removed therefrom. O.A.G. March 12, 1980. 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.2 in main 
volume. 
3. Defects in fences. 
Owner of cow pastured on railway property claimed that railroad failed to 
comply with railroad fencing statute 5327G.2 and 327G.4 when auto driver 
sustained personal injury after collision with cow. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 166 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969). 
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13. Damages. 
Section 478.7 imposing double damages on railroad which refused to pay 
cattle owner damages for injured cattle within 30 days as result of railroad's 
failure to maintain cattle guard was not subject to equal protection clause 
since section treated railroads alike and reasonable basis existed for 
treating railroads differently than other industries. Burchette v. Chicago, 
R.I. and P.R. Company, 234 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1975). 
3276.4 Specifications 
1. Construction and application. 
Railroad's failure to comply with the railroad fencing statute 
requirement. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 166 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 
196g), 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.4 in main 
volume. 
3276.5 Hog-Tight Fences 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.5 in main 
volume. 
3276.6 Failure to Fence 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.6 in main 
volume. 
3276.7 Double Damages 
1. Validity. 
This section imposing double damages not subject to challenge under the 
equal protection clause. Burchette v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 234 N.W.2d 
149 (Iowa 1975). 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.7 in main 
volume. 
3276.8 Laws and Local Regulations Not Applicable 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.8 in main 
volume. 
3276.9 Failure to Fence - General Penalty 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.10 in main 
volume. 
3276.10 Killing of Stock - Interpretative Clause 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.11 in main 
volume. 
3276.11 Private Crossings 
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For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.12 in main I 
volume. 
3276.12 Overhead, Underground, or More Than One Crossing 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.13 in main I 
volume. 
3276.13 Signals at Road Crossings 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.19 in main 
volume. 
3276.14 Violations 
Formerly section 478.20. Renumbered section 327G.14 by Code Editor in 
1976. 
3276.15 Railway and Highway Crossing at Grade 
1. Construction and application. 
In enacting statutes dealing with authority of Commerce Commission in 
regard to railroad and highway crossings, intent of legislature was to retain 
jurisdiction in the Commerce Commission over all such crossings whether 
existing or created by new facilities. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 182 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1970). 
It is duty of railroad to construct and maintain reasonable safe 
crossings. Monson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1354, 159 N.W. 679 
(1916), rehearing denied and modified on other grounds, 165 N.W. 305. 
Mere nonuser of platted street would not defeat right of city to open and 
replank crossing after wrongful destruction by railroad. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
R. v. City of Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425, 80 N.W. 564 (1899). 
Word "over" as used in authorization to cross over city street without 
consent of city, meant "upon." State v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 47 Iowa 
507 (1877). 
"Over" means at an elevation above, as opposed to "under." Milburn v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 (1861). 
2. Contracts. 
Agreement by railroad to keep bridge in repair no consideration for 
contract by city to maintain approaches to bridge where law placed burden of 
maintenance of bridge and approaches on railroad. City of Newton v. Chicago, 
R. I. & P. R. Co., 66 Iowa 422, 23 N.W. 905 (1885). 
Under contract company limited to construction at grade established by 
city. Slatten v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 29 Iowa 148, 4 Am. Rep. 205 
(1870). 
Contract releasing railroad from maintaining or replacing viaduct did not 
preclude subsequent city council from applying to railroad commissioners for 
replacement and request for share to be borne by railroad. O.A.G. 1922, p. 
224. 
3. Location of crossing. 
Neither city nor highway commissioners have authority to forbid laying of 
tracks across street in city even though necessary to alter grade of street 
therefore. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 187. 
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4. Rights and remedies of property owners. 
Though authorized to build overhead crossing for a highway over its 
right-of-way, damages were payable to owner thereby deprived of access to the 
highway. Wulke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 189 Iowa 722, 178 N.W. 1009 
(1920). 
Where crossing necessitated raise in grade of street, owner was entitled 
to damages. Gates v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co., 82 Iowa 518, 48 N.W. 
1040 (18gl). 
Landowners could recover damages resulting from closin9 of private road 
by railroad tracks. Gear v. C. C. & D. R. Co., 39 Iowa 23 {1874). 
5. Commerce Commission. 
Supreme court in holding that railroad commissioners lacked jurisdiction 
to authorize abandonment of overhead bridge in town and substitution of cinder 
crossing did not intend to affect contractual rights previously acquired. 
Town of Huxley v. Conway, 226 Iowa 268, 284 N.W. 136 (1939). 
6. Actions. 
Action by railroad to enjoin another railroad from constructing grade 
crossing over its tracks. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. 
Ry, Co., 91 Iowa 16, 58 N.W. 918 (1894). 
Instruction that failure to put in crossing might amount to negligence 
was erroneous where there was no allegation that road was constructed in an 
improper manner. O'Connor v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 56 Iowa 735, 10 
N.W. 263 (1881). 
7. Prior laws. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.21 in main 
volume. 
3276.16 Disagreement - Application - Notice 
1. Construction and aeplication. 
Stay of condemnation proceedings instituted by highway commission until 
issues contemplated by statute dealing with authority of commerce commission 
in regard to railway and highway crossings could be determined. Chicago, R. 
I. & P.R. Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 182 N.W.2d 160 (Iowa 1970). 
Board of supervisors should make application to board of railroad 
commissioners as provided in Code 1924, section 8021, incorporated in this 
section. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 369. 
Disagreeements between board of supervisors and highway commissioners 
regarding details of construction and distribution of expense should be 
submitted to railroad commission. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 189. 
Railroad commissioners had authority to determine matter of change of 
grade of street in city or town in case of dispute. O.A.G. 1923-24, p·. 187. 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.22 in main 
volume. 
3276.17 Hearing - Order 
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1. Construction and application. 
Board of railroad commissioners has no powers except those expressly 
granted and those incidental to or implied in powers granted. Incorporated 
Town of Huxley v. Conway, 226 Iowa 268, 284 N.W. 136 (1939). 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.23 in main 
volume. 
327G.18 Railway Company to Hold in Trust 
Formerly § 478.24. Renumbered ~ 327G.18 by Code Editor in 1976. 
327G.19 Grade Crossing Fund 
Formerly ~ 478.25. Renumbered § 327G.19 by Code Editor in 1976. 
Former~ 478.25 was repealed by Acts 1949 (52 G.A.) ch. 247, ~ 2. 
327G.20 Reserved 
327G.21 Condition After Change - Temporary Ways 
1. Construction and application. 
Injured person could not recover without evidence showing approaches to 
viaduct were unreasonable or that there was negligence in its construction or 
maintenance. Harris v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 224 Iowa 1319, 278 
N.W. 338 (1938). 
2. Repairs. 
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Where bridge over tracks was necessary at street crossing company liable 
for expense of keeping in repair both bridge and approaches. City of Newton I 
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 66 Iowa 422, 23 N.W. 905 (1885). 
3. Use of streets. 
Power granted to railways by Code 1873, to occupy streets was, by 
implication, withdrawn by amendment in Chapter 47, Laws of 1874. Stanley v. 
City of Davenport, 54 Iowa 463, 2 N.W. 1064, 37 Am. Rep. 216 (1880), affirmed, 
54 Iowa 463, 6 N.W. 706, 37 Am. Rep. 216. 
Indictments for improper and negligent construction should in terms 
charge the fact. State v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 47 Iowa 507 (1877). 
Railroad was entitled, subject to proper equitable and police 
regulations, to construct its road over city street without city consent. 
Chicago, N. & S. W. R. Co. v. City of Newton, 36 Iowa 299 (1873). 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see section 478.27 in main 
volume. 
327G.22. Railway Crossings Near Mississippi River 
Formerly ~ 478.28. Renumbered ~ 327G.22 by Code Editor in 1976. 
327G.23 Grade Crossings 
For basic development of notes of decisions, see § 478.29 in main volume. 
327G.24 through 327G.27 Repealed 
327G.28 Compulsory Establishment 
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Fonnerly § 478.36. Renumbered § 327G.28 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.29 Grade Crossing Surface Repair Fund 
3276.30 Adjustment of Expense (No Annotations) 
3276.31 Disagreement Resolved (No Annotations) 
3276.32 Blocking Highway Crossing 
1. In genera 1. 
Statute allowing cities to limit blockage of street by ordinance and 
Administrative Procedure Act doesn't require promulgation of rules to govern 
notice given by transportation regulation board. Chicago and North Western 
Transportation Co. v. Iowa Transportation Regulation Board, 322 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 1982). 
3276.33 to 3276.60 Reserved 
DIVISION II. PRIVATE BUILDINGS AND SPUR TRACKS 
3276.61 Definition 
Fonnerly § 481.9. Renumbered ~ 327G.61 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.62 Buildings on Railroad Lands 
Fonnerly § 481.1. Renumbered ~ 327G.62 by Code Editor in 1976. 
1. Construct and application. 
Elevator companies permanent scale pit is a "building" within ~ 327G.63, 
imposing negligence liability. Fanners Elevator Co. v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. 
Co., 260 Iowa 478, 149 N.W.2d 867 (1967). 
3276.63 Destruction of Buildings 
Formerly ~ 481.2. Renumbered ~ 327G.63 by Code Editor in 1976. 
1. Construction and application. 
Railroad employees negligence causing damage to elevator companies scale 
mechanism, causing railroad liability, not withstanding exculpatory lease 
provision because damage not caused by railroad for elevator company's 
benefit. Fanners Elevator Co. v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. Co., 260 Iowa 478, 149 
N.W.2d 867 (1967). 
3276.64 Spur Tracks 
Formerly § 481.3. Renumbered ~ 327G.64 by Code Editor in 1976. 
1 /2. Validity. 
Statutes authorizing railroad to condemn right of way for spur track 
requires successful operation of existing industry, and condemning land for 
track construction to manufacturer, warehouse, etc., not unconstitutional as 
taking of private property. Reter v. Davenport, R.I. and N.W. Ry. Co., 243 
Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952). 
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3/4. Construction and aaplication. 
Condemnees complete loss of access to railroad and sewer for personal 
damage claim, not using term access in correct form because no proof they had 
right to use railroad or sewer, that spur track or lateral sewer presently 
existed or that they had commerce commission order that spur track be built. 
They were using "access" in broad sense of "quality of being easy to 
approach", and comdemnees therefore not precluded from pleading loss of 
access. Heins v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971). 
4. Eminent domain. 
Test of use of proposed branchline whereby railroad seeks to condemn 
right of way. Reter v. Davenport, R.I. and N.W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 
N.W.2d 863 (1952). 
3276.65 Cost of Construction 
Formerly ~ 481.4. Renumbered ~ 327G.65 by Code Editor in 1976. 
1. Construction and application. 
Condemnation of right of way for spur track. Reter v. Davenport, R.I. 
and N.W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952). 
3276.66 Bond for Construction 
Formerly § 481.5. Renumbered § 327G.66 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.67 Costs in Excess of Deposit 
Formerly § 481.6. Renumbered § 327G.67 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.68 Failure of Company to Act 
Formerly§ 481.7. Renumbered~ 327G.68 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.69 Connections with Original Spurs 
Formerly § 481.8. Renumbered ~ 327G.69 by Code Editor in 1g76. 
3276.70 to 3276.75 Reserved 
DIVISION III. REVERSION TO OWNERS UPON ABANDONMENT 
3276.76 Relocation of Railway 
1. Construction and application. 
It is competent for legislature to say to whom such abandoned land shall 
revert. Atkin v. Westfall, 69 N.W.2d 523 (1955). 
Legislature had in mind distinction between abandoning part of right of 
way by relocation and failure to use or operate for eight years and in former 
event § 473.1 applies, and in case of latter § 473.2 applies. Id. 
Deed to railroad conveyed strip only for certain specified purposes so 
that fee title to strip reverted to county, which owned rest of tract, upon 
abandonment, and company's deed to third party conveyed nothing. Keokuk 
County v. Reinier, 227 Iowa 499, 288 N.W. 676 (1939). 
Abandonment of land good defense to claim for additional damages on 
appeal from condemnation award. Hastings v. Burlington & M.R.R. Co., 38 Iowa 
316 (1874). 
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2. Abandonment. 
By acquiescence in boundary railroad lost title to land encroached upon, 
independent of adverse possesstion. Helmick v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry. 
Co., 174 Iowa 558, 156 N.W. 736 (1916). 
Evidence failed to establish abandonment. Marling V. Burlington C.R. & 
N. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa 331, 25 N.W. 268 (1885). 
3. Refund of money paid. 
Upon abandonment and reversion railroad not entitled to refund of 
condemnation award. Hastings v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 38 Iowa 316 (1874). 
4. Reversion. 
Right-of-way, conveyed by deed with provision that it should "revert" to 
grantor or his heirs or assigns on abandonment, reverted to present owners on 
either side of center line of track. Brugman v. Bloomer, 234 Iowa 813, 13 
N.W.2d 313 (1944). 
Word "revert" means to turn back, to return to. Reichard v. Chicago, B. 
& Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942). 
Burden of establishing ownership and right to damages on person claiming 
abandoned right-of-way. Montgomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150 
(1930). 
5. Claiming reversion. 
Neither re-entry, demand of possession, nor notice of forfeiture is 
necessary step in action to establish reversioner's right to property. 
Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942). 
Formerly § 473.1. Renumbered section 327G.76 by Code Editor in 1976. 
'3276.77 Reversion of Railroad Right-of-Way 
1. Validity. 
It 1s competent for a legislature to say to whom such abandoned land 
shall revert. Atkin v. Westfall, 69 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1955). 
Legislature had in mind distinction between abandoning part of right-of-
way by relocation and failure to use or operate for eight years and in former 
event section 473.1 applies, and in case of latter section 473.2 applies. Id. 
Statute does not operate retrospectively as it does not create suspension 
but merely prescribes its effect. Skillman v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 78 
Iowa 404, 43 N.W. 275 (188g), 16 Am. St. Rep. 452. 
2. Construction and application. 
This section did not attach reversionary interest to conveyance to 
railroad, which acquired easement to the property and subsequently abandoned 
it by I.C.C. order. Johnson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 
1980). 
Where deed conveyed tract in fee simple to railroad, reverter statute, 
making provision for reversion of right-of-way, did not apply. Turner v. 
Unknown Claimants of Land in Section 4, 87 N. Tp., Range 32 West of 5th 
Principal Meridian, 207 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1973). 
Competent for legislature to say to whom land shall revert. Atkin v. 
Westfall, 69 N.W.2d 523 (1955). 
Though railroad had not reached plaintiff's land there was commencement 
of construction. Vandewater v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 Iowa 687, 153 
N.W. 190 (1915), Ann Cas. 1917C 1132. 
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This section did not forbid forfeiture for abandonment of use in 
accordance with provisions of deed. McClain v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., go 
Iowa 646, 57 N.W. 594 (1894). 
3. Use, operation, abandonment, and breach of condition. 
Condition in deed as to abandonment not breached by change in name of 
company or in merger or consolidation. Reichard v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 
231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942). 
Where plaintiff abandoned right-of-way for five years deed by plaintiff's 
grantor to defendant did not vest title in defendant as having reverted to 
~rantor. Monarch Coal Co. v. Phillips Coal Co., 178 Iowa 660, 156 N.W. 297 
(1916). 
Reversion worked by failure to construct or operate line in eight 
years. Vandewater v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 Iowa 687, 153 N.W. 190 
(1915), Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1132. 
Evidence admissible in action by owner to recover right-of-way for 
nonuser that road was built to reach certain mines, now abandoned and that 
coal company obtained right-of-way. Gill v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 117 Iowa 
278, 90 N.W. 606 (1902). 
Nonuser did not constitute abandonment of right-of-way. Morgan v. Des 
Moines Union R. Co., 113 Iowa 561, 85 N.W. 902 (1901). 
Evidence held competent to show company "ceased permanently" to use way 
within meaning of grant. McClain v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 90 Iowa 646, 
57 N.W. 594 (1894). 
Re-entry within eight years was not a trespass. Fernow v. Chicago, M. & 
St. P. R. Co., 75 Iowa 526, 39 N.W. 869 (1888). 
-~----- Alienation of right-of-way by grantee, and failure to use it for purpose 
which granted, did not constitute abandonment. Barlow v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
R. Co., 29 Iowa 276 (1870). 
4. Reversion. 
When right-of-way reverts easement, with all its incidents, is 
extinguished. Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 
(1942). 
There must be failure to use or operate for eight years prior to 
reversion taking place. Monarch Coal Co. v. Phillips Coal Co., 178 Iowa 660, 
156 N .W. 297 ( 1916). 
Reversion was to grantor despite provision that reversion should be to 
owner of the land from which right-of-way was taken. Spencer v. Wabash R. 
Co., 132 Iowa 129, 109 N.W. 453 (1906). 
It is competent for legislature to say to whom it shall revert upon 
abandonment. Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N.W. 427 (1897). 
5. Fee in railroad. 
Section inapplicable where fee is acquired by deed rather than by 
easement through condemnation. Montgomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 
N.W. 150 (1930). 
A title in fee not reduced to mere easement. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co. v. Town of Churdan, 196 Iowa 1057, 195 N.W. 996 (1923). 
Where fee to company was not limited in any way, company did not lose 
title by non user. Watkins v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 123 Iowa 390, 98 N.W. 910 
(1904). 
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6. Conveyance by railroad. 
Rights of grantees of railroad subject to conditions in deed which I 
railroad took to the property. Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 
563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942). 
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7. Transfers by owners. 
Possibility of reverter transformed into fee simple by abandonment of 
land by railroad. Reichard v. Chicago, B. & O. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 
721 (1942). 
Exception in deed of right-of-way retained what title grantor had in it, 
in him. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 133 Iowa 714, 110 N.W. 1039 (1907). 
Deed failed to pass reversionary interest in right-of-way. Spencer v. 
Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 129, 109 N.W. 453 (1906). 
Where owner, prior to abandonment, conveyed remainder of tract he parted 
with rights in reversion to grantee. Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N.W. 427 
(1897). 
8. Claiming reversion. 
Neither re-entry, demand of possession, nor notice of forfeiture is an 
essential step in establishing reversioner's right to property. Reichard v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942). 
9. Waiver and estoppel. 
Deed given to correct prior deed, and expressly reserving to grantor all 
rights under former deed, was not waiver of former abandonment by railroad. 
Gill v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 117 Iowa 278, 90 N.W. 606 (1902). 
When defendant induced railroad to abandon depot and build on his land 
facts estopped him from asserting title. Des Moines & Ft. D. R. Co. v. Lynd, 
94 Iowa 368, 62 N.W. 806 (1895). 
Plaintiff precluded from insisting on abandonment by agreement with 
defendant's lessee, whereby lessee constructed and maintained road complained 
of. Marling v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa 331, 25 N.W. 268 
(1885). 
10. Refund of money paid. 
Owner not required to return compensation prior to quiet title action. 
Vandewater v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 170 Iowa 687, 153 N.W. 190 (1915), 
Ann Cas. 1917C, 1132. 
11. Condemnation after abandonment. 
Right-of-way previously condemned, paid for and abandoned could not be 
again condemned without compensation. Remey v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 116 Iowa 
133, 89 N.W. 218 (1902). 
Formerly ~ 473.2. Renumbered § 327G.77 by Code Editor in 1976. 
3276.78 Sale of Railroad Property (No Annotations) 
3276.79 Valuing Rail Property (No Annotations) 
3276.80 Reserved 
DIVISION IV 
ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY 
3276.81 Maintenance of Improvements Along Right-of-Way (No Annotations) 
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CHAPTER 343 
GENERAL DUTIES OF COUNTY OFFICERS 
Repealed Act 81, ch. 117, ~ 1244. 
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CHAPTER 346 
COUNTY BONDS 
346.1 Funding and Refunding Bonds 
1. Construction and application. 
Section 75.2 applies to creation of original indebtedness, not to 
issuance of funding or refunding bonds which should be advertised. O.A.G. 
1930, p. 372. 
Supervisors may not issue warrant against general fund to obtain funds 
with which to redeem warrants issued to pay claims. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 411. 
2. Power and duty to issue bonds. 
Authorization by voters necessary. Carpenter v. Buena Vista County, 
18il8, Fed. Cas. No. 2,429; 5 Dill 556. 
Where officers issue bonds without authority, a purchaser is not 
protected. Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa 15, 5 Clarke 15 (1857}. 
Counties or municipalities may issue bonds for judgment debt. Iowa 
Railroad Land Co. v. Carroll County, 39 Iowa 151 (1874). 
3. Refunding. 
Not an increase of indebtedness, merely a change in form. Hibbs v. 
Fenton, 218 Iowa 553, 255 N.W. 688 (1934). 
Road bonds - refunding - notice. O.A.G. 1930, p. 353. 
Discretion of board of supervisors. O.A.G. 1922, p. 297. 
4. Indebtedness subject to limitation. 
Refunding bonds do not increase total indebtedness. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Lyon County, 44 F. 329 (1890). 
Bonds issued for outstanding warrants do not increase indebtedness. 
Reynolds v. Lyon County, Iowa, 97 F. 155 (1899). 
Holder of bond not subrogated to rights of creditors who were paid from 
the proceeds. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lyon County, Iowa, 95 F. 325 (1899). 
Refunding bonds issued to take up prior valid debt are not rendered 
invalid because in excess of limitations. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lyon County, 
44 F. 329 (1890). 
When refunding bonds may be invalid in exceeding limitation. Reynolds v. 
Lyon County, 121 Iowa 733, 96 N.W. 1096 (1903). 
Invalid bonds not considered in computing indebtedness. Keene Five-Cent. 
Sav. Bank v. Lyon County of State of Iowa, 90 F. 523 (1898). 
Interest coupons attached ·to bonds are not part of the principal debt. 
Duran v. Iowa County, Fed. Cas. No. 4,189, 1 N.W. 69 (1864). 
6. Holder for value. 
Negotiable bonds issued to satisfy judgment on warrants in excess of 
limitation were valid in hands of innocent purchasers. Sioux City & St. P. R. 
Co. v. Osceola County, 45 Iowa 168 (1876). Sioux City & St. P.R. Co. v. 
County of Osceola, 52 Iowa 26, 2 N.W. 593 (1879). 
Bonafide purchaser of bearer bonds, takes free from infirmity in origin 
of bonds. Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U.S. 51 (1877}. 
Evidence did not show bond holder was holder for value. Smith v. Sac 
County, 78 U.S. 139, 1 Wall. 139 (1870). 
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7. Constructive notice of irregularities. 
Nonpayment of interest installment. Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U.S. 51 
(1877). 
Holder of bonds issued in excess of limitation takes with notice of 
infirmity. McPherson v. Foster Bros., 43 Iowa 48 (1876). 
8. Interest and premiums. 
County cannot pay compensation other than interest to bank for debts 
owing to bank. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 667. 
9. Sale or exchange of bonds. 
"Upon best available terms" indicates advertising for bids should be 
done. O.A.G. 1934, p. 639. 
"Exchange" as used in section 75.9 applies where funding or refunding 
bonds issued are to be exchanged with holder of outstanding bonds or 
judgment. O.A.G. 1932, p. 269. 
10. Payment of bonds. 
Duty of board of supervisors to levy tax for payment. Sioux City & St. 
P. R. Co. v. Osceola County, 52 Iowa 26, 2 N.W. 593 (1879). 
Section 346.10 does not limit levy that may be made. O.A.G. 1940, p. 
489. 
11. Voluntary payments of invalid bonds. 
Validity of new bonds for others which were void. Lyon County v. 
Ashuelot Nat. Bank, 87 F. 137 (1898). 
12. Estoppel. 
Representations did not estop county. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lyon 
County, 44 F. 329 (1890). 
County held to be estopped. Slutts v. Dana, 109 N.W. 794 (Iowa 1906). 
346.2 Refunding Bridge Bonds 
1. Construction and application. 
Bu1fd1ng and repa1r1ng of bridges is such expense and indebtedness for 
which bonds may be issued. Slutts v. Dana, 138 Iowa 244, 115 N.W. 1115' 
(1908). 
2. Payment of bonds. 
Supervisors had authority to repair bridges despite budget limitation. 
O.A.G. 1948, p. 47. 
346.3 Rate of Interest - Fonn of Bond 
1. Construction and application. 
For annotations, .see I.C.A. 
346.4 Provisions Applicable 
1. Procedure for issuance. 
Negotiation refunding bonds presumed issued according to law. Keene 
Five-Cent Sav. Bank v. Lyon County, Iowa, 97 F. 159 (1899). 
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2. Notice of sale. 
Must be published and bids taken unless bonds are to be exchanged for 
debts outstanding as evidenced by bonds or warrants or judgment. O.A.G. 1932, 
p. 269. 
346.5 Bonds - Negotiation of - Duties of Treasurer 
1. Sale of bonds. 
County could not contract for the exchange of outstanding warrants for 
funding bonds yet to be issued by supervisors. O.A.G. 1934, p. 460. 
Contracts by which bank agreed to cash county warrants at par and county 
would issue funding bonds and exchange them at par with interest for warrants 
to accumulate was illegal. O.A.G. 1922, p. 297. 
2. Duties of treasurer. 
To sell or exchange bonds on best possible terms. O.A.G. 1922, p. 297. 
346.6 Proceeds - How Applied 
1. Construction and application. 
Funding bonds not to be sold on contract before issuance of such bonds to 
take up warrants not yet issued for indebtedness not incurred. O.A.G. 1919-
20, p. 668. 
2. Innocent holders for value. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Unlawful diversion of funds. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
346.7 Record of Bonds Sold and Transferred (No Annotations) 
346.8 Treasurer to Report Bonds Sold (No Annotations) 
346.9 Unconstitutional Issue 
1. Construction and application. 
Issuance of funding bonds for valid indebtedness not prohibited by 
section 346.9. Hibbs v. Fenton, 218 Iowa 553, 255 N.W. 688 (1934). 
2. Refunding bonds, issuance of. 
Exchange of refunding bonds for valid debts does not increase 
indebtedness. Hibbs v. Fenton, 218 Iowa 553, 255 N.W. 688 (1934). 
346.10 Tax for Bonded Indebtedness 
1. Construction and a~elication. 
This section notimitation on amount of levy that may be made for 
funding and refunding the bonds. O.A.G. 1940, p. 489. 
2. Exceptions. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
233 
355.4 
CHAPTER 355 
LAND SURVEYS 
355.1 County Surveyor - Appointment and Duties 
1. Construction and application. 
County boards of supervisors have only powers expressly conferred by 
statute are impliedly so conferred. Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa 
1968). 
Applicant desiring engineer to stake out and make survey in connection 
with designation of location of new lines may use provisions of this 
section. O.A.G. 1938, p. 315. 
355.2 Field Notes of Original Survey 
1. Construction and application. 
Auditor proper custodian of copy of government field notes and they are 
admissible in evidence when certified by him as required by law. Keller v. 
Harrison, 139 Iowa 383, 116 N.W. 327 (1908). 
When surveys differ, county supervisors should be governed by transcript 
of sealed notes of governmental survey found in auditors office. O.A.G. 1898, 
p. 167. 
355.3 Corners 
1. Construction and application. 
A surveyor may set concrete or iron pin to establish a corner, and such 
pin constitutes a permanent monument. O.A.G. May 10, 1974. 
355.4 Rules to be Followed 
1. Construction and application. 
Boundaries established by government survey, whether right or wrong, 
control over survey of county surveyor. Fair v. Ida County, 204 Iowa 1046, 
216 N.W. 952 (1927). 
Locating original government quarter section corner. Leathers v. 
Oberlander, 139 Iowa 179, 117 N.W. 30 (1908). 
Surveys to be in accord with rules established by congress. Hootman v. 
Hootman, 133 Iowa 632, 111 N.W. 60 (1907). 
Method of determining center of section which had not been fixed by 
government survey. Gerke v. Lucas, 92 Iowa 79, 60 N.W. 538 (1894). 
Where a given number of acres are sold out of a corner of quarter 
section, premises should be surveyed into a square. Morris' Adm'rs v. 
Stuart's Adm'rs, 1 G. Greene 375 (1848). 
2. Apportionment of excess or deficiency. 
Variances to be distributed between the several subdivisions of the whole 
line in proportion to their respective length. Moreland v. Page, 2 Iowa 139, 
2 Clarke 139, error dismissed, 61 U.S. 522, 20 How. 522, 15 L. Ed. 1009 
(1855). Newcomb v. Lewis, 31 Iowa 488 (1871). 
Proportioning excess acreage between purchasers. Hootman v. Hootman, 133 
Iowa 632, 111 N.W. 60 (1907). 
236 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
355.15 
355.5 Record Furnished - Pres1J11ptive Evidence 
1. Construction and application. 
A surveyor may set a concrete or iron pin to establish a corner, and such 
pin constitutes a permanent monument. O.A.G. May 10, 1974. 
Where original plat was unimpeached boundary lines accepted as true 
regardless of variations appearing in later surveys. Ross v. Myerly, 237 Iowa 
1126, 24 N.W.2d 577 (1946). 
Plat made by county surveyor properly identified and more than thirty 
years old was competent as an "ancient document". Plattsmouth Bridge Co. v. 
Globe Oil & Refining Co., 232 Iowa 1118, 7 N.W.2d 409 (1943). 
Evidence of survey of highway by public surveyor was sufficient to 
establish location of highway, and to show obstruction was within highway. 
Webster County v. Wasem Plaster Co., 188 Iowa 1158, 174 N.W. 583 (1919). 
Record of field notes and plat of county surveyor not a record of any 
link in chain of title. Keller v. Harrison, 151 Iowa 320, 128 N.W. 851 
(1910), Ann. Cas. 1913A, 300, rehearing denied, 151 Iowa 320, 131 N.W. 53, 
Ann. Cas. 1913A, 300. 
2. Presumption of correctness. 
County surveyor's plat showing river channel and land bordering thereon 
as accretion land subject to taxation was presumptive evidence that it was 
privately owned. Plattsmouth Bridge Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 232 Iowa 
1118, 7 N.W.2d 409 (1943). 
Evidence held sufficient to overcome presumptive correctness of county 
survey. McAninch v. Hulse, 113 Iowa 58, 84 N.W. 914 (1901). 
Presumption of correctly made survey. Strait v. Cook, 46 Iowa 57 (1877). 
3. Parol testimony. 
Parol evidence of location of original monuments and corners of 
government survey was sufficient to overcome plats and field notes of 
government survey which differed as to location of corners and lines. Rowell 
v. Clark, 119 Iowa 299, 93 N.W. 280 (1903). 
Parol testimony of unrecorded survey, not clearly shown to have been made 
with knowledge of the parties was not given presumption of correctness. 
McAninch v. Hulse, 113 Iowa 58, 84 N.W. 914 (1901). 
355.6 Record Book (No Annotations) 
355.7 Record (No Annotations) 
355.8 Chai1111en (No Annotations) 
355.9 Witnesses - Fees (No Annotations) 
355.10 Right to Enter upon Land (No Annotations) 
355.11 Damages - Procedure (No Annotations) 
~ 355.12 Tender (No Annotations) 
I 
I 
I 
355.13 Costs (No Annotations) 
355.14 Federal Surveys - Defacement (No Annotations) 
355.15 Fees (No Annotations) 
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358A.5 
358A.4 Areas and Districts 
1. Validity. 
Zoning ordinance provision directing zoning board of adjustment to 
interpret boundary of two districts in case of variance. Zilm v. Zoning Bd. 
of Adjustment, Polk County, 260 Iowa 787, 150 N.W.2d 606 (1967). 
2. In general. 
Zoning decisions are exercise of police power to promote health, safety, 
order and morals of society. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 299 
N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
This section authorizes the county board of supervisors to divide a 
portion of county into zoning districts without so dividing the entire 
county. O.A.G. August 7, 1967. 
Establishment of zoning districts is a legislative function, delegated by 
state legislature to county board of supervisors who may not in turn delegate 
function to zoning board of adjustment. Zilm v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
Polk County, 260 Iowa 787, 150 N.W.2d 606 (1967). 
3. Boundary lines. 
Fixing of boundary between two adjoining zoning districts. Zilm v. 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Polk County, 260 Iowa 787, 150 N.W.2d 606 (1967). 
Under zoning ordinance providing that "boundaries indicated as 
approximately following the center lines of streets, highways or alleys shall 
-~~----._be__construed to follow such center lines" boundary line of abutting districts 
was center line of avenue which divided districts. Jersild v. Sarcone, 260 
Iowa 288, 149 N.W.2d 179 (1967). 
Zoning commission has authority to make recommendations as to boundaries 
of zoning districts within counties .and to recommend appropriate regulations 
under section 358A.8 but does not have en.forcement authority. O.A.G. August 
7' 1967. 
4. Setback lines. 
Zoning ordinance providing for building or setback lines must be 
reasonable, clear and unambiguous, uniform in operation and not unfairly 
discriminatory. Jersild v. Sarcone, 260 Iowa 288, 149 N.W.2d 179 (1967). 
5. Review. 
Court in reviewing order of zoning board of adjustment could not 
substitute its judgment for that of board. Zilm v. Zoning Board of 
Adjustment, Polk County, 260 Iowa 787, 150 N.W.2d 606 (1967). 
358A.5 Objectives 
1. Construction and application. 
Whether board has zoned in accordance with comprehensive plan. 
Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
Authority for board of supervisors to adopt subdivison ordinances exists 
in chapter 358A, and the requirements of notice and hearings set out therein 
must be followed. O.A.G. November 15, 1978. 
Section 306.21 does not provide the board with authority to adopt such 
ordinances without notice and hearing. Id. 
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358A.8 
Counties establishing county zoning must have a "comprehensive plan" 
which is a ·general statement of policy of the result to be achieved in the 
community as a whole. O.A.G. July 14, 1972. 
2. Spot zoning. 
Validity. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup'rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 
(Iowa 1980). 
358A.6 Public Hearings 
1. Construction and application. 
Formal evidentiary hearing before county board of supervisors not 
required. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 2g9 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 
1980). 
Authority for board of supervisors to adopt subdivision ordinances exists 
in chapter 358A and the requirements of notice and hearing set out therein 
must be followed. O.A.G. November 15, 1978. 
Section 306.21 does not provide the board with authority to adopt such 
ordinances without notice and hearing. Id. 
Statutory requirement of public hearing prior to zoning change is 
mandatory and jurisdictional. Bowen v. Story County Bd. of Sup' rs, 2og N.W.2d 
569 (Iowa 1973). 
Public hearings must be held by the zoning commission and by the board of 
supervisors prior to adoption of zoning regulations, restrictions or effecting 
the change of district boundaries. O.A.G. February 1, 1971. 
2. TYPe of hearing. 
Type of hearing contemplated by this section governing public hearings 
held by county board of supervisors in making rezoning decision is of comment-
argument type. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 
(Iowa 1980). 
3. Review. 
Limited scope of review applicable to determine whether decision of board 
to rezone was fairly debatable. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 
299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
358A.7 Changes and Amendments 
1. In general. 
Statutory requirement of public hearing prior to zoning change is 
mandatory and jurisdictional. Bowen v. Story County Bd. of Sup'rs, 209 N.W.2d 
569 (Iowa 1973). 
Board of adjustment does not have jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate 
appeal from action of board of supervisors changing zoning classification. 
Boomhower v. Cerro Gordo County Bd. of Adjustment, 163 N.W.2d 75, (Iowa 1968). 
358A.8 Conmission Appointed 
1. Construction and application. 
Members of county zoning commission appointed by county board of 
supervisors to make independent recommendations to board concerning property 
boundaries, and regulations or restrictions related thereto. O.A.G. June 30, 
1980. 
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358A.26 
No incompatibility in functions of zoning board of adjustment and county I 
fair board. O.A.G. December 31, 1968 (No. 68-12-24). 
358A.16 Decision (No Annotations) 
358A.17 Vote Required (No Annotations) 
358A.18 Petition to Court 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
358A.19 Review by Court 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
358A.20 Record Advanced (No Annotations) 
358A.21 Trial to Court 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
358A.22 Precedence (No Annotations) 
358A.23 Restraining Order (No Annotations) 
358A.24 Conflict with other Regulations 
1. In genera 1. 
County zoning regulations do not apply to land acquired and maintained by 
the state for governmental purposes. O.A.G. October 23, 1973. 
358A.25 Zoning for Family Homes 
1. In genera 1. 
County zoning pursuant to chapter 358A is required to adopt agricultural 
land preservation ordinance pursuant to zoning authority before imposing 
restriction on land, the county which has not adopted said zoning may not 
adopt agricultural land preservation ordinance. O.A.G., May 4, 1983. 
358A.26 Penalty 
1. In genera 1. 
County is "municipal corporation" for purpose of enacting zoning 
ordinances pursuant to statutory authority and comes within purview of section 
366.1 giving municipal corporations power to enforce obedience to their 
ordinances. Wapello County v. Ward, 257 Iowa 1231, 136 N.W.2d 249 (1965). 
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352.5 
CHAPTER 362 
DEFINITIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
362.2 Definitions 
1. Construction and apelication - in general. 
Civil ·service commissions sole prerogative to give promotional 
examinations does not constitute authority to establish promotional 
qualifications. Bryan v. City of Des Moines, 251 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1978). 
Street construction and repair and sewage collection and disposal 
constitute local affairs which cities are authorized to handle under home rule 
amendment. Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1975). 
5. Dual Office Holding. 
Positions of county attorney and city attorney are incompatible. O.A.G., 
July 14, 1976. 
7. Street intersections. 
While city street intersections with other roads and local service-street 
facilities may be established or constructed or reconstructed by cities acting 
alone, the work may also be accomplished by both cities and the state highway 
commission incorporating one with the other. O.A.G. April 4, 1g59, 
362.5 Contract Defined 
8. Effect of violation of statute. 
Ordinance of an incorporated town vacating a highway was void because of 
interest of councilmen voting for it. Kreuger v. Ramsey, 188 Iowa 861, 175 
N.W. 1 (1919). 
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364 .1 
OIAPlIR 364 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF CITIES 
364.1 Scope 
1. Validity. 
Provision of home - rule act that a city may, except as expressly limited 
by the constitution, exercise any power and perform any function which it 
deems appropriate does not, on its face, violate state constitutional 
provision vesting the legislative authority of the state in the general 
assembly. Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1g75), 
2. Construction and application. 
Municipality acts in representative capacity for abutting property owners 
in special assesment proceeding for street improvements. Sioux City v. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
3. Nature of municipalities. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
4. Municipal powers generally. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Legislative power over municipalities. 
Where the fee of the streets is in the city for the use and benefit of 
the public, general assembly has control thereof, and may prescribe terms and 
conditions on which public may use same. Sears v. Marshalltown Street Ry. 
Co., 65 Iowa 742, 23 N.W. 150 (1885). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
6. Delegation of power to city, generally. 
Cities and towns derive their power and authority by virtue of statute, 
and may exercise only such powers as are granted or are necessarily incident 
thereto. City of Ames v. Olson, 253 Iowa g83, 114 N.W.2d 904 (lg62). 
82. Condemnation. 
Right of owners of property abutting on street to ingress and egress from 
their premises by way of such street is a property right, which cannot be 
denied without just compensation. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 57 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 
1953). 
Payment of cost of street widening and change of grade by assessment of a 
benefited property. Midwest Securities Corporation v. City of Des Moines, 200 
Iowa 245, 202 N.W. 565 (1925). 
Where city council establishes new street grade, but annuls appraisement 
of damages, property owner may obtain action against city. Hempstead v. City 
of Des Moines, 52 Iowa 303, 3 N.W. 123 (187g), 
In proceedings to assess damages to property by reason of location of 
street thereon, witnesses testifying to value not required to be experts. 
Town of Cherokee v. Sioux City & I.F. Town Lot & Land Co., 52 Iowa 279, 3 N.W. 
42 (1879). 
In action for damages against municipal corporation for injuries 
sustained by reason of change of grade of street, opinions of witnesses as to 
value of property before and after change are admissible. Dalzell v. City of 
Davenport, 12 Iowa 437 (1861). 
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364.1 
Ordering of improvement in manner provided by statute is condition 
precedent to right to condemn property and proceed to construct improvement. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 245. 
83. Ap~eal, condemnation. 
On y question involved in eminent domain procedure is value of property 
taken and only appeal that can be taken is from award of damages. 
Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, 85 N.W.2d 912 (Iowa 1957). 
84. Improvements, generally. 
Power to regulate and improve roads and highways given by statute to city 
government does not carry with it right to condemn and open them, or take away 
the general power conferred upon county court to establish highways. Knowles 
v. City of Muscatine, 20 Iowa 248 (1866). 
Toll bridges in city. Clark v. City of Des Moines, 1g Iowa 19g (1865). 
Mullarky v. Town of Cedar Falls, 1g Iowa 21 (1865). 
Council of incorporated city may, under general power to cause streets 
thereof to be "paved, graded or macadamized," cause sidewalks of plank, or 
other material, in its discretion, to be constructed. Burlington & M.R.R. Co. 
v. Spearman, 12 Iowa 112 (1861). 
85. Streets and alleys - in general. 
Abutting owner assessed for paving not entitled to credit for old curb 
and gutter torn up. Goldsmith v. Sac City, 1g3 Iowa 1103, 199 N.W. 983 
(1g24). 
Property owner entitled to be heard on question of whether her land was 
adjacent to an improvement. Hauge v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa go7, 196 
N.W. 68 (1923). 
Adjacent property benefited by opening and extending of a street was 
properly assessed, though more than half way from the improved street to the 
next street. Royal v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 23, 191 N.W. 377 (1923). 
Where plat was made of land dividing it into lots, streets, and alleys 
prior to incorporation of town embracing the land platted, streets and alleys 
became county roads. Chrisman v. Brandes, 137 Iowa 433, 112 N.W. 833 (1907). 
Act authorizing and creating roads refers not only to roads and highways, 
but also to roads which lie within limits of cities and towns. City of Newton 
v. Board of Sup' rs of Jasper County, 135 Iowa 27, 112 N.W. 167 (1907). 
Board of supervisors not authorized to lay out highway over land within 
limits of a corporate town. Gallaher v. Head, 72 Iowa 173, 33 N.W. 620 
( 1887). 
86. Contracts and contractors, streets and alleys. 
A Contract to keep pavement of street in repair provided that repairs 
should be made on notice from city engineer and street committee. American 
Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. City of Ottumwa, 137 F. 572 (lg05). 
Contractor's statutory bond to repair pavement must be measured by 
statute and not by wording of bond. Charles City v. Rasmussen, 210 Iowa 841, 
232 N.W. 137 (lg30). 
Contractor and bondsman not liable under statutory bond for ordinary wear 
and tear on the pavement. Id. 
Evidence that repairs to pavement were made for cause for which 
contractor was not liable, held not to give city counterclaim against assignee 
of contract. Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 742, 218 N.W. 
580 (1g23). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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364.1 
87. Water supply. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
88. Sidewalks. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
108. Weeds, destruction of. 
Primary duty upon cities and towns to destroy all noxious weeds growing 
within parkings, streets and alleys in corporate limits, and other weeds 
growing therein as render streets and alleys unsafe for public travel. O.A.G. 
1g33, p. 802. 
Weed law had no application to extermination of ordinary or other than 
noxious weeds within corporate limits of cities and towns. O.A.G. 1938, p. 
408. 
262. Use of streets and alleys, generally. 
Right to use streets is given alike to all citizens, and includes full 
width and length thereof. Mettler v. City of Ottumwa, 197 Iowa 187, 196 N.W. 
1000 (1924). 
Care and control of streets and sidewalks vested in municipalities, and 
they may adopt or~inances in pursuance of such power. Pugh v. City of Des 
Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W 892 (1916). 
383. Public works. 
Municipal corporation liable for careless or neglect of agents in 
construction of public works. Templin v. Iowa City, 14 Iowa 59 (1862). 
City which constructed bridge according to competent engineers' 
specifications not liable for damages. Wm. Tackberry Co. v. Simmons Warehouse 
co:, 170 Iowa 203, 152 N.W. 779 (1915). 
City undertaking construction and maintenance of public work assumes 
performance of ministerial function. Hines v. City of Nevada, 150 Iowa 620, 
130 N.W. 181 (1911). 
384. Improvements, generally. 
Engineering expertness not imputed to members of city council. Russell 
v. Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
388. Streets, alleys and sidewalks. 
Municipality's duty to maintain streets and alleys does not relieve 
property owners or others from duty not to obstruct them so as to endanger 
safety of public rightfully using them nor from liability for damage 
occasioned thereby. Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 260 Iowa 573, 149 N.W.2d 794 
(1967). 
City must exercise reasonable and ordinary care to maintain streets in 
safe condition for travel in the usual and ordinary modes of travel, which 
includes use by pedestrians. Engman v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 1039, 125 
N.W.2d 235 (1964). 
Negligent maintenance of extension of primary road system in city. Smith 
v. City of Algona, 232 Iowa 362, 5 N.W.2d 625 (1942). 
Municipality under duty to remove ice and snow from sidewalks, but no 
corresponding duty in reference to streets and highways, and hence, 
municipality not generally liable to respond in damages for injuries sustained 
by reason of accumulation of ice and snow in traveled portion of streets. 
Bahner v. Des Moines, 230 Iowa 13, 296 N.W. 728 (1941). 
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364.7 
Smoothing down private at juncture with street did not make city liable 
for maintenance thereof as city road. Archip v. Sioux City, 213 Iowa llg8, 
241 N.W. 300 (1932). 
City's duty to maintain street in reasonably safe condition for travel 
not affected by fact that defective grade in street was constructed by county, 
and constituted an approach to a bridge. Whitlatch v. City of Iowa Falls, 19g 
Iowa 73, 201 N.W. 83 (1924). 
Owner of property which is depreciated permanently in value by 
carelessness in improvement of street may recover damages. Cotes v. City of 
Davenport, 9 Iowa 227 (1859). 
364.2 Vesting of Power 
115. Use of streets, generally. 
Electric company was authorized to maintain high voltage transmission 
line on streets. Dilley v. Iowa Public Service Co., 210 Iowa 1332, 227 N.W. 
173 (1929). 
Location of telephone pole between curb and sidewalk was not necessarily 
a nuisance. Greenland v. City of Des Moines, 206 Iowa 12g9, 221 N.W. 953 
(1928). 
City not entitled to compensation for use of its streets. City of Des 
Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co., 181 Iowa 1282, 162 N.W. 323 (1917). 
Municipality has power to regulate placing of telephone poles in 
streets. Wendt v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W 1024 
(1913). 
Authorization for the construction of telephone or telegraph lines along 
public roads. Farmers' Telephone Co. of Quimby v. Town of Washata, 157 Iowa 
447, 133 N.W. 361 (lgll). 
No telephone company authorized to locate, erect or maintain its poles 
along streets and public highways of city or town unless it received a 
franchise therefor from the city or town. O.A.G. 1904, p. 316. 
116. Rental for streets. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
117. Street railways, generally. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.3 Limitation of Powers 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.4 Property Right 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.5 Joint Action - League of Municipalities 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.6 Procedure 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.7 Disposal of Property 
2. In ~eneral. 
Ur an renewal property acquired and demolished. O.A.G., November 22, 
1978. 
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364.11 
Municipality may deed property on vacating street. Krueger v. Ramsey, 
188 Iowa 861, 175 N.W. 1 (1920). 
City acquires fee simple title of land dedicated for street use, but when 
land is dedicated with limitations on the dedication and city accepts the plat 
as dedicated, such action is not void and the limitations have been 
recognized. Leverton v. Laird, 190 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa 1971). 
City has wide discretion in opening, control and vacation of streets and 
alleys, and interference with that discretion by courts is justified only in a 
clear case of arbitrary and unjust exercise of discretion. Stoessel v. City 
of Ottumwa, 227 Iowa 1021, 289 N.W. 718 (1940). 
Town acquired title to allegedly dedicated street, had authority to 
vacate it, and could convey title to individuals only if street was properly 
accepted, opened and used by the public. Patrick v. Cheney, 226 Iowa 853, 285 
N.W. 184 (1939). 
City may vacate street and make use of the ground for any legitimate 
purpose not constituting a nuisance. Walker v. City of Des Moines, 161 Iowa 
215, 142 N.W. 51 (1913). 
7. Exchange. 
Highway commission and county board of supervisors not authorized to 
exchange land. O.A.G. October 16, 1972. 
364.8 Overpasses or Underpasses 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.9 Flood Control - Railway Tracks 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.10 Repealed by Acts 1976 (66 G.A.) ch. 1183, ~ 98. 
364.11 Street Construction by Railways 
1. Validity. 
Street railway's duty to pave between tracks not invalid. Marshalltown 
Light, Power & Ry. Co. v. City of Marshalltown, 127 Iowa 637, 103 N.W. 1005 
(1905). 
Paving requirement between rails. Sioux City St.R. Co. v. Sioux City, 78 
Iowa 742, 39 N.W. 498 (1888). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Construction and application. 
"Railroad" as distinquished from "street railway". Des Moines City R. 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 1261, 159 N.W. 450 (1916). 
Railway companies to construct and repair street improvements between 
rails of their tracks and foot outside thereof. O.A.G. 1934, p. 362. 
3. Street railways. 
Street railway's duty to pave between tracks not invalid. Marshalltown 
Light, Power & R. Co. v. City of Marshalltown, 127 Iowa 637, 103 N.W. 1005 (1905). 
Street railway not properly assessable for portion of cost of paving. 
Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 Iowa 568, 89 
N.W. 7 (1902). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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4. Grades. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
5. Crossing. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
6. Forfeiture. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
7. Limitations. 
Statute of limitations will not 
exercise of its governmental powers, 
railroad right of way. Chicago R.I. 
Iowa 425, 80 N.W. 564 (18g9). 
8. Contracts. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
g_ Notice. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Lien. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
11. Assessment certificates. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
12. Right of action. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
13. Defenses. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
14. Burden of Eroof. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
15. Evidence. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
16. Decree or jud9!!1ent. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
17. Interest. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
364.11 
run to defeat the right of a city, in the 
to open and use a disused crossing over a 
& P.Ry. v. City of Council Bluffs, 109 
18. Conclusiveness of adjudication. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
19. Eguitable relief. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
20. ReEeal s. 
For annotations, see I .C .A. 
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364.12 Responsibility for Public Places 
I. IN GENERAL 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty of governmental body to maintain streets or highways includes duty 
to repair. Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976). 
Negligence of state in failing to eliminate hazard. Posting "bump" sign 
did not excuse duty to repair. Id. 
Section giving city care and control of public places does not make city 
insurer of safety of users of its streets and places, but does impose 
different standard of care than rests upon private owners. Lindstrom v. Mason 
City, 256 Iowa 83, 126 N.W.2d 292 (1964). 
Maintenance and repair of streets is a governmental function rather than 
a proprietary one. Hall v. Town of Keota, 248 Iowa 131, 79 N.W.2d 784 (1957). 
Municipal councils exercise large discretion in control of streets, but 
unreasonable and arbitrary exercise thereof may be restrained. Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
Where the title to the fee of a street is in the city, that title carries 
with it the obligation to keep the street in repair, free from obstructions, 
and reasonably safe. Callahan v. City of Nevada, 170 Iowa 719, 153 N.W. 188 
(1915). 
2. Drains and sewers - in general. 
As an incident to empowering municipalities to open, grade, pave, curb 
and otherwise improve their streets, alleys and highways, surface water could, 
in some degree, be diverted from its natural course. Cole v. City of Des 
Moines, 212 Iowa 1270, 232 N.W. 800 (1930). 
Injury to lot by overflow of surface water - improving city streets. 
Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 113 Iowa 332, 85 N.W. 17 (1901). 
Drain tiles and street drainage. Eggert v. Templeton, 113 Iowa 266, 85 
N.W. 19 (1901). 
g. Railroad crossings and right of way. 
City seeking to require railroad to abandon right of way along certain 
street within city because of traffic problem had right to apply to Interstate 
Commerce Commission for abandonment of such portion of line. City of Des 
Moines, Iowa v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 159 F. Supp. 223 (1958). 
I I. TORTS 
101. Nature of tort liability. 
Municipality liable for failure of street maintenance or for negligent 
street construction. Mardis v. City of Des Moines, 34 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1948). 
Municipality cannot be held liable for inability to protect citizens 
against all accidents occurring in streets for reasons other than defect 
therein. Armstrong v. Waffle, 212 Iowa 335, 236 N.W. 507 (1931). 
An organized town cannot surrender the control of its streets, so as to 
escape obligation to keep the same in a reasonably safe condition. Humboldt 
County v. Incorporated Town of Dakota City, 197. Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1923). 
Injuries resulting from negligent failure to barricade or light a trench 
dug in the street. Spurling v. Incorporated Town of Stratford, 195 Iowa 1002, 
191 N.W. 724 (1923). 
City could not escape liability for defect in street on fact that defect 
did not amount to a nuisance. Raine v. City of Dubuque, 169 Iowa 388, 151 
N.W. 518 (1915). 
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364.12 
Municipal corporation liable for injuries resulting from defective 
streets. Bills v. City of Ottumwa, 35 Iowa 107 (1872). 
City liable for personal injuries resulting from defective condition of 
roads and bridges within its corporate limits. Rusch v. City of Davenport, 6 
Iowa 443 (1858). 
102. Duty to re~air or maintain. 
C1t1es andowns have care, supervision, and control of all public 
streets and alleys and duty to keep them open and free from nuisances. Smith 
v. J.C. Penney Co., 260 Iowa 573, 149 N.W.2d 794 (1967). 
Duty of city is only to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition, no 
liability for consequences which could not be reasonably forseen. McCormick 
v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 35, 50 N.W.2d 564 (1952). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
103. Care required of municipality. 
City is not insurer of safety of travelers on streets, but is required to 
use ordinary and reasonable care to keep streets in safe condition. Abraham 
v. Sioux City, 218 Iowa 1068, 250 N.W. 461 (1933). 
Failure on part of city or town to exercise reasonable care. Fetters v. 
City of Des Moines, 260 Iowa 490, 149 N.W.2d 815 (1967). 
Municipal corporation in exercise of powers and duties delegated· by 
legislature, are held to strict observance of this section dealing with care 
in control of streets and public grounds. Lindstrom v. Mason City, 256 Iowa 
83, 126 N.W.2d 292 (1964). 
This section requires city to exercise reasonable and ordinary care to 
maintain streets in a safe condition. Pietz v. City of Oskaloosa, 250 Iowa 
374, 92 N.W.2d 577 (1958). 
Care and control of streets and sidewalks vested in municipalities, and 
they may adopt ordinances in pursuance of such power which are reasonable and 
do not conflict with state laws or violate private rights. Pugh v. City of 
Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
104. Governmental functions. 
Town council of municipality has discretion to adopt plan for street 
construction recommended by competent engineer. Dodds v. Town of West 
Liberty, 225 Iowa 506, 281 N.W. 476 (1938). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
105. Property owners, liability of. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
106. Person causing defects or dangerous condition, liability of. 
Duty to exercise due care to avoid injuring members of traveling public 
using streets rests not only on municipality but on others making excavations 
in or near streets. Leonard v. Mel Foster Co., 244 Iowa 1319, 60 N.W.2d 532 
(1953). 
Water company granted right to use streets of city for construction of 
water system has duty of seeing that instrumentalities by which it distributes 
its water supply to patrons be constructed and maintained with reasonable care 
for safety of those using street. City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Water Co., 
188 Iowa 24, 175 N.W. 821 (1920). 
Person making excavation in street liable for injuries to thi.rd persons 
resulting from failure to erect suitable barriers. City of Ottumwa v. Parks, 
43 Iowa 119 (1876). 
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107. Places to which liability extends - in general. 
Negligent maintenance of extension of primary .road system in city. Smith 
v. City of Algona, 232 Iowa 362, 5 N.W.2d 625 (1942). 
Smoothing down private road at juncture with street did not make city 
liable for maintenance thereof as city road. Archip v. Sioux City, 213 Iowa 
1198, 241 N.W. 300 (1932). 
City, although creating allegedly dangerous condition in private road, 
was not liable for death allegedly caused thereby because city failed to place 
barrier across road at intersection with public street. Id. 
Control and supervision of municipal streets confided to municipal 
councils, and it is there duty to maintain and free from nuisances and 
obstructions, and their power extends to areaways. Mettler v. City of 
Ottumwa, 197 Iowa 187, 196 N.W. 1000 (1924). 
Organized town cannot surrender control of its streets. Humboldt County 
v. Incorporate Town of Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1923). 
Public right in street extends upward - overhead structure was nuisance 
and municipality liable for injuries resulting therefrom. Wheeler v. City of 
Ft. Dodge, 131 Iowa 566, 108 N.W. 1D57 (1906). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
108. Unopened, unimproved or partially opened streets. 
Duty of municipality to use reasonable diligence to keep streets free 
from obstructions applies only to parts of streets dedicated to vehicular 
traffic. Morse v. Incorporated Town of Castana, 213 Iowa 1225, 241 N.W. 304 
(1932). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
1D9. Parks. 
The provision that cities shall keep highways, streets, avenues, alleys, 
public squares and commons open and in repair and free from nuisance, includes 
parks. Woodard v. City of Des Moines, 182 Iowa 11D2, 165 N.W. 313 (1917). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
110. Property adjacent to street. 
Duty imposed by statute on cities and towns of maintaining streets and 
sidewalks in reasonably safe condition does not relieve property owners or 
others from duty not to obstruct or place dangerous instrumentalities 
thereon. Beyer v. City of Dubuque, 258 Iowa 476, 139 N.W.2d 448 (1966). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
111. Cause of, or responsibility for, defect or dangerous condition. 
City's duty to maintain street in reasonably safe condition is not 
affected by fact that defective grade in street was constructed by county, and 
constituted an approach to a bridge. Whitlatch v. City of Iowa Falls, 199 
Iowa 73, 201 N.W. 83 (1924). 
Excavations in principal streets of a city made under direction of street 
commissioner and foreman in accordance with survey and plat by city 
engineer. Millard v. Webster City, 113 Iowa 22D, 84 N.W. 1044 (1901). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
112. Time allowed for making repairs or eliminating defects. 
Municipality's duty to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition for 
travel includes, when necessary, erection of barriers or guardrails along 
grades and at dangerous places. Whitlatch v. City of Iowa Falls, 199 Iowa 73, 
201 N.W. 83 (1924). 
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City not negligent per se in leaving pile of dirt on street for use in 
repairing pavement. Ferguson v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 689, 198 N.W. 40 
(1924). 
Duty of city to place signal light at danger point to warn travelers. 
Kendall v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 866, 167 N.W. 684 (1918). 
City not negligent in warning or guarding travelers against sewer 
excavation. Frohs v. City of Dubuque, 169 Iowa 431, 150 N.W 62 (1914). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
113. Nature of defects - in general. 
Height of elevation or depth of depression not decisive determinants on 
question of liability. Beach v. City of Des Moines, 238 Iowa 312, 26 N.W.2d 
81 (1947). 
Where plans prepared by engineer for construction of alley intersection 
were not obviously defective, no negligence of city in adopting the plans. 
Russell v. Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
Whether defect in public street so dangerous as to constitute negligence 
on part of city depends upon surrounding circumstances. Thomas v. City of Ft. 
Madison, 225 Iowa 822, 281 N.W. 748 (1938). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
114. Streets, construction or condition. 
City not liable for injuries resulting from city's adoption of an 
improper plan for improvement of a street due to error of judgment.on part of 
engineer, unless plan obviously so hazardous that it would be considered 
hazardous as a matter of law. Dodds v. Town of West Liberty, 255 Iowa 506, 
281 N.W. 476 (1938). 
City not liable for engineer's preparation of approach. Griffin v. City 
of Marion, 163 Iowa 435, 144 N.W. 1011 (1914). 
Construction of an approach from a street to a sidewalk at a slope of one 
foot in seven is not negligence per se. Lush v. Incorporated Town of 
Parkersburg, 127 Iowa 701, 104 N.W. 336 (1905). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
115. Sidewalks or crosswalks, construction or condition. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
116. Depressions or projections. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
117. Excavations. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
118. Notice of injury. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
119. Notice of defects or obstruction. 
What constitutes length of time sufficient to constitute constructive 
notice to municipality of dangerous condition and reasonable opportunity 
remedy condition is generally a question for the jury. Hovden v. City of 
Decorah, 261 Iowa 624, 155 N.W.2d 534 (1968). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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120. Necessity of notice of defect or obstruction. 
While a municipality must exercise ordinary diligence in keeping its 
streets in repair, it cannot be held negligent until it has notice of the 
defect complained of, actual or constructive, and an opportunity to remedy. 
Spiker v. City of Ottumwa, 1g3 Iowa 844, 186 N.W. 465 (1g22). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
121. Officer or agent notified of defect. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
122. Unsafe condition caused by, or under authority of municipality, notice 
of defect. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
123. Defect in construction or repair. 
Notice to city of defect in original construction of street or failure to 
perform positive duty is conclusively presumed. Whitlatch v. City of Iowa 
Falls, 1gg Iowa 73, 201 N.W. 83 (1924). 
Where city gave abutting owner a permit to tear up street, it had notice 
of dangerous condition of street resulting from digging, and city was charged 
with nondelegable duty to care for its streets. Spiker v. City of Ottumwa, 
193 Iowa 844, 186 N.W. 465 (1g22). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
124. Constructive notice of defects or obstructions. 
~~----~- Length of time sufficient to constitute constructive notice of dangerous 
condition and what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to remedy it - depends 
on facts and circumstances of each case - question for trier of fact. 
Anderson v. City of Ft. Dodge, 213 N.W.2d 527 (Iowa 1973). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
125. Time of existence of defect or obstruction, constructive notice. 
There is no fixed or definite rule as to length of time a defect or 
obstruction in street must have existed to furnish notice. Each case depends 
upon facts and circumstances. Parks v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 972, 191 
N.W. 728 (1923). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
126. Proximate cause of injury. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
127. Contributory negligence - in general. 
Pedestrian's contributory negligence not measured by duty owed him by 
city to maintain street in reasonably safe condition. Engman v. City of Des 
Moines, 255 Iowa 1039, 125 N.W.2d 235 (1964). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
128. Care required, contributory negligence. 
Pedestrian to exercise ordinary care to avoid falling on city streets. 
Russell v. Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
Travelers must use reasonable care to avoid injury while using public 
highway. Corbin v. City of Dubuque, 207 Iowa 1168, 224 N.W. 828 (1929). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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129. Knowledge of defect or dangerous condition~ contributory negligence. 
Mere knowledge of defective condition of pu lie street will not, as a 
matter of law, render a pedestrian guilty of negligence in using same, unless 
it was imprudent and dangerous to attempt its use. Taylor v. City of Sibley, 
238 Iowa 1010, 29 N.W.2d 251 (1947). 
For additional annotations, see I .C.A. 
130.· Inadvertence or momentar* forgetfulness, contributory negligence. 
For annotations, see I.e .. 
131. Persons under disability, contributory negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
132. Automobile cases, contributory negligence. 
Driver may rely on presumption that municipality performed its duty in· 
maintaining its streets in reasonably safe condition. Spiker v. City of 
Ottumwa, 193 Iowa 844, 186 N.W 465 (1922). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
133. Traveling in nighttime, contributory negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
134. Traveling in nighttime with knowledge of danger, contributory 
negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
135. Duty to observe defects or dangers, contributory negligence. 
For an notations, see I .C .A. 
136. Right to assume street is free from defects, contributory negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
137. Choice of ways, contributory negligence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
III. ACTIONS FOR INJURIES 
Subdivision Index 
Appeal and error 245 
Applicability of instructions to pleadings and evidence 23g 
Automobile cases, contributory negligence, questions for jury 233 
Burden of proof 206 
Care of way and negligence of defendant, instructions 237 
Condition at other places, admissibility of evidence 213 
Conditions of way and nature of defect, admissibility of evidence 210 
Conduct of trial 223 
Construction or condition of street or sidewalk, questions for jury 226 
Constructive notice of defects or obstructions, instructions 241 
Contributory negligence 
Admissibility of evidence 218 
Instructions 242 
Presumptions and burden of proof 207 Questions for jury 232 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence 222 
Damages, instructions 243 
257 
Evidence 208-219 
Admissibility 208 
Condition of other places 213 
364.12 
Condition of way and nature of defect 210 
Condition of way before and after accident 211 
Contributory negligence 218 
Injuries and damages 219 
Negligence 209 
Notice of defect or dangerous condition 212 
Ordinances 217 
Other accidents 216 
Photographs 214 
Precautions and repairs after accident 215 
Excavations and openings, questions for jury 227 
Failure to repair, questions for jury 228 
Injuries and damages, admissibility of evidence 219 
Instructions 236-243 
In general 236 
Applicability of instructions to pleadings and evidence 239 
Care of way and negligence of defendant 237 
Constructive notice of defects or obstructions 241 
Contributory negligence 242 
Damages 243 
Notice of defect or obstruction 240 
Nuisances and obstructions 238 
Judgment 244 
Jury panel 204 
Knowledge of defect or dangerous condition, contributory negligence, jury 
questions 235 
Negligence 
·Admissibility of evidence 209 
Questions for jury, actions for injuries 225 
Notice ·of defect or dangerous condition 
Admissibility of evidence 212 Questions for jury 229 
Notice of defect or obstruction 
Instruction 240 · 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence 221 
Nuisances and obstructions, instruction 238 
Ordinances, resolution or municipal records; admissibility of evidence 
217 
Other accidents, admissibility or evidence 216 
Parties 202 
Persons entitled to sue 201 
Photographs, admissibility 214 
Pleadings 203 . 
Precautions against injury, questions for jury 230 
Precautions and repairs after accident, admissibility of evidence 215 
Presumptions and burden of proof 206, 207 
In general 206 
Contributory negligence 207 
Proximate cause, questions for jury 231 
Questions for jury 224-235 
In general 224 
Automobile cases 233 
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Construction or condition of street or sidewalk 226 
Contributory negligence 232 
Excavations and openings 227 
Failure to repair 228 
Knowledge of defect or dangerous condition 235 
Negligence 225 
Notice of defect or dangerous conditions 229 
Precautions against injury 230 
Proximate cause 231 
Traveling in nighttime 220 
Subpoenas 205 
Sufficiency of evidence 220 
Traveling in nighttime, contributory negligence, question for jury 234 
Verdict and judgment 244 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence 220-222 
Contributory negligence 222 
Notice of defect or obstruction 221 
IV. BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
301. Construction and repair of bridges and culverts, generally. 
Construction and maintenance of bridges in towns and within cities not 
controlling their own bridge fund is to be undertaken by the county. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 265. 
City council has authority to narrow or change a public highway 
established by board of supervisors before the city was incorporated. O.A.G. 
1898, p. 124. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
302. Charter provisions. 
Where town, under its charter, had control of streets, it could contract 
for construction of free bridges over a stream dividing them. Mullarky v. 
Town of Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa 21 (1865). 
Under Des Moines city charter, city without authority to erect a toll 
bridge within the city limits. Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199 
(1865). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
303. Location of bridges. 
City council may locate bridges wherever public necessity requires, 
without submitting its plans and specifications to river front improvement 
commission. O.A.G. 1906, p. 191. 
304. Culverts. 
City bound to exercise reasonable care in construction of culverts 
rendered necessary by extension of streets. Van Pelt v. City of Davenport, 42 
Iowa 308 (1875). 
City not liable where it employed a competent engineer in the 
construction of a culvert. Id. 
Where drain is established wholly within a city of second class, board of 
supervisors should construct such culverts as are reasonably necessary and 
city such other culverts as it may desire, or it may contribute to 
construction of county culverts. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 336. 
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305. Railroads, grants to. 
Grant to railroad company of right to lay and maintain track over a 
bridge belonging to city. City of Des Moines v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 41 
Iowa 569 (1875). 
306. Repair of bridges. 
Whether an approach is part of a bridge or viaduct depends on whether the 
approach is essential to enable travelers to reach the main structure. Shope 
v. City of Des Moines, 188 Iowa 1141, 177 N.W. 79 (1920). 
County has primary responsibility for repair or replacement of bridge on 
secondary highway extension within corporate limits of municipality of less 
than 2000 population if the municipality has not enacted ordinance assuming 
control of bridge. O.A.G. March 30, 1973. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
307. Bids for bridges. 
Capitol City Brick & Pipe Co. v. City of Des Moines, 127 N.W. 66 (Iowa 
1910). 
308. Contracts, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
309. Claims for materials. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
310. Bond of contractor. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
311. Liability for materials. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
312. Care required. 
Whether municipality kept bridges safe in proper manner determined by 
situtation as it existed before, and not after an accident. Bird v. City of 
Keokuk, 226 Iowa 456, 284 N.W. 438 (1939). 
Counties not responsible for keeping sidewalk over a bridge inside a city 
free from snow, even though bridge was erected by the county. O.A.G. 1919-20, 
p. 276. 
313. Liability for damages. 
Municipalities and their officers are, at common law, liable for injuries 
to travelers resulting from failure to maintain or repair public bridges. 
Krause v. Davis County, 44 Iowa 141 (1876). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
314. Scrip, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
115. Bridge fund, prior law. 
For annotations,. see I.C.A. 
316. Injunction. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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317. Contributory negligence, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
318. Actions - bridges, generally. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
319. Presumptions and burden of proof, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
320. Evidence, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
321. Jury questions, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
322. Instructions, bridges. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
V. NUISANCES AND OBSTRUCTIONS 
Subdivision Index 
In general 401 
Abatement of nuisance 431-438 
In general 431 
Estoppel 434 
Evidence 437 
Injunctions against nuisances 433 
Instructions 438 
Petition 435 
Presumptions and burden of proof 436 
Suit in equity to abate 432 
Abatement of smoke nuisance 422 
Actions for smoke damages 427 
Alternatives to abatement of nuisance 408 
Bees 409 
Buildings or other encroachments 402 
Burden of proof, abatement of nuisances 436 
Estoppel 
Abatement of nuisance 434 
Smoke nuisance 426 
Evidence, abatment of nuisance 437 
Fines 407 
Gasworks 410 
Hogpens 411 
Inflammable junk 413 
Injunction, smoke nuisance 423 
Injunction against city, remedies of property owners 430 
Injunctions against nuisances, abatement of nuisnace 433 
Instructions, abatement of nuisance 438 
Junk yards 412 
Jury questions 404 
Liability for 
Nuisances and obstructions 403 
Smoke damage 424 
Liability of city 428 
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Obstructions of use 439 
Obstructions or excavations in street 414 
Ordinances 406 
Petition, abatement of nuisance 435 
Police power 405 
Pools and ponds as nuisance 417 
Prescription, smoke nuisance 425 
Presumptions and burden of proof, abatement of nuisance 436 
Railroads 415 
Remedies of property owners 429, 430 
Injunction against city 430 
Review 440 
Sewage disposal facility as nuisance 420 
Smoke 421-427 
In general 421 
Abatement of smoke nuisance 422 
Actions for smoke damages 427 
Estoppel 426 
Injunction 423 
Liability for smoke damage 424 
Prescription 425 
Stagnant waters, filling of lots 416 
Suit in equity to abate, abatement of nuisance 432 
Trees as nuisance 418 
Weeds, destruction of 419 
VI. STREETS AND PUBLIC GROUNDS 
501. Validity. 
Provision authorizing cities to vacate and dispose of streets does not 
violate Const. Art. 3, ~ 30. Louden v. Starr, 171 Iowa 528, 154 N.W. 331 
(1915). 
502. Streets, generally. 
Cities and towns have care, superv1s1on and control of all public streets 
and alleys and duty to keep them open and free from nuisances. Smith v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 260 Iowa 573, 149 N.W.2d 794 (1967). 
Special charter city has power to open and maintain streets and alleys. 
Heinz v. City of Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. 783 (1941). 
Control and supervision of municipal streets are confined to municipal 
councils. Mettler v. City of Ottumwa, 197 Iowa 187, 196 N.W. 1000 (1924). 
State having full authority and power over public highways in 
commonwealth, can delegate its reserved powers as to their control to 
municipal authorities to act for and represent it. Central Life Assur. Soc. 
of the U.S. v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 171 N.W. 31 (1919). 
503. Jurisdiction. 
Board of railroad commissioners had no jurisdiction to authorize railroad 
to abandon overhead bridge in town and to substitute therefore a cinder 
roadway and crossing. Incorporated Town of Huxley v. Conway, 226 Iowa 268, 
284 N.W. 136 (1939). 
Control and supervision of municipal streets confined to municipal 
councils. Mettler v. City of Ottumwa, 197 Iowa 187, 196 N.W. 1000 (1924). 
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364 .12 
Board of supervisors, in excess of its jurisdiction, ordered vacation of 
a street in an unincorporated village. Bowersox v. Board of Sup' rs of Johnson 
County, 183 Iowa 645, 167 N.W. 582 (1918). 
Board of supervisors has no jurisdiction to locate a street within the 
limits of an incorporated town. Philbrick v. Town of University Place, 106 
Iowa 352, 76 N.W. 742 (1898). 
Jurisdiction of highways within corporate limits resides exclusively in 
the corporation. Gallaher v. Head, 72 Iowa 173, 33 N.W. 620 (1887). 
Board of supervisors has no authority, to alter or change any street 
within corporate limits of a city. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 110. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
504. Title and rights in streets. 
Municipality has fee title to city street but public has only easement in 
country highway. Clare v. Wogan, 204 Iowa 1021, 216 N.W. 739 (1927). 
Municipalities own fee-simple title to streets. Incorporated of Ackley 
v. Central States Electric Co., 204 Iowa 1246, 214 N.W. 879 (1927). 
Title to streets and alleys of city is held by city in trust for public, 
and council may not dispose of them in disregard of public good. Lerch v. 
Short, 192 Iowa 576, 185 N.W. 129 (1921). 
Land taken or dedicated for streets is subject to the right of the 
public. Wegner v. Kelley, 157 N.W. 206 (Iowa 1916). 
Fee to all streets and alleys in Des Moines is in the city, but in trust 
for the general public. Walker v. City of Des Moines, 61 Iowa 215, 142 N.W. 
51 (1913}. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
505. Plenary authority as to streets. 
In absence of acceptance under some specific reservation, city has 
plenary authority to control dedicated streets. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 
677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
506. Eminent domain. 
Statutes authorized city and commission to take or damage homes for 
purpose of widening public street in relocating primary highway. Gardner v. 
Charles City, 259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W. 2d 915 (1966). 
Sale of vacated street to railroad does not preclude subsequent 
condemnation to reopen the street. City of Osceola v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 
196 F. 777 (1912). 
City council alone can determine necessity for street or alley, although 
authority of the council to condemn land therefor may be subject of appeal to 
district court. Town of Alvord v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 
N.W. 467 (1917). 
Eminent domain to be used to provide for destruction of property to 
prevent spreading of fires. Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874). 
507. Establishment of ~treets. 
Abusive discretion by city in refusing to open street determined by need 
of general public. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
City council's discretion to determine whether public necessity requires 
street be opened. Id. 
City may "establish" streets or accept dedication of streets to public 
without being required to open them to public upon request. Id. 
Highways through village become streets upon incorporation. Town of 
Ackley v. Central States Elec. r.o., 206 Iowa 533, 220 N.W. 315 (1928). 
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Meaning of "establish," "lay off", "extend", "open", "improve". Royal v. 
Des Moines, 195 Iowa 23, 191 N.W. 377 (1923). 
Repeal of ordinance vacating alley cannot re-establish the alley. 
Bradley v. City of Centerville, 139 Iowa 599, 117 N.W. 968 (1908). 
Issue of malice in opening a street should not have been submitted to jury. Young v. Gormley, 119 Iowa 546, 93 N.W. 565 (19D3). 
Witness permitted to testify to intent of council in passing ordinance 
establishing a street. Strahan v. Town of Malvern, 77 Iowa 454, 42 N.W. 369 
(1889). 
While city streets intersections with other roads and local service-
street facilities may be established or constructed or reconstructed by cities 
acting alone, the work may also be accomplished by both cities and the state 
highway commission incorporating one with the other. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
508. Prescription or permissive use of land. 
See also I.C.A. 614.1. 
The fact that land was used as an alley raised no presumption that the 
owner knew that it was under a claim of right. Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 
1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927). 
Permissive use of land does not ripen into title a prescriptive right in 
the city. Johnson v. Robertson, 156 Iowa 64, 135 N.W. 585 (1912). 
Statute of limitations may operate in favor of the city. Johnson v. City 
of Shenandoah, 153 Iowa 493, 133 N.W. 761 (1911). 
Must be at least ten years of continuous use by the public. Davis v. 
Town of Bonaparte, 137 Iowa 196, 114 N.W. 896 (1908). 
Statute of limitations does not run to different governmental powers of a 
city. Chicago etc. Ry •. Co. v. Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425, 80 N.W. 564 
(1899). 
509. Street lines, establishment. 
Boundary of highway or alley not established by acquiescence. Johnson v. 
City of Shenandoah, 153 Iowa 493, 133 N.W. 761 (1911). 
Acquiescence may be evidence of location of boundary. City of Eldora v. 
Edgington, 130 Iowa 151, 106 N.W. 503 (1906). 
Improvement of property with reference to the street as laid out may be 
grounds for injunction against alteration. Delashmutt v. City of Oskaloosa, 
94 Iowa 722, 62 N.W. 16 (1895). 
510. Delegation of power as to streets. 
What the Legislature may itself do in regulating and controlling streets 
of a city, it may delegate to the municipality. Huston v. City of Des Moines, 
176 Iowa 455, 156 N.W. 883 (1916). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
511. Future needs, streets. 
Cities must be able to intelligently plan their streets for future 
needs. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
512. Width of street. 
Supreme Court cannot limit city commission's reasonable discretion in 
reducing grade to widen street. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
Change of grade of street within discretion of the city. Des Moines City 
Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
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364.12 
Presumption of legality and bona fides in widening of street. Central 
Life v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 171 N.W. 31 (1919). 
Evidence sustained finding that street was one hundred feet wide. 
Menoher v. Town of Gravity, 148 Iowa 695, 127 N.W. 1D87 (191D). 
Council may narrow or change street established by Supervisors prior to 
incorporation. D.A.G. 1898, p. 124. 
513. Level of streets. 
As respects liability of city for changing the established grade of a 
street. Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
514. Extending street. 
Interference with rights of railroad in street extension. Chicago etc. 
R. Co. v. Starkweather, 97 Iowa 159, 66 N.W. 87 (1896). 
515. Sprinkling of streets. 
Authority to improve, care for, supervise and control streets includes 
authority to sprinkle streets. McAllen v. Hamblin, 129 Iowa 329, 105 N.W. 593 (lg06). 
516. Improvement of street. 
When owner of lot abutting unopened street which has been dedicated and 
accepted as public street requests city to improve street, city has 
discretionary power in matter rather than mandatory duty to open and improve 
it. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
Resurfacing of a city street constituted an improvement so as to 
authorize state highway commission to assist the city in resurfacing from the 
primary road fund. O.A.G. 1g32, p. 194. 
See also annotations to sections 389.20 and 391.2. 
Street improvement not subject to injunction in absence of proof of 
fraud. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 1240 Iowa 681, 37 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
Reasonable care required of city in regard to streets. Lohr v. Sioux 
City, 232 Iowa 1140, 7 N.W.2d 781 (lg43). 
Degree of care required of city in construction of streets. Russell v. 
Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
Character and extent of improvements in discretion of city. Call Bond 
and Mortgage Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 227 Iowa 142, 287 N.W. 832 (1939). 
Liability of city for adoption of an improper plan for street 
improvement. Dodds v. West Liberty, 225 Iowa 506, 281 N.W. 476 (1938). 
Contracts for improvement. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 
453 (1931). Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa 1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925). Carlson 
v. City of Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
Discretion of council in street improvement. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. 
Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
Subsequent irregularity for which there is a remedy by appeal does not 
deprive city of jurisdiction for improvement of street. Koontz v. City of 
Centerville, 161 Iowa 627, 143 N.S. 490 (1913). 
Street improvements held not accepted as required in Code 1897, section 
870. Gilcrest & Co. v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 525, 137 N.W. 1072 (1912), 
petition overruled 139 N.W. 552. 
City has duty to improve street to which it acquires title. Talcott 
Bros. v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N.W. 311, 12 L. R. A., N.S., 696 (1906). 
City may improve that part of a street within its limits. Backman v. 
Oskaloosa, 130 Iowa 600, 104 N.W. 347 (1905). 
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Incorporated town could not improve a street without ordinance or 
resolution so providing. Eckert v. Town of Walnut, 117 Iowa 629, 91 N.W. 929 
(1902). 
Presumption that council had information upon which to base decision to 
improve a street. Brewster v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 
(1879). 
517. Damages from improvement of streets. 
City was not liable where culverts were too small to allow proper 
drainage. Cole v. Des Moines, 212 Iowa 1270, 232 N.W. 800 (1930). 
Removal of lateral support in improving street not actionable. Corcoran 
v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 405, 215 N.W. 948 (1927). 
Presumption of legality and bona fides in widening of street. Central 
Life v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 171 .N.W. 31 (1919). 
No right of city to drain surface waters flowing onto highway and cast it 
on adjoining land in larger quantities than in natural course. Cheh v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 247, 126 N.W. 166 (1910). 
Overflow of water due to change in fill by owner does not render city 
liable where change in street did not cause extra flow of water. Hoffman v. 
City of Muscatine, 113 Iowa 332, 85 N.W. 17 (1901). 
Cutting down a street on which no grade had been established - abutting 
property made more difficult of access, retaining wall rendered necessary, and 
shade trees standing in street are injured. Damages recoverable. Richardson 
v. City of Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
View of premises by the jury - instructions to jury in regard to 
information gained by view. Thompson v. City of Keokuk, 61 Iowa 187, 16 N.W. 
82 (1883). 
Trust deed given to secure a debt does not preclude owner from recovering 
for damage done to property. Cotes v. City of Davenport, 9 Iowa 227 (1859). 
518. Use of streets - in general. 
City's duty to exercise ordinary care includes parking areas. Leonard v. 
Mel Foster Co., 244 Iowa 131g, 60 N.W.2d 532 (lg53). 
City has no implied right to grant to individuals the right to use the 
streets for business purposes. Gates v. City Council of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 
1, 50 N.W.2d 578 (1952). 
Municipalities have no implied power to grant privileges to use the 
streets for private purposes. Cowin v. City of Waterloo, 237 Iowa 202, 21 
N.W.2d 705 (1946). 
Area within limits of streets where they cross railroad right-of-way 
constituted portion of "street" within law authorizing supervision thereof by 
town. Ackley v. Central States Electric Co., 206 Iowa 533, 220 N.W. 315 
(lg28). 
Private use of public street preventing free use as public way prohibited 
by municipality. Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 
(1g16). 
City cannot authorize perversion of street to private or other uses. 
Lacey v. City of Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 121 N.W. 542 (1909). 
Municipal corporation cannot put streets to use inconsistent with street 
purposes. Bennett v. Town of Mount Vernon, 124 Iowa 537, 100 N.W. 349 (1904). 
Each municipality may decide which of its streets shall be designated 
"arterial". O.A.G. Dec. 13, 1961. 
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519. Public utilities, use of streets. 
Council of city without power to lease streets and public places thereof 
for use in maintaining and conducting telephone exchange. City of Pella v. 
Fowler, 215 Iowa 90, 244 N.W. 734 (1932). 
Interurban electric railway has right without consent of city to 
construct and maintain spur track across street at right angles with consent 
of abutting owners. Interurban Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1398, 
199 N.W. 355 (1924). 
Telegraph and telephone companies subject to all regulations within 
police power of state or of municipal corporation - and use of public streets 
is a matter of police regulation. East Boyer Telephone Co. v. Incorporated 
Town of Vail, 166 Iowa 226, 147 N.W. 327 (1914). 
Municipality has power to regulate placing of telephone poles in 
streets. Wendt v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W. 1024 
(1913). 
520. Abutting owners, privileges and restrictions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
521. Repair of streets. 
City has authority to repair or reconstruct paving. Ellyson v. Des 
Moines, 179 Iowa 882, 162 N.W. 212 (1917). 
City not liable for consequential damages resulting from repairing 
streets if work not negligently done. O'Connell v. City of Davenport, 164 
Iowa 95, 145 N.W. 519 (1914). 
Where street improvement being made under valid resolution adopted by 
city, general taxpayer cannot interfere. Shelby v. City of Burlington, 125 
Iowa 343, 101 N.W. 101 (1904). 
Use of materials within limits of the highway. Overman v. May, 35 Iowa 
89 (1872). 
City may buy materials to repair streets without advertising for bids. 
O.A.G. 1932, p. 97. 
City may repair only those streets within its limits. O.A.G. 1918, p. 
515. 
522. Abandonment or estoppel, streets. 
No proof to establish relinquishment of permanent control or ownership by 
town as to constitute abandonment of areas encroached upon. Town of Marne v. 
Goeken, 259 Iowa 1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
Facts did not show abandonment of street. DeNefe v. Agency City, 143 
Iowa 237, 121 N.W. 1049 (1909). Baker v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 228, 
134 N.W. 587 (1912). 
Delay in asserting public right does not create an abandonment or 
estoppel. Kelroy v. Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
Abandonment or estoppel - when it may occur - non user, acquisition of 
private rights. Brewer v. Claypool, 223 Iowa 1235, 275 N.W. 34 (1937). 
City lost right acquired by deed for street purposes by abandonment. 
Beim v. Carlson, 209 Iowa 1001, 227 N.W. 421 (1929). 
Knowledge of claim and adverse possession plus improvements created 
estoppel. Page etc. Co. v. Clear Lake, 208 Iowa 735, 225 N.W. 841 (1929). 
Minor encroachments by fence create no estoppel. Schultz v. City of 
Oskaloosa, 193 Iowa 781, 187 N.W. 867 (1922). . 
Failure of public officials to object to encroachment does not, alone, 
estop a city. Crawford v. City of Winterset, 186 Iowa 297, 172 N.W. 640 
(1919). 
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City not estopped to prevent encroachment by a porch in absence of 
consent. Herrick v. Moore, 185 Iowa 828, 169 N.W. 741 (1918). 
Construction of fence and planting of trees work no estoppel. Kuehl v. 
Town of Bettendorf, 179 Iowa 1, 161 N.W. 28 (1916). 
Conduct of town creates estoppel. Christopherson v. Forest City, 178 
Iowa 893, 160 N.W. 691 (1916). 
Estoppel created by executed contract. Zollinger v. City of Newton, 172 
Iowa 352, 154 N.W. 611 (1915). 
Improvement of ground necessary to create estoppel. Schultz v. Stringer, 
168 Iowa 668, 150 N.W. 1063 (1915). 
Where land is held for many years and improved, town must show right by 
unequivocal evidence. Martin v. Town of St. Ansgar, 165 Iowa 560, 146 N.W. 47 
(1914). 
Acquiescence to improvements, which removal would cause damage, creates 
estoppel. Bridges v. Grand View, 1913, 158 Iowa 402, 138 N.W. 917 (1913). 
Johnson v. City of Shenandoah, 153 Iowa 493, 133 N.W. 761 (1911). 
Thirty years of failure to object created estoppel. Oeutsman v. Kuntze, 
147 Iowa 158, 125 N.W. 1007 (1910), 
Non user, alone, for 10 years does not create estoppel. Burroughs v. 
Cherokee, 134 Iowa 429, 109 N.W. 876 (1906). 
Building fence and' planting trees are not, alone, enough to create 
estoppel. City of Eldora v. Edgington, 130 Iowa 151, 106 N.W. 503 (1906). 
Where encroachments are made purposely, city is not estopped. Vorhes v. 
Town of Ackley, 127 Iowa 658, 103 N.W 998 (1905). 
Nq estoppel against using streets for public purposes. Bennett v. Mt. 
Vernon, 124 Iowa 537, 100 N.W. 349, (1904). 
Long period of non user by city and open possession by abutter, created 
estoppel. Weber v. Iowa City, 119 Iowa 633, 93 N.W. 637 (1903). 
Failure on part of city to object to encroachment may mature into an 
estoppel. Corey v. Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1902). 
Town estoppel to open alley. Blennerhassett v~ Forest City, 117 Iowa 
680, 91 N.W. 1044 (1902). 
Fact that city taxed the property does not estop city from claiming it 
had become a public street. Hull v. Cedar rapids, 111 Iowa 466, 83 N.W. 28 (1900). 
Invalid ordinance vacating a crossing held to not estop city from 
reopening such crossing. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 
425, 80 N.W. 564 (1899). 
Vacation of street is a matter of record, thus parol testimony is not 
admissible. Lathrop v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 105, 28 N.W. 465 (1886). 
Where city allowed occupancy of land granated to it for street, for 30 
years it was presumed to have abandoned it. Simplot v. City of Dubuque, 49 
Iowa 630, Affirmed, 56 Iowa 39, 10 N.W. 221 (1878). 
City was not estopped to assert ownership in land occupied by abutter for 
16 years. Solberg v. City of Decorah, 41 Iowa 501 (1875). 
523. Vacation of streets - in general. 
Provisions of chapter 364 would prevail over chapter 306 regarding 
vacation and disposal of municipal streets in view of § 4.7 that special 
provisions prevail over general. O.A.G., September 13, 1977. 
Cities and towns have authority to vacate streets and alleys, and may do 
so by ordinance, having due regard for interest of public. Town of Marne v. 
Goeken, 259 Iowa 1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
Street should not be vacated if it will seriously inconvenience or injure 
the public. Kelroy v. Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
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Evidence did not show abuse of discretion in vacating alley. Stoessel v. 
City of Ottumwa, 227 Iowa 1021, 289 N.W. 718 (1940). 
Invalid ordinance not a defense to suit to enjoin obstruction of alley. 
Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa.166, 284 N.W. 145 (1939). 
Validity of ordinance vacating alley may be tested by certiorari. Lerch 
v. Short, 192 Iowa 576, 185 N.W. 129 (1921). 
Ordinance held to be void becau.se of interest of one member of council. 
Krueger v. Ramsey, 188 Iowa 861, 175 N.W. 1 (1919). 
Factors to be considered by council in vacating a street. Walker v. Des 
Moines, 161 Iowa 215, 142 N.W. 51 (1913). 
Vacation of county road, making a street a cul-de-sac does not destroy 
the street as a highway. Chrisman v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. Co., 125 Iowa 133, 100 
N.W. 63. (1904). 
Estoppel against abutting owners from questioning right of city to vacate 
street. Lake City v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569, 98 N.W. 376 (1904). 
Even where vacation proceedings by city are irregular, it may be estopped 
against one who improves in reliance thereon. Blennerhassett v. Forest City, 
117 Iowa 680, 91 N.W. 1044 (1902). 
Ordinarily vacation of street is conclusively deemed for the public 
good. Burlington Gaslight Co. v. Burlington Ry. Co., 91 Iowa 470, 59 N.W. 
292, Affirmed 17 S. Ct. 359, 165 U.S. 370, 41 L. Ed. 749 (1894). 
Parol evidence not proper to prove street was vacated. Vacation is a 
matter of record. Lathrop v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 105, 28 N.W. 465 
1886). 
524. Power to vacate. 
Street may be vacated and fee conveyed only if street was properly 
accepted, opened and used by the public. Patrick v. Cheney, 226 Iowa 853, 285 
N .W. 184 ( 1939). 
Street can be vacated by the city or town. McKinney v. Rowland, 197 Iowa 
180, 1g7 N.W. 88 (lg24). 
Council must act with proper regard for public interests and 
convenience. Lerch v. Short, 192 Iowa 576, 185 N.W. 129 (1921). 
General Assembly may give municipal corporations the power to vacate. 
Krueger v. Ramsey, 188 Iowa 861, 175 N.W. 1 (1919). 
No presumption that city abused or exceeded its power to vacate. Hubbell 
v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
Legislature may delegate power to vacate streets to cities and towns. 
Hubbell v. Des Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915). 
Power to vacate may not be exercised arbitrarily. Walker v. Des Moines, 
161 Iowa 215, 142 N.W. 51 (1913). 
City could vacate part of a street although lots adjoining depreciated in 
value. Williams v. Carey, 73 Iowa 194, 34 N.W. 813 (1887). 
Right to vacate streets not affected because it was for benefit of 
private individual. City of Marshalltown v. Forney, 61 Iowa 578, 16 N.W. 740 
(1883). 
Power of vacation of city organized under Special Charter, but later 
incorporated under the general laws. Stubenraugh v. Nerfenesch, 54 Iowa 567, 
7 N.W. 1 (1880). 
Right to vacate not confined to streets which the city or town 
established. Gray v. Iowa Land Co., 26 Iowa 387 (1869). 
525. Damages from vacation. 
Need not be determined and paid before vacation is effective. Hubbell v. 
Des Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915). Hubbell v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 
715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
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Ingress and egress of lot owner may not be destroyed. Krueger v. Ramsey, 
188 Iowa 861, 175 N.W. 1 (1919). 
Damages consequential on vacation of streets are recoverable. Louden v. 
Starr, 171 Iowa 528, 154 N.W. 331 (1915). 
Where vacation did not interfere with access of lot owner there were no 
damages. Walker v. Des Moines, 161 Iowa 215, 142 N.W. 51 (1913). 
Loss of access must be compensated for. Sutton v. Mentzer, 154 Iowa 1, 
134 N.W. 108 (1912). Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 Iowa 590, 117 N.W. 974 
(1908). 
Vacation by city of a street to be used for railroad purposes. 
Harrington v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 126 Iowa 388, 102 N.W. 139 (1905). 
Owners held to not have a remedy on vacation because all were damaged in 
different degrees. Borghart v. Cedar Rapids, 126 Iowa 313, 101 N.W. 1120, 68 
L.R.A. 306 (1905). 
Inconvenience merely is not compensable. Barr v. Oskaloosa, 45 Iowa 275 
(1876). 
526. Notice of proceedings to vacate. 
Cities and incorporated towns may vacate a street or alley by ordinance, 
without notice to the owners of abutting property. Dempsey v. City of 
Burlington, 66 Iowa 687, 24 N.W. 508 (1885). 
527. Ownership on vacation. 
Rights of public are divested and street becomes private property. 
Tomlin v. Cedar Rapids etc. Co., 141 Iowa 5gg, 120 N.W. 93 (1909). 
City maintains title and may dispose of it for other purposes. 
Harrington v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 126 Iowa 388, 102 N.W. 139 (1905). 
Title does riot revert to original owner. Day v. Schroder, 46 Iowa 546 
(1877). 
528. Disposition of land, vacation. 
City may deed away the property. Krueger v. Ramsey, 188 Iowa 861, 175 
N.W. 1 (1919). 
City could grant vacated street to railway. Louden v. Starr, 171 Iowa 
52B, 154 N.W. 331 (1915). 
City may use vacated street for any legitimate purpose. Walker v. Des 
Moines, 161 Iowa 215, 142 N.W. 51 (1913). 
Where vacated street is given to railroad, the abutter may not require 
compensation. Tomlin v. Cedar Rapids etc. Co., 141 Iowa 599, 120 N.W. 93 
(1909). 
The fact that a vacated street continued in use by the public had no 
effect on vacation. Bradley v. City of Centerville, 139 Iowa 599 17 N.W. 968 
(1908). 
Wording of ordinance held to not vacate street but merely gave railroad 
right to use it. Harrington v. Ry. Co., 126 Iowa 388, 102 N.W. 139 (1905). 
Payment of taxes on part of vacated street did not estop city from 
claiming title. Lake City v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569, 98 N.W. 476 (1904). 
The primary inquiry in case of vacation is whether public good will 
result. Spitzer v. Runyan, 113 Iowa 619, 85 N.W. 782 (1901). 
City has power to deed to a private person. Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 
Iowa 687, 24 N.W. 508 (1885). 
City may not donate vacated streets for private purposes. O.A.G. 1916, 
p.139. 
270 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
364 .12 
529. Lighting of Streets - in general. 
Cities not required to light their streets - no negligence in failing to 
do so unless reasonable care dictates. Shannon v. City of Council Bluffs, 194 
Iowa 1294, 190 N.W. 951 (1922). 
No absolute obligation imposed. Blain v. Town of Montezuma, 150 Iowa 
141, 129 N.W. 808 (1911). 
530. Contracts for street lighting. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
531. Franchises, street lighting. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
532. Rights and remedies of taxpayers, street lighting. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
533. Actions, street lighting. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
534. Abutting owners, rights. 
Owner of property abutting street has special right in street as 
distinquished from general public where street has been opened and used. Tott 
v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
Municipality's duty to maintain streets and alleys does not relieve 
property owners or others from duty not to obstruct them. Smith v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 260 Iowa 573, 14g N.W.2d 7g4 (lg67). 
Rights of access, light, air and view are property rights. Liddick v. 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W·.2d 361 (1942). 
Abutter can claim rights to alley only through the public. Dugan v. 
Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927). 
Abutters right to reasonable temporary obstruction of street. Jones v. 
Fort Dodge, 1919, 185 Iowa 600, 171 N.W. 16 (1919). 
lot owner has no title to street. Hubbell v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715, 
167 N.W, 619, (1918). 
Land taken or dedicated for streets is subject to right of abutter. 
Wegner v. Kelley, 157 N.W. 206, Affirmed 182 Iowa 259, 165 N.W. 449 (1916). 
Permission to abutter to use street for private purposes may be 
implied. Wendt v. Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W. 1024 (1913). 
City may not authorize an areaway so as to injure property of abutting 
owner. Perry v. Castner, 124 Iowa 386, 100 N.W. 84, 66 L.R.A. 160 (1904). 
Purchaser of lot abutting on an alley does not take to centerline of 
alley. Blennerhassett v. Forest City, 117 Iowa 680, 91 N.W. 1044 (1go2). 
lot owner has right to bring his lot to grade to prevent surface water 
due to improvements by city from flowing over it. Cedar Falls v. Hansen, 104 
Iowa 189, 73 N.W. 585 (18g7). 
Abutting owners have interest in the street subordinate to rights of the 
public. Cadle of Muscatine R. Co., 44 Iowa 11 (1876). 
535. Access to and use of street or alley. 
Right of access may be destroyed but must be compensated for. Liddick v. 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Interference with right of access amounts to a taking. Nalon v. Sioux 
City, 216 Iowa 1041, 250 N.W. 166 (1933). 
Right of access of owner is not shared by the public. Ritchhart v. 
Barton, 193 Iowa 271, 186 N.W. 851 (1922). 
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Right of access lost through vacation must be compensated for. Hubbell 
v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
Court had power to fix plaintiffs' right in railroad strip by reason of 
his ownership in the abutting lot. West Davenport etc., Co. v. Theophilus, 
177 Iowa 353, 158 N.W. 689 (1916). 
Where abutter had two entrances he had no right to use a portion of the 
street for an entrance. Callahan v. City of Nevada, 170 Iowa 719, 153 N.W. 
188, L.R.A. 1916B, 927 (1915). 
Self help by lot owner, against city constructed sewer, is not 
justified. City of McGregor v. Boyle, 34 Iowa 268 (1872). 
536. Trees, abutting owners. 
City's assessment against owner of property adjacent to city parking of 
cost of removal of trees from city parking was void. Shriver v. City of 
Jefferson, 190 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1971). 
Owner of lot held to have right to remove tree in public parking. 
Armstrong v. Waffle, 212 Iowa 335, 236 N.W. 507 (1931). 
Owner of lot has property right in trees in parking subject to rights of 
the State. Newlands v. Iowa etc. Co., 179 Iowa 228, 159 N.W. 244 (1916). 
Trees in a street or highway are not a nuisance unless they obstruct 
travel. Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa 66 (1877). 
Where a street is acquired by city through prescription, the fee remains 
in the land owner. Overman v. May, 35 Iowa 89 (1872). 
537. Parks. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
538. Market places. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
539. Injunctions, streets. 
Work done on street after the filing of decision dissolving injunction is 
not an act of contempt. Coffey v. Gamble, 117 Iowa 545, 91 N.W. 813 (1902). 
Plaintiff entitled to injunction against opening of road. Brown v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, 117 Iowa 302, 90 N.W. 711 (1902). 
Where plaintiff did not own the land he could not restrain city from 
opening a street through it. Greiner v. Town of Sigourney, 89 N.W. 1103 
(1902). 
Land owner was not entitled to have opening of street enjoined for 
defects in the proceedings of council. Rockwell v. Bowers, 88 Iowa 88, 55 
N.W. 1 (1893). 
Certiorari is proper remedy to review ordinance establishing or vacating 
a street. Stubenraugh v. Nerfenesch, 54 Iowa 567, 7 N.W. 1 (1880). 
Injunction will not lie to restrain city from running bed·of stream 
through a city street. McMahon v. Council Bluffs, 12 Iowa 268 (1861). 
Court had no power to restrain removal of building from city street. 
Sayers v. City of Lyons, 10 Iowa 249 (1859). 
Owners of land entitled to injunction during appeal from order dissolving 
injunction against opening of a street. Trustees v. City of Davenport, 7 Iowa 
213, 7 Clarke 213 (1858). 
540. Vacation, in1unctions a~ainst. 
Injunction wi 1 not lie o prevent vacating of a street. Mclachlan v. 
Town of Gray, 105 Iowa 259, 74 N.W. 773 (1898). 
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364.12 
Injunction will not lie to restrain vacation where access was not 
destroyed. Lorenzen v. Preston, 53 Iowa 580, 5 N.W. 764 (1880). 
Plaintiff has burden of showing he has rights which are abridged. Sawyer 
v. Meyer, 45 Iowa 152 (1876). 
There must be a material injury resulting from vacation or establishment 
of a street. Gray v. Iowa Land Co., 26 Iowa 387 (1869). 
541. Pedestrians. 
City does not discharge its duty by maintaining streets so that they are 
reasonably safe for vehicular traffic only, when it can reasonably be expected 
that street will also be used by pedestrians. Engman v. City of Des Moines, 
255 Iowa 1039, 125 N.W.2d 235 (1964). 
542. Defects in streets. 
Failure to repair hole in middle of street. Engman v. City of Des Moines 
255 Iowa 1039, 125 N.W.2d 235 (1964). 
543. Alleys. 
City required to exercise reasonable care to maintain alley way for 
pedestrians. Greninger v. City of Des Moines, 264 N.W.2d 615 (Iowa 1978). 
544. Review, streets. 
Refusal of city to open street was not an abuse of discretion. Tott v. 
Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
Widening of public street - landowners not entitled to review of legality 
of proposed action of city and highway commission. Gardner v. Charles City, 
259 Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
Review justified only in case of arbitrary and unjust exercise of 
discretion. Stoessel v. City of Ottumwa, 227 Iowa 1021, 289 N.W. 718 
(1940). Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa 166, 284 N.W. 145 (1939). 
Courts will not interfere with authorizations granted by the 
legislature. Central Life Assur. Soc. v. Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 171 N.W. 
31 (1919). . 
Discretionary acts when authorized will not be reviewed. Bowersox v. 
Board, 183 Iowa 645, 167 N.W. 582 (1918). 
Judgment of district court finding vacation is not conclusive on 
appeal. Gable v. Cedar Rapids, 150 Iowa 108, 129 N.W. 737 (1911). 
Decision of city council over opening or vacating of streets is 
conclusive. Platt v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 31 N.W. 883 (1887). 
Certiorari is proper remedy to review act of council in vacating 
street. Stubenraugh v. Nerfenesch, 54 Iowa 567, 7 N.W. 1 (1880). 
Decision of council is conclusive. Cherokee v. Sioux City, etc. Land 
Co., 52 Iowa 279, 3 N.W. 42 (1879). 
VII. GRADES AND GRADING OF STREETS 
Subdivision Index 
Actions, Grading of Streets Generally 617-619 
Evidence 618 
Instructions 619 
Basis or Plan of Improvement, Grading 609 
Contracts for Grading 604 
Curative Acts 620 
Damages from Grading 606-615 
In General 606 
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Basis or Plan of Improvement 609 
Drains, Gutters and Culverts 612 
Estoppel, Waiver or Loss of Right to Damages 614 
Grading in Absence of Established Grade 610 
Measure of Damages 608 
Nature of Injury and Elements of Damages 607 
Property Owners, Rights and Duties as to Surface Waters 613 
Release and Satisfaction 615 
Surface Waters 611 
Drains, Gutters and Culverts 612 
Estoppel, Waiver or Loss of Right to Damages 614 
Evidence, Actions 618 
Expenses of Grading, Payment 605 
Grades 
Generally 601 
Establishment 602 
Grading, Generally 603 
Grading in Absence of Established Grade 610 
Gutters, Grading 612 
Injunctions 616 
Instructions, Actions 619 
Measure of Damages, Grading 608 
Nature of Injury and Elements of Damages 607 
Property Owners, Rights and Duties as to Surface Waters 613 
Release and Satisfaction, Damages from Grading 615 
Surface Waters, Grading 611 
601. Grades, generally. 
Power to change physical level of a street. Tillotson v. Windsor 
Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
"Establishment" of a grade means the adoption of a standard level of a 
street. Id. 
Authorization of town and to grade and improve streets. Linn County v. 
Town of Central City, 247 Iowa 1340, 78 N.W.2d 809 (1956). 
City could not escape liability for change of grade. Liddick v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Trespasser on street cannot prevent city from improving same on grounds 
part of it is not in the city limits. Backman v. Oskaloosa, 130 Iowa 600, 104 
N.W. 347 (1905). 
Where assessment was void, owner not liable for benefits conferred on 
holder of lien for assessment. Carter v. Cernansky, 126 Iowa 506, 102 N.W. 438 (1905). 
Owner could discharge rainwater falling on his building and alley. 
Phillips v. Waterhouse, 69 Iowa 199, 28 N.W. 539 (1886). · 
602. Grade, establishment. 
Permanent grade may be established only by ordinance. McManus v. 
Hornaday, 99 Iowa 507, 68'N.W. 812 (1896); Blanden v. Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 
441, 71 N.W. 411 (1897); Eckert v. Walnut, 117 Iowa 629, 91 N.W. 929 (1902); 
Caldwell v. Town of Nashua, 122 Iowa 179, 97 N.W. 1000 (1904); Walter v. Ida 
Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927); People's etc. Co. v. Des Moines, 
213 Iowa 378, 247 N.W. 478 (1932) 79 A.L.R. 1310; Brown v. City of Sigourney, 
164 Iowa 184, 145 N.W. 478 (1914); People's etc. Co. v. Des Moines, 241 N.W. 
468 (1932). 
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364.12 
City liable for lowering grade and thereby rendering driveway useless. 
Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
Supreme court would not limit city commissions' discretion. Des Moines 
etc. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
Change of established grade must be made by ordinance. Landis v. City of 
Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 157 N.W. 841 (1916). 
Establishment of grade for center of street also establishes it for the 
portion of sidewalks in the street. Beirness v. Missouri Valley, 162 Iowa 
720, 144 N.W. 628 (1913). 
Work of bringing street to grade could not be started without resolution 
or ordinance. Collins v. Iowa Falls, 146 Iowa 305, 125 N.W. 226 (1910). 
Authority of city to establish grade cannot be controlled. Kemp v. Des 
Moines, 125 Iowa 640, 101 N.W. 474 (1904). 
Grading at points of intersection. Kelly v. City of Cedar Falls, 123 
Iowa 660, 99 N.W. 556 (1904). 
Ordinance fixing grade need not preceed resolution ordering 
improvement. Allen v. Davenport, 107 Iowa go, 77 N.W. 532 {1898). 
Ordinance cannot be extended by implication. Morton v. City of 
Burlington, 106 Iowa 50, 75 N.W. 662 (1898). 
Resolution held to not establish grade - merely to provide for future 
establishment. Blanden v. City of Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1897). -
Grade established by ordinance - contents of ordinance. Kepple v. City 
of Keokuk, 61 Iowa 653, 17 N.W. 140 (1883). 
Cities and towns have power to establish grades for city streets. O.A.G. 
1949, p. 11. 
603. Grading, generally. 
Meaning of "grading". Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172, 168 
N.W. 803, 5 A.L.R. 1523 (1918). 
Unauthorized change in grade by city precluded it from assessing abutters 
property for improvement. Landis v. City of Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 157 N.W. 
841 (1g16). 
City cannot deposit earth on lot of abutter in making change. 
Hendershott v. City of Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658, 26 Am. Rep. 182 (1877). 
Errors as to termination of grade line - effect of. City of Burlington 
v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143 (1871). 
Damages in suit for negligent and unskillful grade. Russell v. City of 
Burlington, 30 Iowa 262 (1870). 
604. Contracts for grading. 
Measure of compensation was for the jury. Goben v. Des Moines Asphalt 
Paving Co., 214 Iowa 834, 239 N.W. 62 (1931). 
Contracts by implication. Carlson v. City of Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 
236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
605. Expenses of grading, payment. 
From general fund or grading fund. Shelby v. City of Burlington, 125 
Iowa 343, 101 N.W. 101 (lg04). 
606. Damages from grading - in general. 
Work begun without resolution did not create right of action not 
otherwise existing. Reilly v. City of Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 633, 92 N.W. 887 
(1902); Wilbur v. City of Fort Dodge, 120 Iowa 555, 95 N.W. 186 (1903). 
City liable for cutting down street. Markham v. City of Anamosa, 122 
Iowa 689, 98 N.W. 493 (1904). 
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Must be change in established grade to give cause for damages. Wilbur v. 
City of Fort Dodge, 120 Iowa 555, 95 N.W. 186 (1903). 
Property must be improved with reference to established grade. Reilly v. 
City of Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 633, 92 N.W. 887 (1902). 
Failure to comply with code ~ 465 created liability in city. Blanden v. 
City of Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1897). 
City liable for negligence by permitting obstructions. Powers v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa 197 (1878). 
City liable for negligent change in grade. Hendershott v. City of 
Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658, 26 Am. Rep. 182 (1877); Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa 229 
(1870); Templin v. City of Iowa City, 14 Iowa 59, 81 Am. Dec. 455 (1862). 
City not liable for proper exercise of authority. Creal v. City of 
Keokuk, 4 G. Greene 47 (1853). 
607. Nature of injury and elements of damages, grading. 
Removal of lateral support was not actionable. Corcoran v. City of Des 
Moines, 205 Iowa 405, 215 N.W. 948 (1927); Talcott Bros. v. City of Des 
Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N.W. 311, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 696, 120 Am. St. Rep. 419 
(1906). 
Destruction of trees in parking resulted in no liability in city. Kemp 
v. City of Des Moines, 125 Iowa 640, 101 N.W. 474 (1904). 
Failure to follow statutes created liability in city. Brown v. City of 
Webster City, 115 Iowa 511, 88 N.W. 1070 (1902); Blanden v. City of Fort 
Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1897). 
City not liable for erroneous information as to grade given by city 
engineer. Waller v. City of Dubuque, 69 Iowa 541, 29 N.W. 456 (1886). 
Municipalities not liable for injuries due to improvement of streets 
without negligence. Creal v. City of Keokuk, 4 G. Greene, 47 (1853). 
608. Measure of damages, grading. 
Depreciation in value of premises caused by change in street level. 
Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
Value before and value after work was done. Richardson v. City of 
Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
Instructions to jury. Correll v. City of Cedar Rapids, 110 Iowa 333, 81 
N.W. 724 (1900). 
Damages due to overflow from negli9ently constructed culvert. Van Pelt 
v. City of Davenport, 42 Iowa 308 (1875). 
609. Basis or plan of improvement 1 gradina. In adopting plans, city acts in a "ju icial capacity." Russell v. Sioux 
City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
No liability of city where harm caused by error of judgment. Dodds v. 
Town of West Liberty, 225 Iowa 506, 281 N.W. 476 (1938); Van Pelt v. City of 
Davenport, 42 Iowa 308, 20 Am. Rep. 622 (1875). 
Liability for defective plans. Hume v. City of Des Moines, 146 Iowa 624, 
125 N.W. 846, 29 L.R.A., N.S., 126 Ann. Cas. 1912B, 904 (1910). 
Discrepancy between grade and ordinance. Given v. City of Des Moines, 70 
Iowa 637, 27 N.W. 803 (1886). 
610. Grading·in absence of established grade. 
No liability attaches to city by mere "establishment" of grade of 
street. Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
City liable for damage caused by changes in surface of street till it 
establishes a grade. Brown v. City of Sigourney, 164 Iowa 184, 145 N.W. 478 (1914). 
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Recovery of damages for grading. Wilbur v. City of Fort Dodge, 120 Iowa 
555, 95 N.W. 186 (1903); Millard v. Webster City, 113 Iowa 220, 84 N.W. 1044 (1901). 
Grade must be lowered in manner prescribed by statutes. Blanden v. City 
of Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441, 71 N.W. 411 (1897). 
611. Surface waters, grading. 
Should not be discharged where it did not naturally flow. Farley v. City 
of Des Moines, 199 Iowa 974, 203 N.W. 287 (1925); Baker v. Incorporated Town 
of Akron, 145 Iowa 485, 122 N.W. g26, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 619 (1909). 
Natural drainage should not be destroyed. Wilbur v. City of Fort Dodge, 
120 Iowa 555, 95 N.W. 186 (1903). 
No liability for slight increase in quantity. Hoffman v. City of 
Muscatine, 113 Iowa 332, 85 N.W. 17 (1901). 
City liable for failure to provide for escape of surface water. Ross v. 
City of Clinton, 46 Iowa 606, 26 Am. Rep. 169 (1877); Damour v. City of Lyons 
City, 44 Iowa 276 (1876). 
City held not liable for deflecting surface waters by embankment. Creal 
v. City of Keokuk, 4 G. Greene 47 (1853). 
612. Drains, gutters and culverts, grading. 
Where storm sewer was placed at natural outlet, city was not liable. 
Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172, 168 N.W. 803, 5 A.L.R. 1523 (1918). 
City was liable where in bringing street to grade, it negligently filled 
drains. Hume v. City of Des Moines, 146 Iowa 624, 125 N.W. 846, 2g L.R.A., 
N.S., 126, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 904 (1910). 
Drain held to be a nuisance. Fitzgerald v. Town of Sharon, 143 Iowa 730, 
121 N.W. 523 (19Qg). 
Damges for negligent construction. Cooper v. City of Cedar Rapids, 112 
Iowa 367, 83 N.W. 1050 (1900). 
City not held liable where it did not accelerate flow of water or collect 
and discharge it though drains were too small. Knostman & Peterson Furniture 
Co. v. City of Davenport, 99 Iowa 589, 68 N.W. 887 (1896). 
City not liable for not proving gutters and culverts so as to keep water 
from street, from overflowing lots lowers than street. Morris v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 67 Iowa 343, 25 N.W. 274, 56 Am. Rep. 343 (1885); Freburg v. 
City of Davenport, 63 Iowa 119, 18 N.W. 705, 50 Am. Rep. 737 (1884). 
City not liable for honest error in judgment of competent engineer. Van 
Pelt v. City of Davenport, 42 Iowa 308, 20 Am. Rep. 622 (1875). 
Liability of city for negligence in construction or failure to construct 
gutters and drains. Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa 229 (1870). 
City has duty to protect abutter if practicable. Cotes v. City of 
Davenport, 9 Iowa 227 (1859). 
Where city constructs ditch along street it should provide for access to 
abutting lots. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 220. 
613. Property owners, rights and duties as to surface waters. 
Owner's duty one of ordinary care to prevent flooding of his property. 
Wendt v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W. 1024 (1913). 
No duty in abutter to bring his property to grade. Monarch Mfg. Co. v. 
Omaha, C.B. & S.R. Co., 127 Iowa 511, 103 N.W. 4g3 (1905). 
Town liable for allowing depression in which water collected to remain in 
front of abutter's property. Howard v. Town of Lamoni, 124 Iowa 348, 100 N.W. 
62 (1904). 
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Owner may bring lot to grade even if it causes diversion of surface 
water. City of Cedar Falls v. Hansen, 104 Iowa 189, 73 N.W. 585, 65 Am. St. 
Rep. 439 (1897). 
City need not protect lots below grade line from water. Gilfeather v. 
City of Council Bluffs, 69 Iowa 310, 28 N.W. 610 (1886); Fredberg v. City of 
Davenport, 63 Iowa 119, 18 N.W. 705, 50 Am. Rep. 737 (1884). 
614. Estoppel waiver or loss of right to damages. 
Owner can raise his lot to grade though he acquiesced in drainage ditch 
across his land. City of Cedar Falls v. Hansen, 104 Iowa 189, 73 N.W. 585, 65 
Am. St. Rep. 439 (1897). 
Error as to termination of grade line - effect of. City of Burlington v. 
Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143 (1871). 
615. Release and satisfaction, grading. 
City liable for negligent construction of culvert though appropriation 
came from county. Van Pelt v. City of Davenport, 42 Iowa 308, 20 Am. Rep. 622 
(1875). 
Directors of school district could execute release and satisfaction to 
city for damages in change of grade affecting school property. O.A.G. 1938, 
p. 746. 
616. Injunctions, grading. 
Evidence held to show that street extended to shores of lake. Peck v. 
Alfred Olsen Const. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131, 89 A.L.R. 1147 (1932). 
Discretion of council board - restraint of arbitrary action. Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
Injunction should not prevent city from establishing grade in future. 
Hunter v. City of Ottumwa, 150 Iowa 281, 129 N.W. 961 (1911). 
Injunction not granted to prevent construction of retaining wall by 
railroad for city. Patterson v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 291, 119 N.W. 
593 ( 1909). 
Change in drainage of surface water was enjoined. Dilly v. Town of 
Henderson, 118 N.W. 750 (1908). 
Damage did not appear sufficient to warrant injunction. Burlington 
Gaslight Co. v. Burlington C.R. & N.R. Co., 91 Iowa 470, 59 N.W. 292, affirmed 
17 S. Ct. 359, 165 U.S. 370, 41 L. Ed. 749 (1894). 
Injunction would not lie to prevent construction of drain where plaintiff 
could not show he would be harmed. Collins v. City of Keokuk, 91 Iowa 293, 59 
N.W. 200 (1894). 
617. Actions, grading generally. 
That grading was not lawfully ordered stated a cause of action. Iowa v. 
City of Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538, 41 N.W. 313, 2 A.L.R. 606 (1889)". 
Evidence confined to injury caused By acts complained of. Russell v. 
City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 262 (1870). 
Digging and carrying away earth from below grade causing injury is 
actionable. Freeland v. City of Muscatine, 9 Iowa 461 (1859). 
Suit by landowner where premises are occupied by tenant. Cotes v. City 
of Davenport, 9 Iowa 227 (1859). 
618. Evidence, ~rading. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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619. Instructions, grading. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
620. Curative acts. 
Legalizing act in regard to unexecuted grading contracts held valid. 
Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 343, 70 N.W. 214 (1897). 
VIII. COST OF STREET IMPROVEMENTS 
Subdivision Index 
In General 701 
Amount of Assessment 713 
Burden of Proof 722 
Charters, Construction of 702 
Collection or Enforcement of 717 
Conveyances to Evade 711 
Counterclaim 721 
Crosswalks 715 
Curative Acts 704 
Defects and Irregularities in Making the Improvement, Power to Assess and 
Validity of Street Improvement Assessment 708 
Enforcement of Assessments 717 
Estoppel 720 
Evidence 723 
Intersections 714 
Judgment 724 
Method of Computing Assessments 712 
Nature of Improvement Affecting Validity of Assessment, Power to Assess 
and Validity of Street Improvement Assessment 707 
Ordinances, Construction of as to Street Improvements 703 
Payment of Assessment 716 
Payment of Street Improvement Cost from General Funds 705 
Persons Liable for 719 
Power to Assess and Validity of Street Improvement Assessment 706-708 
In General 706 
Defects and Irregularities in Making the Improvement 708 
Nature of Improvement Affecting Validity of Assessment 707 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 722 
Procedure for 7og 
Property Subject to Assessment for Street Improvement 710 
Repeals 725 
Use of Proceeds of Assessment for Street Improvements 718 
IX. SIDEWALKS, GENERALLY 
Subdivision Index 
Actions 819-822 
Appeal and Error 822 
Evidence 820 
Instructions 821 
Sidewalks 819 
Appeal and Error, Actions 822 
Assessments 813-816 
Crosswalks 815 
Notice of Assessment Hearing for Sidewalks 814 
Property Subject to Assessment 816 
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Construction of Sidewalk 809 
Construction and Repair of Sidewalks 801 
Contracts 810 
Crosswalks, Assessments 815 
Established Grade 811 
Evidence, Actions 820 
Grading Required 812 
Injunctions 818 
Instructions 821 
Judgments 823 
Lessees, Liability for Sidewalks 817 
Nature and Necessity of Proceedings 802-808 
Necessity of Ordinance or Resolution 805 
Notice 806 
Ordinance, Resolution or Order for Improvement 804 
Petition 803 
Review of Improvement Proceedings 808 
Sidewalks 802 
Vote of Council 807 
Note 801 
Necessity of Ordinance or Resolution, Nature and Necessity of 
Proceedings 805 
Notice, Nature and Necessity of Proceedings 806 
Notice of Assessment hearing for 814 
Ordinance, Resolution or Order for Improvement, Nature and Necessity of 
Proceedings 804 
Petition, Nature and Necessity of Proceedings 803 
Property Subject to Assessment 816 
Review of Improvement Proceedings, Nature and Necessity of Proceedings 
808 
Vote of Council, Nature and Necessity of Proceedings 807 
801. Construction and repair of sidewalks, generally. 
Maintenance and repair of street is a governmental function rather than a 
proprietary one, and sidewalk is part of street. Halvorson v. City of 
Decor~P~c~§Hr~ 0~8r 3~~~e~~~n~·~~~gf~t~ tb~6~~treet improvements" inapplicable 
to sidewalk assessments. Northern Light Lodge No. 156 I.O.O.F. of Iowa v. 
Town of Monona, 180 Iowa 62, 161 N.W. 78 (1917). 
Council may delegate authority to construct a sidewalk. Brewster v. City 
of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 (1859). 
802. Nature and necessity of Yroceedings - sidewalks. 
Authority given by counci must be aimed at some individual walk. Clark 
v. Martin, 182 Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
803. Petition, sidewalks. 
Petition of majority of frontage necessary for reconstruction of walk. 
Farraher v. City of Keokuk, 111 Iowa 310, 82 N.W. 773 (1900). 
Petition necessary for construction of walk. Tallant v. City of 
Burlington, 39 Iowa 543 (1874). 
804. Ordinance, resolution or order for improvement, sidewalks. 
Description of property if erroneous may be waived by conduct of owner. 
Sunset Golf Club v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 548 (1951). 
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Signature of mayor on record of proceedings of council ordering 
construction was sufficient. Perrott v. Balkema, 211 Iowa 764, 234 N.W. 240 (1931). 
Mode of procedure in constructing sidewalks and assessment of costs. 
Brush v. Incorporated Town of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 
N.W. 856 (1927). 
Ordinance that city could construct walk if in 30 days owner failed was 
valid. Kaynor v. District Court of Black Hawk County, 178 Iowa 1055, 158 N.W. 
557 (1916). 
Ordinance conferred no authority to remove trees. Waterbury v. Morphew, 
146 Iowa 313, 125 N.W. 205 (1910). 
Proceedings must be regular to compel owner to construct sidewalk. 
Burget v. Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 (1903). 
Ordinance may authorize owners to build walks according to 
specifications. Zalesky v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 714, 92 N.W. 657 
(1902). 
Ordinance ordering construction may refer to other ordinances. City of 
Chariton v. Holliday, 60 Iowa 391, 14 N.W. 775 (1882). 
Where owner failed to build walk city could delegate authority to 
build. Brewster v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 (1879). 
Duration of work under notice to build walk. City of Independence v. 
Jekel, 38 Iowa 427 (1874). 
805. Necessity of ordinance or resolution, sidewalks. 
Order may be by ordinance, resolution, or motion. Perrot v. Balkema, 211 
Iowa 764, 234 N.W. 240 (1931). 
Ordinance necessary to right of city to exercise the power granted. 
Kaynor v. District Court of Black Hawk County, 178 Iowa 1055, 158 N.W. 557 (1916). 
Notice of owner must comply with ordinance. Zalesky v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 118 Iowa 714, 92 N.W. 657 (1902). 
806. Notice, sidewalks. 
Appearance by owner waives notice. Sunset Golf Club v. Sioux City, 242 
Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 548 (1951); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sedgwick, 203 Iowa 
726, 213 N.W. 435 (1927). 
Notice is jurisdictional - mode of giving notice. Clark v. Martin, 182 
Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918); Zalesky v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 714, 
92 N.W. 657 (19D2); Hawley v. City of Ft. Dodge, 103 Iowa 573, 72 N.W. 756 
(1897); City of Chariton v. Holliday, 60 Iowa 391, 14 N.W. 775 (1882). 
807. Vote of council, sidewalks. 
Necessary as to particular walk to be reconstructed. Clark v. Martin, 
182 Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
Repeal of resolution ordering construction. City of Chariton v. 
Holliday, 60 Iowa 391, 14 N.W. 775 (1882). 
808. Review of improvement proceedings, sidewalks. 
Not receivable in absence of fraud. Brush v. Incorporated Town of 
Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856 (1927); Brewster v. City 
of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 (1879). 
809. Construction of sidewalk. 
Authority to require owners to pave streets includes authority to require 
construction of walks. Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa 282 (1866); Warren v. Henly, 31 
Iowa 31 (1870). 
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Duty of city to pedestrians. Russell v. Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 
N.W. 708 (1940). 
Entitlement of city to materials in walk where it contracts to build 
another at different grade. Guthrie v. M'murren, 167 Iowa 154, 149 N.W. 71, 
L.R.A. 1915B, 187 (1914); Brewster v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 
737 (1879). 
City could issue warrants to pay for construction of walks. Clark v. 
City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 87 Am. Dec. 423 (1865). 
City was authorized to construct sidewalk under charter. Burlington & 
M.R.R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa 112 (1861). 
810. Contracts, sidewalks. 
Approval of finished product. Scott v. Stewart, 161 Iowa 141, 140 N.W. 
421 (1913). 
811. Established grade, sidewalks. 
Sidewalk need not be at same grade as street when necessary for 
drainage. Kaynor v. City of Cedar Falls, 156 Iowa 161, 135 N.W. 564 (1912). 
Authority of city to establish sidewalk or street grade cannot be 
controlled. Kemp v. City of Des Moines, 125 Iowa 640, 101 N.W. 474 (1904). 
Owner can have no duty to build walk until grade is established. Burget 
v. Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. g33 (1903). 
Council could not build walk where no grade was established. Hartrick v. 
Town of Farmington, 108 Iowa 31, 78 N.W. 794 (1899). 
812. Grading required, sidewalks. 
Necessary prior to construction of permanent walks. Carlson v. City of 
Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1931). 
Owner not liable for city constructed walk in absence of established 
grade. Kaynor v. District Court of Black Hawk County, 178 Iowa 1055, 158 N.W. 
557 (1916). 
City required to bring street to established grade prior to building 
permanent walk. Kaynor v. City of Cedar Falls, 156 Iowa 161, 135 N.W. 564 
(1912). 
Bed of sidewalk must be graded before walk can be built. Bowman v. City 
of Waverly, 155 Iowa 745, 128 N.W. 950 (1910). 
Where council did not comply with prerequisites, court could have 
enjoined it from enforcing a notice to owner to rebuild walk. Converse v. 
Incorporated Town of Deep River, 139 Iowa 732, 117 N.W. 1078 (1908). 
City must bring street to grade before it can require owner to build 
walk. O.A.G. 1910, p. 192. 
Where no grade is established, town may construct temporary walks. 
O.A.G. 1909, p. 274. 
City could not assess against owner cost of bringing sidewalk bed to 
grade. O.A.G. 1907, p. 143. 
813. Assessments sidewalks. 
Council coul~ assess although proceedings were informal and mayor merely 
signed. Perrott v. Balkema, 211 Iowa 764, 234 N.W. 240 (1931). 
Evidence showed special benefit from improvement of walk. Brush v. 
Incorporated Town of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856. 
Work constituted reconstruction, not repair. Clark v. Martin, 182 Iowa 
811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
Protest by owner of assessment against another piece of property not 
admissible to show owner appeared and objected to assessment. Cavanaugh v. 
City of Des Moines, 179 Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 (1917). 
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Strip between cemetery and street may be assessed for sidewalk 
improvements. Northern Light Lodge No. 156, 1.0.0.F. of Iowa v. Town of 
Monona, 180 Iowa 62, 161 N.W. 78, L.R.A. 1918A, 150 (1917). 
That assessment figure did not include dollar sign could. not vitiate 
assessment. Monroe v. Pearson, 176 Iowa 283, 157 N.W. 849 (1916). 
Sale of property for delinquent assessments. Royce v. Town of Aplington, 
90 Iowa 352, 57 N.W. 868 (1896). 
Where charter conferred no power on city to levy special assessments, the 
money for walks could be raised-only by general taxes. City of Fairfield v. 
Ratcliff, 20 Iowa 396 (1866). 
City could not levy sidewalk tax to pay for construction of walks on 
bridge. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 368. ~ 
814. Notice of assessment hearing for sidewalks. 
Owner should have notice of time of hearing and have opportunity to be 
heard. O.A.G. 1g11-12, p. 831. 
815. Crosswalks, assessments. 
Cost of crosswalks may not be assessed against private property. Mann v. 
City of Onawa, 199 Iowa 430, 200 N.W. 306 (1924); Kaynor v. City of Cedar 
Falls, 156 Iowa 151, 135 N.W. 564 (1912). 
816. Property subject to assessment, sidewalks. 
Assessment could not be cancelled as to one lot owner and sustained as to 
another where both were equally liable. Cavanaugh v. City of Des Moines, 179 
Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 {1917). 
Strip between cemetery and street. Northern Light Lodge No. 156, 
1.0.0.F. of Iowa v. Town of Monona, 180 Iowa 62, 161 N.W. 78, L.R.A. 1918A 150 
(1917). 
That "parcel" or part of a lot which actually abuts on the street. 
Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 944 (1912). 
Property owned by county in city limits. Edwards & Walsh Const. Co. v. 
Jasper County 117 Iowa 365, 90 N.W. 1006, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301 (1902). 
School district property. O.A.G. 1909, p. 295. 
817. Lessees, liability for sidewalks. 
Lessee liable to city for cost of construction of sidewalk. City of Des 
Moines v. Dorr, 31 Iowa 89 (1871). 
818. Injunctions, sidewalks. 
Not upheld where existence showed owner verbally approved the 
construction. Matson v. Mitchell, 17g N.W. 173 (1920). 
Suit to restrain excavation which would destroy shade trees. Gallagher 
v. City of Jefferson, 125 Iowa 324, 101 N.W. 124 (1904). 
Contempt proceedings against council annulled. Coffey v. Gamble, 134 
Iowa 754, 94 N.W. 936 (1903). 
Where money damages were inadequate injunction would lie. Burget v. 
Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 (1903). 
819. Actions - sidewalks. 
Liability of town for sidewalk defects not.dependent on population. 
Graham v. Town of Oxford, 105 Iowa 705, 75 N.W. 473 (1898). 
Collection of tax for sidewalk construction. City of Des Moines v. 
Casady, 21 Iowa 570 (1866). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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820. Evidence, sidewalks. 
Personal injury actions'. Hanson v. City of Anamosa, 177 Iowa 101, 158 
N.W. 591 (1916); Delacy v. Mason City, 240 Iowa 951, 38 N.W.2d 587 (1949); 
Petterman v. City of Burlington, 170 Iowa 555, 153 N.W. 154 (1915); Blake v. 
City of Bedford, 170 Iowa 128, 151 N.W. 74 (1915); Yeager v. Incorporated Town 
of Spirit Lake, 115 Iowa 593, 88 N.W. 1095 (1902). 
821. Instructions sidewalks. 
Armstrong v. tity of Des Moines, 232 Iowa 711, 6 N.W.2d 287 (1942). 
Thompson v. City of Sigourney, 212 Iowa 1348, 237 N.W. 366 (1906). 
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 440, 197 N.W. 307 (1924). 
Evans v. City of Council Bluffs, 187 Iowa 369, 174 N.W. 238 (1919). 
Allen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 183 Iowa 818, 167 N.W. 577 (1918). 
Blake v. City of Bedford, 170 Iowa 128, 151 N.W. 74 (1915). 
Cooper v. City of Oelwein, 145 Iowa 181, 123 N.W. 955 (1909). 
Clark v. City of Cedar Rapids, 129 Iowa 358, 105 N.W. 651 (1906). 
Spicer v. Webster City, 118 Iowa 561, 92 N.W. 884 (1902). 
Yeager v. Incorporated Town of Spirit Lake, 115 Iowa 593, 88 N.W. 1095 
(1902). 
Munger v. City of Waterloo, 83 Iowa 559, 49 N.W. 1028 (1891). 
Montgomery v. City of Des Moines, 55 Iowa 101, 7 N.W. 421 (1880). 
822. Appeal and error, sidewalks. 
Suit for trespass and damages therefor. Schultz v. City of Oskaloosa, 
193 Iowa 781, 187 N.W. 867 (1922). 
Suit for personal injury. Johnson v. City of Ames, 187 Iowa 60, 171 N.W. 
2 (1919). 
823. Judgments, sidewalks. 
In action to collect tax for construction no personal judgment may be 
given against one not owner of land when order to construct was given and work 
done. City of Des Moines v. Casady, 21 Iowa 570 (1866). 
824. Snow and ice removal. 
Statutory exception to duty of city to remove snow and ice from sidewalks 
does not exclude city from liability to pedestrians for failure to comply, as 
the exception does not modify the first portion of the statute placing an 
overall responsibility on the city. Peffers v. City of Des Moines, 299 N.W.2d 
675 (Iowa 1980). 
X. SNOW AND ICE, REMOVAL FROM SIDEWALKS [PRIOR LAW] 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
Subdivision Index 
In General 901 
Abutting Owners, Liability as to Ice and Snow 903 
Accumulations Caused by Defects or Other Concurring Causes 905 
Admissibility of Evidence 915 
Burden of Proof, Evidence 914 
Choice of Ways, Contributory Negligence as to Snow and Ice 911 
Constructive Notice 908 
Contributory Negligence 
In General 910 
Choice of Ways 911 
Jury Questions as to Snow and Ice 922 
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Duty to Remove Snow and Ice 904 
Evidenc 913-916 
Admissibility 915 
Ice and Snow 913 
364.15 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 914 
Weight and Sufficiency 916 
Instructions 923 
Jury Questions 917-922 
Contributory Negligence 922 
Ice and Snow 917 
Negligence 918 
Notice of Dangerous Condition 919 
Precautions against Injury 920 
Proximate Cause 921 
Negligence 902 
Jury Question as to Ice and Snow 918 
Notice of Snow and Ice 907, 908 
In General 907 
Constructive Notice 908 
Notice of Dangerous Condition, Jury Question as to Snow and Ice 919 
Pleadings 912 
Precautions Against Injury, Jury Questions as to Snow and Ice 920 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, Evidence 914 
Proximate Cuase, Jury Questions as to Snow and Ice 921 
Time Allowed for Removal 906 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 916 
364.13 Installments (No Annotations) 
364.14 Personal Injuries 
Index to Notes 
Abutting Property Owners 6 
Construction and application 1 
Evidence 5 
Insurance 2 
Notice 4 
Pleading and Approve 3 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
364.15 Changing Grade of Streets 
Index to Notes 
Actions 21,22 
Limitation 22 
Appraisers 32 
Assessment of Costs 18 
Conduct of Trial, Pleadings 26 
Construction and Application 1 
Constructions before Establishment of Grade, Damages 8 
Constructions without Reference to Established Grade, Damages 9 
Damages 5-15 
Constructions before Establishment of Grade 8 
Constructions without Reference to Established Grade 9 
Deduction or Set-off of Benefits 13 
285 
Location of Property 10 
Measure 11 
Mitigation 12 
364 .15 
Municipalities and Persons Liable 14 
Nature and Elements 6 
Nature and Extent of Change 7 
Persons Entitled 15 
Deduction or Set-off of Benefits, Damages 13 
Estoppel, Waiver or Loss of Rights 20 
Evidence, Pleadings 24 
Improvement According to Grade 4 
Injunction 30 
Instructions, Pleadings 28 
Judgments, Pleadings 29 
Jury Questions, Pleadings 27 
Limitation of Actions 22 
Location of Property, Damage 10 
Measuare of Damages 11 
Mitigation of Damages 12 
Municipalities and Persons Liable, Damages 14 
Nature and Elements of Damage 6 
Nature and Extent of Change 7 
Negligence 16 
Objections to Change, Procedure for Change of Grade 3 
Persons Entitled to Damages 15 
Persons Liable, Damages 14 
Pleadings 23-29 
Conduct of Trial 26 
Evidence 24 
Instructions 28 
Judgments 29 
Jury Questions 27 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 25 
Procedure for Change of Grade 2,3 
Objections to Change 3 
Release and Satisfaction 19 
Remedies of Property Owners 17 
Repeals 33 
Review 34 
Set-off of Benefits, Damages 13 
Viaducts 31 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence, Pleadings 25 
1. Construction and ap~lication. . 
Estoppel may lie were city is long-continued non-user of a street or 
alley. Clinton Nat. Bank v. City of Comanche, 251 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1977). 
Authorization of town to grade and improve streets. Linn County v. Town 
of Central City, 247. Iowa 1340, 78 N.W.2d 809 (1956). 
This section not applicable to county highways. Liddick v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Provisions for damages apply to special charter cities. Phillips v. City 
of Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa 576, 19 N.W. 672 (1884). 
Owners remedy purely statutory .. Corcoran v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 
405, 215 N.W. 948 (1927). 
Abutting owners cannot require city to excavate or fill street to 
grade. Given v. City of Des Moines, 70 Iowa 637, 27 N.W. 803 (1886). 
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Establishment by proper legislative action only. Kepple v. City of 
Keokuk, 61 Iowa 653, 17 N.W. 140 (1883). 
Owners remedy purely statetory Corcoran v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 
405, 215 N.W. g48 (1927). 
Abutting owners cannot require city to excavate or fill street to 
grade. Given v. City of Des Moines 70 Iowa 637, 27 N.W. 803 (1886). 
Establishment by proper legislative action only. Kepple v. City of 
Keokuk, 61 Iowa 653, 17 N.W. 140 (1883). 
Construction of viaduct over railroad is change in grade. O.A.G. January 
14, 1949' p. 11. 
2. Procedure for change grade. 
Grade may be changed by ordinance. Landis v. City of Marion, 176, Iowa 
240, 157 N.W. 841 (1916). 
Walter v. City of Ida Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927). 
People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464, 79, 
A. L. R. 1310 (1932). 
People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
Power to be exercised by ordinance, not merely resolution. McManus v. 
Hornady, 99 Iowa 507, 68 N.W. 812 (1896). 
3. Objections to change. 
May be waived by failure to appear before council prior to paving. F.M. 
Hubbell, Son & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 N.W. 701 (1915). 
4. Improvement accordin~ to grade. 
Street railway trac s not improvement within this section. Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (lg27). 
What constitutes improvement generally. Meardon v. Iowa City, 148 Iowa 
12, 126 N.W. 939 (1910). 
Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928 (1907). 
Bringing grade of lot to grade of street is improvement. Witwer Bros. v. 
City of Cedar Rapids· 107 N.W. 604 (1906). 
Grading of lot to conform to new grade is improvement for which damages 
can be recovered when street is finally brought to grade. York v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 130 Iowa 435, 103 N.W. 790 (1905). 
Building need not be at exact grade of street improvement; with reference 
to grade is sufficient. Stevens v. City of Cedar Rapids, 128 Iowa 227, 103 
N.W. 363 (1905). 
Filling of lot prior to building and grading of lot are improvements. 
Chase v. City of Sioux City, 86 Iowa 603, 53 N.W. 333 (1892). 
Question of whether improvements have been made is for jury. Conklin v. 
City of Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 35 N.W. 444 (1887). 
Property owner must show improvement with reference grade and that grade 
was established by city. Morris v. City of Council Bluffs, 67 Iowa 343, 25 
N.W. 274, 56 Am. Rep. 343 (1885). 
Presumption that city, in constructing streets made them conform to 
established grade. Thompson v. City of Keokuk, 61 Iowa 187, 16 N.W. 82 
(1883). 
Owner justified in building with reference to established grade. Damour 
v. Lyons City, 44 Iowa 276 (1876). 
5. Damages. 
Absent statute, city not liable for change in grade. Farmer v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 116 Iowa 322, 89 N.W. 1105 (1902); Reilly v. City of Fort Dodge, 
118 Iowa 633, 92 N.W. 887 (1902); Chiesa & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 
343, 138 N.W. 922, 48 L. R. A.,N. S. 899 (1912). 
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Cole v. City of Muscatine, 14 Iowa 296 (1862); Kepple v. City of Keokuk, 
61 Iowa 653, 17 N.W. 140 (1883). 
Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Chiesa & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 343, 138 N.W. 922, 48 L. R. 
A., N.S. 899 (1913). 
City of Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143 (1871). 
Legislature can provide for damages to street railway owners. Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
When damages are payable from assessment fund. Midwest Securities 
Corporation v. City of Des Moines, 200 Iowa 245, 202 N.W. 565 (1925). 
When damages are recoverable-generally. Vilas v. Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. 
Co., 179 Iowa 1244, 162 N.W. 795 (1917). 
Liability of city for change in grade similar to grading without 
ordinance. Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928 (1907). 
No injury caused by ordinance changing grade. Hempstead v. City of Des 
Moines, 63 Iowa 36, 18 N.W. 676 (1884). 
Injury need not be direct. Hemspstead v. City of Des Moines 52 Iowa 303, 
3 N.W. 123 (1879). 
Damages to be ascertained strictly according to the statutes. City of 
Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143 (1871). 
6. Nature and elements of damage. 
Property owner acquires vested access rights immediately upon dedication 
and acceptance of a street for public use. Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 
189 N.W.2d. 522 (1971). 
Recovery for loss of access. Id. 
Damage must be of material consequence, not merely inconvenience. 
Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Evidence of cost of rebuilding house excluded. Corcoran v. City of Des 
Moines, 205 Iowa 405, 215 N.W. 948 (1927). 
Cost of bringing property to conformity with new grade is item of 
damages. Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928 
(1907). 
Thompson v. City of Keokuk, 61 Iowa 187, 16 N.W. 82 (1883). 
Trees should not be removed unnecessarily. Kemp v. City of Des Moines, 
125 Iowa 640, 101 N.W. 474 (1904). 
Use and purposes of improvements made can be considered in assessing 
damages. Preston v. City of Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa 71, 63 N.W. 577 (1895). 
Owner entitled to recover for diminution in actual value of property. 
Hempstead v. City of Des Moines 52 Iowa 303, 3 N.W. 123 (1879). 
Damages recoverable for injuries to land as well as improvements. 
Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 437 (1861). 
Owner may recover for permanent depreciation. Cotes v. C.ity of 
Davenport, 9 Iowa 227 (1859). 
7. Nature and extent of change. 
Viaduct effected change in established grade. Liddick v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Recovery limited to damages for change of grade. Kukkuk v. City of Des 
Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Slight variance from established grade not material. Landis v. City of 
Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 157 N.W. 841 (1916). 
Impairment of access, light and air. Western Newspaper Union v. City of 
Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367 (1913). 
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364.15 
If change ingrade causes no damage, there is no liability. Meardon v. 
Iowa City, 148 Iowa 12, 126 N.W. g3g (1g10). 
Bringing of street to established grade 10 years after establishment held 
to be a second change. Buser v. City of Cedar Rapids, 115 Iowa 683, 87 N.W. 
404 (1901). 
Liability of city for cutting down street on which no grade was 
established. Millard v. City of Webster City, 113 Iowa 220, 84 N.W. 1044 
(1go1). 
Richardson v. City of Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
Recovery may be had for injury though final grade is on line with 
natural surface of street. Ressegieu v. City of Sioux City, 94 Iowa 543, 63 
N.W. 184, 28 L. R. A. 389 (1893). 
Where street was lowered a few inches and curb remained same there was no 
damage. Coates v. City of Dubuque, 68 Iowa 550, 27 N.W. 750 (1886). 
Paving of street not a change in grade. Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31 
(1870). 
8. Constructions before establishment of grade. 
Owner paying for paving without established grade cannot recover for 
later change. Walter v. City of Ida Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1g27). 
Where building was constructed without established grade, no recovery 
allowed for change. Vilas v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 179 Iowa 1244, 162 
N.W. 795 (1917). 
9. Constructions without reference to established grade. 
Owner could not recover where he improved with reference to sidewalk 
constructed below grade. Ayer v. City of Perry, 1g3 Iowa 181, 186 N.W. 840 
(1922). 
Owner not entitled to damages for bringing of street to established 
grade. Collins v. City of Iowa Falls, 146 Iowa 305, 125 N.W. 226. (1910). 
Reilly v. City of Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 633, 92 N.W. 887 (1902). 
Farmer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 116 Iowa 322, 89 N.W. 1105 (1902). 
10. Location of property. 
Damages payable where no grade established and no resolution authorizing 
regrading. Caldwell v. Town of Nashua, 122 Iowa 179, 97 N.W. 1000 (1904). 
Change in grade of parallel streets imposes liability for grade change on 
intersecting street. Conklin v. City of Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 35 N.W. 444 
(1887). 
11. Measure of damages. 
Deprivation of reasonable access to property - compensation for valuable 
property right which has been taken. Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 
N.W.2d. 522 (Iowa 1971). 
Right of property owner of ingress and egress to property was private 
property right. 
Depreciation in value of premises caused by change in street level. 
Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1958). 
Value of property immediately before and immediately after. Corcoran v. 
City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 405 215 N.W. 948 (1927). Richardson v. City of 
Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
Consideration of benefits by jury. Meardon v. Iowa City, 148 Iowa 12, 
126 N.W. 939 (1910). 
Factors bearing on difference in value-cost of bringing to new grade. 
Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928 (1907). 
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Evidence showed whole property not improved with reference to grade. 
Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. g28 (1907). 
Questions called for conclusion of witness. Richardson v. City of 
Webster City, 111 Iowa 427, 82 N.W. 920 (1900). 
Evidence showing benefits admissible. Morton v. City of Burlington, 106 
Iowa 50, 75 N.W. 662 (1898). 
Parol evidence. King v. City of Des Moines, 99 Iowa 432, 68 N.W. 708 
(1896). 
Witness may not state opinions on effect of change in value. Dalzell v. 
City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 437 (1861). 
25. Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
In absence of passion and prejudice of jury, award not disturbed. Ideal 
etc. Works v. Des Moines, 167 Iowa 517, 149 N.W. 640 (1914). 
Verdict that property was benefited supported by evidence. Mccash v. 
City of Burlington, 72 Iowa 26, 33 N.W. 346. (1887). 
26. Conduct of trial. 
Unauthorized new view of premises by juror not prejudicial misconduct. 
Caldwell v. Town of Nashua, 122 Iowa 179, 97 N.W. 1000 (1904). 
27. Jury questions. 
Record warranted submission of question of liability to jury. Hathaway 
v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 288 (1953). 
Question of contributory negligence in maintaining street was for the jury. Wendt v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W. 1024 (1913). 
28. Instructions. 
Failure to charge more specifically on damages from change of grade was 
not cause for complaint in absence of request. Botsford v. City of Des 
Moines, 212 N.W. 673 (1927). 
Meaning of "materially and unduly". Walters v. City of Marshalltown, 145 
Iowa 45 7 , 120 N • W. 1046, 26 L • R • A. , N • S. , 199 ( 1909) • 
Where one building was built prior to establishment of initial grade. 
Richardson v. City of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928 (1907). 
Charge that evidence was received to show whether access was increased. 
Morton v. City of Burlington, 106 Iowa 50, 75 N.W. 662 (1898). 
The measure of recovery. Stewart v. City of Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61, 
50 N.W. 219 (1891). 
Intent of abutter is not measure of whether improvement was made with 
reference to grade. Conklin v. City of Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 35 N.W. 444 
(1887). 
That jury should consider the improvement as contemplated.by the 
ordinance changing the grade. Mccash v. City of Burlington, 72 Iowa 26, 33 
N.W. 346 (1887). 
That jury was not bound to find same damages as assessed by 
Commissioners. Thompson v. City of Keokuk, 61 Iowa 187, 16 N.W. 82 (1883). 
29. Judgements. 
Damages for interference with access not adjudicated in appeal from 
special assessment. Ashman v. City of Des Moines, 209 Iowa 1247, 228 N.W. 316 
(1930), modified on other grounds, 229 N.W. 907. 
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364.16 
30. Injunction. 
When injunction will not lie to prevent a city from establishing grade 
for street. Gallaher v. City of Jefferson, 125 Iowa 324, 101 N.W. 124 (1904). 
31. Viaducts. 
Legislature has authorized different method of procedure in regard to 
assessment of damages for construction of viaduct from that provided in case 
of change of grade. Globe Machinery & Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 156 
Iowa 267, 136 N.W. 518 (1912). 
32. A~praisers. 
easonable compensation allowed for service in appraising damages 
resulting from change or establishment of street grade. O.A.G. 1928, p. 430. 
33. Repeals. 
For annotation, see I.C.A. 
34. Review. 
Supreme Court could assume that just compensation would be complied with 
by city in connection with highway relocation. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 
Iowa 506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
364.16 Municipal Fire Protection 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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In cities and towns which do not control their own bridge levies, 
agricultural land comprising tracts of ten acres or more are subject to all 
county levies unless there is a specific exemption. O.A.G. 1930, p. 236. 
Counties not responsible for keeping sidewalk over bridge inside of a 
city free from snow. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 276. 
City had right to control bridge fund collected upon property in city. 
O.A.G. 1916, p. 122. 
County rather than city should pay fees and expenses of registration 
board for services in registering names preparatory to holding a special city 
election. O.A.G. 1916, p. 96. 
Town not authorized to vote aid in construction of county bridge unless 
cost of bridge is at least $10,000.00. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 346. 
9. Levy of tax, bridges. 
Cities of second class traversed by a stream had power to control their 
own bridge fund. Murphy v. Berry, 200 Iowa 974, 205 N.W. 777 (1925). 
County had no power to levy tax for bridges on property within limits of 
this city. City of Keokuk v. Kennedy, 156 Iowa 680, 137 N.W. 914 (1912). 
City could not levy a bridge or sidewalk tax for purpose of paying for 
construction of sidewalks on bridge. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 368. 
Authority to levy bridge tax vested in cities. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 378. 
10. Power to control and regulate, bridges. 
City could not interfere in use of bridge companies use of right of 
way. Sioux City, Iowa v. Missouri Valley Pipeline Co. 46 F.2d 819 (1931). 
11. Sale and transfer of bridge. 
Construction of new bridge in place of unsafe one and charging of 
tolls. Scott v. Des Moines, 34 Iowa 552 (1872). 
Town had no power to execute deed of trust of bridge to trustees 
authorizing them to collect tolls to pay the debt created by its 
construction. Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa 21 (1865). 
12. Toll bridges. 
A grant without reservation to railroad to use city owned bridge entitles 
railroad to use it free of tolls. Des Moines v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 41 Iowa 
569 (1875). 
Collection of tolls by city must be authorized by state law. Clark v. 
Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199 (1865). 
13. Liability for damages, bridges. 
City is liable for unsafe condition of bridges within its limits. Fowler 
v. Town of Strawberry Hill, 74 Iowa 644, 38 N.W. 521 (1888). 
18. Recovery of tax paid. 
Recovery of taxes paid to company which did not comply with conditions 
entitling it to aid. Smith v. Omaha etc. Ry. Co., 97 Iowa 545, 66 N.W. 1041 
(1896). 
II. BUDGETING ANO ACCOUNTING 
384.13 Finance Conmittee (No Annotations) 
384.14 Office of Conmittee (No Annotations) 
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384.15 Rules 
1. In general. 
A city may require information as to how its public funds are being 
used. O.A.G. November 7, 1972. 
384.16 City Budget 
For annotation, see I.C.A. 
384.17. Levy by County (No Annotations) 
384.18 Budget Amendment 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.19 Written Protest (No Annotations) 
384.20 Separate Accounts 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.21 Reserved 
~ 384.22 Annual Report 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
I III. GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS 384.23 Construction of Words aand• and •or• (No Annotations) 
384.24 Definitions 
I For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.25 General Obligation Bonds for Essential Purposes 
I For annotations, see I.C.A. 384.26 General Obligation Bonds for General Purposes 
I For annotations, see I.C.A. 384.27 Sale of Bonds 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
I 384.28 Categories for General Obligation Bonds For annotations, see I.C.A. 
I 384.29 Fonn of Bonds For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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384.37 
384.30 Execution 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.31 Negotiable 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.32 Tax to Pay 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.33 Action (No Annotations) 
384.34 Local Budget Law (No Annotations) 
384.35 Rule of Construction (No Annotations) 
384.36 Prior Proceedings 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
IV. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS 
384.37 Definitions 
1. Construction and application. 
Work on street held an improvement for which special assessment was 
proper. Koons v. Lucas, 52 Iowa 177, 3 N.W. 84 (1879). 
"Lot." Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa 282 (1866). 
2. Prior law. 
Valid. Owen v. City of Sioux City, 91 Iowa 190, 59 N.W. 3 (1894). 
3. Sidewalks. 
This chapter inapplicable to steps preliminary to construction of walk. 
Northern Light Lodge No. 156, I.O.O.F. of Iowa, v. Town of Monona, 180 Iowa 
62, 161 N.W. 78 (1917). 
Pavement between sidewalk and crosswalk not assessable to owner. Mann v. 
City of Onawa, 199 Iowa 430, 200 N.W. 306 (1924). 
4. Paving. 
City may not make separate assessments for paving, gutter.ing and 
curbing. Bailey v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 747, 138 N.W. 853 (1912). 
5. Reconstruction. 
Construction of new surface upon original concrete base constituted a 
"reconstruction." Fuche v. City of Cedar Rapids, 158 Iowa 392, 139 N.W. 903 
(1913). 
6. Curative acts. 
Legislature may legalize defect in proceedin9s to improve a street. City 
of Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655, 68 N.W. 431 {1896). 
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7. Primary road districts. 
Annexation of territory within primary road district to a city after 
boundaries of district had been fixed. In re: Paving White Pole or River to 
River Road, Polk County, 193 Iowa 423, 187 N.W. 14 (1922). 
384.38 Certain Costs Assessed to Private Property 
1. Validity. 
Apportionment of cost of street paving on abutting lots according to 
their frontage. Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 
115 Iowa 568, 89 N.W. 7 (1go2). 
Tax should not be levied on property.lying beyond limits of the 
benefits. Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa 396 (1873). 
2. Construction and application. 
Special assessments may be levied against abutting property owners to 
reimburse city. Morrison v. City of Washington, 332 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa ~ 
1983). Ci-./+ FF· 
Statutes permitting special assessment levies by city or town must be 
~trictly construed. H.L. Munn Lumber Co. v. City of Ames, 176 N.W.2d 813 {Iowa 1970). 
Separate public improvements to be dealt with on their own merits. 
Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 310 (1949). 
Necessity of improvement determined by city council. Call Bond & 
Mortgage Co. v. Great Northern Railway, 227 Iowa 142, 287 N.W. 832 (1939). 
Statutes relating to special assessments against abutting property 
strictly construed in favor of property owner. Miller v. City of Sheldon, 1g3 
Iowa 855, 200 N.W. 341 (1924). 
Right to create liability for assessments is given to city by statute. 
Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 
(1916). 
Rigid adherence to statutes relating to public improvements is 
required. Bennett v. City of E111Tietsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Purpose. 
Purpose to enable cost of street improvement to be taxed in proportion to 
benefits received by property. O.A.G. 1913-14, p. 15g. 
4. Legislative intent. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Legislative power. 
Legislature has power to authorize municipalities to require streets to 
be paved, and cost to be assessed on abutting lot owners. Warren v. Henly, 31 
Iowa 31 (1870). 
6. Mandatory nature. 
Manner of exercising right to issue special assessment certificates was 
mandatory and jurisdictional. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 
453 (1938). 
7. Law governing. 
For annotation, see I.C.A. 
8. Repeals. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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9. Jurisdiction. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10 Curative acts. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
11. Powers of city. 
City proceeding to establish street without jurisdiction was without 
power to exercise taxing power for cost of improvement. Seim v. Carlson, 2og 
Iowa 1001, 227 N.W. 421 (1929). 
City not having authority to grade street at expense of abutting 
property. Gallaher v. Garland, 126 Iowa 206, 101 N.W. 876 (1904). 
City has authority to assess abutting lots for expense of curbing a 
parkway. Downing v. City of Des Moines, 124 Iowa 289, g9 N.W. 1066 (1904). 
City could incur expense and issue bonds for extending sewer line past 
concrete wall on river bank. O.A.G. 1938, p. 333. 
12. Counties. 
Town agreed to aid county in constructing approach to county bridge. 
Linn County v. Town of Central City, 247 Iowa 1340, 78 N.W.2d 80g (1956). 
Town not authorized to let a contract for town and county work within 
town to be reimbursed by county. O .• A.G. May 31, 1962. 
13. Contracts. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
14. Payment of cost from general funds. 
City or town had right to improve streets and pave therefor from general 
fund, or from the highway or poll taxes. Humboldt County v. Incorporated Town 
of Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1923). 
Municipality may extend sewer, gas and water facilities beyond its 
corporate limits. O.A.G March 28, 1974. 
City could not levy a sidewalk tax for the purpose of paying for 
construction of sidewalks on a bridge. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 368. 
15. Charters, construction of. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Ordinance. 
Where city has fixed by general ordinance the method of procedure to be 
followed, it is limited to the mode so prescribed. Bol'«ltan v. City of Waverly, 
155 Iowa 745, 128 N.W. 950 (1910). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Sidewalks, ordinance. 
Order requiring construction of sidewalks may be either by resolution or 
motion, and need not be by ordinance or formal resolution. Perrott v. 
Balkema, 211 Iowa 764, 234 N.W. 240 (1931). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Necessity of ordinance. 
Ordinance essential to right of city to exercise power granted. Kaynor 
v. District Court of Black Hawk County, 178 Iowa 1055, 158 N.W. 557 (1916). 
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384.38 
19. Delegation of authority. 
Construction or reconstruction of permanent sidewalks must be authorized 
by city council. Clark v. Martin, 182 Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
20. Petition for improvement. 
City engineer's work constituted reconstruction, and not repair, which 
the city was unauthorized to undertake. Farraher v. City of Keokuk, 111 Iowa 
310, 82 N.W. 773 (1900). 
21. Joint improvements. 
City street intersections with other roads and local service-street 
facilities may be established or reconstructed or constructed by cities acting 
alone - work may also be accomplished by both cities and State Highway 
Commission incorporating one with the other. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
City and county authorized to improve a road which is on boundary of city 
and county and which is one-half in city and one-half in county. O.A.G. Sept. 
22, 1966. 
22. Temporary improvements. 
No authority of city to tax abutting property for cost of temporary 
improvements. McManus v. Hornaday, 99 Iowa 507, 68 N.W. 812 (1896). 
23. Cross walks. 
Cost of cross walks cannot be assessed against private property. Mann v. 
City of Onawa, 199 Iowa 430, 200 N.W. 306 (1924). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Intersections. 
Cost of paving alley and street intersections was assessable. Dickinson 
v. Incorporated Town of Guthrie Center, 185 Iowa 541, 170 N.W. 759 (1919). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
25. Parking facilities. 
City or town council could acquire jurisdiction to defray, by special 
assessment, only that part of cost attendant upon acquisition or construction 
of a parking facility which was created or incurred subsequent to passage of 
the requisition resolution of necessity. H.L. Munn Lumber Co. v. City of 
Ames, 176 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1970). 
26. Sewer projects. 
Property owners have right to be treated fairly and equally in sharing 
burdens and receiving benefits of sanitary sewer system. Sayles v. Bennett 
Ave. Development Corp., 258 Iowa 628, 138 N.W.2d 895 (1965). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
27. Sidewalks. 
Details of duty owed by city to pedestrians in respect to construction of 
sidewalk differ from those a city owes to pedestrians in construction of an 
intersection. Russell v. Sioux City, 227 Iowa 1302, 290 N.W. 708 (1940). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
28. Streets and roads. 
Property owner may be specially assessed by city for paving residential 
street. Morrison v. City of Washington, 332 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). 
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Improvement of a street is a public object which will support a special 
assessment therefor on abutting property, regardless of the question of 
benefit to such property. Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416, 70 N.W. 
605 (1897). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
29. Water, gas and electricity. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
30. Tree removal. 
Cities and towns may not assess abutting property for cost of removal of 
trees from city parking in front of owner's residence. O.A.G. May 15, 1969. 
City's assessment against owner of property adjacent to city parking of 
cost of removal of trees from city parking was void. Shriver v. City of 
Jefferson, 190 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1g71). 
31. Abutting property. 
Where lot extended so as to abut on each of two parallel streets, special 
assessment for improvement of one street could be imposed only on value of 
that half of the lot which abutted on the improved street. Dunn v. City of 
Sioux City, 251 Iowa 1279, 104 N.W.2d 830 (1960). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
32. Definition, abutting property. 
Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 944 (1912). 
Millan v. City of Chariton, 145 Iowa 648, 124 N.W. 766 (1910). 
33. Property not abutting on improvement. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
34. Agricultural property. 
Agricultural lands within boundaries of city or town, laid off into lots 
of more than 10 acres, are exempt from taxation except for city and town road 
purposes, and paving arterial highways into and out of the city. O.A.G. 1944, 
p. 76. 
35. Benefitted pro~erty. 
Tax is not voi for failure to fix limits; it being presumed that the 
council in good faith deemed all property in city benefitted. Dubuque & S. C. 
R. Co. v. Mitchell, 152 Iowa 187, 131 N.W. 25 (1911). 
36. Cemetery property. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
37. Corner lots. 
Subject to assessment for improvement of two intersecting streets. 
Miller v. City of Sheldon, 198 Iowa 855, 200 N.W. 341 (1924). 
Corner lot could legally be assessed for street improvements in each of 
the streets on which it abutted. Harris v. Evans, 196 Iowa 799, 195 N.W. 178 
(lg23). 
Doubly assessed. Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271 (1871). 
38. County property. 
County property owned and used for public purposes by a county was not 
exempt from special assessments for street improvements. Edwards & Walsh 
Construction Co. v. Jasper County, 117 Iowa 365, 90 N.W. 1006 (1902). 
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384.38 
Special assessments for street improvements should be against county when 
the street abutting land owned by county and used by fair association is 
paved. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 369. 
39. Omitted property. 
Omission to assess certain abutting property for benefits because it had 
once been assessed for the same purpose. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 
Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
40. Rail roads. 
Street railway company with mere right-of-way on street not liable for 
assessment for improvement of street. Davis v. Lucas, 52 Iowa 730, 3 N.W. 134 
(1879). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
41. River beds. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
42. School propert~. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
43. Nature of assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
44. Separate assessments. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
45. Assignment. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
46. Exemptions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
47. Method of computing assessments. 
Town, having by ordinance fixed mode of procedure to construct sidewalks 
and access costs, is limited to mode prescribed. Brush v. Incorporated Town 
of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856 (1927). 
Engineer's use of "curve" to determining of benefits according to area 
and distance from improvement held not ground for setting aside assessment. 
In re: Resurfacing Fourth Street in City of Davenport, 203 Iowa 298, 211 
N.W. 375 (1926). 
City has right to prescribe mode in which tax shall be assessed. City of 
Burlington v. Quick,-47 Iowa 222 (1877). 
48. Area as basis for assessment. 
Area method of computing assessment for street paving proper. Beh v. 
City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
49. Value of property. 
Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
50. Amount of assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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51. Expenses within assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
52. Credit, amount of assessment. 
Abutting owner assessed for paving not entitled to credit for old curb 1 and gutter torn up by city. In re: Audubon and Ninth Streets, 198 Iowa 1103, 199 N.W. 983 (1924). 
53. Excessive assessments. 
Landowner only entitled to relief for amount assessment exceeded that I 
permissible. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Assessment including items which could not legally be assessed for is 
void. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
54. Proportional assessment. I 
Burden must be distributed ratably on property subject to assessment. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 
913 (1923). 
Equitable apportionment. Snyder v. City of. Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 
163 N.W. 594 (1917). I 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
55. Uniform assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
56. Form of assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
57. Defects and irregularities in procedure. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
58. Validity of assessment. 
Special assessment to pay cost of a disposal ditch. Bennett v. City of 
Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 {1908). 
Municipal assessment for street grading wholly void. Carter v. Cernansky, 
126 Iowa 506, 102 N.W. 438 (1905). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
I 
I 
I 
59. Conformity of work authorized with work done. I 
Resurfacing versus repair and patching. Not such as to render action 
void. Noble v. City of Des Moines, 191 Iowa 12, 174 N.W. 44 (1919). 
Necessity of substantial compliance with contract before cost of 
improvement could be assessed upon abutting property. Atkinson v. Webster 
City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). I 
Extension by council of time fixed by contract for completion of street 
paving not unreasonable as to invalidate assessments. F. M. Hubbell, Son & 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 N.W. 701 (1915). 
Fraud of contractor in not using amount of cement required by contract 
renders void the assessment on property abutting thereon. Carter v. Cernansky, I 
126 Iowa 506, 102 N.W. 438 (1905). 
60. Payment of assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
61. Actions to collect assessments. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
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62. Use of proceeds of assessment. 
Money raised by assessment on land for paving certain streets is a trust 
fund, and cannot be lawfully appropriate by the city to pay for paving other 
streets. Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Iowa 90, 77 N.W. 532 (1898). 
63. Persons liable. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
64. Deeds and conveyances. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
65. Conveyances to evade assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
66. Land 1 ord and tenant. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
67. Injunctions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
68. Estoppel and waiver. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
69. Payment, estoppel and waiver. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
70. Counterclaim. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
71. Evidence. 
Evidence showed special benefit from sidewalk improvements. Brush v. 
Incorporated Town of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856 
( 1927). 
Evidence showed assessment for improvements did not exceed special 
benefits, and that property was properly inc 1 uded as "adj a cent property." In 
re: Hume, 202 Iowa 969, 208 N.W. 285 (1926). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
72. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Assessment by city council for public improvement is presumed legal, 
equitable, and just. Hahn v. City of LeMars, 197 Iowa 292, 197 N.W. 8 (1924). 
Presumption that all real estate receives some degree of benefit from 
permanent improvement of street adjoining it. Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 
257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
Engineer's tentative determination of benefits by using "curve," taking 
account of the area and distance from improvement, did not preclude reasonable 
presumption of substantial justice. In re: Resurfacing Fourth Street in 
City of Davenport, 203 Iowa 298, 211 N.W. 375 (1926). 
Presumption that action of town council in levying assessment is 
correct. Curtis v. Town of Dunlap, 202 Iowa 588, 210 N.W. 800 (1926). 
Burden of impeaching an assessment for local improvements is on 
complaining property owner-., In re: Paving Streets in Floyd Park Addition, 
Sioux City, 197 Iowa 915, 196 N.W. 597 (1924). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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73. Instructions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
74. Judgment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
75. Review. 
That cost of paving streets may be greater than should be borne by small 
town raises no ground for courts to interfere. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 913 (1923). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.39 Improvements Brought to Grade 
1. Construction and application. 
Street should not be permanently improved until grade is established. 
People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464, 79 A. L. 
R. 1310 (1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
Error or irregularity in procedure does not cause council to lose 
jurisdiction or render proceeding invalid. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464, 79 A. L. R. 1310 (1932). People's Inv. 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
Assessment for paving alley when no grade was established was void. 
Walter v. City of Ida Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927). 
2. Jurisdiction. 
Error or irregularity in procedure does not cause council to lose jurisdiction or render proceeding invalid. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 (1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
3. Powers and duties of cities. 
City only required to grade a street to its established grade. Kaynor v. 
City of Cedar Falls, 156 Iowa 161, 135 N.W. 564 (1912). 
Alley could not be paved above established grade. F. M. Hubbell, Son & 
Co. v. Bennett Bros, 130 Iowa 66, 106 N.W. 375 (1906). 
Authority of city to establish grade is legislative, and when exercised 
within its limits, cannot be controlled. Kemp v. City of Des Moines, 125 Iowa 
640, 101 N.W. 474 (1904). 
City must bring street to grade before requiring property owners to lay 
permanent walks. O.A.G. 1910, p. 192. 
Power of municipal corporation to order sidewalks and assess costs 
thereof. O.A.G. 1907, p. 143. 
4. Ordinance. 
Change in established grade must be made by ordinance. Landis v. City of 
Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 157 N.W. 841 (1916). 
Subsequent ordinance changing alley grade to conform to improvement could 
not validate assessment. F. M. Hubbell, Son & Co. v. Bennett Bros., 130 Iowa 
66, 106 N.W. 375 (1906). 
5. Contracts. 
Incumbent upon city to establish grade of street before paving. Allen v. 
City of Davenport, 107 Iowa 90, 77 N.W. 532 (1898). 
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6. Sidewalks. 
Sidewalks to be at established grade. Carlson v. City of Marshalltown, 
212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 421 (1g31). 
Provision that sidewalks shall be at established grade. Kaynor v. City 
of Cedar Falls, 156 Iowa 161, 135 N.W. 564 (1912). 
Where town neither brought the street to grade nor pointed out the grade 
line, lot owner was not in default for failure to comply with order of council 
directing construction of a walk. Burget v. Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 
120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 (1903). 
Where no grade is established, town may construct temporary walks but not 
pennanent walks, and if temporary walks are constructed by town, cost must be 
kept within statutory limit. O.A.G. 1909, p. 274. 
7. Materialit~ of grade variance. 
Variancerom established grade, in ordering permanent street 
improvement, is not a jurisdictional matter depriving council of jurisdiction 
to assess abutting owners. In re: Audubon and Ninth Streets, 198 Iowa 1103, 
199 N.W. 983 (1924). 
Slight variance not material. Landis v. City of Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 
157 N.W. 841 (1916). 
Variance between grade established by council and that on which pavement 
is laid, does not invalidate special assessment to pay for paving. F. M. 
Hubbel, Son & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 N.W. 701 (1915). 
8. Remedy of property owner. 
Traveling of street on which no grade was established - appeal. People's 
Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464, 79 A. L. R. 1310 
(1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
Failure to appear and object after notice is waiver of right to object. 
People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464, 79 A. L. 
R. 1310 (1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
Variance of two to eighteen inches not grounds for enjoining 
assessment. Shaver v. J. W. Turner Improvement Co., 1333 N.W. 770 (Iowa 
1911). 
Plaintiff entitled to injunction to restrain unauthorized construction of 
a walk. Burget v. Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 
(1903). 
9. Injunction. 
Will not lie to prevent establishment of permanent grade unless 
unreasonable and unnecessary. Gallaher v. City of Jefferson, 125 Iowa 324, 
101 N.W. 124 (1904). 
10. Damages from improvement. 
Conformance to grade by property owner. Monarch Mfg. Co. v. Omaha C. B. 
& S. R. Co., 127 Iowa 511, 103 N.W. 4g3 (1905). 
11. Waiver. 
Property owner not appearing and filing objections in proceedings after 
statutory notice waives right to object because no benefits would accrue 
unless street grade was first established. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (1932). 
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384.40 Underground Improvements 
1. Construction and application. 
Sewer and water connections with abutting property. Seymour v. City of 
Ames, 218 Iowa 615, 255 N.W. 874 {lg34). 
Right of town to put in connections and charge owners. Toben v. Town of 
Manson, 192 Iowa 1127, 185 N.W. 984 (1922). 
Exercise of power granted by this section. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 403. 
2. Ordinance. 
Charges for underground water connection by city draw interest. O.A.G. 
1923-24, p. 403. 
384.41 Petition by Property Owners 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1. Construction and application. I 
Character and extent of improvement of streets left to discretion of city 
authorities. Call Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 227 Iowa 142, 287 N.W. 832 
(lg39). 
City without power to pass ordinance without petition. Tallant v. City I 
of Burlington, 39 Iowa 543 (1874). 
384.42 Procedure on Public Improvement 
1/2. Construction and application. 
City may include more than one project in resolution of necessity. 
O.A.G. April 9, 1976. 
1. Jurisdiction. 
Where jurisdiction of proceedings for street improvement and assessment 
for benefits therefrom has been once regularly acquired by city council, it is 
not lost by subsequent irregularity for which there is a remedy by appeal. 
Koontz v. City of Centerville, 161 Iowa 627, 143 N.W. 490 (1913). 
2. Injunction. 
Standing of residents and property owners in city area to which a 
corporation proposed to extend its sanitary sewer system. Sayles v. Bennett 
Ave. Development Corp., 258 Iowa 628, 138 N.W.2d 895 (1965). 
3. Validity of contract. 
Exercise of public utility franchise which city had no power to grant. 
Sayles v. Bennett Ave. Development Corp., 258 Iowa 628, 138 N.W.2d 895 (1965). 
384.43 Preliminary Plans 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.44 Estimated Cost 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.45 Plats 
1. Construction and application. 
Compliance with special assessment statutes necessary to issuance of 
special assessment certificates to pay for improvements. Lytle v. City of 
Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 453 (1938). 
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Council need not consider added requirements enacted but not yet 
effective. Butters v. City of Des Moines, 202 Iowa 30, 209 N.W. 401 (1926). 
2. Cost of plat. 
From improvement fund if proceedings are dismissed and improvement not 
constructed. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 61. 
3. Duplicate. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.46 Lot Valuations 
1. In general. 
Section 441.2(1) providing special method for valuing agricultural land 
based on productivity, net earning capacity, and fair market value as 
agricultural land did not apply to determine if special assessment made for 
paving of gravel street exceeded statutory limits of 25 percent of the value 
of lot. City of Clive v. Iowa Concrete Block & Material Co., 298 N.W.2d 585 
(Iowa 1980). 
384.47 Schedule 
1. Construction and application. 
Compliance with special assessment statutes necessary to issuance of 
special assessment certificates to pay for improvements. Lytle v. City of 
Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 453 (1938). 
Council need not consider added requirements enacted but not yet 
effective. Butters v. City of Des Moines, 202 Iowa 30, 209 N.W. 401 (1926). 
2. Estimate of value. 
Owner could assume mistakes in estimate of value of lot would be 
corrected. Smith, Lichty & Hillman Co. v. Mason City, 210 Iowa 700, 231 N.W. 
370 (1930). 
384.48 Adoption of Plat 
1. Construction and application. 
Paving assessment not invalid because in the final 
the width was changed after adoption of the resolution. 
Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
384.49 Resolution of Necessity 
order for improvement 
In re: Apple, 161 
1. Construction and application. 
Property owner's waiver of rights for failure to file objection to 
assessment does not apply to sewer projects. Petition of City of Des Moines, 
245 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
City may include more than one project in resolution of necessity. 
O.A.G., April 9, 1976. 
Construction of plant for sewage disposal. Glucose Co. v. Marshalltown 
C. C. 153 F. 620 (1907). 
Payment for street paving by special assessment certificates. Lytle v. 
City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 453 (1938). 
Building of sewers. Dunn v. Sioux City, 206 Iowa 908, 221 N.W. 571 (1928). 
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Statutory conditions precedent to improvement to be strictly followed. 
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sedgwick, 203 Iowa 726, 213 N.W. 435 (1927). 
Requisition by city of jurisdiction for street improvement. Manning v. 
City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 N.W. 347 (1921). 
Requirement of resolution of necessity and publication of notice are to 
be strictly followed. Davenport Locomotive Works v. City of Davenport, 185 
Iowa 151, 169 N.W. 106 (1918). 
Variance from established grade not jurisdictional defect. Shaver v. J. 
W. Turner Improvement Co., 133 N.W. 770 (1912), affirmed, 155 Iowa 492, 136 
N.W. 711. 
Resolution for sewer construction void for want of jurisdiction. Bennett 
v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
2. Ordinance. 
City could improve streets without amending prior ordinance where statute 
prescribed procedure. Miller v. City of Oelwein, 155 Iowa 706, 136 N.W. 1045 
(1912). 
Consistency with statutes required. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 126 
Iowa 680, 102 N.W. 529, 3 Ann. Cas. 651 (1905). 
Procedure under ordinance held to be mandatory. Starr v. City of 
Burlington, 45 Iowa 87 (1876). 
3. Determination of necessity of improvement. 
Council can act on report of committee without having actual knowledge of 
the facts. Brewster v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737 (1879). 
4. City council. 
Council, in ordering street improvements, acts as properly constituted 
legislative body of city, not as property owners' agent. Schumacher v. City 
of Clear Lake, 214 Iowa 34, 239 N.W. 71 (1931). 
5. Procedure in general. 
Must be in compliance with statutes relating to preliminary 
proceedings. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
Objections raised to notice and material to be used related to regularity 
not to validity of proceedings. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 
N.W. 381 (1905). 
Ordering of improvement in manner provided by statute is condition 
precedent to right to condemn property and proceed to construct the 
improvement. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 245. 
6. Necessity of resolution of necessity. 
Resolution of necessity needed to assess property according to 
benefits. Peterson v. Incorporated Town of Stratford, 190 Iowa 45, 180 N.W. 
13 (1920). 
Adoption of resolution and publication of intent to improve necessary 
prior to making improvement. Locomotive Works v. City of Davenport, 185 Iowa 
151, 169 N.W. 106 (1918). 
Resolution held necessary. Eckert v. Incorporated Town of Walnut, 117 
Iowa 629, 91 N.W. 929 (1902). 
Acceptance of sewer - estopped. Cooper v. City of Cedar Rapids, 112 Iowa 
367, 83 N.W. 1050 (1900). 
Various resolutions failed to confer jurisdiction to improve. Starr v. 
City of Burlington, 45 Iowa 87 (1876). 
Paving costs of intersections in area annexed to city but not included in 
resolution of necessity for municipal paving program cannot be paid 
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subsequently by the city either paying the contractor directly or indemnifying 
the subdivider. O.A.G. March 25, 1968. 
7. Clarity of resolution. 
Resolution providing that cost of acquiring ground for street that is to 
be assessed against adjacent property is valid. Guenther v. City of Des 
Moines, 197 Iowa 414, 197 N.W. 326 {1924). 
8. Operation and effect of resolution. 
Resolution was insufficient to authorize levy of special tax. Wardens 
and Vestry of Christ Church v. City of Burlington, 39 Iowa 224 (1874). 
9. Confonning to resolution. 
Resolution need state materials to be used and method of construction 
only in a general way. Richardson v. City of Denison, 189 Iowa 426, 178 N.W. 
332 {1920). 
Where resolution ordered patching and part of work was reconstruction, 
the assessment could not be enjoined. Ellyson v. City of Des Moines, 179 Iowa 
882, 162 N.W. 212 (1917). 
Assessment was not invalid because final order changed width after 
adoption of resolution. In re: Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
10. Finalitt. 
When du y and legally adopted the action of council is final. Brenton v. 
City of Des Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
11. Materials, selection of. 
Resolution ordering construction of sidewalk not void because 
specifically designated material and mixture to be used. Perrott v. Balkema, 
211 Iowa 764, 234 N.W. 240 (1931). 
Within discretion of council. Swan v. City of Indianola, 142 Iowa 731, 
121 N.W. 547 (1909). 
Resolution and advertisement did not restrict competition in violation of 
the statutes. Saunders v. Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N.W. 529 {1907). 
12. Contracts. 
Generally, see Notes of Decisions under ~ 391.28 et seq. 
Where resolution was held void contract tor payment of contractor was 
void. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 297 N.W. 453 (1938). 
Flushcoating streets with oil and repairing defects held not "oiling". 
Jackson v. City of Creston, 206 Iowa 244, 220 N.W. 92 (1928). 
Construction of primary road extension by Highway Commission. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 769. 
13. Assessments. 
City paying expense from general fund may build sewers without 
formalities necessary, where cost is assessed against property. Dunn v. Sioux 
City, 206 Iowa go8, 221 N.W. 571 (1928). 
Assessments pursuant to intent of council will be sustained. Cardell v. 
City of Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
Construction of sewer beyond point fixed by resolution. Williams v. City 
of Cherokee, 184 Iowa 899, 169 N.W. 110 (1918). 
Must be statutory authority to levy special assessments. Bennett v. City 
of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
Council held to have levied tax without jurisdiction. Dubbert v. City of 
Cedar Falls, 149 Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). 
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Proportion of cost to be assessed against any particular property. 
·Millan v. City of Chariton, 145 Iowa 648, 124 N.W. 766 (1910). 
14. Record. 
Failure to put resolutions on ordinance record held not to invalidate 
them. Jones v. City of Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 592 (1915). 
Impeachment of record of council. Bailey v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 
747, 138 N.W. 853 (1912). 
Omission of name of owner in record of resolution from names of parties 
assessed did not invalidate it. Edwards & Walsh Const. Co. v. Jasper County, 
117 Iowa 365, 90 N.W. 1006, 94 Am. St. Rep. 301 (1902). 
15. Presumptions. 
Adoption of resolution of necessity providing for construction of sewer 
created conclusive presumption that benefit resulted from improvement. Moss 
v. Incorporated Town of Hull, 24g Iowa 1178, 91 N.W.2d 5g9 (1958). 
Where proper resolution of necessity adopted in sewer proceeding, 
presumption that of new sewer and property served would be benefitted. 
Brenton v. City of Des Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
16. Validity of resolution. 
Resolution of necessity, for pavement of certain width, held valid though 
in conflict with existing ordinance fixing curb line. Turley v. Incorporated 
Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (1927). 
Contract for paving must substantially conform to resolution of 
necessity. Richardson v. City of Denison, 189 Iowa 426, 178 N.W. 332 (1920). 
Failure to put resolutions on ordinance record held not to invalidate 
them. Jones v. City of Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 5g2 (1915). 
17. Sufficiency of resolution - in general. 
Resolution levying assessments on all property in town sufficient to 
authorize assessment against property of defendant. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (lg29). 
Resolution advising owners of improvement contemplated is sufficient. 
Turley v. Incorporated Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (lg27). 
Resolution for paving held proper. Cardell v. City of Perry, 201 Iowa 
628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
Resolution providing that cost of acquiring ground for street is to be 
assessed against adjacent property is valid. Guenther v. City of Des Moines, 
197 Iowa 414, 1g7 N.W. 326 (1924). 
Resolution held to declare the necessity or advisability of grading 
street. Royal v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 23, 191 N.W. 377 (1923). 
Resolution held sufficient. Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 
N.W. 347 (1921). 
A distinctly separate resolution need not be adopted by itself. Meader 
v. Incorporated Town of Sibley, 191 Iowa 1139, 183 N.W. 610 (1921). 
Resolution need state materials to be used and method of construction 
only in a general way. Richardson v. City of Denison, 189 Iowa 426, 178 N.W. 
332 (1920). 
Resolution stating that construction to be in accord with plans and 
specifications therein referred to is valid. City of Bloomfield v. Stanley, 
174 Iowa 114, 156 N.W. 307 (1916). 
That clerk changed numbers of resolutions did not invalidate them. Jones 
v. City of Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 5g2 (1915). 
Need not specify particular kind of blocks or detail method of 
construction. In re: Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
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Resolution providing for assesssment of abutting and adjacent property 
was valid. Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 567, 142 N.W. 207 (1913). 
Resolution held valid though it did not expressly state material to be 
used in paving. Miller v. City of Oelwein, 155 Iowa 706, 136 N.W. 1045 
(1912). 
Resolution held invalid, failed to describe property adequately. Dunker 
v. City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 292, 136 N.W. 536 (1912). 
Resolution failed to comply with statute. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 
138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
Resolution and advertisement did not restrict competition in violation of 
the statutes. Saunders v. Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N.W. 529, 9 L. R. A. 
N. S., 392 (1907). 
Resolution was not invalid because not mentioning curbing and 
guttering. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
Plat of engineer referred to resolution cured irregularities. Dittoe v. 
City of Davenport, 74 Iowa 66, 36 N.W. 895 (1888). 
18. Location, sufficiency of resolution. 
Resolution held sufficient. Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 
N.W. 347 (1921). 
Need not specify particular kind of blocks or detail method of 
construction. In re: Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
19. Specificity, sufficiency of resolution. 
Resolution held sufficient. Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 
N.W. 347 {1921). 
Resolution providing for assessment of abutting and adjacent property was 
valid. Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 567, 142 N.W. 207 (1913). 
Resolution held valid though it did not expressly state material to be 
used in paving. Miller v. City of Oelwein, 155 Iowa 706, 136 N.W. 1045 
(1912). Nixon v. Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 N.W. 239. 
Resolution was not invalid because not mentioning curbing and 
guttering. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
20. Injunction. 
Municipal councils exercised large discretion in improving streets, but 
unreasonable and arbitrary exercise thereof may be restrained. Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 (1927). 
21. Repeal of resolution. 
Majority vote. City of Chariton v. Holliday, 60 Iowa 391, 14 N.W. 775 
(1883). 
22. Review. 
Supreme Court presumed pavement bid, resolution of necessity, and notice 
to bidders were in form consistent with district court's decree. Hoffman v. 
City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930). 
384.50 Notice of Hearing 
1. Validity. 
For validity, statute must provide for notice. Trustees of Griswold 
College v. City of Davenport, 65 Iowa 633, 22 N.W. 904 (1885). 
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2. Construction and application. 
Property owner's constitutional rights not violated by lack of due 
process. Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
This section intended to cover errors arising out of exercise of jurisdiction acquired. Comstock v. Eagle Grove City, 113 Iowa 58g, 111 N.W. 
51 (1907). 
3. Purpose. 
Assessment could not be enforced until owners were given notice of 
hearing. Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 157 Iowa 525, 137 N.W. 1072 
(1912). 
4. Prior 1 aws. 
Code section 810 was mandatory. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 
67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
Code 1897, section 971, did not contravene the state or United States 
Constitutions prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law. 
Reed v. City of Cedar Rapids, 137 Iowa 107, 111 N.W. 1013 (1907). 
Procedure for cities under special charter. Diver v. Keokuk Savings 
Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905). 
5. Jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction exists for public improvement as to property owner taking 
part in initial proceedings irrespective of legal notice. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co. v. Sedgwick, 203 Iowa 726, 213 N.W. 435 (1927). 
6. Necessity of notice. 
Assessment on abutting owners without notice is unlawful. Gatch v. City 
of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 718, 18 N.W. 310 (1884). Trustees of Griswold College 
v. City of Davenport, 18 N.W. 314 (Iowa 1884). 
Statutory requirements as to notice must be strictly observed, or 
proceedings involving special assessments will be held void. Roznos v. Town 
of Slater, 254 Iowa 77, 116 N.W.2d 471 (1962). 
Jurisdiction to improve exists as to owner taking part in initial 
proceedings irrespective of legal notice. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. 
Sedgwick, 203 Iowa 726, 213 N.W. 435 (1927). 
Adoption of resolution of necessity and publication of notice of 
intention required for validity. Davenport Locomotive Works v. City of 
Davenport, 185 Iowa 151, 169 N.W. 106 (1918). 
Where work done is reconstruction, cost could not be assessed for lack of 
notice. Clark v. Martin, 182 Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
Notice is jurisdictional. Benshoff v. City of Iowa Falls, 175 Iowa 30, 
156 N.W. 898 (1916). 
Owner may be estopped from objecting to jurisdiction. Gilcrest & Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 157 Iowa 525, 137 N.W. 1072 (1912). 
Where notice of hearing not given, owners not liable for assessment. 
Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (1911). 
Resolution which failed to provide for notice or mode of determining 
amount was invalid. Zelie v. City of Webster City, 94 Iowa 393, 62 N.W. 796 
(1895). 
Where it appears that notice would have been of no advantage to owner, 
lack of notice is not a defense against collection of the tax. Dittoe v. City 
of Davenport, 74 Iowa 66, 36 N.W. 895 (1888). 
Payment on grounds of no notice of the equalizing and assessment; 
determination of his share being matter of calculation, not discretion. Amery 
v. City of Keokuk, 72 Iowa 701, 30 N.W. 780 (1887). 
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Where tax is levied without notice, party claiming validity must show 
notice would have been unavailing. Auer v. City of Dubuque, 65 Iowa 650, 22 
N.W. 914 (1885). 
Notice and opportunity to be heard is necessary. Trustees of Griswold 
College v. City of Davenport, 65 Iowa 633, 22 N.W. 904 (1885). 
Where assessments are not equal, notice necessary. Gatch v. City of Des 
Moines, 63 Iowa 718, 18 N.W. 310 (1884). 
Publication provided for in ordinance held mandatory. City of Dubuque v. 
Wooten, 28 Iowa 571 (1870). 
Party being assessed for permanent sidewalk improvement should be given 
notice of time when question of amount of assessment against his property is 
to be heard and an opportunity to be present and make any showing that he 
would in justice be entitled to make. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 831. 
7. Personal service. 
Publication of notice as prescribed is jurisdictional, and personal 
service of notice invalid. Zalesky v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 714, 92 
N.W. 657 (1902). 
Resident who has been personally served cannot complain that no 
publication of notice was made. City of Chariton v. Holliday, 6 Iowa 391, 14 
N.W. 775 (1882). 
8. Conforming to ordinance and resolution. 
Entire resolution need not be included in notice. Spalti v. Town of 
Oakland, 179 Iowa 59, 161 N.W. 17 (1917). 
Notice of hearing on resolution need not be given more specific than a 
resolution sufficiently specific. Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 
N.W. 776 (1911). 
Notice not valid because last publication was on Sunday. Gallaher v. 
Garland, 126 Iowa 206, 101 N.W. 867 (1904). 
9. Sufficiency of notice. 
Notice of hearing of proposed resolution of necessity to construct sewer 
system in town complied with due process where it advised those whose property 
was subject to assessment as to the nature of improvement and afforded them 
opportunity to be heard. Roznos v. Town of Slater, 254 Iowa 77, 116 N.W.2d 
471 (1962). . 
Statute held to have been sufficiently complied with. Anderson - Deering 
Co. v. City of Boone, 201 Iowa 1129, 205 N.W. 984 (1925). 
Notice need not state amount of assessment when owner may ascertain such 
by mere mathmetical calculation. Ford v. Incorporated Town of North Des 
Moines, 80 Iowa 626, 45 N.W. 1031 (1890). 
Notice prescribed in ordinance held sufficient. Lyman v. Plummer, 75 
Iowa 353, 39 N.W. 527 (1888). 
10. Ordinances. 
Valid assessment may be made if due notice and due opportunity to be 
heard are provided by local ordinances. Trustees of Griswold College v. City 
of Davenport, 18 N.W. 314 (Iowa 1884); Gatch v. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 
718, 18 N.W. 310 (1884). 
Assessments under code of 1897. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 126 Iowa 
680, 102 N.W. 529 (1905). 
Notice as required by ordinance not complied with. Burget v. 
Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 (1903). 
Publication of notice as prescribed is jurisdictional. Zalesky v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 714, 92 N.W. 657 (1902). 
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City ordinance requiring notice must be complied with. Starr v. City of 
Burlington, 45 Iowa 87 (1876). 
Notice held mandatory. Roche v. City of Dubuque, 42 Iow 250 (1875). 
11. Property included. 
Resolution of necessity for construction of sewer failed to sufficiently 
inform property owners of land that would be included in district for 
assessment. Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 292, 136 N.W. 536 (1912). 
12. Description of property. 
Immaterial that realty was incorrectly described in resolution of 
necessity and in notices of preliminary proceedings. Sunset Golf Club v. 
Sioux City, 242 Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 548 (1951). 
13. Location. 
Where notice of intention to improve did not describe location of 
improvement and materials to be used, the city council was without power to 
order improvement at expense of the city. Davenport Locomotive Works v. City 
of Davenport, 185 Iowa 151, 169 N.W. 106 (1918). 
Notice sufficient where it specified actual location and terminals of 
proposed pavement though the width of the pavement was not given. In re 
Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
14. Materials used. 
Unnecessary for notice of proposed resolution of necessity to describe 
method of construction detail. Wigodsky v. Town of Holstein, 1g5 Iowa 910, 
192 N.W. 916 (1923). 
Notice sufficient though it did not specify particular kinds of blocks or 
detail method of construction of pavement. In re Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 
N.W. 1021 (1913). 
15. Combined notice. 
Contents of resolution. O.A.G. 1928, p. 190. 
Different municipal improvements may be legally noticed in the same 
notice of assessment. Iowa Pipe & Tile Co. v. Callanan, 125 Iowa 358, 101 
N.W. 141 (1904). 
16. Contractor's rights. 
May recover cost from city if owners not estopped. Gilcrest & Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 157 Iowa 525, 137 N.W. 1072 (1912). 
17. Time. 
Multiple publications sufficient compliance with statute. Durst v. City 
of Des Moines, 150 Iowa 370, 130 N.W. 168 (1911). 
18. Sundays. 
Notice not insufficient because last publication occurred on Sunday. 
Nixon v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 N.W. 239 (1908). 
19. Defects in notice. 
Since city council has jurisdiction to improve street, any error or 
irregularity in procedure cannot cause council to lose jurisdiction or render 
proceedings invalid. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1932). 
Owner who petitioned for improvement or filed objections prior to date of 
hearing cannot object to defects in notice. Gilchrest & Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (Iowa 1911). 
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20. Objections. 
Point raised that notice was not published sufficient number of times. 
Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (1911). 
Fact of void assessment not waived by failure to object. Chicago, R.I. & 
P.Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (192g). 
Requirement of two publications in each of two newspapers published in 
city of proposed public improvements held not to apply to city operating under 
special charter. Miller v. City of Glenwood, 188 Iowa 514, 176 N.W. 373 
(1920). 
Not necessary for notice to specify time when objections will be heard. 
Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
Where a general city ordinance provided that the cost of street 
improvement should be assessed against the abutting property, on objection by 
the plaintiff that she had no notice that the cost of guttering and curbing in 
front of her lots was to be assessed against her was unavailable. Arnold v. 
City of Ft. Dodge, 111 Iowa 152, 82 N.W. 495 (1900). 
21. Estoppel or waiver. 
Defective description by city of realty in resolution of necessity and in 
notice of preliminary proceedings. Mere errors or irregularities waived by 
failure to object. Sunset Golf Club v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 
548 (1951). 
If no notice was given, there was no waiver of objections. Western 
Asphalt Paving Corporation v. City of Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 1324, 214 N.W. 
687 (1927). 
Owners estopped. Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 157 Iowa 525, 137 
N.W. 1072 (1912). 
Appearance waives defects in notice. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 
Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
Objection that notice of intention was defective waived. Reed v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 137 Iowa 107, 111 N.W. 1013 (1907). 
Property owner who made no objection to contract for improvement until 
after work was done could not complain of contract, after having received 
benefits thereof, on grounds rendering it merely voidable. Diver v. Keokuk 
Sav. Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905). 
Objection of no opportunity to be heard in opposition to assessment was 
untenable. Arnold v. City of Ft. Dodge, 111 Iowa 152, 82 N.W. 495 (1900). 
22. Meeting and hearing. 
Adjourned meeting was continuation of original meeting. McMurray v. City 
of Pella, 246 Iowa 313, 67 N.W.2d 620 (1955). 
23. Evidence. 
Affidavit of publication made four months after publication was competent 
proof of publication. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 
196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 913 (1923). 
Contention that notice not properly published not sustained. Miller v. 
City of Glenwood, 188 Iowa 514, 176 N.W. 373 (1920). 
24. Injunction. 
If notice of hearing is so defective as to render assessments thereunder 
absolutely, court of equity has power to enjoin further proceedings in the 
matter. Roznos v. Town of Slater, 254 Iowa 77, 116 N.W.2d 471 (1962). 
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384.51 Adoption of Resolution 
1. In general. 
Authority of city to make special assessment against abutting property 
for cost of work done. Allen v. City of Davenport, 132 F. 209 (1904). 
Cities and towns are not required to provide sewers and drains. Elledge 
v. City of Des Moines, 259 Iowa 284, 144 N.W.2d 283 (1966). 
Adoption of resolution of necessity and publication of notice of 
intention to improve are conditions precedent to ordering or making the 
improvement. Davenport Locomotive Works v. City of Davenport, 185 Iowa 151, 
169 N.W. 106 (1918). 
Were the proceedings void because of any fundamental defects? And is 
there any fraud shown? Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
Special charter cities. Diver v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 
N.W. 542 (1905). 
No ordinance or resolution was necessary to authorize a city to construct 
a temporary open sewer for surface drainage. Cooper v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
112 Iowa 367, 83 N.W. 1050. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Jurisdiction. 
Where council had jurisdiction, failure to establish a street grade could 
not cause loss of jurisdiction. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 
Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 (1932). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Validity of proceedings. 
Town's void contract for lift station rendered assessment based thereon 
invalid and subject to challenge at any step in proceeding. Chicago R.I. & 
P.Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
4. Necessity of petition. 
Majority of resident owners upon particular street to be improved must 
petition therefor before city can authorize. French v. City of Burlington, 42 
Iowa 614 (1876). 
5. Necessity and propriety of improvement. 
Resolution of necessity is for city council to decide whether improvement 
is expedient and that property assessed will be specially benefited. Slater 
v. Incorporated Town of Adel, 324 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 1982). 
Legislative determination by city council that public improvement is 
expedient and proper creates presumption that property abutting on improvement 
will be benefited thereby and such determination cannot be set· aside in judicial proceeding. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Interference by the courts. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 310 
(194). 
Absent fraud, council's determination as to necessity for improvements is 
not reviewable. Brush v. Incorporated Town of Liscomb, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 
N.W. 856 (1927). 
If, after entering upon street paving improvement, city council became 
convinced that public necessity or convenience required pavement to be wider 
than first contemplated, it could take necessary measures to do so. Nixon v. 
City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 N.W. 239 (1908). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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6. Resolution of necessity. 
Statement presented to town council that assessment levy was excessive 
did not constitute attack on resolution of necessity. Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. 
Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
Resolution of necessity for special assessment of street improvements did 
not require unanimous city council vote. Slater v. Incorporated Town of Adel, 
324 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 1982). 
Resolution of necessity for paving can be amended at time fixed for 
consideration and passage. Cardell v. City of Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 
775 (1926). 
Resolution of necessity failed to sufficiently inform owners of lands to 
be included in assessment. Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 292, 136 
N.W. 536 (1912). 
Where city established street grade by ordinance, the work of bringing 
the street to such grade might be corrrnenced without ordinance or resolution. 
Collins v. City of Iowa Falls, 146 Iowa 305, 125 N.W. 226 (1910). 
City may include more than one project in resolution of necessity. 
O.A.G. April 9, 1976. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
7. Notice of hearing. 
Second notice not required if size of project is reduced by amendment 
therefore no increase in assessment aqainst lot for added public 
improvements. Slater v. Incorporated.Town of Adel, 324 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 
1982). 
Sufficiency of. Roznes v. Town of Slater, 254 Iowa 77, 116 N.W.2d 471 
(1962). 
8. Objections - in general. 
Tabulation of objections not necessary in absence of statutory 
requirement therefor. McMurray v. City of Pella, 246 Iowa 313, 67 N.W.2d 620 
(1955). 
Where property owner appears before city council pursuant to notice, and 
files objections, he is limited, both on his appeal to the district court and 
the Supreme Court, to such objections, except in case of fraud. Andre v. City 
of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). · 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Necessity of objection. 
Matters objected to which render special assessment void may be raised on 
appeal or by independent action. Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 
208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
Objection to street improvement assessment because two assessments were 
made against corner lot and because assessments exceeded one-fourth the value 
of the lot should have been raised before the city council and on appeal. 
Harris v. Evans, 196 Iowa 799, 195 N.W. 178 (1923). 
Objection to be interposed previously to the order that improvement be 
made. Davenport Locomotive Works v. City of Davenport, 185 Iowa 151, 169 N.W. 
106 (1918). 
Variance between improvement as constructed and that planned is not jurisdictional. Cheney v. City of Ft. Dodge, 157 Iowa 250, 138 N.W. 549 
(1912). 
Objection to proceeding to improve a street may be required to be made 
before the city council. Shaver v. J.W. Turner Improvement Co., 133 N.W. 770 
(Iowa 1911). 
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Objections could not be made the basis of a suit to enjoin assessment of 
the cost of the work after it has been completed. Collins v. City of Keokuk, 
147 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 601 (1910). 
Irregularities in levy of an assessment for street paving. Marshalltown 
Light, Power & Ry. Co. v. City of Marshalltown, 127 Iowa 637, 103 N.W. 1005 
(1905). 
Where municipal assessment for grading street was void, property owner 
not bond to object thereto in order to contest alledged tax lien. Carter v. 
Cernansky, 126 Iowa 506, 102 N.W. 438 (1905). 
10. Grounds of objection. 
No insufficient filing where city engineer took plat and schedule into 
his office where it was accessible to recorder's office. Reed v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 137 Iowa 107, 111 N.W. 1013 (1907). 
Where bidder did not enlarge bid to cover additional expense, no ground 
for objection. Comstock v. Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 111 N.W. 51 
(1907). 
Grounds of objection raised by petition on appeal from assessment were 
properly stricken out where they were not previously made before the city 
council. Higman v. Sioux City, 129 Iowa 291, 105 N.W. 524 (lg06). 
11. Sufficiency of objections. 
Written objection that assessment against tract was in excess of twenty-
five percent of its value deemed sufficient. In re Paving Assessments Levied 
in town of Odebolt, 193 Iowa 1234, 188 N.W. 780 (1922). 
Objections made to assessment for pavement held sufficiently definite and 
specific. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
Objection sufficient to put in issue whether assessment was equitable and 
was in proportion to benefits rather than to frontage. Benshoof v. City of 
Iowa Falls, 175 Iowa 30, 156 N.W. 898 (1916). 
Objection not stating wherein the law was violated could be disregarded 
by the council. Koontz v. City of Centerville, 161 Iowa 627, 143 N.W. 490 
(1913). 
Objection did not go to the validity of the whole tax. Allen v. City of 
Davenport, 107 Iowa 90, 77 N.W. 532 (1898). 
12. Amended or additional objections. 
Discovery that concrete foundation was not up to specifications. 
Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
13. Persons entitled to object. 
Owners of property not subject to special assessment for street 
improvement had not statutory right to appear and object. Husson v. City of 
Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 310 (Iowa 1949). 
Abutting and adjacent owners should have been assessed. Burroughs v. 
City of Keokuk, 181 Iowa 660, 165 N.W. 83 (1917}. 
Plaintiff not precluded from attacking a void municipal assessment. 
Carter v. Cernansky, 126 Iowa 506, 102 N.W. 438 (1905). 
Grantee charged with actual knowledge of assessments cannot complain of 
their injustice. Farwel v. Des Moines Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 286, 66 N.W. 176 
(1896). 
14. Time for objection. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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15. Waiver of objections. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Waiver, generally. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Particular defects, waiver of. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Estoppel. 
Resolution of necessity for street paving ordered on motion of city 
council without petition of property owners passed by less than required 
three-fourths vote - owners not estopped to raise voting question after 
completion of work. Seymour v. City of Ames, 218 Iowa 615, 255 N.W. 874 (1934). 
Where city council's record showed improvement was ordered on motion of 
council, city cannot urge property owners' estoppel to object to assessment 
because of waiver of statutory limitation in petition. Nelson v. Sioux City, 
208 Iowa 709, 226 N.W. 41 (1929). 
Lot owners, having notice of resolution of necessity for construction, 
and who knew of the letting of the contract for construction, and that work 
was entered upon and prosecuted to completion, were not precluded from 
attacking a special assessment. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 
115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
19. Fraud. 
Fraud in assessment for pavement is not waived by failure to object or to 
appeal, and abutting owner may subsequently enjoin sale of property for 
assessment. Lytle v. Sioux City, 198 Iowa 848, 200 N.W. 416 (1924). 
Property owner should have objected to city council that assessment for 
paving improvement exceeded twenty-five percent of property's value. Evans v. 
City of Des Moines, 184 Iowa 945, 169 N.W. 336 (1918). 
20. Hearing. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
21. Vote reguired. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
22. Contracts and contractors. 
City council could not lawfully enter into contract for payment of major 
portion of cost of street paving by issuance of special assessment 
certificates without compliance with statutory provisions relating to making 
of special assessments. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 453 (1938). 
Contract for street paving could not be held invalid because contract 
price exceeded the estimate which the engineer was under this statute required 
to furnish. Miller v. City of Glenwood, 188 Iowa 514, 176 N.W. 373 (1920). 
23. Record. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Actions. 
If procedure for street improvement renders assessments therefor 
absolutely void, or if council lacks jurisdiction, invalidity may be raised by 
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independent action. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 I 
(Iowa 1932). 
Where special assessment made for street paving was illegal, but the work 
was done, and the city subsequently paid the claim of the contractor therefor, 
it could maintain a suit in equity against an abutting property owner to , 
recover for the improvement in front of his property on a quantum meruit ·1 
theory. City of Davenport v. Allen, 120 F. 172 (1903). 
25. Aeeeal to district court. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
26. Injunction. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
27. Evidence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
28. Presumetions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
29. Review. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.52 Detailed Plans and Specifications 
1. Construction and aeelication. 
Plans and specifications for paving, designating asphalt filler, and at 
council's option, coal tar pitch filler, giving specifications therefor, were 
not so misleading as to nullify council's action in adopting them. Vowles v. 
Town of Kenwood Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1009 (1924). 
Town engineer did not file specifications for the vibrolithic paving 
before the notice to bidders was published. Wigodsky v. Town of Holstein, 195 
Iowa 910, 192 N.W. 916 (1923). 
Time of completion of paving, bids for which are advertised for, is a 
material part of the specifications, which cannot be changed by bidder. 
Urbany v. City of Carroll, 176 Iowa 217, 157 N.W. 852 (1916). 
It is not necessary that the plans and specifications for a street 
improvement should be on file for the information of the property owners prior 
to the time of advertising for bids. Miller v. City of Oelwein, 155 Iowa 706, 
136 N.W. 1045 (1912). 
2. Bids. 
Bidders on municipal construction work owe duty to base their bids on 
plans and specifications on file. Brutsche v. Incorporated Town of Coon 
Rapids, 220 Iowa 1295, 264 N.W. 696 (1936). 
Specifications of company granted contract to construct electric light 
plant for town varied so materially from town's specifications as to 
invalidate contract for want of competitive bidding. Iowa Electric Light & 
Power Co. v. Incorporated Town of Grand Junction, 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136 
(1933). 
3. Amended seecifications. 
City council, after having named various kinds of paving material, and 
published resolution of necessity for paving, may at hearing, amend resolution 
by specifying new material, and adopt resolution as amended, in absence of 
fraud. Vowles v. Town of Kenwood Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1009 (1924). 
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A street paving assessment was not invalid because unwashed gravel was 
used with the city engineer's approval instead of washed gravel, as called for 
in the specifications, where an "after word" to the specifications reserved to 
the city engineer be discretion to permit the use of unwashed gravel. In re 
Apple, 161 Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913). 
4. Compliance. 
Bid for public works contract must substantially conform to specification 
and proposal. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Incorporated Town of Grand 
Junction, 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136 (1933). 
Substantial compliance with plans and specifications in paving 
construction held sufficient to support assessment. Vowles v. Town of Kenwood 
Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1009 (1924). 
384.53 Procedures to Let Contract 
Index to Notes 
Assessment Certificates, Payment of Contractor 12 
Assignment of Contract 22 
Cancellation or Rescission of Contract 25 
Compromise and Settlement 19 
Construction and Application 
Curative Acts 2 
Equipment, Purchase of 21 
Estoppel 8 
Evidence 28 
Extension of Time 7 
Extra Work 14 
Fraud 9 
Injunction 27 
Instructions 30 
Jurisdiction 3 
Liability of City 16, 17 
In General 16 
Torts 17 
Liability of Contractor 10 
Modification of Contract 23 
Payment of Contractor 11 
Performance of Contract 6 
Pleading 26 
Priority of Payment 18 
Quantum Merult 13 
Questions for Jury 29 
Reformation of Contract 24 
Removal of Materials 20 
Requisites and Validity of Contract 4 
Review 31 
Subcontractor 15 
Torts, Liability of City 17 
1. Construction and application. 
Municipality must see that there is no unlawful overreaching where 
interests of owners are involved. Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving 
Corporation, 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624, 109 A.L.R. 608 {lg37). 
Contract of more than $5000 held not within budget law. Schumacher v. 
City of Clear Lake, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1931). 
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Statutes authorizing contracts strictly construed. Atkinson v. Webster 
City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
Failure of clerk to file contract prior to connnencement of work does not 
alone void contract. Collins v. City of Keokuk, 147 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 601 
(1910). 
Board of public works in cities of first class - approval of contracts. 
Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416, 70 N.W. 605 (1897), reversed on 
other grounds, 19 S.Ct. 379, 173 U.S. 193, 43 L. Ed. 665 
Determination of amount of assessment. Gilcrest v. Macartney, 97 Iowa 
138, 66 N.W. 103 (1890). 
Contract for work to be done in sections - assessments. Tuttle v. Polk, 
92 Iowa 433, 60 N.W. 733 (1894). 
Storm sewer - construction of. O.A.G. 1928, p. 46. 
2. Curative acts. 
McCain v. City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 331, 103 N.W. 979 (1905). 
Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 343, 70 N.W. 214 (1897). 
3. Jurisdiction. 
Sewer construction. Lundberg v. Lake City, 194 Iowa 136, 187 N.W. 438 
(1922). 
Resolutions and contract were for repair of paving by patching, and part 
of work done was more in nature of resurfacing. Noble v. City of Des Moines, 
191 Iowa 12, 174 N.W. 44 (1919). 
4. Requisites and validity of contract. 
Valid contract necessary to assessment of costs to owners. Allen v. City 
of Davenport, 132 F. 209 (1904), 65 C.C.A. 641, certiorari denied, 25 S.Ct. 
794, 196 U.S. 639. 
Contract entered into by town must be authorized by governing body. Poor 
v. Incorporated Town of Duncombe, 231 Iowa 907, 2 N.W.2d 294 (1942). 
Contract was a nullity where proceedings were void. Lytle v. City of 
Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 270 N.W. 453 (1938). 
Provision giving city right to complete work at contractor's expense not 
compulsory. Charles City v. Rasmussen, 210 Iowa 841, 232 N.W. 137 (1930), 72 
A.L.R. 638. 
Contract need not be in writing. Wayman v. City of Cherokee, 204 Iowa 
675, 215 N.W. 655 (1927). 
Indebtedness in excess of constitutional limitation. Waller v. 
Pritchard, 201 Iowa 1364, 202 N.W. 770 (1925). 
Contract must substantially conform to resolution of necessity. 
Richardson v. City of Denison, 189 Iowa 426, 178 N.W. 332 (1920). 
Contract held severable. North View Land Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
185 Iowa 1032, 169 N.W. 644 (1918). 
Contracts from general fund are binding on successors of officers of 
city. First Nat. Bank v. City of E1m1etsburg, 157 Iowa 555, 138 N.W. 451 
(1912). 
Presumption that city will provide outlet for sewer. Dunker v. City of 
Des Moines, 156 Iowa 292, 136 N.W. 536 (1912). 
Contract for grading and paving valid where grading cost is paid from 
~rading fund. Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 
(1910). 
Failure of clerk to file improvement contract does not render contract 
void. Collins v. City of Keokuk, 147 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 601 (1910). 
Contract must correspond to conditions laid down as basis for competitive 
bidding. Hedge v. City of Des Moines, 141 Iowa 4, 119 N.W. 276 (1909). 
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384.53 
Provisions for claims for extra work and for waiver of such held valid. 
Capital City Brick & Pipe Co. v. City of Des Moines, 136 Iowa 243, 113 N.W. 
835 (1907). 
Contracts to be paid by assessment certificates do not raise or create 
indebtedness. Corey v. City of Fort Dodge, 133 Iowa 666, 111 N.W. 6 (1907). 
Contract may not raise indebtedness of city beyond constitutional 
limit. Citizen's Bank of Des Moines v. City of Spencer, 126 Iowa 101, 101 
N.W. 643 (1904). 
Contract let without knowledge of council could be rejected by council. 
O.A.G. 1932, p. 44. 
5. Construction of contract. 
If contract can be construed to be enforceable it will be so construed. 
Corey v. City of Fort Dodge, 133 Iowa 666, 111 N.W 6 (1907). 
Contract held to not contemplate expenses for grading. McCain v. City of 
Des Moines, 128 Iowa 331, 103 N.W. 979 (1905). 
Sewer construction - excavation. McCauley v. City of Des Moines, 83 Iowa 
212, 48 N.W. 1028 (1891). 
6. Performance of contract. 
No recovery for defective work where city was enjoined from levying 
assessment because of defects. Snouffer & Ford v. Grove, 139 Iowa 466, -116 
N.W. 1056 (1908}; Snouffer & Ford v. Rowell, 116 N.W. 1058 (Iowa 1908); Barber 
Asphalt Paving Co. v. Brown, 117 N.W. 765 (Iowa 1908); Des Moines Brick Mfg. 
Co. v. Mason, 118 N.W. 464 (Iowa 1908); Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 
118 N.W. 465 (Iowa 1908); Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. v. McCain, 118 N.W. 465 
(Iowa 1908). 
Deficiency in thickness of paving so great as to constitute fraud. Sioux 
City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 233 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624, 
(1937}. 
Counterclaim for failure to complete work could not be urged where 
defendants' default justified abandonment by plaintiff. Goben v. Des Moines 
Asphalt Paving Co., 218 Iowa 829, 252 N.W. 262 (1934). 
Contractor liable for negligence. Newton Auto Salvage Co. v. Herrick, 
203 Iowa 424, 212 N.W. 680 (1927). 
Contracts for municipal improvements to be strictly complied with. 
Cardell v. City of Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
Departure from contract not fraud in validating assessments. Lundberg v. 
Lake City, 194 Iowa 136, 187 N.W. 438 (1922). 
Penalty provision held to not work forfeiture. O'Shonessy v. City of 
Sioux City, 192 Iowa 396, 184 N.W. 728 (1921). 
Council could expend time for completion where contract so provided. 
Messer v. Marsh, 191 Iowa 1144, 183 N.W. 602 (1921). 
How paving was laid in prior years does not show substantial compliance 
with present contract of more stringent terms. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 
Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
Minor variations may not void special assessments. In re. Apple, 161 
Iowa 314, 142 N.W. 1021 (1913}. 
Where city and owners did not accept pavement for lack of compliance 
neither was obligated to reject or offer to return it. Snouffer & Ford v. 
City of Tipton, 161 Iowa 223, 142 N.W. g7 (1913). 
Neither city nor owners can be made to pay where work fails to 
substantially comply with the contract. Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, 
150 Iowa 73, 129 N.W. (1911) 345, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 414. 
Trivial deviations in good faith cannot defeat recovery under contract. 
Ford v. City of Manchester, 136 Iowa 213, 113 N.W. 846 (lg07). 
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Facts showed failure to substantially comply with contract. McCain v. 
City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 331, 103 N.W. 979 (1905). 
Facts held to not warrant rejection of whole lot of blocks where 
defective ones would be replaced. Loftus v. Riley, 83 Iowa 503, 50 N.W. 17 
(1891). 
7. Extension of time. 
City's power to extend the time could be exercised after the expiration 
of the time fixed for performance. O'Shonessy v. City of Sioux City, 192 Iowa 
396, 184 N.W. 728 (1921). 
Where street-paving contract in its specifications provided that the 
council might extend the time of completing the work for a reasonable cause, 
the council had power to extend the time of completing the work. Messer v. 
Marsh, 191 Iowa 1144, 183 N.W. 602 (1921). 
Extension of time by council not so unreasonable as to invalidate 
assessments. F.M. Hubbell, Son & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 
N.W. 701 (1915). 
8. Estoppel. 
Contractor estopped to claim there was no opportunity to remedy defects 
in the work. Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, 150 Iowa 73, 129 N.W. 345 
(1911). 
9. Fraud. 
No recovery by contractor under quantum meruit where guilty of a fraud. 
Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
Substitution of materials not such departure from the contract as to 
constitute fraud invalidating the assessment. Lundberg v. Lake City, 194 Iowa 
136, 187 N.W. 438 (1922). 
10. Liability of contractor. 
Contractor for construction of sewer is liable only for negligence, not 
for result of work. Newton Auto Salvage Co. v. Herrick, 203 Iowa 424, 212 
N.W. 680 (1927). 
11. Payment of contractor. 
Contractor could not recover loss or damages for breach of written 
contract where assessment was void. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 
N.W. 453 (1938). 
Contractor could not sustain claim for additional compensation. Love v. 
City of Des Moines, 210 Iowa 90, 230 N.W. 373 (1930). 
Liability of city for negligent and improper assessments. Gilchrest & 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (Iowa 1911). 
12. Assessment certificates, payment of contractor. 
City liable to contractor for loss due to delay levying assessments. 
J.W. Turner Imp. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 155 Iowa 592, 136 N.W. 656 (1912). 
Where assessments were illegal, city liable for the amount of 
certificates. Younker v. City of Des Moines, 101 N.W. 1129 (Iowa 1905). Iowa 
Pipe & Tile Co. v. Callanan, 125 Iowa 358, 101 N.W. 141 (1904). Ft. Dodge 
Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 115 Iowa 568, 89 N.W. 7 
(1902). Polk County Sav. Bank v. State, 69 Iowa 24, 28 N.W. 416 (1886). 
Scofield v. City of Council Bluffs, 68 Iowa 695, 28 N.W. 20 (1886). Becroft 
v. City of Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa 646, 19 N.W. 807 (1884). 
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384.53 
13. Quantum meruit. 
Where a city has been enjoined from levying an assessment to pay the cost 
of street improvements on the ground that the work was defectively performed, 
no recovery can be had by the contractor against the abutting property owner 
on a quantum meruit. Des Moines Brick Mfg Co. v. McCain, 118 N.W. 465 (Iowa 
1908). 
No recover under quantum meruit where guilty of a fraud. Sioux City v. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
City was not obligated to make restitution to contractor. Horrabin 
Paving Co. v. City of Creston, 21 Iowa 1237, 262 N.W. 480 (1935). 
Where work did not comply with contract, there was no recovery in quantum 
meruit. Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, 161 Iowa 223, 142 N.W. 97 (1913). 
14. Extra work. 
Caused by error or deceit on part of city. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co. 
v. City of Des Moines, 172 N.W. 66 (Iowa 1910). 
Under terms of contract laying of concrete held not extra work. 
Fullerton v. City of Des Moines, 147 Iowa 254, 126 N.W. 159 (1910). 
Factors not contemplated by the parties. McCauley v. City of Des Moines, 
83 Iowa 212, 48 N.W. 1028 (1891). 
City held liable for extra work resulting from change in grade. Slusser, 
Taylor & Co. v. City of Burlington, 47 Iowa 378 (Iowa 1876). 
Contract held to promise additional compensation. Slusser, Taylor & Co. 
v. City of Burlington, 42 Iowa 378 (Iowa 1876). 
15. Subcontractor. 
Subcontractor entitled to payment for estimated work done though he had 
not worked a full two weeks. Goben v. Des Moines Asphalt Paving Co., 218 Iowa 
829, 252 N.W. 262 (1934). 
16. Liability of city - in general. 
City was not morally obligated to pay loss to contractor. Love v. City 
of Des Moines, 210 Iowa 90, 230 N.W. 373 (1930). 
Fraudulent failure to defend appeals from assessments may make city 
liable. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation v. City of Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 
1324, 214 N.W. 687 (1927). 
Town must pay if lawfully can do so. Humboldt County v. Incorportated 
Town of Dakota City, 197 Iowa 457, 196 N.W. 53 (1923). 
City liable to contractor for loss due to delay in levying assessments. 
J.W. Turner Imp. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 155 Iowa 592, 136 N.W. 656 (1912). 
City not release from liability merely because no authority exists to pay judgments out of general revenue. Slusser, Taylor & Co. v. City of 
Burlington, 42 Iowa 378 (1876). 
City liable for neglect to lay, confirm and collect assessments for cost 
of work. Morgan v. City of Dubuque, 28 Iowa 575 (1870). 
17. Torts, liability of city. 
Reservation of right to supervise and inspect for purpose of seeing that 
work conforms to contract specifications does not make municipality liable for 
contractors negligence. Walker v. City of Cedar Rapids, 251 Iowa 1032, 103 
N.W.2d 727 (1960). 
18. Priority of payment. 
Assignment of contract - priority of claims. Reynolds v. City of Onawa, 
192 Iowa 398, 184 N.W. 729 (1921). 
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19. Compromise and settlement. I 
City was authorized to make supplemental contract constituting settlement 
and discharge of controversy with paving contractor by paying additional 
compensation. City of Des Moines v. Horrabin, 204 Iowa 683, 215 N.W. 967 
(1927). 
Compromise and accord and satisfaction binding. First Nat. Bank v. City I 
of Emmetsburg, 157 Iowa 555, 138 N.W. 451 (1912). , 
20. Removal of materials. 
City was not entitled to materials in walk where it refused to accept the I 
walk. Guthrie v. M'Murren, 167 Iowa 154, 149 N.W. 71 (1914). 
Forfeiture provision did not prevent removal of materials by · 
contractor. Snouffer & Ford v. City of Tipton, 161 Iowa 223, 142 N.W. 97 
(1913). 
21. Egu i pment, purchase of. I 
May be purchased from street construction fund for maintenance 
purposes. O.A.G. 1946, p. 63. 
22. Assignment of contract. I'. 
Assignment of paving contract invalid without consent of city. Sioux 
City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
23. Modification of contract. 
Where contract is modified the modification must be impeached before it I 
can be claimed the original contract was not performed. In re Mayden, 156 
Iowa 157, 135 N.W. 571 (1912). 
24. Reformation of contract. 
City may treat contract as reformed to conform to the real agreement. I 
Fullerton v. City of Des Moines, 147 Iowa 254, 126 N.W. 159 (1910). , . 
25. Cancellation or rescission of contract. 
Contractor holding assessment certificates could not rescind on grounds 
that assessments were excessive. Anderson-Deering Co. v. City of Boone, 201 I· 
Iowa 1129, 205 N.W. 984 (1925). 
Facts held to show illegality not cured. Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 
Iowa 90, 77 N.W. 532 (1898). 
26. Pleading. 
Invalid assessment enjoined. Allen v. City of Davenport, 132 F. 209 
(1904). 
27. Injunction. 
Fraud justifying injunction not shown. Swan v. City of Indianola, 142 
Iowa 731, 121 N.W. 547 (1909). 
Injunction would lie where there was a substantial departure from the 
contract. McCain v. City of Des Moines, 128 Iowa 331, 103 N.W. 979 (1905). 
28. Evidence. 
Extension of time. Miller v. Incorporated Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 
276 N.W. 826, 114 A.L.R. 1423 (1938). 
Expert opinion in regard to substantial compliance. Sioux City v. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624, 109 A.L.R. 608 
(1937). 
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Testimony held incompetent to establish claim. Love v. City of Des 
Moines, 210 Iowa 90, 230 N.W. 373 (1930). 
Evidence of usual compensation bears on contention of what agreed price 
really was. Goben v. Akin, 208 Iowa 1354, 227 N.W. 400 (1929). 
Evidence showed substantial compliance. Vail v. City of Chariton, 181 
Iowa 296, 164 N.W. 597 (1917). Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 
N.W. 473 (1916). Gilchrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (Iowa 
1911). 
Evidence showed contractor failed to substantially comply with 
contract. Wingert v. Snouffer & Ford, 134 Iowa 98, 108 N.W. 1035 (1906), 
rehearing denied, 134 Iowa 97, 111 N.W. 432. 
Evidence admissable to show acts of city engineer indicating grade. 
Slusser, Taylor & Co. v. City of Burlington, 47 Iowa 300 (1877}. 
29. Questions for jury. 
Amount and time of payment. Goben v. Des Moines Asphalt Paving Co., 218 
Iowa 829, 252 N.W. 262 (1934). 
Whether compensation claimed was unreasonable. Goben v. Des Moines 
Asphalt Paving Co., 214 Iowa 834, 239 N.W. 62. 
Issue of substantial compliance. Central Trust Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 204 Iowa 678, 216 N.W. 41 (1927). 
Authority of councilman in charge of improvements to let contract. 
Wayman v. City of Cherokee, 204 Iowa 675, 215 N.W. 655. 
Whether settlement constituted on accord and satisfaction. Goben v. Des 
Moines Asphalt Paving Co., 204 Iowa 466, 215 N.W. 508 (1927). 
Amount of grading done - dispute due to inaccuracy of bench mark. 
Guthrie v. City of Dubuque, 105 Iowa 653, 75 N.W. 500. 
30. Instructions. 
As to negligent performance of work. Goben v. Des Moines Asphalt Paving 
Co., 218 Iowa 829, 252 N.W. 262 (1934). 
Contract may be established by evidence other than record of proceedings 
of council. Collins v. City of Dubuque, 29 Iowa 597 (1870). 
31. Review. 
Injunction would not lie where taxpayer did not serve notice of appeal 
til city and contractor had settled claims. Horrabin v. Iowa City, 160 Iowa 
650, 142 N.W. 212 (1913). 
384.54 Confinnation by Decree 
1. Validity. 
Grant to district court of power to find that benefited properties had 
been omitted and to order their inclusion in assessment district. In re 
Bowdoin St., City of Des Moines, 35 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1949). 
2. Construction and application. 
Statute did not authorize trial court to determine whether piece of 
property within assessment district was not specially benefited. City of 
Clive v. Iowa Concrete Block & Material Co., 298 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1980). 
Deficiencies between cost of improving gravel road and permissable amount 
of assessments against property within special assessment district. Id. 
Provision of former I 391.90, requiring trial court in equity to make 
public improvement assessment that should have been made or to direct city 
council to do so. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 
(1965}. 
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Court shall order or require the inclusion of any benefited property 
found to have been omitted. In re Bowdoin St., City of Des Moines, 35 N.W.2d 
571 (Iowa 1g4g), 
Rights of party not in court could not be adjudicated. Bradley v. City 
of Centerville, 13g Iowa 5gg, 117 N.W. g68 (lg08). 
3. Review. 
Supreme Court's review was de novo in proceeding on taxpayer's appeal 
from confirmation of evaluations as assessments in connection with city 
sanitary sewer project. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 
1g77), 
Supreme Court order and fixing assessment at reduced amount. Kuhlmann v. 
Persinger, 261 Iowa 461, 154 N.W.2d 860 (lg67). 
384.55 Notice of Paving to Waterboard (No Annotations) 
384.56 State Lands 
1. Construction and application. 
The last paragraph of~ 307A.5 which sets a monetary limit on assessments 
upon State property, is ambiguous and a single, reasonable interpretation 
cannot be ascertained. O.A.G. May 3, 1g16. 
Where a municipality levies special assessments against state-owned land, 
such assessment should be paid by the executive council from the state general 
fund. O.A.G. January 28, 1g71, 
Board of social welfare could pay out of its funds special assessments 
upon property to which state had taken title, and special assessments against 
such property for financing of certain primary or secondary roads were to be 
paid from any funds in state treasury not otherwise appropriated. O.A.G. 
1g38, p, 7g4, 
384.57 Monthly Payments 
1. In general. 
A governmental unit may collect interest on funds retained pursuant to a 
contract or public improvement. O.A.G., July 17, 1g80. 
384.58 Inspection of Work 
1. Validity. 
Held constitutional. Burlington Sav. Bank v. City of Clinton, Iowa 106 
F. 26g (lgOl). 
The area method of special assessment is not invalid. Dunn v. City of 
Sioux City, 251 Iowa 121g, 104 N.W.2d 830 (lg60). 
2. Construction and application. 
Improvement conclusive on owner when contract substantially complied 
with. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 55g, 158 N.W. 473 (lgl6). 
Extension of time for completion of street paving as authorized by 
contract does not invalidate assessments therefor. Id. 
Extension by council of time fixed by contract for completion of street 
paving not unreasonable as to invalidate assessments. F.M. Hubbell, Son & Co. 
v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 N.W. 701 (lg15). 
Resolution failed to inform owners of lands to be assessed. Dunker v. 
City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 2g2, 136 N.W. 536 (1g12). 
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384.59 
3. Selection of engineers. 
Duty of city to select competent engineers. Hemminger v. City of Des 
Moines, 199 Iowa 1302, 203 N.W. 822 (1925). 
4. Amount of assessment. 
Storm sewer properly included in amount of assessment for paving. Turley 
v. Incorporated Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (1927). 
State property exempt from special assessment for storm sewer. O.A.G. 
1922, p. 159. 
5. Acceptance of work. 
Acceptance of work may estop city. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. 
Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Assessment not void where resolutions and contract were for repair of 
paving by patching and part of the work done was more in nature of 
resurfacing. Noble v. City of Des Moines, 191 Iowa 12, 174 N.W. 44 (1919). 
Improvement conclusive on owner when contract substantially complied 
with. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
Facts showed acceptance. Gilchrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 
776 (1911). 
City held to not have accepted. Wingert v. City of Tipton, 134 Iowa 97, 
111 N.W. 432 (1907). 
6. Time for levy of assessment. 
Duty of city to promptly levy assessments. J.W. Turner Imp. Co. v. City 
of Des Moines, 155 Iowa 592, 136 N.W. 656 (1912). 
Assessment for sewer not to be levied and collected prior to 
completion. Sanborn v. City of Mason City, 114 Iowa 189, 86 N.W. 286 (1901). 
7. Operation and effect of order. 
Resolution ordering assessment not conclusive where records showed lack 
of jurisdiction to assess. Comstock v. Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 111 
N.W. 51 (1907). 
8. Evidence. 
Evidence sustained finding city had not accepted. Atkinson v. City of 
Davenport, 117 Iowa 687, 84 N.W. 689 (1900). 
384.59 Assessment Schedule 
1. Construction and application. 
City could not assess entire quarter section platted and subdivided into 
lots the cost of bu.ilding sidewalk on side thereof. Cavanaugh v. City of Des 
Moines, 179 Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 (1917). 
"Abutting property" is that between which and street is no intervening 
land. Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 944 (1912). 
Lots are to be assessed separately though used as one tract. Stutsman v. 
City of Burlington, 127 Iowa 563, 103 N.W. 800 (1905). 
Assessing lots in pairs was a violation of statute. Gill v. Patton, 118 
Iowa 88, 91 N.W. 904 (1902). 
2. Resolution. 
Resolution of necessity must adequately inform owners of the lands to be 
included in district for assessment. Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 
292, 136 N.W. 536. 
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Assessment valid though resolution failed t list lots and owners. Higman 
v. Sioux City, 129 Iowa 291, 105 N.W. 524 (1906). 
3. Description of property. 
Description sufficient as against owner if it accords with boundaries as 
agreed on by contract between city and owner. City of Muscatine v. Chicago, 
R.I. & P.R. Co., 79 Iowa 645, 44 N.W. 909 (1890). 
Sufficiency of description of property considered and determined. Buell v. 
Ball, 20 Iowa 282 (1866). 
4. Errors and irregularities. 
Errors and irregularities in improvements can be corrected only by appeal 
to district court. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 
241 N.W. 464 {1932). 
Where irregularity appeared in proceedings to gravel street because grade 
had not been established owner's remedy was by appeal. People's Inv. Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1898). 
If property is properly described error in name of owner is immaterial. 
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa 590, 76 N.W. 836 (1898). 
5. Objections. 
Failure ·to appear and file objections in proceedings after statutory 
notice waives right to object. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 
Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 (1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 
N.W. 468 (Iowa 1898). 
Where property owner failed to file objections for resolution of 
necessity was adopted but did file objection at time of final assessment, 
property owner was limited to the issue of excessive assessment. Moss v. 
Incorporated Town of Hull, 249 Iowa 1178, 91 N.W.2d 599 (1958). 
Supreme Court cannot consider objections to increase in special 
assessment not made before city council not included in petition in district 
court. Schumacher v. City of Clear Lake, 214 Iowa 34, 239 N.W. 71 (1931). 
6. Actions. 
Invalidity may be raised by independent action where assessment is 
void. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 
(1932). People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1898). 
7. Evidence. 
Failures of valuation committee to properly assess sewer project 
sufficient to overcome presumption that property assessments were correct. 
Petition of City of Des Moines, 245 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
Evidence showed this section complied with. Illinois Cent R. Co. v. 
Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 913 (1923). 
384.60 Adoption of Schedule 
1. Construction and application. 
Property owner may pay assessment in full after starting payment by 
installment. O.A.G., December 24, 1980. 
County treasurer - statutory duty to proceed with collection of special 
assessments by same proceedings used in collection of ordinary taxes. Bennett 
v. Greenwalt, 226 Iowa 1113, 286 N.W. 722 (1939). 
"Abutting property" defined. Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 
N.W. 944 (1912). 
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384.60 
2. Amendment. 
City council may not alter or amend a final schedule of special 
assessments unless such assessments are invalid or illegal. O.A.G. November 
4, 1973. 
3. Ordinance. 
Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 126 Iowa 680, 102 N.W. 529 (1905). 
4. Manner of Assessment. 
Assessment en masse against several lot owners was proper. Clark v. 
Martin, 182 Iowa 811, 166 N.W. 276 (1918). 
5. Requisites and validity of levy. 
Authority of city to levy special assessments derived from statute. Des 
Moines City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 1261, 159 N.W. 450 (1916), 
L.R.A. 1918D, 839, modified on motion for rehearing 183 Iowa 1261, 165 N.W. 
398, L.R.A. 1918D, 839. 
Assessment against parcel separated from street by another was 
improper. Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 944 (1912). 
Levy held valid though resolution failed to list lots and owners. Higman 
v. Sioux City, 129 Iowa 291, 105 N.W. 524 (1906). 
Levy held to have been made by council though auditor ascertained amount 
to be collected from each owner. City of Burlington v. Quick, 47 Iowa 222 (1877). 
6. Entry of assessment. 
Special assessment levied by city for street improvements need not be 
entered in book containing regular taxes. O.A.G. 1922, p. 128. 
7. Tax list. 
Special assessments sufficiently placed upon tax list. O.A.G. 1922, p. 
128. 
8. Time for certification. 
City council may certify special assessments to county auditor at any 
time. O.A.G. February 25, 1955. 
9. Delay in certification. 
Did not relieve tax payer of liability for penalty. O.A.G. 1932, p. 65. 
10. Record. 
Record held to show assessment against owner though owner's name was 
omitted in record of resolution. Edwards & Walsh Const. Co. v. Jasper County, 
117 Iowa 365, 90 N.W. 1006 (1902). 
County treasurer had no authority to change or modify a record of special 
assessment. O.A.G. July 31, 1964. 
County treasurer had no power to change record of special assessment 
certified· to him under this section. O.A.G. 1930, p. 369. 
11. Notice of records. 
Purchaser of assessment certificate is charged with notice of the 
records. Talcott v. Noel, 107 Iowa 470, 78 N.W. 39 (1899). 
12. Liability of city. 
Over assessment not fraud. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co. v. Sioux City, 
219 Iowa 998, 258 N.W. 907 (1935). 
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City was held bound by written paving contract as well as implied 
contract to make valid assessment. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 191 Iowa 762, 183 N.W. 456 (1921). 
13. Liens. 
Loss by party of property by tax sale did not require ratable reduction 
of lien of assessment certificates. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Munn, 223 Iowa 
302, 272 N.W. 85 (1937). 
Lien of delinquent special assessment not brought forward on tax list, 
lost. Wallace v. Gilmore, 216 Iowa 1070, 250 N.W. 105 (1933). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
14. Foreclosure of lien. 
Purchaser of certificates held not entitled to sue in equity for 
foreclosure of assessment land. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Valley Des Moines, 
220 Iowa 556, 260 N.W. 669 (1935). 
15. Covenant, breach of. 
Right of city to make assessment a lien by filing certificate with 
auditor was not "incumbrance" violating convenant in lease. Frankel v. Blank, 
205 Iowa 1, 213 N.W. 597 (1927). 
16. Payment of tax. 
Assessment not payable to treasurer until it is certified and reaches him 
for collection. F.M. Hubbel, Son & Co. v. Hammill, 187 Iowa 1083, 175 N.W. 41 
(1919). 
17. Interest and penalties. 
Time when penalty becomes due. O.A.G. 1928, p. 400. 
Interest. Ankeny v. Henningsen, 54 Iowa 29, 6 N.W. 65 (1880). 
18. Receipts. 
County must furnish and pay for receipts given in collection of special 
assessments. O.A.G. December 11, 1963. 
19. Evidence. 
Paper purporting to be a resolution endorsed "Adopted" in handwriting of 
record was not competent evidence of the levy. Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 
605, 15 N.W. 568 (1883). 
20. Appea 1. 
Notice of appeals sufficient where handed to clerk who endorsed written 
acknowledgment. Collinson v. City of Dubuque, 242 Iowa 986, 46 N.W.2d 839 
(1951). 
Paper filed stated "I object" held insufficient to perfect appeal. 
Downing v. City of Independence, 203 Iowa 216, 212 N.W. 549 (1927). 
On appeal owner limited to same objections ur~ed before council. Andre 
v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
384.61 Assessment of Benefits 
Index to Notes 
Actions 19 
Amount of Assessment 9-13 
In General 9 
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Area Factor, Amount of Assessment 12 
Burden of Proof, Generally 25 
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Collection of Assessments 17 
Construction and Application 1 
Determination of Benefits 7, 8 
In General 7 
Future Uses 8 
Due Process 2 
Evidence 26, 27 
In General 26 
Sufficiency of Evidence 27 
Evidence to Overcome Presumptions 24 
Excessive Assessments 14 
Frontage Factor, Amount of Assessments 13 
Future Uses, Determination of Benefits 8 
Issues, Proof and Variance 21 
Judgment or Decree 28 
Liability of City 18 
Nature of Benefits 5 
Objections 16 
Ordinance 3 
Pleading 20 
Presumptions 22-24 
Presumptions 22-24 
In General 22 
Burden to Overcome 23 
Evidence to Overcome 24 
Property subject to Assessment, Generally 4 
Proportion to Benefits, Amount of Assessment 11 
Proportion to Value, Amount of Assessment 10 
Separate Assessments 15 
Sufficiency of Evidence 27 
1. Construction and application. 
Fact that property owner was fuel company was irrelevant as to whether 
special assessment for street improvement should have been deferred. City of 
Clive v. Iowa Concrete Block and Material Co., 298 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1980). 
Meaning of "assessment." Shurtz's Will, 242 Iowa 448, 46 N.W.2d 559 
(1951). 
City proceeding to establish street without jurisdiction was without 
power to exercise taxing power for cost of improvement. Beim v. Carlson, 209 
Iowa 1001, 227 N.W. 421 (1929). 
Method of assessment. Dickinson v. Incorporated Town of Guthrie Center, 
185 Iowa 541, 170 N.W. 759 (1919). 
A city is without inherent power to levy special assessments for street 
improvements: such authority must have its origin in some statute providing 
therefor. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 1261, 159 
N.W. 450 (1916). 
Act held not curative or retroactive. Benshoof v. City of Iowa Fal_ls, 
175 Iowa 30, 156 N.W. 898 (1916). 
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This section effective and definite without aid of ordinance. Stutsman 
v. City of Burlington, 127 Iowa 563, 103 N.W. 800 (1905). 
The legislature has power to authorize municipalities to require the 
streets to be paved, and the cost assessed on the abutting lot owners. Warren 
v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31, (1871). 
Power to levy special assessment as well as power to levy general taxes 
can be granted only by the legislature. City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff, 20 
Iowa 396 (1866). 
While city street intersections with other roads and local-service street 
facilities may be established or constructed or reconstructed by cities acting 
alone, the work may also be accomplished by both cities and the state highway 
commission incorporating one with the other. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
County treasurer has no authority to change or modify a record of special 
assessment of property as certified to the county auditor by the city clerk. 
O.A.G. July 31, 1964. 
Division of property under this section is made by owner of the property 
or his agent, and approved by city council. O.A.G. 1930, p. 369. 
Construed in favor of property owners. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 252. 
2. Due process. 
City council, in assessing special benefits, may, without notice to the 
landowner, determine the value of the property benefited. Durst v. City of 
Des Moines, 164 Iowa 82, 145 N.W. 528 (1914). 
3. Ordinance. 
Need not provide that assessments will be proportioned to benefits. 
Brush v. Incorporated Town of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 
N.W. 856 (1927). 
Ordinance defining "adjacent property" was not superseded by statute. 
Dunker v. City of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 567, 142 N.W. 207 (1913). 
4. Property subject to assessment, generally. 
Where lot extended so as to abut on each of two parallel streets, special 
assessments for improvement of one street could be imposed only on value of 
that half of the lot which abutted on the improved street. Dunn v. City of 
Sioux City, 251 Iowa 1279, 104 N.W.2d 830 (1960). 
Effect of possibility that another street at other end of block might 
eventually be opened. In re Bowdoin St., City of Des Moines, 35 N.W.2d 571 
(1949). 
Railway corporation's property was subject to assessment for sewer 
purposes. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Churdan, 196 Iowa 1057, 195 
N.W; 996 {1923). 
Assessment for street improvements against "parcel" of land separated 
from street by another parcel of the original lot was not warranted. Kneebs 
v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 944 ~1912). 
Authority to assess remote property indirectly benefited from sewer. 
Gray v. City of Des Moines, 150 Iowa 299, 130 N.W. 582 (1911). 
For additional annotations, see I .C.A. 
5. Necessity of benefits. 
Assessment cannot exceed twenty-five percent of the assessed value of the 
property. Mulford v. City of Iowa Falls, 221 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
Property not benefited by new sewer, not liable for assessment. Brenton 
v. City of Des Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
Benefit to owner necessarily follows paving improvement. Lytle v. Sioux 
City, 198 Iowa 848, 200 N.W. 416 (1924). 
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384.61 
Judgment cance 11 i ng benefit because of 1 ack of "any benefit" reserved. 
Dickinson v. City of Waterloo, 179 Iowa 946, 162 N.W. 242 (1917). 
Only benefited property may be assessed. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co. 
v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 (1916). 
6. Nature of benefits. 
New sewer benefited property served by septic tanks. Brenton v. City of 
Des Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
In construction of storm sewer, mere fact that lot has adequate drainage 
does not alone determine liability to assessment. Diesing v. City of 
Marshalltown, 199 Iowa 1270, 203 N.W. 693 (1925). 
Special benefit derived from construction of sewer where it is so 
situated that connection can be made. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 
67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
7. Determination of benefits - in general. 
Method used by city council in determining the benefits conferred on 
plaintiffs' property from sanitary sewer improvement. Mulford v. City of Iowa 
Falls., 221 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
An elevation factor is a proper consideration in ascertaining benefits 
from a storm sewer, for special assessment purposes. Spencer Shopping Center, 
Inc. v. City of Spencer, 200 N.W.2d 513 (1972). 
Where there is no evidence to support finding contrary to legislative 
determination by city council as to assessments for public improvement and as 
to value of benefits conferred upon subject property, that determination must 
stand. Wharton v. City of Oskaloosa, 158 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1968). 
Special benefits conferred on property assessed for public improvement 
need not be reflected in immediate enhancement of market value. In re Hume, 
202 Iowa 969, 208 N.W. 285 (1926). 
Though statutes fix property that may be assessed, duty of determining 
what property is benefited and quantum of benefit is vested in municipality 
with right of appeal to aggrieved party. Miller v. City of Sheldon, 198 Iowa 
855, 200 N.W. 341 (1924). 
Benefits need not be effected by immediate enhancement of market value. 
In re Paving Streets in Floyd Park Addition, Sioux City, 197 Iowa 915, 196 
N.W. 597 (1924). 
Benefit need not be a present benefit. In re Jefferson St. Sewer, 179 
Iowa 975, 162 N.W. 239 (1917). 
In assessing benefits, general relations of property apart from its 
particular use, as well as its present use, held to be considered. Chicago, 
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. City of Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 153 N.W. 106 (1915). 
In the assessment of benefits for a public improvement, the test is not 
necessarily whether the market value has been increased, but whether the 
improvement has enhanced the actual value or worth of the property. Camp v. 
City of Davenport, 151 Iowa 33, 130 N.W. 137 (1911). 
8. Future uses, determination of benefits. 
Future potential use of property should be considered in deciding 
benefits accruing to land. Spring Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar 
Falls, 225 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1975). 
Consideration of future uses, reasonably to be anticipated, may be 
considered in determining benefit to property assessed. Mulford v. City of 
Iowa Falls, 221 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
Proper to consider future uses and expectations as well as present use to 
which property is put. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1971). 
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Wharton v. City of Oskaloosa, 158 N.W.2d 
Future uses and reasonably anticipated prospects may be considered. Beh 
v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
Amount of assessments for benefit from special improvements not 
necessarily limited by present use to which owner of abutting property devotes 
property. Rood v. City of Ames, 244 Iowa 1138, 60 N.W.2d 227 (1953). 
Amount of benefits not necessarily limited by present use. Brenton v. 
City of Des Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
Municipality, in assessing agricultural land for pavement, may consider 
future prospect and reasonable anticipation as to future use and value of 
property. Gronbech v. Town of Jewell Junction, 213 Iowa 358, 239 N.W. 26 (1931). 
Rented value or income considered in fixing actual value. Finkle v. City 
of Marshalltown, 205 Iowa 918, 218 N.W. 618 (1928). 
Consideration of future prospects and reasonable anticipation as to 
future use. Fred Riepe Estate v. City of Burlington, 199 Iowa 373, 202 N.W. 
78 (1925). 
Benefits need not be effected by immediate enhancement of market value. 
Lytle v. Sioux City, 198 Iowa 848, 200 N.W. 416 (1924). 
In construction of storm sewer, mere fact that lot has adequate drainage 
does not alone determine liability to assessment. Diesing v. City of 
Marshalltown, 199 Iowa 1270, 203 N.W. 693 (1925). 
Consideration of future prospects and reasonable anticipations proper. 
Tjaden v. Town of Wellsburg, 197 Iowa 1292j 198 N.W. 772 (1924). Hahn v. City 
of Le Mars, 197 Iowa 292, 197 N.W. 8 (1924 • . 
Benefits need not be effected by immediate enhancement of market value. 
In re Paving Streets in Floyd Park Addition, Sioux City, 197 Iowa 915, 196 
N.W. 597 (1924). 
Consideration of future prospects and reasonable anticipations proper. 
Bell v. Burlington, 154 Iowa 607, 134 N.W. 1082 (1912). 
Availability of pavement for future use in connection with abutting 
property may be considered in determining whether amount of assessment exceeds 
benefits. Cheny v. City of Ft. Dodge, 157 Iowa 250, 138 N.W. 549 (1912). 
9. Amount of assessment - in general. 
Equality is not obtainable in special assessments, proximation is 
reasonable. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
In special property value determination, city must give at least initial 
consideration to value listed on preceding assessment role. Petition of City 
of Des Moines, 245 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
Ultimate question is whether the amount levied on a tract constitutes its 
fair proportion of the total cost. Mulford v. City of Iowa Falls, 221 N.W.2d 
261 (Iowa 1974). . 
Where street with commercial and residential properties on one side and 
dairy farm on the other side was paved, that assessment of dairy farm was 
disproportionately higher than that of residential properties did not 
invalidate assessment. Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 
N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
Test to determine reasonableness of special assessments against property 
for construction of storm sewer is not whether assessment exceeds benefits 
derived, but whether it represents fair proportionate part of total cost. 
Rood v. City of Ames, 244 Iowa 1138, 60 N.W.2d 327 (1953). 
Cost of paving intersection was properly taxed to entire property 
abutting on the part of street improved. Perry v. City of Albia, 155 Iowa 
550, 136 N.W. 681 (1912). 
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Costs to be assessed against any particular property determined by 
proportion of the entire cost which each parcel of property should bear. 
Millan v. City of Chariton, 145 Iowa 648, 124 N.W. 766 (1910). 
10. Proeortion to value, amount of assessment. 
Various assessments in relation to property value are not required to be 
proportionate to each other, and assessments against unimproved property may 
be higher in relation to total value than assessment against improved 
property. Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 
(1965). 
Paving assessment must represent a fair proportional part of total cost, 
but fairness in proportional cost of paving assessment is not determined by 
the percentage ratio of assessment to property value. Id. 
Speculative matters not proper in considering benefits. Fred Riepe 
Estate v. City of Burlington, 19g Iowa 373, 202 N.W. 78 (1925). 
11. Proportion to benefits, amount of assessment. 
Property assessed for construction of storm sewer benefitted only so far 
as is conferred by removal of surface water from district generally. Diesing 
v. City of Marshalltown, 199 Iowa 1270, 203 N.W. 693 (1925). 
High property should bear lesser cost of storm sewer than lower land. 
Smith v. City of Marshalltown, 197 Iowa 85, 196 N.W. 734 (1924). 
Depth of lot a factor in determining assessment. Benshoof v. City of 
Iowa Falls, 175 Iowa 30, 156 N.W. 898 (1916). 
That assessment reaches same result as front foot rule does not impeach 
statement that it is made according to benefits. Hedge v. City of Des Moines, 
141 Iowa 4, 119 N.W. 276 (1909). 
Assessment held not made according to benefits. Bennett v. City of 
Enmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
12. Area factor, amount of assessment. 
Percentage to be assigned the area factor in determining special 
assessment for a storm sewer is a matter of judgment to be exercised by the 
city's engineers and city council. Spencer Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of 
Spencer, 200 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1972). 
Area or frontage methods cannot be made sole or exclusive basis of 
determining assessments without regard to other factors. Rood v. City of 
Ames, 244 Iowa 1138, 60 N.W.2d 227 (1953). 
Assessment for street improvement benefits according to area not 
invalid. In re Resurfacing Fourth St. in City of Davenport, 203 Iowa 298, 211 
N.W. 375 (1926). Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 605, 117 N.W. 1082 
(1908). 
13. Frontage factor, amount of assessment. 
If factors other than frontage affect benefits, they must be given 
weight. Spencer Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of Spencer, 200 N.W.2d 513 
(Iowa 1972). 
Whether assessment was made in proportion to benefit, rather than solely 
in proportion to frontage. -Jones v. Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 592 
(1915). 
In the absence of any other consideration affecting benefits, frontage 
might properly be considered as basis for determining benefits. Des Moines 
Union Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 140 Iowa 218, 118 N.W. 293 (1908). 
Assessment for construction of sewer not rendered invalid by considering, 
in determining amount of benefits conferred, frontage of property. Reed v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 137 Iowa 107, 111 N.W. 1013 (1907). 
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Front-foot rule applied to the assessment of land abutting a street for 
paving the street will be sustained, though the assessment exceeds the 
benefits conferred. Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Iowa 90, 77 N.W. 532 
(1898). 
14. Excessive assessments. 
Assessment may fail the "just and equitable" test even though it is not 
excessive when measured against the benefits conferred. Knudsen v. City of 
Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Evidence sufficient to overcome presumption of validity of assessments 
computed only on straight charge per benefitted front-foot. Wharton v. City 
of Oskaloosa, 158 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1968). 
Evidence sufficient to show reduction in assessments justified on theory 
that assessments were in excess of benefits conferred on property by the 
paving. Dickey v. City of Burlington, 247 Iowa 116, 73 N.W.2d 96 (1956). 
Reduction of paving assessment on property suitable for factory site was 
proper, in view of want of demand for factory sites. Finkle v. City of 
Marshalltown, 205 Iowa 918, 218 N.W. 618 (1928). · 
Objections before council, petition on appeal, and evidence held not to 
warrant finding paving assessments exceeded benefits. Walter v. City of Ida 
Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927). 
Individual excessive assessments do not warrant finding that method of 
assessment was unconstitutional. In re Resurfacing Fourth St. in City of 
Davenport, 203 Iowa 298, 211 N.W. 375 (1926). 
Ample evidence of special benefits - assessments not excessive. In re 
Hume, 202 Iowa 969, 208 N.W. 285 (1926). 
City council, in levying special assessments for public improvements upon 
abutting property must not levy amount in excess of special benefits 
conferred, nor in any event exceeding 25 percent of the value of property. 
Snyder v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 163 N.W. 594 (1917). 
Assessment may not exceed special benefits nor it may exceed one-fourth 
of the value of the property assessed. Camp v. City of Davenport, 151 Iowa 
33, 130 N.W. 137 (1911). 
Assessment in substantial excess of benefits. Iowa Pipe & Tile Co. v. 
Callahan, 125 Iowa 358, 101 N.W. 141 (1904). 
15. Separate assessments. 
Paving under two separate contracts and two separate resolutions held to 
be separate improvements. Curtis v. Town of Dunlap, 202 Iowa 588, 210 N.W. 
800 (1926). 
Improvement of intersecting streets at same time under separate 
resolutions and assessments. Miller v. City of Sheldon, 198 Iowa 855, 200 
N.W. 341 (1924). 
Where curbing and paving are part of same general improvement prior 
assessment for curbing should be subtracted from paving assessment. Chicago, 
Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 (1916). . 
"Paving" includes curbing, guttering and paving and these should not be 
assessed separately. Bailey v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 747, 138 N.W. 853 
(1912). 
Lots should be assessed separately. Stutsman v. City of Burlington, 127 
Iowa 563, 103 N.W. 800 (1905). 
16. Objections. 
Statute which allows city council to provide that property owners will be 
deemed to have waived all objections to amount of proposed assessment if they 
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do not file those objections with the clerk, does not apply to assessments for 
sewer projects. Petition of City of Des Moines, 245 N.W.2d 533 (1976). 
Where property owner failed to file objections before resolution of 
necessity was adopted, but did file objections at time of final assessment, 
property owner was limited to issue of excessive assessment. Moss v. 
Incorporated Town of Hull, 249 Iowa 1178, 91 N.W.2d 599 (1958). 
Owner's failure to object prior to adoption of resolution of necessity 
did not validate excessive assessment. Smith, Lichty & Hillman Co. v. Mason 
City, 210 Iowa 700, 231 N.W. 370 (1930). 
Owner's complaint of inequitable assessment to city council put in issue 
whether it was equitable. Benshoof v. City of Iowa Falls, 175 Iowa 30, 156 
N.W. 898 (1916). 
17. Collection of assessments. 
To pay cost of improvement, city became trustee charged with duty of 
levying, collecting, and properly applying assessments. Farson v. Sioux City, 
106 F. 278 (1901). 
City charged with duty of collecting and applying assessments on 
property. Vickrey v. City of Sioux City, 104 F. 164 (1900). 
Failure to exercise statutory power in collecting assessments constituted 
breach of pledge in improvement bond requiring city to exercise full faith and 
diligence. Hauge v. City of Des Moines, 207 Iowa 1209, 224 N.W. 520 (1929). 
18. Liability of city. 
Meaning of "deficiency" where city promised to pay deficiency from 
consolidated budget fund. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 N.W. 453 
(1938). 
Where city contracted to pay costs if lawful assessment was impossible, 
it was bound by such provision. Hedge v. City of Des Moines, 141 Iowa 4, 119 
N.W. 276 (1909). 
19. Actions. 
Equity had jurisdiction of a suit by a bond holder to require an 
accounting in respect to trust funds from assessment and for the enforcement 
of the same. Farson v. City of Sioux City, 106 F. 278 (1901). 
Court of equity had jurisdiction to compel city to perform its duty, as 
trustee, to collect and properly apply assessments. Vickrey v. City of Sioux 
City, 104 F. 164 (1900). 
Action against city on contract for paving - action at law. Ford v. City 
of Manchester, 136 Iowa 213, 113 N.W. 846 (1907). 
20. Pleading. 
A demurrer to the petition in a suit to set aside an assessment for 
street improvements admitted the allegations of the petition as to the value 
of the assessed property. Durst v. City of Des Moines, 150 Iowa 370, 130 N.W. 
168 (1911). 
21. Issues, proof and variance. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
22. Presumptions - in general. 
Included in the presumption that assessments made by a city for 
improvements are correct is a presumption that there is some benefit and that 
the assessment does not exceed the special benefit accruing from the 
improvement. Mulford v. City of Iowa Falls, 221 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
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Once a city council has properly ordered a special improvement, there is 
a presumption of necessity and a presumption that some benefit results to 
assessed property owners. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 
1971). 
Presumption existed that assessments levied for public improvement did 
not exceed benefits conferred. Wharton v. City of Oskaloosa, 158 N.W.2d 834 
(Iowa 1968). 
Presumption exists that all real estate receives some degree of benefit 
from permanent improvement of street adjoining it. Beh v. City of West Des 
Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 (1965). 
Presumption that assessment as made by city council was correct. Gingles 
v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W.2d 717 (1950). 
Where resolution of necessity was adopted, it is presumed construction 
was necessary and property would be benefitted. Brenton v. City of Des 
Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
Property abutting on paving improvement presumptively acquires benefit 
therefrom. Johnson v. City of Waterloo, 202 Iowa 617, 210 N.W. 755 (1926). 
Presumed that all property in tax district was assessed for full benefit 
conferred. Floyd Park Addition to Sioux City, 197 Iowa 922, 196 N.W. 60 
(1923). 
Presumed that drainage benefits were equal to the cost. Appeal of 
Mclain, 189 Iowa 264, 176 N.W. 817 (1920). 
Presumed that statute was followed in assessing cost. Dickinson v. 
Incorporated Town of Guthrie Center, 185 Iowa 541, 170 N.W. 759 (1919). 
Presumed that where tract was valued at a certain sum per acre, the value 
was applicable to each acre. Gray v. City of Des Moines, 150 Iowa 299, 130 
N.W. 582 (1911). 
Presumed that council levied assessment according to benefits. Andre v. 
City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
23. Burden to overcome presumption. 
Burden is on objectors to overcome presumption that special assessment 
against their property is correct as made. Petition of City of Des Moines, 
245 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
Presumption that improvement authorized by city was necessary, that some 
benefit accrued to the assessed property and that the assessment was correct 
as made and burden is on objector to overcome these presumptions. Spring 
Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1975). 
Landowners carry burden of overcoming presumption that assessment made by 
council was correct and did not exceed special benefits accruing from the 
improvement. Mulford v. City of Iowa Falls, 221 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
Ultimate question is whether amount levied on tract constitutes its fair 
proportion of total cost. Spencer Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of Spencer, 
200 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1972). 
Burden is on protesting property owner to show that his assessment is 
excessive by evidence which includes proof of the actual benefit to his 
property. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1971). 
Assessments made by city for public improvement are presumed to be 
correct, and burden is on property owner to prove otherwise. Wharton v. City 
of Oskaloosa, 158 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1968). 
Presumption obtains that street improvement assessment made by council is 
in proportion to benefits received, and burden is placed upon property owner 
to overcome such presumption. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City, 256 
Iowa 201, 127 N.W.2d 115 (1964). 
Where resolution of necessity was adopted, it was presumed construction 
was necessary and property would be benefitted. Brenton v. City of Des 
Moines, 219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
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Council's special assessment is presumed correct. Finkle v. City of 
Marshalltown, 205 Iowa 918, 218 N.W. 618 (1928). 
Presumption that assessments are correct. Tjaden v. Town of Wellsburg, 
197 Iowa 1292, 198 N.W. 772 (1924). 
Findings of council as to benefit presumed correct. Vail v. City of 
Chariton, 181 Iowa 296, 164 N.W. 597 (1917). 
24. Evidence to overcome presumptions. 
Special assessment presumes benefit on property assessed. Knudsen v. 
City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Testimony of experts as to dollar value of benefits accruing to assessed 
properties. Spring Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 
129 (Iowa 1975). 
Mere fact that assessment was substantially in accordance with cost of 
improvement in front of each tract is not conclusive that assessment was not 
according to special benefits conferred. Snyder v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 
Iowa 679, 163 N.W. 5g4 (1917). 
25. Burden of proof, generally. 
Owner has burden of showing assessment was in excess of benefits. Hume, 
202 Iowa 969, 208 N.W. 285 (1926). 
Railway had burden of showing depreciation of the value of property. 
Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Cedar Heights, 198 Iowa 
350, 199 N.W. 313 (1924). 
Owner must negative presumption of benefit. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. City of Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 153 N.W. 106 (1915). 
26. Evidence - in general. 
Assessment cases cannot be determined with mathematical certainty; the 
evidence is necessarily based on opinion. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 
N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1971). 
Court could consider its own physical inspection of properties involved 
in sewer assessment litigation as evidence. Wharton v. City of Oskaloosa, 158 
N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1968). 
Evidence held to show assessment not in excess of benefits. Curtis v. 
Town of Dunlap, 202 Iowa 588, 210 N.W. 800 (1926). 
Market price not conclusive evidence of actual value. Id. 
Testimony of property owner's expert witness held not controlling where 
owner admitted in a letter that cost was not in excess of benefits. North 
View Land Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 185 Iowa 1032, 169 N.W. 644 (1918). 
27. Sufficiency of evidence. 
Evidence held to show assessment not in excess of benefits. Curtis v. 
Town of Dunlap, 202 Iowa 588, 210 N.W. 800 (1926). Baily v. Town of Dunlap, 
210 N.W. 803 (Iowa 1926). Jordan v. Town of Dunlap, 210 N.W. 804 (Iowa 1926). 
Evidence and action by landowner objecting to assessments for street 
paving project with respect to parcels on which apartment buildings were 
situated supported finding of trial court that only benefit to the assessed 
land was a second access to the parking area at rear of apartment buildings. 
Spring Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 12g (Iowa 
1975). 
Evidence fully supported reduction of assessment. Id. 
Where there is no evidence to support a finding contrary to that of the 
city council in respect to the benefit to property stemming from a public 
improvement, its determination must stand. Mulford v. City of Iowa Falls, 221 
N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1974). 
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Evidence held to authorize decree fixing lower value of lot. Lee v. City 
of Ames, 225 Iowa 1061, 283 N.W. 427 (193g). 
Evidence held to show special benefit from sidwalk improvements. Brush 
v. Incorporated Town of Liscomb, Marshall County, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856 (1927). 
Evidence showed assessment not in excess of benefits. In re Hume, 202 
Iowa 969, 208 N.W. 285 (1926). 
Evidence held insufficient to show benefit found to accrue was excessive. 
Appeal of Mclain, 189 Iowa 264, 176 N.W. 817 (1920). 
Evidence showed abutting owners received benefits from paving. Hedge v. 
City of Des Moines, 141 Iowa 4, 119 N.W. 276 (1909). 
Evidence held to sustain reduction of assessment by trial court. Early 
v. City of Ft. Dodge, 136 Iowa 187, 113 N.W. 766 (1907). 
28. Judgment or decree. 
Assessment in conjunction with city sanitary sewer project was not just 
and city must pay amount assessment reduced, city allocation of federal funds 
not disturbed. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
In an action by a city to collect a tax for constructing a sidewalk, a 
personal judgment cannot be rendered against a defendant who is not the owner 
of the land assessed at the time the order for the construction of the 
sidewalk was made and the work done. City of Des Moines v. Casady, 21 Iowa 
570 (1866). 
29. Appeals. 
Supreme Court's review was de novo in proceeding on tax payers appeal 
from assessment in connection with city sewer project. Knudsen v. City of Des 
Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Review by Supreme Court in case involving reduction of pavement 
assessment was de novo. Goodell v. City of Clinton, 193 N.W.2d 91 (1971). 
Supreme Court will affirm judgment sustaining paving assessments, in 
absence of showing assessments were in excess of benefits. Cardell v. City of 
Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
Authority of district court on appeal from assessment by council. Smith 
v. City of Marshalltown, 1g7 Iowa 85, 196 N.W. 734 (1924). 
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1. Validity 
Held valid. Durst v. City of Des Moines, 164 Iowa 82, 145 N.W. 528 
(1914). 
2. Construction and application. 
Property owner not precluded from entitlement to deferrment of special 
assessment because part of land assessed as agricultural land not used where 
tenant farmer testified he tilled all land he could. City of Clive v. Iowa 
Concrete Block and Material Co., 298 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1980). 
Where special assessment deferred, interest accrues on days of change in 
use of property, withdrawal or discontinuance of deferrment. O.A.G., May 30, 
1979. 
This section not applicable to drainage district assessments. Farley 
Drainage Dist. No. 7 v. Hamilton County, 140 Iowa 339, 118 N.W. 432 (1908). 
Hatcher v. Bd of Sup'rs of Greene County, 165 Iowa 197, 145 N.W. 12 (1914). 
Provision of Code 1962 ~ 391.gQ (repealed) required trial court in equity 
to make public improvement assessment that should have been made or to direct 
city council to do so. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 
(1965). 
Rule limiting assessment to 25 percent of lot's value. Smith, Lichty & 
Hillman Co. v. Mason City, 210 Iowa 700, 231 N.W. 370 (1930). 
Twenty-five percent limitation on improvement assessments applies to 
value after improvement has been constructed. Nelson v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 
709, 226 N.W. 41 (1929). 
Lot was subject to assessment for paving improvement on basis of actual 
market value, though owner might sometime deem it to his interest to donate 
lot to city for widening street. Johnson v. City of Waterloo, 202 Iowa 617, 
210 N.W. 755 (1926). 
Manner of making assessment immaterial if correct result was achieved. 
Hansen v. City of Missouri Valley, 178 Iowa 859, 160 N.W. 340 (1916). 
3. Amount of assessment. 
Absolute equality is not attainable in special assessment cases; 
approximation is all that can reasonably be expected. Knudsen v. City of Des 
Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Sufficient evidence to determine value of land. Persinger v. Sioux City, 
257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 {1965). 
Cost of improvements essential factor in reaching amount of assessment. 
Diesing v. City of Marshalltown, 199 Iowa 1270, 203 N.W. 693 (1925). 
Assessment against railroad right-of-way cannot exceed 25 percent. 
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 
N.W. 947 (1916). 
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Two sets of pavement did not constitute a single improvement. Durst v. 
City of Des Moines, 164 Iowa 82, 145 N.W. 528 (1914). 
4. Excessive assessment. 
Assessments levied against objectors' property in connection with city 
sanitary sewer project were not "just and equitable" in light of various 
factors. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Landowner not entitled to have excessive sidewalk assessment declared 
void. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
City may not levy special assessments in excess of cost of improvement in 
order to provide a margin of safety in case of shortage. Bankers Life Co. v. 
City of Emmetsburg, 224 Iowa 1287, 278 N.W. 311 (1938). 
Overassessment of property by city for improvement does not constitute 
fraud. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co. v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 998, 258 N.W. 907 
(1935). 
Supreme Court must reduce assessments which evidence shows exceed 
statutory limit. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Reinbeck, 201 Iowa 
126, 206 N.W. 664 (1926). 
Excessive or unequal assessment. In re Paving Streets in Floyd Park 
Addition, 197 Iowa 915, 196 N.W. 597 (1924). 
Amount to be levied. Snyder v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 163 
N.W. 594 (1917). 
Assessment may, within the limits of the statute, exceed the cost of 
improvement in front of a particular lot. Carpenter v. City of Hamburg, 179 
Iowa 1168, 162 N.W. 602 (1917). 
Assessment according to area of abutting property per square foot is 
proper. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
Reduction of assessment by trial court held proper. Baily v. Sioux City, 
133 Iowa 276, 110 N.W. 839 (1907). 
5. Benefits. 
Evidence of best offer at auction and owner's sale price proper to 
consider. Turley v. Incorporated Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 
723 (1927). 
Theory of special benefits. Nelson v. Robinson, 189 Iowa 1076, 178 N.W. 
416 (1920). 
6. Value - in general. 
Valuation on vacant lots held excessive. Turley v. Incorporated Town of 
Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (1927). 
Assessment where value is speculative. North View Land Co. v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 185 Iowa 1032, 169 N.W. 644 (1918). 
7. Actual value. 
Determining values of agricultural property. Heins v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 231 N.W.2d 16 (Iowa 1975). 
Determination of statutory limitation. Curtis v. Town of Dunlap, 202 
Iowa 588, 210 N.W. 800 (1926). 
Actual value of property at time of levy is value upon which assessment 
is to be made, and not the assessed value. Hansen v. City of Missouri Valley, 
178 Iowa 859, 160 N.W. 340 (1916). 
8. Determination of value - in general. 
Actual value at time of assessment considering improvement made should be 
determined. City council not required to take testimony as to value of lots 
assessed. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
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9. Factors considered, determination of value. 
City, in determining property value for special assessment purposes, must 
give at least initial consideration to value listed on the last preceding 
assessment rolls. Petition of City of Des Moines, 245 N.W.2d 533 (1976). 
How to establish actual value. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City, 
256 Iowa 201, 127 N.W.2d 115 (1964). 
Rented value or income considered in fixing actual value. Finkle v. City 
of Marshalltown, 205 .Iowa 918, 218 N.W. 618 (1928). 
Evidence of best offer at auction and owner's sale price proper to 
consider. Turley v. Incorporated Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 
723 (1927). 
Difference between contract price of house and actual cost of building 
not proper method of ascertaining value of lot. Johnson v. City of Waterloo, 
202 Iowa 617, 210 N.W. 755 (1926). 
Factors involved in determination of value of lot. Belknap v. City of 
Onawa, 192 Iowa 1383, 186 N.W. 452 (1922). 
Parts of tract to be considered in arriving at sum to be levied. Rawson 
v. City of Des Moines, 133 Iowa 514, 110 N.W. 918 (1907). 
Value of property after completion of improvement may be considered. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 323. 
10. Assessment roll, determination of value. 
In determining actual value of property assessed for improvement, due 
regard must be given to assessment as fixed by council. Turley v. 
Incorporated Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (1927). 
Last preceding assessment roll must be considered in determining value of 
lots assessed for improvement. Id. 
Factors involved in determination of value of lot. Belknap v. City of 
Onawa, 192 Iowa 1383, 186 N.W. 452 (1922). 
Absent evidence of higher value, assessment for taxation controls. Jones 
v. City of Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 592 (1915). 
11. Future use and prospects, determination of value. 
Future potential use of property should be considered in deciding 
benefits accruing to land from paving improvement for wh.ich assessment is 
made. Spring Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 129 
( Iowa 197 5) • 
Probable future growth of a town and uses to which abutting property may 
reasonably be put. Gingles v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W.2d 717 
(1950). 
Consideration of future prospects of the property. Nash v. City of Ames, 
282 N.W. 340 (Iowa 1938). 
Probable future growth of town and uses of property are proper to 
consider in determining value for special assessment. Turley v. Incorporated 
Town of Dyersville, 202 Iowa 1221, 211 N.W. 723 (1927). 
12. Agricultural land, determination of value. 
Property owners, whose special assessments had been deferred because 
their land was subject to assessment and was used and assessed agriculturally, 
were not liable for interest during period of deferment. City of Clive v. 
Iowa Concrete Block & Material Co., 298 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1980). 
Agricultural land not to be valued at sum it would bring if converted 
into lots. Toben v. Town of Manson, 193 Iowa 750, 187 N.W. 599 (1922). 
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13. Objections. 
Statute requiring filing of objections to proposed assessment does not 
apply to assessments for sewer projects. Petition of City of Des Moines, 245 
N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
Objection that assessment exceeded twenty-five percent limit should have 
been urged before the council. Harris v. Evans, 196 Iowa 799, 195 N.W. 178 
(1923). 
Written objection to assessment on two tracts stating that assessment 
against each was in excess of twenty-five percent of value was sufficiently 
specific. In re Paving Assessments Levied in Town of Odebolt, 193 Iowa 1234, 
188 N.W. 780 (1922). 
Erroneous determination of value by city council does not deprive it of jurisdiction and render assessment void. Durst v. City of Des Moines, 164 
Iowa 82, 145 N.W. 528 (1914). 
14. Waiver of limitation of amount of assessment. 
Statutory limitation assessment not waived by failure to object prior to 
adoption of resolution of necessity. Smith, Lichty & Hillman Co. v. Mason 
City, 210 Iowa 700, 231 N.W. 370 (1930). 
Where record showed improvement ordered on motion of council, city would 
not urge owner's estoppel to raise question of waiver of limitation in 
petition. Nelson v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 709, 226 N.W. 41 (1929). 
Failure to appear before council and object may waive statutory 
limitation. Anderson-Deering Co. v. City of Boone, 201 Iowa 1129, 205 N.W. 
984 (1g26). 
Owner petitioning for improvement and expressly waiving the limitation 
held to have agreed to accept proportionate cost though it may be in excess. 
In re Paving Streets in Floyd Park Addition, 197 Iowa 915, 196 N.W. 597 
(1924). 
Where owner waived limitation he was not precluded from claiming 
assessment was unreasonably excessive. In re Floyd Park Addition to Sioux 
City, 197 Iowa 922, 196 N.W. 597 (1924). 
Where owners agreed to pay entire cost council had right to assess entire 
cost proportionately against the property involved. Dayton-Oldham Granit 
Works v. Mason City, 196 Iowa 77, 194 N.W. 200 (1923). 
Where owner agreed to use of front-foot rule city could so assess though 
assessment might exceed benefits. Stodola v. City of Cedar Rapids, 192 Iowa 
1025, 183 N.E. 607 (1921). 
Owner's letter that it would consent to usual assessment held in nature 
of admission that it would regard fair cost as not in excess of special 
benefits. North View Land Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 185 Iowa 1032, 169 
N.W. 644 (1918). 
Council must order improvement in reliance on owner's agreement to waive 
limitation if it would assess beyond limitations. Bailey v. City of Des 
Moines, 158 Iowa 747, 138 N.W. 853 (1912). 
15. Liability of city. 
City was not liable to holders of refunding street and sewer bonds 
because of alleged excessive assessment of properties. Bankers Life Co. v. 
City of Emmetsburg, 224 Iowa 1287, 278 N.W. 311 (1938). Inter-Ocean 
Reinsurance Co. v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 998, 258 N.W. 907 (1935). 
That city allegedly levied assessment in excess of limitation did not 
make it liable to holder of certificates for amounts unpaid. Stockholders 
Inv. Co. v. Town of Brooklyn, 216 Iowa 693, 246 N.W. 826 (1933). 
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16. Evidence - in general. 
Failure of property subject to special assessment to sell at tax sale is 
no evidence of property's value relative to assessment. Morrison v. Culver's 
Estate, 216 Iowa 676, 248 N.W. 237 (1933). 
Loss of business not substantive evidence to negative presumptive 
benefits. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Cedar Heights, 
198 Iowa 350, 199 N.W. 313 (1924). 
Evidence held to show assessment as reduced by district court was fair. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 
913 (1923). 
17. Prima facie evidence. 
Last preceding assessment is prima facie evidence of value, but it may be 
overcome. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City, 256 Iowa 102, 127 N.W.2d 
115 ( 1964). 
18. Sufficiency of evidence. 
Evidence supported reduction of assessment. Spring Valley Apartments, 
Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1975). 
Amount placed upon property value by trial court was beyond support of 
evidence. Beh v. City of West Des Moines, 257 Iowa 211, 131 N.W.2d 488 
(1965). 
Evidence established that special assessment against railroad right-of-
way for street improvement exceeded twenty-five percent of actual value of 
property. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City, 256 Iowa 102, 127 N.W.2d 
115 (1964). . 
Evidence held to justify reduction of judgment. Nash v. City of Ames, 
282 N.W. 340 (Iowa 1938). 
Evidence established land value as regards basis for imposing pavement 
assessment. Gronbach v. Town of Jewell Junction, 213 Iowa 358, 239 N.W. 26 
(1931). 
Evidence showing value of property. Verlinden v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 
892, 226 N.W. 42 (1929). Nelson v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 709, 226 N.W. 41 
(1929). 
Evidence of value of houses being rented held insufficient to warrant 
reduction. Finkle v. City of Marshalltown, 205 Iowa 918, 218 N.W. 618 (1928). 
Evidence sustained valuation of corner lot one-half mile from business 
district. Adams v. Incorporated Town of West Liberty, 205 Iowa 456, 218 N.W. 
468 (1928). 
Evidence showed assessment exceeded statutory limit. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
Ry. Co. v. Town of Reinbeck, 201 Iowa 126, 206 N.W. 664 (1926). 
Loss of business not substantive evidence to negative presumptive 
benefits. Waterloo C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Cedar Heights, 
198 Iowa 350, 199 N.W. 313 (1924). 
Evidence held to show assessment as reduced by district court was fair. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 
913 (1923). 
Evidence showed assessment to be in excess of statutory limitations. 
Belknap v. City of Onawa, 192 Iowa 1383, 186 N.W. 452 (1922). 
19. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Burden on protesting property owner to establish that benefit is not as 
great as assigned b~ the taxing authority. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1977). 
Burden is on objectors to overcome presumption that special assessment 
against their properties is correct as made. Petition of City of Des Moines, 
245 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1976). 
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Presumption that improvement authorized by city was necessary. Spring 
Valley Apartments, Inc. v. City of Cedar Falls, 225 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1975). 
City seeking to assess property in excess of statutory limitation, has 
burden of showing ground entitling it. Bailey v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 
747, 138 N.W. 853 (1912). 
20. Pleading. 
Demurrer to count in petition to recover on improvement bonds alleging 
deficiency due to excess levy was properly overruled. Hauge v. City of Des 
Moines, 207 Iowa 1209, 224 N.W. 520 (1929). 
21. Review. 
Supreme Court's review was de novo in proceeding on taxpayer's appeal 
from confirmation of valuations and assessments in connection with city 
sanitary sewer project. Knudsen v. City of Des Moines, 254 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 
1977). 
Supreme Court review of property assessment for municipal improvement is 
de novo. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Weight should be given to trial court's finding that railroad had shown 
the assessment exceeded substantially twenty-five percent of disclosed actual 
value. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City, 256 Iowa 102, 127 N.W.2d 115 
(1964). 
Reviewing court should give consideration to trial court's finding of 
value. Lee v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 1061, 283 N.W. 427 (1939). 
384.63 Insufficiency - Certification to County Auditor - Deficiency 
Assessment 
1. Construction and application. 
Test to determine reasonableness of special assessments against property 
is whether it represents fair proportionate part of total cost. Rood v. City 
of Ames, 244 Iowa 1138, 60 N.W.2d 227 (1953). 
Area or.frontage methods cannot be made sole or exclusive basis of 
determining assessments without regard to other factors. Id. 
Funds derived from special assessments insufficient to pay in full street 
improvement bonds. Shaw, McDermott & Sparks v. Town of Danbury, 227 Iowa 415, 
288 N.W. 435 (1939). 
City not liable to holders of refunding street improvement bonds and 
refunding sewer bonds. Bankers Life Co. v. City of Emmetsburg, 224 Iowa 1287, 
278 N.W. 311 (1938). 
City may improve from general fund and incur debts for such to statutory 
limit. Waller v. Pritchard, 201 Iowa 14364, 202 N.W. 770 (1925). 
This section limited to special assessments on abutting property. 
Grunewald v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 222, 91 N.W. 1059·(1902). 
2. Ordinance. 
City by general ordinanance provides for assessing expense of paving 
street intersections and spaces in front of government property on private 
property owners abutting improvement. Corey v, City of Ft. Dodge, 133 Iowa 
666, 111 N.W. 6 (1907). 
May control fund from which payment is to be made. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 
366. 
3. Contracts. 
Recovery of contract price. Lytle v. City of Ames, 225 Iowa 199, 279 
N.W. 453 {1938). 
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Provision for payment by city if assessments could not lawfully be 
made. Hedge v. City of Des Moines, 141 Iowa 4, 119 N.W. 276 (1909). 
384.64 Assessment to Railway Company 
1. Construction and app 1 i cation. . 
Party having no interest in property not entitled to relief against 
assessment. Interurban Ry. Co. v. City of Valley Junction, 190 Iowa 189, 180 
N.W. 288 (1920). 
Where benefit to railroad is only nominal it is not assessable. Chicago, 
B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chariton, 169 N.W. 337 (1918). 
Assessment may be made on right-of-way abutting on a street. Chicago 
Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 
(1916). 
Where right-of-way is mere easement it is not subject to assessment. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 302. 
Railway property is chargeable with its share of cost of improvement. 
O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 681. 
2. Separate assessments. 
Separate assessment of two sides of a lot divided by railway belonging to 
it. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N.W. 103 
(1903). 
3. Amount of assessment. 
The face of easement should be considered as tending to reduce 
benefits. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Cedar Heights, 
198 Iowa 350, 199 N.W. 313 (1924). 
4. Valuation. 
Assessment not to exceed 24 percent of value of land assessed. Chicago 
Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 (1916). 
5. Evidence. 
Fact that part of tracks assessed were for railroad purposes did not 
overcome presumption in favor of assessment. In re Resurfacing Fourth St. in 
City of Davenport, 203 Iowa 298, 211 N.W. 375 (1926). 
Evidence held insufficient to negative presumptive benefits. Waterloo, 
C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Cedar Heights, 198 Iowa 350, 199 
N.W. 313 (1924). 
Testimony of real estate values should not be entirely disregarded. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pomeroy, 196 Iowa 504, 194 N.W. 
913 (1923). 
Objecting owner has burden of showing non-compliance with plans and 
specifications. Gilcrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 161 N.W. 645 (1917). 
Railroad did not sustain burden of showing lack of benefit. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. Ry. v. City of Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 153 N.W. 106 (1915), 
modified on other grounds, 172 Iowa 444, 154 N.W. 596. 
Party resisting payment of assessment certificate must show invalidity. 
Tuttle v. Polk, 92 Iowa 433, 60 N.W. 733 (1894). 
6. Prior law. 
Power of cities to assess railroad right-of-way prior to this statute. 
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 
N.W. 947 (1916). 
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Charter prov1s1ons. City of Davenport v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 16 
Iowa 348 (1864). 
384.65 Installments Due 
1. Construction and application. 
A property owner may pay the assessment in full at any time after 
starting payment by installment. If paid in full after July 1, the interest 
accrues to December 1 of the following year. A property owner may not make 
payments of more than one installment at a time if less than full payment. A 
property owner is not entitled, by statute, to a refund of any excess 
payments. There's no difference in special assessments if a city pays for 
improvement from existing funds rather than by issuance of bonds. O.A.G. Dec. 
24, 1980. 
Code 1897 in regard to extension of time for payment, related to 
certificates issued against property assessed. F. N. Hubbell, Son & Co. v. 
Hammill, 187 Iowa 1083, 175 N.W. 41 (1919). 
"Abutting property" - defined. Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 
N.W. 944 (1912). 
"Commencement of the work" - defined. Eagle Mfg. Co. v. City of 
Davenport, 101 Iowa 493, 70 N.W. 707 (1897). 
Right to lay special assessments for sidewalks, etc., chargeable to 
particular lots, cannot be exercised by a municipal corporation, without 
special grant of authority from legislature. City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff, 
20 Iowa 396 (1866). 
Penalties on unpaid installments would be three-fourths of one percent 
per month. On certificates, delinquent as to both principal and interest, 
Treasurer is required to collect a penalty on delinquent interest as well as 
principal. O.A.G. 1934, p. 412. 
2. Repeals. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Validity of assessment. 
Assessment was not warranted where parcel was separated from street by 
another parcel of original lot. Kneebs v. Sioux City, 156 Iowa 607, 137 N.W. 
944 (1912). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
4. Time for payment. 
"Annually" means each year after first installment is due and payable. 
O.A.G. Feb. 25, 1955. O.A.G. 1930, p. 50. 
Time when installments become due. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 295. 
Taxes not delinquent till first day of March next after maturity. O.A.G. 
1918, p. 221. 
5. Interest. 
Six percent interest rate contemplated by assessment statutes rather than 
five percent contemplated by 5 535.3 relating to interest on ordinary judgments was applicable to judgment, on remand. Kuhlmann v. Persinger, 261 
Iowa 461, 154 N.W.2d 800 (1967). 
Proper for court, in deciding controversy over assessments, to allow 
interest. Madison County v. City of Winterset, 164 Iowa 223, 145 N.W. 492 
{1914). 
In computation of interest on special assessments under this section, a 
June to June basis must be used. O.A.G. June, 1961. 
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384.65 
Delinquent installments carry interest at six percent after delinquency 
as well as penalty. O.A.G. 1930, p. 145. 
Time for payment of interest for unpaid installments. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 
222. 
Charges for underground water connection under section 391.8 are special 
assessments and draw interest under this section. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 403. 
Time when installments become due. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 295. 
6. Interest and penalties. 
Time when installment becomes delinquent. O.A.G. 1928, p. 400. 
Where owner waives objections to proceedings, he is liable for interest 
on assessments only. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 27. 
Method of computing interest or penalty on assessments when divided in 
installments. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 374. 
Duty of Treasurer to collect interest on paving certificates up to time 
of payment, including penalties from time of delinquency. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 
271. 
Delinquent payments should bear some interest or penalty as ordinary 
taxes. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 366. 
7. Penalties. 
Contractor was entitled to penalty collected; the penalty being incident 
to the tax, and not being interest. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Webster 
County, 143 Iowa 255, 121 N.W. 1072 (1909). 
Limit on penalties fixed by statute and no larger sum was collectable. 
Ankeny v. Henningsen, 54 Iowa 29, 6 N.W. 65 (1880). 
Collection of penalty on delinquent assessment was limited to four 
years. O.A.G. 1938, p. 851. 
County treasurer required to collect penalty on interest which is 
delinquent the same as on delinquent principal. O.A.G. 1934, p. 554. 
Penalties on unpaid installments would be three-fourths of one percent 
per month. On certificates delinquent as to both principal and interest, 
Treasurer is required to collect penalty on delinquent interest as well as 
principal. O.A.G. 1934, p. 412. 
Failure of clerk to certify assessment levy promptly did not relieve 
taxpayer of liability for penalty. O.A.G. 1932, p. 65. 
Time when installment becomes delinquent. O.A.G. 1928, p. 400. 
Where owner waives objections to proceedings, he is liable for interest 
on assessments only. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 27. 
Assessments draw penalties on first day of March after maturity. O.A.G. 
1922, p. 131. 
Special assessments not a lien in absence of strict compliance with 
statutes. Halvorson v. Mullin, 179 Iowa 293, 161 N.W. 309 (1917). 
Procedure required to create lien. Id. 
Assessments not levied on front-foot rule were not lien. Fitzgerald v. 
Sioux City, 125 Iowa 396, 101 N.W. 268 (1904). 
Lien attaches at time of filing of papers. Cernansky v. Fitch, 121 Iowa 
186, 96 N.W. 754 (1903}. 
9. Notice of lien. 
Records and ordinances put purchaser on inquiry. Talcott v. Noel, 107 
Iowa 470, 78 N.W. 39 (189g}. 
10. Loss of lien. 
Lien for unpaid future installments of special assessments cut off by 
sale for general taxes. Fergason v. Aitken, 220 Iowa 1154, 263 N.W. 850 
(1936}. 
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Lien of delinquent special assessments for street improvements not 
brought forward on tax list held lost. Wallace v. Gilmore, 216 Iowa 1070, 250 
N. W. 105 ( 1933). 
Purchaser at tax sale taking treasurer's deed takes free from unpaid 
installments of special assessments which were a lien at time of tax sale. 
O.A.G. 1932, p, 267. 
11. Enforcement of lien. 
Purchaser of certificates could not secure foreclosure of lien if city 
followed statutory method of collection and payment of certificates by sale. 
Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Valley-Des Moines Co., 220 Iowa 556, 260 N.W. 669, 
105 A. L. R. 1018 (1935). 
12. Priorities. 
Tax deed for regular taxes displaces lien of special assessment which 
attached after sale and before issuance of deed. Means v. City of Boone, 214 
Iowa 948, 241 N.W. 671 (1932). Montgomery v. City of Des Moines, 190 Iowa 
705, 180 N.W. 723 (1921). Harrington v. Valley Sav. Bank, 119 Iowa 312, 93 
N.W. 347 (1903). 
Assessment for_ sewer held prior to drainage assessment. Anderson-Deering 
Co. v. City of Boone, 201 Iowa 1129, 205 N.W. 984 (1925). 
Lien for paving assessment does not displace prior lien for curbing 
street. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 108 Iowa 307, 79 N.W. 77 (1899). 
This section makes special assessment liens equal in precedence with 
general tax liens. O.A.G. March 2, 1970. 
13. Sale. 
Property sold for delinquent taxes at either a regular or scavenger tax 
sale should be sold subject to special assessment liens. O.A.G. March 2, 
1970. 
Where sale of incumbered realty by board of supervisors is for less than 
total amount stated in tax sale certificate, the sale should be approved by 
the tax-levying and tax-certifying bodies having majority interest in said 
taxes, but where public auction sale of such property by board has not been 
completed, the board may reject any bid taken and hold another sale by public 
auction. O.A.G. August 9, 1968 (No. 68-8-5). 
14. Redemption from tax sale. 
Holder of certificates had prior right to assignment of certificate of 
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tax sale on tender of sum necessary to redeem. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co. v. I 
Dickey, 222 Iowa 995, 270 N.W. 29 (1937). 
15. Covenants and conveyances. 
Assessment not lien within lessor's covenant till certificate filed with 
auditor. Frankel v. Blank, 205 Iowa 1, 213 N.W. 597 (1927). 
Lien for sewer improvement not affected by sale of the property. Dayton-
Oldham Granite Works v. Mason City, 196 Iowa 77, 194 N.W. 200 (1923). 
Effect of lien on contract to give "perfect title." Waterman v. Wood, 
185 Iowa 897, 171 N.W. 171 (1919). 
Amount of special assessments not recoverable in action to recover 
damages for breach of contract to convey. Johnstone v. Robertson, 179 Iowa 
838, 162 N.W. 66 (1917). 
Covenant to defend against "lawful claims" does not include street 
assessment where lien has not attached. Cernansky v. Fitch, 121 Iowa 186, 96 
N.W. 754 (1903). 
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16. Injunction or equitable relief. 
Suit to enjoin paving and levy of assessment. Allen v. City of 
Davenport, 132 F. 209, 65 C.C.A. 641, certiorari denied, 25 S.Ct. 794, 196 
U.S. 639, 49 L.Ed. 630 (1904). 
Decree cancelling assessment lien not binding on one acquiring assessment 
certificate before entry or decree and not made a party. Hawkeye Life Ins. 
Co. v. Valley-Des Moines Co., 220 Iowa 556, 260 N.W. 669, 105 A.L.R. 1018 
(1935). 
Party having no interest in the property not entitled to relief against 
the assessment. Interurban Ry. Co. v. City of Valley Junction, 190 Iowa 189, 
180 N.W. 288 (1920). 
17. Personal liability. 
No personal obligation increases of assessed property. Morrison v. 
Culver's Estate, 217 Iowa 676, 248 N.W. 237 (1933). 
18. Actions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
19. Limitations. 
Liens for assessments are perpetual. Fisk v. City of Keokuk, 144 Iowa 
187, 122 N.W. 896 (1909). 
20. Pleading and proof. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
21. Evidence. 
Burden of proving lien rests on party claiming lien. Halvorson v. 
Mullin, 179 Iowa 293, 161 N.W. 309 (1917). 
384.66 Test of Regularity 
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Equity 31-70 
Evidence 
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Fraud 3 
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Issues, Equity 36 
Notice of Appeal to District Court 76 
Objection 4,5 
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Objections, Appeals to District Court 80, 81 
In General 80 
Consideration on Appeal 81 
Parties, Equity 37 
Pleadings, Equity 38 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
Appeals to District Court 84 
Equity 40 
Record, Review by Supreme Court 8 
Regularity or Legality of Proceedings, Generally, Equity 32 
Relief Granted 
Appeals to District Court 86 
Equity 41 
Remedies, Generally 2 
Removal to Federal Court 6 
Review by Supreme Court 7-10 
In General 7 
Disposition on Review 10 
Record 8 
Theory of Parties 9 
Right to Appeal to District Court 74 
Right to Relief, Equity 33 
Scope of Hearing or Determination, Appeals to District Court 79 
Sureties on Bond, Appeals to District Court 78 
Suspension of Proceedings, Appeals to District Court 85 
Tender, Equity 34 
Theory of Parties, Review by Supreme Court 9 
Time for Appeal to District Court 75 
Waiver of Objections 5 
I. IN GENERAL 
Subdivision Index 
Construction and Application 1 
Disposition on Review by Supreme Court 10 
Fraud 3 
Objections 4, 5 
Record, Review by Supreme Court 8 
Remedies, Generally 2 
Removal to Federal Court 6 
Review by Supreme Court 7-10 
In General 
Disposition on Review 10 
Record 8 
Theory of Parties 9 
Theory of Parties, Review by Supreme Court 9 
Waiver of Objections 5 
1. Construction and application. 
This section mandatory, and not permissive, and appeal is perfected by 
notice and by bond and by petition. Baker v. City of Cedar Falls, 185 N.W.2d 
810 (Iowa 1971). 
City or town council could acquire jurisdiction to defray only that part 
of cost attendant upon acquisition or construction of a parking facility which 
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384.66 
was created or incurred subsequent to passage of the requisite resolution of 
necessity. H. L. Munn Lumber Co. v. City of Ames, 176 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1970). 
Error or irregularity in procedure could not cause council to lose 
jurisdiction or render proceedings invalid. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1932). 
Whether a particular city can be properly taxed as a whole, or whether 
particular property is properly included, cannot be determined in a collateral 
proceedings. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 152 Iowa 187, 131 N.W. 25 
(1911). 
Code 1897, sections 823, 824, and 839 had no relation to cases involving 
a want of jurisdiction. Comstock v. Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 111 N.W. 
51 (1907). 
Code 1873, section 478, did not require that the city should institute 
its action against abutting owner before it paid the contractor. City of 
Burlington v. Quick, 47 Iowa 222 (1877). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Remedies, generally. 
Statutory remedy must be followed except for void proceedings. Husson v. 
City of Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 310 (Iowa 1949). 
3. Fraud. 
No showing of fraud or discrimination as would render proceedings for 
improvements subject to injunction. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 
310 (Iowa 1949). 
Excessive assessment held not fraudulent. Lytle v. Sioux City, 198 Iowa 
848, 200 N.W. 416 (1924). 
Poor quality of paving does not give owner cause to enjoin collection of 
assessment on grounds of fraud. Plagman v. City of Davenport, 181 Iowa 1212, 
165 N.W. 393 (1917). 
Attempt to assess amounted to a fraud. Kaynor v. City of Cedar Falls, 
156 Iowa 161, 135 N.W. 564 (1912). 
Acceptance of work known by city to be defective was fraudulent. 
Robertson v. City of Des Moines, 123 N.W. 331 (Iowa 1909). 
Adequate remedy at law exists where there is fraud. Swan v. City of 
Indianola, 142 Iowa 731, 121 N.W. 547 (1909). 
4. Objections - in general. 
Matters rendering assessment void may be raised on appeal or by 
independent action. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 
422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
Too technical an objection to vitiate the assessment in equity. Monroe 
v. Pearson, 176 Iowa 283, 157 N.W. 849 (1916). 
5. Waiver of objections. 
Failure to appear and file objections after notice waives right to 
object. People's Inv. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 (1932). 
Reduction of assessment not disturbed on appeal in view of evidence. 
Toben v. Town of Manson, 193 Iowa 750, 187 N.W. 599 (1922). 
6. Removal to federal court. 
Appellant, which nominally plaintiff is in effect defendant, and should 
be considered such for removal purposes. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. City 
of Spencer, Iowa, 283 F. 824 (1922). 
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7. Review by Supreme Court - in general. 
Supreme Court review of property assessment for municipal improvement is 
de novo. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Failure to appeal taken as admission of benefit conferred. Diesing v. 
City of Marshalltown, 199 Iowa 1270, 203 N.W. 693 (1925). 
Proper for Supreme Court to look into reasons and data upon which council 
fixed sum total of benefits. Appeal of McClain, 189 Iowa 264, 176 N.W. 817 
(1920). 
Where two separate tracts of materially different area are assessed same 
amount, it is not presumed that assessment is inequitable or unjust. Snyder 
v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 163 N.W. 594 (1917). 
Assessments not interferred with except on convincing proof of 
inequitableness. Thielen v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Wright County, 179 Iowa 248, 160 
N.W. 915 (1917). 
Action of court reaching figures was presumptively equitable. Jones v. 
City of Sheldon, 172 Iowa 406, 154 N.W. 592 (1915). 
That street was made less convenient to taxpayer cannot be first raised 
on appeal. Cheney v. City of Ft. Dodge, 157 Iowa 250, 138 N.W. 549 (1912). 
On appeal, question of whether change in paving contract was authorized 
cannot be first raised. In re Mayden, 156 Iowa 157, 135 N.W. 571 (1912). 
Equity will grant relief against assessment void for lack of 
jurisdiction. Bennett v. City of Emmetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). . 
Where pending appeal assessment is vacated, its validity will not be 
determined. Berry v. City of Des Moines, 115 Iowa 44, 87 N.W. 747 (1901). 
New objections will not be heard on appeal. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. City of Ottumwa, 112 Iowa 300, 83 N.W. 1074 (1900). Mason v. City of Des 
Moines, 108 Iowa 658, 79 N.W. 389 (1899). 
8. Record, review by Supreme Court. 
Where record had no evidence on benefits conferred by improvement, it was 
presumed council's determination was correct. Brenton v. City of Des Moines, 
219 Iowa 267, 257 N.W. 794 (1935). 
That assessment exceeded statutory limit should be urged before 
council. In re Audubon and Ninth Streets, 198 Iowa 1103, 199 N.W. 983 (1924). 
Appeal cannot be heard where no transcript and certificate are made 
within six months after decree. McClelland v. City of Cedar Rapids, 107 N.W. 
428 (Iowa 1906). 
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9. Theory of parties, review by Supreme Court. I 
Case accepted as appeal rather than suit to cancel assessment. Walter v. 
City of Ida Grove, 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927). 
10. Disposition on review by Supreme Court. 
Supreme Court order fixing assessment at reduced amount. Kuhlmann v. 
Persinger, 261 Iowa 461, 154 N.W.2d ·860 (1967). 
Judgment sustaining assessment affirmed where failure to comply with 
specifications applied to small portion to which there was no evidence of 
cost. Cardell v. City of Perry, 201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
Assessment reduced where evidence showed it exceeded statutory limit. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Reinbeck, 201 Iowa 126, 206 N.W. 664 
(1926). 
Reduction of assessment not disturbed on appeal in view of evidence. 
Toben v. Town of Manson, 193 Iowa 750, 187 N.W. 599 (1922). 
With no basis in evidence for assessment in other amount than made, 
Supreme Court could not make different assessment. Noble v. City of Des 
Moines, 191 Iowa 12, 174 N.W. 44 (1919). 
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Value of property is largely matter of op1n1on, and determination of 
trial court will not be disturbed. Hansen v. City of Missouri Valley, 178 
Iowa 859, 160 N.W. 340 (1916). 
Where city admitted improper assessment and court failed to take this 
into account, opinion was modified. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 154 N.W. 596 (1915). 
Findings of trial court will not be disturbed where it assumed 
apportionment was approximately correct. Madison County v. Winterset, 164 
Iowa 223, 145 N.W. 492 (1914). 
II. EQUITY 
Subdivision Index 
31. 
Co. 
lie. 
In General 31 
Conclusiveness and Effect of Adjudication 42 
Evidence 39 
Injunction, Generally 35 
Issues 36 
Parties 37 
Pleadings 38 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof 40 
Regularity of Legality of Proceedings, Generally 32 
Relief Granted 41 
Right to Relief 33 
Tender 34 
In ~eneral. 
Lac of jurisdiction can be raised by independent action. People's 
v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 (1932). 
Bill to vacate assessment including officials compensation will not 
Meijerink's Estate v. Lindsay, 203 Iowa 1031, 213 N.W. 934 (1927). 
Inv. 
32. Regularity or legality of proceedings, generally. 
Assessment invalid where untimely hearing and resolution of necessity 
relative to acquisition and improvement. H. L. Munn Lumber Co. v. City of 
Ames, 176 N.W.2d 813 (1970). 
Where lot extended so as to abut on each of two parallel streets, special 
assessment for improvement of one street could be imposed only on value of 
that half of lot which abutted on the improved street. Dunn v. City of Sioux 
City, 251 Iowa 1279, 104 N.W.2d 830 (1960). 
Assessment could not be cancelled to one lot owner and sustained as to 
another where both were equally liable. Cavanaugh v. City of Des Moines, 179 
Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 (1917). 
33. Right to relief. 
Assessment in excess of value of improvements for pavement did not 
warrant injunction against sale, where owner did not object to assessment or 
appeal. Lytle v. Sioux City, 198 Iowa 848, 200 N.W. 416 (1924). 
Failure to appeal bars independent action. Lundberg v. Lake City, 194 
Iowa 136, 187 N.W. 438 (1922). 
Where assessment is void, independent 4Ction may be brought. Brown v. 
City of Creston, 174 N.W. 380 (Iowa 1919). -
Assessment enjoined for lack of jurisdiction •. F. M. Hubbell, Son & Co. 
v. Bennett Bros., 130 Iowa 66, 106 N.W: 375 (1906). 
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Equity will grant relief against assessment void for lack of 
jurisdiction. Diver v. Keokuk Sav. Bank, 126 Iowa 691, 102 N.W. 542 (1905). 
Equity will enjoin the collection of a void local assessment, and 
taxpayers are n.ot relegated to an appeal from the assessment. Chicago, M. & 
St. P.R. Co. v. Phillips, 111 Iowa 377, 82 N.W. 787 (1900). 
34. Tender. 
Where assessment is void, tender thereof not necessary to maintain 
suit. Gallaher v. Garland, 126 Iowa 206, 101 N.W. 867 (1904). Iowa Pipe & 
Tile Co. v. Callanan, 125 Iowa 358, 101 .N.W. 141 (1904). 
Where party is clearly liable for assessment, he must tender or pay same 
before equity will hear his complaint. Grimmell v. City of Des Moines, 57 
Iowa 144, 10 N.W. 330 (1881). 
Where assessment as to one lot was unauthorized, equity would not hear 
complaint till tender was made. Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271 (1871). 
35. Injunction, generallf. 
Injunction will notie except if proceedings were void. Meader v. 
Incorporated of Sibley, 191 Iowa 1139, 183 N •. W. 610 (1921). 
Where city lacks power to assess, such may be enjoined. Northern Light 
Lodge No. 156, I.O.O.F. of Iowa v. Town of Monona, 180 Iowa 62, 161 N.W. 78 
(1917). 
Equity will grant relief against assessment void for lack of jurisdiction. Bennett v. City of Errrnetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 
(1908). 
36. Issues. 
Issue whether contractor had performed was not properly raised in action 
by contractor's assignee to set aside decrees holding assessments invalid. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corp. v. City of Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 1324, 214 N.W. 
687 (1927). 
Irregularities cannot be questioned in suit to enjoin collection of 
assessments. Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 
(1910). 
37. Parties. 
In action to enJ01n assessment collection, contractor was not necessary 
party. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Phillips, 111 Iowa 377, 82 N.W. 787 
(1900). 
38. Pleadings. 
Allegation held insufficient to raise question of taking without due 
process. Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899). 
Supreme Court cannot consider objections not made to council and not 
included in petition to district court. Schumacher v. City of Clear Lake, 214 
Iowa 34, 239 N.W. 71 (1931). 
39. · Evidence. 
In proceeding to cancel special assessment for sidewalks, written protest 
of one owner against assessment against another piece of property was 
inadmissable to show objection to assessment. Cavanaugh v. City of Des 
Moines, 179 Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 (1917). 
40. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Proceeding and resolutions of city council not in record presumed to be 
regular. Franquemont v. Munn, 208 Iowa 528, 224 N.W. 39 (1929). 
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41. Relief granted. 
Provision of this section requires trial court in equity to make public 
improvement assessment that should have been made or to direct city council to 
do so. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Decree enjoining improvement and assessment held not broader than relief 
sought. Jackson v. City of Creston, 206 Iowa 244, 220 N.W. 92 (1928). 
Assessment held cured by correction in trial court. Vowles v. Town of 
Kenwood Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1D09 (1924). 
Assessment could not be cancelled to one lot owner and sustained as to 
another where both were equally liable. Cavanaugh v. City of Des Moines, 179 
Iowa 739, 162 N.W. 17 (1917). 
42. Conclusiveness and effect of adjudication. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
III. APPEALS TO DISTRICT COURT 
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Scope of Hearing or Determination 79 
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Suspension of Proceedings 85 
Time for Appeal 75 
71. In general. 
Appeal must be in strict compliance with statute. Van Meter v. City of 
Tipton, 178 Iowa 1201, 159 N.W. 171 (1916). City of Fairfield v. Jefferson 
County, 168 Iowa 623, 151 N.W. 53 (1915). 
Statutory provisions for appeal are mandatory. Woodard v. Iowa City, 212 
Iowa 326, 232 N.W. 806 (1930). 
72. Amount of assessment, generally. 
Landowner not entitled to have excessive sidewalk assessment declared 
void, but only to relief for assessment exceeding permissible amount. 
Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Fact that owners of property subject to assessment for soil cement paving 
project as general taxpayers, would have to pay part of cost of paving other 
streets with reinforced concrete because cost of such pavement would exceed 
amount that could be assessed against benefitted property, did not invalidate 
proceedings. 
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73. Appeal as proper or exclusive remedy. 
Procedure to contest irregularity is by statutory remedy. People's Inv. 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W. 464 .(1932). People's Inv. 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 241 N.W. 468 (Iowa 1932). 
Excessive assessment must be raised before council. Myrah v. Dana, 199 
Iowa 801, 202 N.W. 748 (1925). 
Where assessment is void, independent action may be brought. Brown v. 
City of Creston, 174 N.W. 380 (Iowa 1919). 
Variance from established grade held an irregularity. Shaver v. J. W. 
Turner Improvement Co., 133 N.W. 770 (Iowa 1911). 
Special statutory remedy. Owens v. Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 383 
(1905). 
Excessive assessment must be raised before council. Durst v. City of Des 
Moines, 150 Iowa 370, 130 N.W. 168 (1911). 
Procedure to contest irregularity is by statutory remedy. Collins v. 
City of Keokuk, 147 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 601 (1910). 
Quality of work done, except for fraud, is an irregularity. Clifton Land 
Co. v. City of Des Moines, 144 Iowa 625, 123 N.W. 340 (1909). 
Matters not going to jurisdiction may not be contested by independent 
action. Nixon v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 N.W. 239 (1908). 
Failure to appear before council or to appeal waives objection to 
assessment on ground of no benefit received. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. 
Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N.W. 103 (1903). 
Where city council lacks authority to assess, enforcement may be enjoined 
by independent. Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 
115 Iowa 568, 89 N.W. 7 (1902). 
74. Right to appeal. 
Right to appeal from town council's special assessment or levy is purely 
statutory. Fuller v. Incorporated Town of Rolfe, 249 Iowa 80, 86 N.W.2d 249 
(1957). 
Only property owners affected may appeal. Wright Const. Co. v. City of 
Des Moines, 202 Iowa 661, 210 N.W. 809 (1926). 
75. Time for appeal. 
Failure to file petitions stating grounds of complaint against special 
assessments - appeal not timely perfected. Baker v. City of Cedar Falls, 185 
N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1971). 
Appeal taken prior to time levy became effective was premature. Fuller 
v. Incorporated Town of Rolfe, 249 Iowa 80, 86 N.W.2d 249 (1957). 
76. Notice of appeal. 
Must be given in susbstantial compliance with statutory provisions. 
Fuller v. Incorporated Town of Rolfe, 249 Iowa 80, 86 N.W.2d 249 (1957). 
Failure of property owners to direct or address notice of appeal from 
special assessment to town rendered notice of appeal invalid. Harrington v. 
Town of Salix, 248 Iowa 135g, 85 N.W.2d 527 (1957). 
Notice of appeal proper where city clerk was handed notice and signed 
acknowledgement of service endorsed on original notice. Collinson v. City of 
Dubuque, 242 Iowa 986, 47 N.W.2d 839 (1951). 
Notice of appeal was insufficient because not directed to city or town. 
Fuller v. Incorporated Town of Rolfe, 226 Iowa 604, 284 N.W. 455 (1939). 
Notice of appeal addressed to city and served on mayor sufficient. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corp. v. City of Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 1324, 214 N.W. 
687 (1927). 
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Notice of appeal addressed to mayor and council without naming them was 
insufficient. In re Paving Assessments Levied in Town of Odebolt, 193 Iowa 
1234, 188 N.W. 780 (1922). 
77. Bond - in general. 
Bond approved by clerk without endorsement supports appeal. Rivers v. 
City of Des Moines, 202 Iowa 940, 211 N.W. 415 (1926). Dickinson v. City of 
Des Moines, 202 Iowa 782, 211 N.W. 417 (1926). 
Presumption of approval of bond resulting from its filing overcome. 
Buttolph v. Town of Postville, 230 Iowa 89, 296 N.W. 817 (1941). 
Where bond was not filed on time, there was no bond that could be amended 
after time limit. Woodard v. Iowa City, 212 Iowa 326, 232 N.W. 806 (1930). 
Requirements as to appeal bond mandatory. Dickinson v. City of Des 
Moines, 202 Iowa 782, 211 N.W. 417 (1926). 
Bond accepted and filed by clerk gives jurisdiction. Bates v. City of 
Des Moines, 201 Iowa 1233, 207 N.W. 793 (1926). 
Neither mayor nor clerk could waive approval by agreeing in advance to 
accept surety. St. Mary's Church v. City of Pella, 197 Iowa 205, 196 N.W. 949 (1924). 
Leaving bond with clerk for less than sum fixed without approval of clerk 
was not sufficient compliance. In re Paving Assessments Levied in Town of 
Odebolt, 193 Iowa 1234, 188 N.W. 780 (1922). 
Appeal bond had to be approved by clerk or mayor. McCord v. City of 
Cherokee, 180 Iowa 448, 161 N.W. 440 (1917). 
Bond tendered after dismissal of appeal insufficient. City of Fairfield 
v. Jefferson County, 168 Iowa 623, 151 N.W. 53 (1915). 
78. Sureties on bond. 
Taxpayers did not qualify as sureties on petitioner's appeal bond, and 
trial court lacked jurisdiction of appeal. Oldenkamp v. Incorporated Town of 
Hull, 249 Iowa 471, 87 N.W.2d 444 (1958). 
Presumption of approval of bond resulting from its filing overcome. 
Buttolph v. Town of·Postville, 230 Iowa 89, 296 N.W. 817 (1941). 
79. Scope of hearing or determination. 
Determination should be made whether assessment exceeds twenty-five 
percent of actual value of property properly to be assessed. Persinger v. 
Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 133 N.W.2d 110 (1965). 
Ordering of pavement and assessment are legislative determination. 
Gingles v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W.2d 717 (1950). 
On appeal, court has broad power of review. Cardell v. City of Perry, 
201 Iowa 628, 207 N.W. 775 (1926). 
On appeal, district court authorized to determine what assessments should 
be made against the properties. Smith v. City of Marshalltown, 197 Iowa 85, 
197 N.W. 734, (1924). 
On appeal, owner entitled to be heard on whether her land was adjacent to 
improvement. Hauge v. City of Des Moines, 1g7 Iowa 907, 196 N.W. 68 (1923). 
Action of council in ordering improvement and declaring it a benefit held 
a legislative determination. In re Jefferson St. Sewer, 179 Iowa 975, 162 
N.W. 239 (lgl7). 
Court may inquire both as to validity and amount of assessment. Early v. 
City of Ft. Dodge, 136 Iowa 187, 113 N.W. 766 (1907). 
On appeal, no orders may be made which affect persons who have not 
appealed. Berry v. City of Des Moines, 115 Iowa 44, 87 N.W. 747 (1901). 
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80. Objections - in general. 
Void assessment may be annulled on appeal without prior filing of 
objections. Rivers v. City of Des Moines, 202 Iowa 940, 211 N.W. 415 
(1926). Bates v. City of Des Moines, 201 Iowa 1233, 207 N.W. 793 (1926). 
Objections not made before council cannot be raised on appeal. Tjaden v. 
Town of Wellsburg, 197 Iowa 1292, 198 N.W. 772 (1924). 
Remedies and availabilities to taxpayer. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 
Iowa 469, 173 N.W. 381; Clifton v. City of Des Moines, 144 Iowa 625, 123 N.W. 
340; Durst v. City of Des Moines, 164 Iowa 82, 145 N.W. 528; Ellyson v. City 
of Des Moines, 179 Iowa 882, 162 N.W. 212; Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 
998, 184 N.W. 347. 
Excessive assessment objection must first be made before council. Harris 
v. Evans, 196 Iowa 799, 195 N.W. 78 (1923). 
On appeal, owner limited to consideration of objections filed before 
council, except for fraud. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 
1082 (1908). 
81. Consideration on appeal, objections. 
Lack of benefit must be raised before council. Hansen v. City of 
Missouri Valley, 178 Iowa 859, 160 N.W. 340 (1916). 
Matters rendering assessment void may be raised on appeal or by 
independent action. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 
422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
Variance between improvement as constructed and that planned is not 
jurisdictional. Cheney v. City of Ft. Dodge, 157 Iowa 250, 138 N.W. 549 
(1912). 
On appeal, only objections made before council may be heard. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. Ry. Co. v. City of Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 153 N.W. 106 (1915). 
Gilchrest & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 131 N.W. 776 (Iowa 1911). 
On appeal, owner limited to consideration of objections filed before 
council, except for fraud. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 
1082 (1908). 
82. Excluded issues. 
Damages for interference with access not an issue in appeal from 
assessment. Ashman v. City of Des Moines, 209 Iowa 1247, 228 N.W. 316 (1929). 
Objections not made before council cannot be raised on appeal. Tjaden v. 
Town of Wellsburg, 197 Iowa 1292, 198 N.W. 772 (1924). 
On appeal, only objections made before council may be heard. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. Ry. Co. v. City of Centerville, 172 Iowa 444, 153 N.W. 106 (1915). 
Failure to object on appearance waives defects of notice. Andre v. City 
of Burlington, 141 Iowa 65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
Person affected by assessment who has not appealed cannot appear in 
district court taking advantage of appeal by another. Berry v. City of Des 
Moines, 115 Iowa 44, 87 N.W. 747 (1901). 
83. Evidence. 
Presumption of benefit received. Gingles v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 
41 N.W.2d 717 (1950). 
Absent evidence, it was assumed that improvement commenced at point fixed 
by resolution. Williams v. City of Cherokee, 184 Iowa 899, 169 N.W. 110 
(1918). 
It could not be assumed that a resolution was duly passed where city, on 
appeal, pleaded work was done under invalid ordinance. Cook v. City of 
Independence, 133 Iowa 582, 110 N.W. 1029 (1907). 
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84. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Landowner appealing from assessment for public improvement has burden of 
showing extent of benefit conferred. Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 Iowa 727, 
133 N.W.2d 110 (1965}. 
Assessment against property for improvements is presumed to be just and 
equitable, and burden is on property owner to prove contrary. Rood v. City of 
Ames, 244 Iowa 1138, 60 N.W.2d 227 (1953). 
85. Suspension of proceedings. 
Appeal suspends collection of assessment till determination. Fidelity 
Inv. Co. v. White, 208 Iowa 519, 223 N.W. 884 (1929). 
86. Relief granted. 
Cause remanded to determine amount to be assessed against property where 
from record appellate court could not determine what assessment should be. In 
re Jefferson St. Sewer, 179 Iowa 975, 162 N.W. 239 (1917). 
When appeal only involves amount of assessment, court may not annul 
assessment and make another on different property. Chicago, Great Western Ry. 
Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 176 Iowa 247, 157 N.W. 947 (1916). 
Held error to reduce assessment where evidence on benefit conflicted. 
Camp v. City of Davenport, 151 Iowa 33, 139 N.W. 137 (1911). 
Even if assessment were arbitrary, entire assessment should not be 
declared void, but should be corrected. Andre v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 
65, 117 N.W. 1082 (1908). 
87. Conclusiveness and effect of adjudication. 
Right to damages for interference with access not adjudicated in appeal 
from assessment. Ashman v. City of Des Moines, 209 Iowa 1247, 228 N.W. 316 (1929), modified on other grounds, 229 N.W. 9D7. 
Adjudication that contract was improperly performed is not binding on 
contractor as against city. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation v. City of 
Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 1324, 214 N.W. 687 (1927). 
Where council had no jurisdiction to make assessment court could only 
declare it void. Landis v. City of Marion, 178 Iowa 1396, 161 N.W. 26 (1917). 
Where appeal attacking assessment was dismissed, assessment was treated 
as valid. Fish v. City of Keokuk, 144 Iowa 187, 122 N.W, 896 (1909). 
384.67 Payment to County Treasurer 
1. Construction and application. 
Assessments-not payable to treasurer until it is certified and reaches 
him for collection. F. M. Hubbell, Son & Co. v. Hammill, 187 Iowa 1083, 175 
N.W. 41 (1919). 
2. Payment. 
Expense of collecting assessment cannot be included in assessment. 
Higman v. Sioux City, 129 Iowa 291, 105 N.W. 524 (1906). 
Obligation of owner to pay tax begins on date of assessment. O.A.G. 
1918, p. 221. 
Owner had right to pay assessment anytime prior to certification to 
County Treasurer. F. M. Hubbell, Son & Co. v. Hammill, 187 Iowa 1083, 175 
N.W. 41 (1919). 
3. Checks. 
Where official held check in payment of assessment for two weeks, and was 
personally unable to collect through bank failure, he was personally liable. 
O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 84. 
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4. Interest. 
Kuhlmann v. Persinger, 261 Iowa 461, 154 N.W.2d 860 (1967). 
Entitlement of plaintiff, in action on tax certificate which was refused 
payment, to interest. Edward & Walsh Const. Co. v. Jasper County, 117 Iowa 
365, 90 N.W. 1006 (1902). 
Entitlement of private person, suing to recover assessment, to 
interest. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 108 Iowa 307, 7g N.W. 77 
(189g). 
Entitlement of private person, suing to recover assessment to interest. 
Tuttle v. Polk, 92 Iowa 433, 60 N.W. 733 (1894). 
Where owner pays full balance due, interest is figured to the time of 
such payment. O.A.G. 1930, p. 262. 
Interest on unpaid installments payable each year when first semi-annual 
payment of ordinary taxes was due, though no installment thereof was to be 
paid at that time. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 222. 
Owner paying unpaid installments in advance pays interest only to date of 
payment. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 463. 
5. Penalties. 
Assessment is not delinquent while its validity is being litigated. 
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. District Court, Polk County, 181 Iowa 1265, 163 
N.W. 214 (1917). 
In case of special assessments, only such penalties can be collected as 
are authorized by statute. Ankeny v. Henningsen, 54 Iowa 29, 6 N.W. 65 
(1880). 
Failure of clerk to certify assessment levy promptly, did not relieve 
owner of liability for penalty. O.A.G. 1932, p. 65. 
6. Landlord and tenant. 
Lessee and lessor could not extend time of payment by executing such 
promise in writing. Vorse v. Des Moines, Marble Mantle Co., 104 Iowa 541, 73 
N.W. 1064 (1898). 
7. Limitation. 
Special assessments levied may be barred by limitations. Fitzgerald v. 
Sioux City, 125 Iowa 396, 101 N.W. 268 (1904). 
8. Recovery of assessments paid. 
Taxpayers held not entitled to intervene to recover assessments paid in 
an action by assignee of contractor's certificates against county treasurer. 
First Nat. Bank v. Kelly, 159 Iowa 312, 139 N.W. 564 (1913). 
It was error to order judgment for plaintiff in action against city to 
recover assessment paid on ground that assessment was illegal where nothing 
showed assessment was void. Hawkeye Loan & Brokerage Co. v. City of Marion, 
110 Iowa 468, 81 N.W. 718 (1900). 
Where owner paid assessment he could not recover though he received no 
notice. Newcomb v. City of Davenport, 86 Iowa 291, 53 N.W. 232 (1892). 
Where owner paid tax owed to city he could not recover same on grounds 
city used illegal method of collection. Dittoe v. City of Davenport, 74 Iowa 
66, 36 N.W. 895 (1888). 
384.68 Bonds Issued 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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384.69 Property Sold at Tax Sale 
1. Construction and application. 
At scavenger tax sale, County Treasurer should attempt to sell property 
for delinquent taxes and special assessments. City may bid at such sale to 
protect interest. O.A.G., July 16, 1979. 
When property at scavenger sale receives no bids sufficient to satisfy 
special assessments, and no general taxes are owed, city is not required to 
bid for property. O.A.G., November 20, 1978. 
Statutory duty of County Treasurer to collect special assessments by same 
proceedings as used in collecting ordinary taxes. Bennett v. Greenwalt, 226 
Iowa 1113, 286 N.W. 722 (1939). 
Purchaser of certificates not entitled to sue in equity to foreclose 
special assessment lien. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Valley - Des Moines Co., 
220 Iowa 556, 260 N.W. 669 (1935). 
Treasurer empowered in case of nonpayment, to see such lots as other 
property was sold for taxes. Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271 (1871). 
Notice to be given. O.A.G. March 2, 1970. 
Installments not delinquent not computed in determining amount to be 
collected at tax sales. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 369. 
2. Power to enforce assessment by sale. 
Tax sale can be made for unpaid special assessments. Campbell v. Bruce, 
231 Iowa 1150, 3 N.W.2d 521 (1942). 
Tax sale in December following listing of taxes in January preceding does 
not necessarily depend on existence of prior lien. Halvorson v. Mullin, 179 
Iowa 293, 161 N.W. 309 (1917). 
Provision charter authorizing city to levy and collect special tax does 
not include power to sell and convey in case of nonpayment. Merriam v. 
Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163 (1868). 
Power to levy and collect special tax did not give power to collect it by 
sale. Mcinerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa 410 (1867). 
3. Time for sale. 
Sale of realty pending appeal was not warranted. Fidelity Inv. Co. v. 
White, 208 Iowa 519, 223 N.W. 884 (1929), modified on other grounds, 208 Iowa 
519, 225 N.W. 868. 
4. Property subject to sale. 
Section 446.7 did not affect right of holder of assessment certificates 
to have the property sold. Bennett v. Greenwalt, 226 Iowa 1113, 286 N.W. 722 
(1939). 
Railroad property could not be sold as ordinary property where its loss 
would dismember road as line of travel. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. 
Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N.W. 103 (1903). 
Assessment did not create lien on personal property of owner of lot. 
Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa 282 (1866). 
5. Interest and penalties. 
Where assessment was in litigation it was not delinquent till final 
determination. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 374. 
Correct method of computing interest or penalty. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 373. 
6. Validity of sale. 
Not affected by failure to carry forward and enter unpaid general taxes 
or tax list. Campbell v. Bruce, 231 Iowa 1160, 3 N.W.2d 521 (1942). 
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Tax sale was not void because an installment on a special assessment bond 
was included in sale where county bid only taxes, interest, penalty and 
cost. Fleck v. Duro, 227 Iowa 356, 288 N.W. 426 (1939). 
Unless there is prejudice mere delay in issuing certificates of purchase 
does not invalidate the sale. Fisk v. City of Keokuk, 144 Iowa 187, 122 N.W. 
896 (1909). 
7. Installments for which sold. 
Installments not due or delinquent should not be computed in determining 
amount of tax to be collected at tax sale. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 369. 
8. Purchase by city. 
Absent statute town was unauthorized to buy property offered at tax 
sale. Morrison v Culver's Estate, 216 Iowa 676, 248 N.W. 237 (1933). 
Council could purchase tax certificates if sale was held under this 
section or like provision. O.A.G. 1934, p. 144. 
City could bid on property offered for sale for delinquent assessment. 
O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 106. 
9. Invalid sale. 
Despite invalid sale city could sue in equity to collect tax and enforce 
lien. Mcinerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa 410 (1867). 
10. Injunction. 
In suit to enjoin sale court could not enter decree against persons 
having property rights in special assessments who were not made defendants. 
Bennett v. Greenwalt, 226 Iowa 1113, 286 N.W. 722 (1939). 
In action by railway to restrain sale of lots where pleadings merely show 
ownership, purpose of purchase not being shown, it is considered to have the 
fee. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Lindquist, 119 Iowa 144, 93 N.W. 103. 
Counterclaim by city as to amount of tax, proper in action to restrain 
sale. Kendig v. Knight, 60 Iowa 29, 14 N.W. 78 (1882). 
11. Setting aside sale. 
Owner must offer to pay the assessment plus interest before he may have 
certificate of purchase set aside. Fisk v. City of Keokuk, 144 Iowa 187, 122 
N.W. 896 (1909). 
12. Redemption. 
Decree permitting owner to redeem held erroneous and inequitable. Warn v 
Tucker, 236 Iowa 450, 19 N.W.2d 201 (1945). 
Court may consider equitable circumstances bearing on question of right 
to set aside deed. Incorporated Town of Story City v. Hadley, 214 Iowa 132, 
241 N.W. 649 (1932). 
Owner charged on accounting with interest and penalty. Hintrager v. 
McElhiney, 112 Iowa 325, 83 N.W. 1063 (1900). 
13. Compromise. 
Board of supervisors cannot compromise special assessments for public 
improvements. O.A.G. 1928, p. 226. 
14. Deed. 
Showing was insufficient to warrant setting aside tax deed. Incorporated 
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Town of Story City v. Hadley, 214 Iowa 132, 241 N.W. 649 (1932). I 
Entitlement of certificate holder to have deed reformed so as to include 
entire lot. Harris v. Evans, 196 Iowa 799, 195 N.W. 178 (1923). 
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Presumption of duly levied tax created by tax deed rebutted by fact there 
was not record of levy of the tax. Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605, 15 N.W. 
568 (1883), rehearing denied, 62 Iowa 605, 17 N.W. 910. 
Recitals of tax deed, of fact of sale, are not conclusive thereof. 
McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa 246 (1867). 
Acts of 1858 left to city charters to provide for a special officer to 
execute deed. Street v. Hughes, 20 Iowa 131 (1866). 
15. Liability of city. 
Town unauthorized to buy property offered at tax sale could not enforce 
collection and was not liable to assessment certificate holder. Morrison v. 
Culver's Estate, 216 Iowa 676, 248 N.W. 237 (1933). 
16. Tax liens. 
County treasurer may advertise and sell property even though there are 
suspended ordinary taxes on the property, but sale is subject to such lien. 
O.A.G. 1953, p. 13. 
384.70 Redemption by Bondholder 
1. Construction and application. 
Holder of certificates of special assessments had prior right to 
assignment of certificates of tax sale on tender of amount necessary to 
redeem. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co. v. Dickey, 222 Iowa 995, 270 N.W. 29 
{1937). 
City levying assessments cannot protect itself by tender to holder of tax 
certificate and receiving assignment after certificate holder receives deed. 
Means v. City of Boone, 214 Iowa 948, 241 N.W. 671 (1932). 
Tax levying bodies which puchases at tax sale not prohibited from selling 
and assigning certificate. O.A.G. 1938, p. 2. 
Where city held certificate it had right to assignment of tax sale 
certificate whether or not territory was in a separate incorporated town. 
O.A.G. 1936, p. 165. 
Under this section person is actually purchasing tax sale certificate 
with privilege of later acquiring title by tax deed. O.A.G. 1936, p. 56. 
How unpaid holder of certificates may protect himself when general taxes 
are due. O.A.G. 1932, p. 267. 
Loss of right to assignment by permitting holder of tax sale certificate 
to take tax deed. O.A.G. 1932, p. 265. 
2. Time for assignment. 
Assignment held not premature. Fleck v. Duro, 227 Iowa 356, 288 N.W. 
426. 
3. Rights of assignees. 
Reliance of assignee on statement of clerical employee of city was at his 
own peril. Carleton D. Beh Co. v. City of Des Moines, 228 Iowa 895, 292 N.W. 
69 (1940). 
Purchaser of improvement certificate could not sue for foreclosure of 
assessment lien where city followed statutory method of collection. Hawkeye 
Life Ins. Co. v. Valley-Des Moines Co., 220 Iowa 556, 260 .N.W. 669 (1935). 
Assignee held without greater right than assignor had. Western Asphalt 
Pavin9 Corporation v. City of Marshalltown, 203 Iowa 1324, 214 N.W. 687 
{1927). 
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4. Redemption. 
Holder of assessment certificate - conduct required to protect special 
assessment lien. Flanders v. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co., 228 Iowa 926, 292 
N .W. 795 (1940). 
Who is entitled to redeem from tax sale. O.A.G. 1938, p. 2. 
Holder of tax sale certificate to receive amount entitled in case of 
redemption. O.A.G. 1930, p. 280. 
Holder of assessment certificate of any city or town wherein property is 
located may redeem from tax sale. O.A.G. 1928, p. 224. 
5. Amount required to be paid. 
Taxes for which property was sold and all subsequent taxes added to the 
tax sale. O.A.G. 1938, p. 266. 
This section permits holder of certificate to tender sum due on tax sale 
and become owner of tax sale certificate. O.A.G. 1938, p. 2. 
Holder of tax sale certificate at scavenger sale entitled to receive in 
redemption amount bid for the property, interest and taxes paid. O.A.G. 1936, 
p. 341. 
Purchaser at tax sale entitled to amount he bid plus interest. O.A.G. 
1936, p. 267. 
6. Liens. 
Tax sale purchaser taking free from lien of special assessment. O.A.G. 
1932, p. 267. 
7. Injunction. 
Court could not enter decree in respect to persons having property rights 
in special assessments, who were not made parties. Bennett v. Greenwalt, 226 
Iowa 1113, 286 N.W. 722 (1939). 
I 
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8. Mandamus. I 
Mandamus may issue to compel assignment. Inter-Ocean Reinsurance Co. v. 
Dickey, 222 Iowa 995, 270 N.W. 29 (1937). 
9. Evidence. I 
Defendant was not permitted to urge the fact that there was no assignment 
of certificate of sale in action to quiet title to lot acquired by tax deed. 
Hall v. Wallace, 229 Iowa 171, 294 N.W. 283 (1940). 
Evidence insufficient to warrant finding that city intended for 
statements of clerical employee to be relied on by assignee. Carleton v. Beh I 
Co. v. _City of Des Moines, 228. Iowa 895, 292 N.W. 69 (1940). 
384.71 Costs Paid from Applicable Funds 
1. Validity. I 
Provision authorizing street improvement and assessment of cost against 
abutting property according to benefits is not violative of const. art. 1, s 
18. Hutchins v. Hanna, 179 Iowa 912, 162 N.W. 225 (1917). 
frontage not unconstitutional. Hackworth v. City of Ottumwa, 114 Iowa 467, 87 · 
Apportionment of cost of street paving on abutting lots according to 1. N.W. 424 (1901). 
2. Constitutional provision. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
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3. Construction and application. 
Meaning of terms "paving fund" and "general paving fund." Corey v. City 
of Fort Dodge, 133 Iowa 666, 111 N.W. 6 (1907). 
Municipality may extend sewer, gas and water facilities beyond its 
corporate limits. Payment for same. O.A.G. March 28, 1974. 
While city street intersections with other roads and local service-street 
facilities may be established or constructed or reconstructed by cities acting 
alone, the work may also be accomplished by both cities and the state highway 
commission incorporating one with the other. O.A.G. April 4, 1g69, 
Road use tax funds may be used for payment of street bonds, and cities 
and towns may allocate fixed portion of street fund for payment of street 
bonds. O.A.G. December 13, 1961. 
4. Contracts. 
Contract held to not conform to notice. Hedge v. City of Des Moines, 141 
Iowa 4, 11g N.W. 276 (190g), 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Bids. 
Code section requiring notice for bids to state, "the terms of payment 
fixed" was satisfied by provision in contract. Dubbert v. City of Cedar 
Falls, 149 Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). 
6. Repairs. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
7. Funds. 
For annotations, see I .C.A. 
8. Assessment of benefits - in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
9. Basis of assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Property subject to assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
11. Adjacent property, assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
12. Notice, assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
13. Double taxation, assessment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
14. Tax levies. 
Improvement fund and roadway district fund - uses. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 
444. 
15. Bondholders, rights of. 
For annotations, see. I.C.A. 
16. Bonds. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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17. Review. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.72 Reassessment and Relevy 
1. Validity. 
384. 72 
This section not provision for "special laws." Tuttle v. Polk, 92 Iowa 
433, 60 N .W. 733 (1894). 
2. Construction and application. 
Absent an inadequacy in original assessment city could not reassess. 
Morrison v. Culver's estate, 216 Iowa 676, 248 N.W. 237. 
Unauthorized assessments may be corrected. Burroughs v. City of Keokuk, 
181 Iowa 660, 165 N.W. 83 (1917). 
Statute provides method to correct irregular and defective levies. 
Bradley v. City of Centerville, 139 Iowa 599, 117 N.W. 968 (1908). 
Reassessment proper where original adjudged illegal regardless of 
correctness of adjudication. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 126 Iowa 680, 102 
N.W. 529 (1905), 3 Ann. Cas. 651. 
Ordinance validating void assessment not auathorized. McManus v. 
Hornaday, 124 Iowa 267, 100 N.W. 33 (1904), 104 Am. St. Rep. 316, 2 Ann. Cas. 
237. 
Statute not to cure jurisdictional defects. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 
99 N.W. 557 (Iowa 1904). 
Reassessment not authorized on quartum meruit where contractor not 
entitled to compensation. Crawford v. Mason, 123 Iowa 301, 98 N.W. 795 
(1904). 
Act 1888 (22 G.A.) not limited to prior assessments. Gill v. Patton, 118 
Iowa 88, 91 N.W. 904 (1902). 
Fact that contract did not exactly conform to ordinance or advertisement 
was not jurisdictional. Ottumwa Brick & Construction Co. v. Ainley, 109 Iowa 
386, 80 N.W. 510 (1899). 
Council may cure defect in contract caused by failure to determine kind 
and quantity of materials prior to advertising. Tuttle v. Polk, 84 Iowa 12, 
50 N.W. 38 (1891). 
3. Ordinance, absence of. 
Where necessary ordinance is invalid no valid reassessment can be made. 
Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 126 Iowa 680, 102 N.W. 529 (1905), 3 Ann. Cas. 
651. 
Where at time of levy there was no ordinance authorizing assessment, the 
passage of subsequent ordinance authorizing levy did not authorize 
reassessment. Martin v. City of Oskaloosa, 99 N.W. 557 (Iowa -1904). 
4. Opportunity for reassessment. 
Where assessment is invalid and curative act has been passed city to be 
given opportunity to reassess prior to suit on implied contract for costs. 
Citizen's Bank of Des Moines v. City of Spencer, 126 Iowa 101, 101 N.W. 643 
(1904). 
5. Vendor and purchaser. 
Where contract allowed purchaser to deduct assessment and reassessment 
was higher, he could deduct sum of reassessment. Evening Star Lodge, No. 43, 
A.F. & A.M., v. Robbins, 179 Iowa 537, 161 N.W. 680 (1917). 
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6. Presumptions. 
Presumption of ample notice of reassessment. Martin v. City of 
Oskaloosa, 126 Iowa 680, 102 N.W. 529 (1905), 3 Ann. Cas. 651. 
384.73 Void Tax or Assessment 
1. Construction and application. 
Unauthorized assessment may be corrected. Burroughs v. City of Keokuk, 
181 Iowa 660, 165 N.W. 83 (1917). 
2. Vendor and purchaser. 
Where contract allowed purchaser to deduct assessment and reassessment 
was higher, he could deduct sum of reassessment. Evening Star Lodge, No. 43, 
A.F. & A.M., v. Robbins, 179 Iowa 537, 161 N.W. 680 (1917). 
384.74 Correction of Errors (No Annotations) 
384.75 Special Provisions (No Annotations) 
384.76 Application to Joint Undertakings (No Annotations) 
384.77 Assessments along Railways 
1. Construction and application. 
Street railway company's assessment for repavement of bridge, In re 
Walnut St. Bridge in City of Des Moines, 220 Iowa 55, 261 N.W. 781 (1935). 
Repaving not for peculiar benefit of railway company - assessments 
therefor legal. Coates v. City of Dubuque, 68 Iowa 550, 27 N.W. 750 (1886). 
2. Prior laws, construction and application. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
3. Sewers. 
Sewer could just as well be laid on one side of track as in center of 
street. Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 90 Iowa 770, 58 N.W. 
906 (1894). 
4. Surface between rails. 
Dangerous condition of pavement inside street car tracks. Geers v. Des 
Moines Ry. Co., 240 Iowa 783, 38 N.W.2d 89 (1949). 
384.78 Prior Proceedings 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.79 Conflicting Provisions 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
V. REVENUE FINANCING 
384.80 Definitions 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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384.81 Provisions of City Code Exclusive 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.82 Procedure for Financing 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.83 Revenue Bonds 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.84 Rates for Proprietary Functions 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.85 Books and Records 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.86 Pledge Valid and Effective to Others (No Annotations) 
384.87 Payable from Revenues 
1. In general. 
City that assumes revenue bonds for purchasing property may use proceeds 
of sale to pay off bonds. O.A.G., December 14, 1979. 
384.88 Sole Remedy 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.89 Transfer of Surplus 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.90 Part Payment from-General Revenue (No Annotations) 
384.91 Payment to use Services 
1. Rates, discrimination. 
Municipality may charge special or reduced utility rates for governments, 
hospitals, charitable institutions, etc. Such rates are not discriminatory. 
O.A.G., April 21, 1976. 
384.92 Statute of Limitation 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.93 Conflicting Provisions 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.94 Prior Projects Preserved 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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VI. CONTRACT LETTING PROCEDURE 
384.95 Definitions 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.96 Sealed Bids 
1. Construction and application. 
Public competitive bids not required for solid waste disposal contract 
under ~ 4558.76 and a contractor where no public funds are involved. O.A.G., 
October 23, 1978. 
Former ~ 391.31, requiring contracts for street improvements to be let in 
name of city to lowest bidder by sealed proposals, was not limited to cases 
where cost of improvement was to be assessed against adjoining property. 
Everds Bros. v. Gillespie, 256 Iowa 317, 126 N.W.2d 274 (1964). 
This section held not limited to contracts payable by special 
assessment. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 
N.W. 705 (1930). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. Purpose. 
Best work at lowest practical price. Weiss v. Incorporated Town of 
Woodbine, 228 Iowa 1, 289 N.W. 469 (1940). 
Primary purpose of mandatory requirement for competitive bidding on 
municipal contract is to prevent fraud and collusion and for protection of 
public funds. Miller v. Incorporated Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 276 N.W. 
826 (1938). 
3. Discretion. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
4. Necessity of competitive bidding. 
Former ~ 391.31, requiring competitive bidding for "all contracts for 
construction or repair of street improvements" constituted prohibition upon 
letting such contracts in any other mode. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of 
Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705 (1930). 
Construction of sewer from general funds. Dunn v. Sioux City, 206 Iowa 
908, 221 N.W. 571 (1928). 
Improvement by funds from general or highway or poll tax funds. City of 
Des Moines v. Horrabin, 204 Iowa 683, 215 N.W. 967 (1927). 
No statute required contracts for excavation and grading be let to 
competitive bidding. Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa 1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925). 
Extensions of primary roads in cities and towns. O.A.G. 1938, p. 769. 
5. Void contracts, necessity of competitive bidding. 
Alleged oral contract whereby city would pay for twenty-five percent of 
cost of street paving in new addition was void were no competitive bidding was 
invited nor opportunity given therefor. Everds Bros. v. Gillespie, 256 Iowa 
317, 126 N.W.2d 274 (1964). 
Contracts entered into between city and contractor for repairing streets 
without such work having bids submitted for competitive bidding held void, and 
not merely voidable. Horrabin Paving Co. v. City of Creston, 221 Iowa 1237, 
262 N.W. 480 (1935). 
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Contract in violation of statute is void. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. 
City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705 (1930). 
Flushcoating streets with oil and repairing defects held not "oiling." 
Jackson v. City of Creston, 206 Iowa 244, 220 N.W. 92 (1928). 
6. Evasion of competitive bidding. 
Contract to oil instead of repair let to circumvent statutes. Horrabin 
Paving Co. v. City of Creston, 221 Iowa 1237, 262 N.W. 480 (1935). 
I 
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7. Assessments and competitive bidding. I 
To assess cost of public improvement against private property, former . . 
~ 391'.31, requiring competitive bids, must be respected. City of Des Moines 
v. Horrabin, 204 Iowa 683, 215 N.W. 967 (1927). 
8. Maintenance projects. 
Equipment for maintenance can be purchased from construction fund. 
O.A.G. 1946, p. 63. 
9. Supplemental contracts. 
Supplemental contract to pay contractor additional amount for paving was 
not within former section 391.31 requiring competitive bids. City of Des 
Moines v. Horrabin, 204 Iowa 683, 215 N.W. 967 (1927). 
10. Technical defects. 
Notice to bidders, though defective, was cured by form of proposal. 
Vowles v. Town of Kenwood Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1009 (1924). 
11. Substantial compliance. 
Procedure was held to comply with ordinances to repair of pavement. F.M. 
Hubbell, Son Co. v. City of Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 150 N.W. 701 (1915); 
12. Constructive knowledge. 
City was not obligated to make restitution to contractor.· Horrabin 
Paving Co. v. City of Creston, 221 Iowa 1237, 262 N.W. 480 (1935). 
13. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Where call for bids, resolution of necessity and notice were not in 
abstract, presumption was that they were in form consistent with district 
court decree. Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 
(1930). 
14. Curative acts. 
Generally, bid must substantially conform to specifications in 
proposals. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Incorporated Town of Grand 
Junction, 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136 (1933). 
384.97 Notice to Bidders 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
1. Construction and application. I 
Construction contract entered into by town must be authorized by notice 
and authority of governing body. Poor v. Incorporated Town of Duncombe, 231 
Iowa 907, 2 N.W.2d 294 (1942). 
Contractor not required to anticipate failure of city to procure right of ,-
way. Newton Auto Salvage Co. v. Herrick, 203 Iowa 424, 212 N.W. 680 (1927). 
Bidder's duty to base bid on plans and specifications on file. Brutsche 
v. Incorporated Town of Coon Rapids, 220 Iowa 1295, 264 N.W. 696 (1936). 
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2. Necessity of notice. 
Notice to bidders should state as nearly as practicable the extent of the 
work and the kind of material for which bids would be received, when the work 
should be done, the terms of payment, and the time when proposals would be 
acted upon. Bennett v. City of Errrnetsburg, 138 Iowa 67, 115 N.W. 582 (1908). 
3. Definiteness and specificity of notice. 
Definiteness of advertisement for bids and specifications. Gjellefald v. 
Hunt, 202 Iowa 212, 210 N.W. 122 (1926). 
Where specification is in general terms a subsequent reference in more 
specific language qualifies words first used. Urbany v. City of Carroll, 176 
Iowa 217, 157 N.W. 852 (1916). 
4. Nature of work. 
Notice for bids for contract grading of street, stating amount of 
excavation estimated, held to comply with provision requiring notice to state 
as nearly as practicable the extent of the work. Royal v. City of Des Moines, 
195 Iowa 23, 191 N.W. 377 (1923). 
Meaning of "extent of work." Requirement that each bidder submit a 
detailed plan was to advise city of the interpretation of its plan by 
bidders. Jenney v. City of Des Moines, 103 Iowa 347, 72 N.W. 550 (1897). 
5. Materials to be used. 
Conclusion of council as to materials to be used is binding. Hoffman v. 
City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930). 
Council must determine, prior to publication, type of material to be 
used. Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines, 78 Iowa 235, 41 N.W 617 (1889). 
6. Payment terms. 
Notice must fix forms of payment. Royal v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 
23, 191 N.W 377 (1923). 
Commencement and completion dates. Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 
Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). 
7. Conformity of notice with resolution. 
Error or irregularity did not invalidate assessment. Sunset Golf Club v. 
Sioux City, 242 Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 548 (1951). 
Commencement and completion dates. Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 
Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). 
8. Conformity of bid with notice. 
Bid must respond to invitation to bidders, otherwise purported bid would 
be a counter proposal. Miller v. Incorporated Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 
276 N.W. 826 (1938). 
Bidders duty to base bid on plans and specifications on file. Brutsche 
v. Incorporated Town of Coon Rapids, 220 Iowa 1295, 264 N.W. 696 (1936). 
Generally, bid for public works contract must substantially conform to 
specifications in proposal. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Incorporated 
Town of Grand Junction, 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136 (1933). 
Time of completion of paving bids is material part of specifications, and 
cannot be changed by bidder .. Urbany v. City of Carroll, 176 Iowa 217, 157 
N.W. 852 (1916). 
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9. Conformity of contract with notice. 
Additional stipulations not in notice, which are material change, 
invalidate contract. Gjellefald v. Hunt, 202 Iowa 212, 210 N.W. 122 (1926). 
Failure to give notice rendered subsequent proceedings void. Comstock v. 
Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 111 N.W 51 (1907). 
10. Cost - plus plans. 
Cost plus plan proper only if notice is given to bidders. Chicago, R. I. 
& P. Ry. Co. v. Town of Dysart, 208 Iowa 422, 223 N.W. 371 (1929). 
11. Patents. 
Patentee could bid on contract calling for use of his own patented 
pavement. Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930). 
That advertisement required certain patented equipment did not restrict 
competition. Saunders v. Iowa City, 134 Iowa 132, 111 N.W. 529 (1907). 
12. Reference to specifications. 
Notice to bidders was not defective for reason that it referred to the 
specifications. Owens v. City of Marion, 127 Iowa 469, 103 N.W. 381 (1905). 
13. Union labor. 
Question as to whether or not discrimination was made in favor of union 
printers. Miller v. City of Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 122 N.W. 226 (1909). 
I 
I 
I 
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14. Wages. ·I 
Resolution adopted by municipality established minimum wage rates. Iowa 
Electric Co. v. Town of Cascade, 227 Iowa 480, 228 N.W. 633 (1939). 
15. Sufficiency of notice. ·J 
City council's notice of reservation to reject all bids, waive 
formalities and enter public improvement contract should be for best interest 
of city and violated ~ 384.99 providing that contract for public improvement 
must be awarded to lowest bidder, but contract relating to public utility may 
be awarded in best interest of city, in as much as project did not involve ,-
public utility. Dunphy v. City Council of Creston, 256 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa ' 
1977). 
Advertisement sufficiently showed what was to be done. Fullerton v. City 
of Des Moines, 147 Iowa 254, 126 N.W. 159 (1910). 
Facts and data given should enable bidder to compute material and amount I 
of it needed. Jenney v. City of Des Moines, 103 Iowa 347, 72 N.W. 550 (18g7). 
Facts permitted presumption that publication was as required. Arnold v. 
City of Ft. Dodge, 111 Iowa 152, 82 N.W. 4g5 (1900). 
16. Evidence. I 
Record of proceedings relative to street improvements established that 
required statutory notice was given and that contract for such improvement was 
not void. Husson v. City of Oskaloosa, 37 N.W.2d 310 (Iowa 1949). 
17. Presumptions and burden of proof. ., 
Facts permitted presumption that publication was as required. Arnold v. 
City of Ft. Dodge, 111 Iowa 152, 82 N.W. 495 (1900). 
18. Publication of notice. 
Failure of notice to specify extent of work and time for work was 
defective. Polk v. McCartney, 104 Iowa 567, 73 N.W. 1067 (1898). 
Publications of notice under former ~ 391.31 were required to be made on 
consecutive weeks. O.A.G. June 28, 1955. 
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19. Time. 
Notice to bidders, though defective, was cured by form of proposal. 
Vowles v. Town of Kenwood Park, 198 Iowa 517, 199 N.W. 1009 (1923). 
Time of completion of paving bids is material part of specifications and 
cannot be changed by bidder. Urbany v. City of Carroll, 176 Iowa 217, 157 N.W 
852 (1916). 
Commencement and completion dates. Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 
Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). 
Failure to give notice rendered to subsequent proceedings void. Comstock 
v. Eagle Grove City, 133 Iowa 589, 111 N.W. 51 (1907). 
Facts showed notice to be defective. Osborne v. City of Lyons, 104 Iowa 
160, 73 N.W. 650 (1897). 
20. Curative acts. 
Act curing defects in notice held valid. Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 
101 Iowa 343, 70 N.W. 214 (1897). 
384.98 Bid Security 
1. Recovery of deposit. 
Contractor not entitled to recover deposit made when he bid on pavement 
work by reason of a mistake in calculations, where the matter was discussed 
and he knew all the facts before his bid was acted upon, and did not choose to 
withdraw it. Tony Amodeo Co. v. Town of Woodward, 192 Iowa 535, 185 N.W. 94 
(1921). 
384.99 Award of Contract 
1. In general. 
City council's discretion to determine lowest bidder not limited by 
department of housing and urban development's final authorization, city not 
estopped from denying that contractor was responsible as result of 
department's qualification that contractor was responsible. Istari 
Construction Inc. v. City of Muscatine, 330 N.W.2d 798, (Iowa 1983). 
City council not compelled to award public improvement contract to lowest 
bidder. O.A.G., June 23, 1983. 
Valid contract prequisite to power to buy special assessment. Allen v. 
City of Davenport, 132 F. 209 (1904). 
Former ~ 3g1.31 requiring contracts for street improvements to be let in 
name of city to lowest bidder by sealed proposals, was not limited to cases 
where cost of improvement was to be assessed against adjoining property. 
Everds Bros. v. Gillespie, 256 Iowa 317, 126 N.W.2d 274 (1964). 
This section held not limited to contracts payable by special 
assessment. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa g29, 231 
N.W. 705 (1930). 
No statute required contracts for excavation and grading be let to 
competitive bidding. Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa 1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925). 
Contracts for paving must be let to lowest bidder. Wigodsky v. Town of 
Holstein, 195 Iowa 910, 192 N.W. g16 (1923). 
2. Acceptance of bid and award of contract. 
Statements held to not be bribe or material inducement. Lee v. City of 
Ames, 199 Iowa 1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925). 
Acceptance consisted of approval of contract and bond by city council. 
Capital City Brick & Pipe Co. v. City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 354, 132 N.W. 
188 (1911). 
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Where work to be done is fully described in specifications referred to in 
an advertisement, the acceptance of a bid in writing creates a contract. City 
of Ft. Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa 476, 80 N.W. 527 (1899). 
3. Rejection of bids. 
City council's notice of bid rejection and waive of formalities to enter 
public improvement contract as it should deem to be for best interests of city 
violated this section because project did not involve public utility. Dunphy 
v. City Council of Creston, 256 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1977). 
Where there were two bids, both could have been rejected. Urbany v. 
Carroll, 176 Iowa 217, 157 N.W. 852 (1916). 
Acceptance of higher bid could be enjoined. Miller v. City of Oelwein, 
155 Iowa 706, 136 N.W. 1045 (1912). 
4. Validity of contract, generally. 
Where there was only one bidder and no fraud, contract was valid. 
Dubbert v. City of Cedar Falls, 149 Iowa 489, 128 N.W. 947 (1910). Ottumwa 
Brick & Construction Co. v. Ainley, 109 Iowa 386, 80 N.W. 510 (1899). 
5. Mistake. 
Plans and specifications were not so misleading as to nullify action of 
council in adopting them. Wigodsky v. Town of Holstein, 195 Iowa 910, 192 
N.W. 916 (1923). 
6. Discrimination. 
Discrimination in favor of union printers is an abuse of councils 
discretion and unlawful. Miller v. City of Des Moines, 143 Iowa 409, 122 N.W. 
226 ( 1909). 
7. Public policy. 
That paving contract calling for use of patented paving was given to 
patentee did not violate public policy. Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 
Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930). 
8. Irregularities. 
Error or irregularity did not invalidate assessment. Sunset Golf Club v. 
Sioux City, 242 Iowa 739, 46 N.W.2d 548 (1951). 
Contracts for paving must be let to the lowest responsible bidder, and 
mere irregularities will not invalidate the bid. Urbany v. City of Carroll, 
176 Iowa 217, 157 N.W. 852 (1916). 
9. Severable provisions. 
Illegality of contract for sewer improvement held severable, and its 
extent ascertainable, so that contract was enforceable against property owners 
as purged of access. North View Land Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 185 Iowa 
1032, 16g N.W. 644 (1919). 
10. Extra compensation, provision for. 
Provisions for extra compensation. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co. v. City 
of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 354, 132 N.W. 188 (1g11). 
11. Void contracts. 
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Decree holding contract and assessment void, not a bar to suit by holder 
of bonds for city to pay cost of improvement. Burlington Sav. Bank v. City of ·,I 
Clinton, Iowa 106 F. 26g (1901). 
380 I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
384.100 
Where there is substantial difference between material contracted for and 
that described in plans and specifications, there is no competitive bidding, 
and contract is invalid. Greaves v. City of Villisca, 221 Iowa 776, 266 N.W. 
805 (1936). 
Where municipal contract is void because of mandatory statute or public 
policy, acceptance of benefits thereunder cannot give rise to liability by 
estoppel. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 
705 (1930). 
12. Evidence. 
Burden of proving fraud was on property owner. Hoffman v. City of 
Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930). 
Evidence showed bids made according to notice and specifications were 
distinct proposals. Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa 1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925). 
13. Review. 
Failure of city to observe lowest bidder statute could not be raised for 
first time on appeal. Carlson v. City of Marshalltown, 212 Iowa 373, 236 N.W. 
421 (1931). 
Where call for bids, resolution of necessity and notice were not in 
abstract, presumption was that they were in form consistent with district 
court decree. Hoffman v. City of Muscatine, 212 Iowa 867, 232 N.W. 430 
(1930). 
384.100 Opening and Considering Bids 
I. IN GENERAL 
1. Construction and application. 
Mun1c1pal1ty authorized to reject all bids on HUD funded project. Istari 
Construction Inc. v. City of Muscatine, 330 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1983). 
Language of bid construed against contractor. James Horrabin & Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa 712, 190 N.W. 380 (1922). 
Board of public works in cities of first class - authority to contract 
for improvements. Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416, 70 N.W. 605 
(1897). 
2. Power to contract. 
Municipal corporations are creatures of legislature, having only such 
powers to contract as legislature grants. Johnson County Sav. Bank v. City of 
Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705 (1930). 
3. Variance between contract and bid. 
Bid held severable. North View Land Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 185 
Iowa 1032, 169 N.W. 644 (1919). 
After opening of legal bids, council cannot contract at variance with 
bids by permitting substitution of materials. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 
Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
City council cannot substantially vary terms and conditions of contract 
entered into under competitive bid. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co. v. City of 
Des Moines, 127 N.W. 66 (1910). 
4. Estoppel. 
Approval of work by city engineer under whose superv1s1on a contract for 
public improvement was performed estops city from contesting contractor's 
right to contract price because of failure to perform work according to 
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specifications, in absence of fraud or concealment preventing discovery of ,, 
imperfections discoverable by reasonable attention to engineer's duties of 
inspection. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 
590 (1938). 
II. PERFORMANCE BONDS 
31. In general. 
Presence of bond does not obviate completion of work prior to 
assessment. Atkinson v. Webster City, 177 Iowa 659, 158 N.W. 473 (1916). 
Bond construed to secure performance of work contracted for. City of Ft. 
Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa 476, 80 N.W. 527 (1899). 
32. Application. 
Application for bond construed against surety. Iowa Bonding & Casualty 
Co. v. Frank Cram & Sons, 209 Iowa 424, 228 N.W. 24 (1929). 
33. Expiration. 
Bond stipulating against suit after date certain estops work after such 
date. Layne-Bowler Chicago Co. v. City of Glenwood, Iowa, 34 F. 2d 889 
(1929). 
34. Liability. 
Subcontractor may rely on bond without proceeding against city. Hay v. 
Hassett, 174 Iowa 601, 156 N.W. 734 (1916). 
In action on bond, city can attack performance of work though job 
accepted. City of Ottumwa v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 175 Iowa 233, 150 N.W. 
586 (1915). Empire State Surety Co. v. City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 132 
N.W. 837 (1911). 
35. Personal injuries. 
City could not apply money due under contract to satisfy personal injury judgment against contractor. City of Boone v. Gary, 162 Iowa 695, 144 N.W. 
709 (1913). 
36. Discharge of surety. 
Effect of minor variation by city in making repairs. American Bonding 
Co. of Baltimore v. City of Ottumwa, 137 F. 572 (1905). 
Effect of municipal recognition of assignee of paving construction 
contract. Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 
624 (1937). 
37. Parties to actions. 
Right of city to bring action on contractor's bond for breach of paving 
construction contract. Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 
279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
38. Venue. 
Change of venue in discretion of court. Sioux City v. Western Asphalt 
Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
39. Defenses - in general. 
Acceptance of work by city. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 
225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (lg38). 
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40. Estoppel, defenses. 
Approval of work by city engineer. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. 
Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Effect of fraud. Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 
279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
41. Surety, defenses. 
Ultra vires. American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. City of Ottumwa, 137 
F. 572 (1905). 
42. Evidence. 
Action for failure to construct pavement of required thickness. Sioux 
City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
43. Questions of law or fact. 
Extent of deficiency in thickness of pavement. Sioux City v. Western 
Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
In action on bond requiring notice to repair paving issues of notice 
properly withdrawn from jury. City of Ottumwa v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 
175 Iowa 233, 154 N.W. 306 (1915). 
44. Instructions. 
As to what constitutes fraud sufficient to overcome estoppel. Sioux City 
v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624 (1937). 
45. Judgment. 
Provision in judgment that judgment was no bar to claim for future 
additional damages was improper. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 
225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
384.101 Delegation of Authority (No Annotations) 
384.102 When Hearing Necessary 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
384.103 Bonds Authorized (No Annotations) 
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409.1 Subdivisions or Additions 
409.1 
Chapter 409 
Plats 
1. Construction and application. 
Because city's requirements of residential subdivisions fell within home 
rule powers, such requirements controlled obligations of owners, mortgagor, 
and mechanic's lienors. Barkers Inc. v. B.D.J. Development Company, 308 
N.W.2d 78 (Iowa 1981). 
City council's act in administrative capacity to carry out statutes such 
as this chapter governing plats. Oakes Const. Co. v. City of Iowa City, 304 
N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1981). 
Rural landowner who subdivides land for sale as garden plots required to 
file a plat. O.A.G. May 20, 1980. 
Proprietor of rural tract of land of forty acres or less need not file a 
plat until such time as the proprietor subdivides the tract into three or more 
parts. O.A.G. Feb. 27, 1980. 
Municipal ordinance requiring platting of land within its jurisdiction 
upon being subdivided into two or parts is not thereby constitutionally 
inconsistent with this section. O.A.G. Feb. 26, 1980. 
Owner shall have a plat made and filed before his subdivided land can be 
sold. O.A.G. June 11, 1979. 
Contract purchaser may not plat land without joinder by record title 
holder and release of all encumbrances. O.A.G. July 3, 1978. 
County recorder could not refuse to record a properly described and 
acknowledged conveyance on the ground that the original proprietor had failed 
to file a subdivision plat. O.A.G. Dec. 29, 1977. 
The auditor must keep the plat book in his office and in determining 
whether to require a plat of land to be transferred should follow standards 
prescribed in 5 409.31. The right of appeal from the auditor's determination 
of need for a plat is to the board of supervisors. O.A.G. May 27, 1976. 
Code 1897 relating to plats did not apply to unincorporated villages. 
Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Town could not increase or alter requirements of statute. Burroughs v. 
City of Cherokee, 134 Iowa 429, 109 N.W. 876 (1906). 
Surveyor may set a concrete or iron pin to establish a corner, and such 
pin constitutes a permanent monument. O.A.G. May 10, 1974. 
A tract of land subdivided into three tracts or parcels must be platted; 
the auditor may require a survey plat to be made by the county engineer or a 
licensed surveyor. O.A.G. June 8, 1972. 
An original proprietor may sell one lot and retain one lot of his 
original tract, but if he sells two lots and retains one lot, he is required 
to file plat. O.A.G. Sept. 21, 1970. 
Suburban lot - defined. O.A.G. August 19, 1970. 
Addition to a city or town - defined. Id. 
Original proprietor may sell one or two lots of his original tract before 
he is required to file a plat. O.A.G. July 14, 1970. 
County auditor must comply with provisions of this section when he is 
required to order a plat prepared. O.A.G. Nov. 2, 1967. 
"Original proprietor" - defined. O.A.G. July 24, 1964. 
Auditor's plats can be prepared and filed where the original proprietor 
fails to do so, but only in towns of less than 12,000 population not having a 
plan commission. O.A.G. Dec. 21, 1962. 
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2. Incorporation of city and annexations thereto. 
Code 1873 did not give owner by execution of plat power to create an 
incorporated city. Turner v. Cobb, 195 Iowa 831, 192 N.W. 847 (1923). 
3. Streets and alleys. 
Rule that limitations do not run against city did not apply to street 
where plat was never accepted. Brewer v. Claypool, 223 Iowa 1235, 275 N.W. 34 
(1937). 
Roadway existing prior to platting held under evidence not dedicated. 
Shuler v. Independent Sand & Gravel Co., 203 Iowa 134, 209 N.W. 731 (1926). 
Description of street held sufficient on which to base a dedication. 
Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 144 Iowa 541, 123 N.W. 215 (1909). 
Not necessary that there be a dedication of alleys through blocks not 
subdivided into lots. Giltner v. City Council of Albia, 128 Iowa 658, 105 
N.W. 194 (1905). 
Plat held to not constitute dedication due to failure to comply with 
statute. Coe College v. City of Cedar Rapids, 120 Iowa 541, 95 N.W. 267 
(1903). 
Failure of plat to designate strip as street did not negative intent to 
dedicate where width was ascertainable. Coe College v. City of Cedar Rapids, 
87 N.W. 444 (1901). 
Under the facts there was no valid dedication. Minneapolis & St. L. R. 
R. Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa 198, 74 N.W. 933 (1898). 
Deed held to not include any portion of street on which lot abutted. 
Brown v. Taber, 103 Iowa 1, 72 N.W. 416 (1897). 
Entry on plat that streets were conveyed to county was ineffectual to 
deprive city of any rights or control. City of Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa 
234 (1868). 
4. Homesteads. 
Plat made prior to extension of city limits, not showing streets or 
alleys held to not be town plat, thus entitling defendant to 40 acres of 
homestead. Parrott v. Thiel, 117 Iowa 392, 90 N.W. 745 (1902). 
Held to not be a town plat. Truax v. Pool, 46 Iowa 256 (1877). 
5. Water courses. 
High water mark boundary of lot on river's edge. Wenig v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 187 Iowa 40, 173 N.W. 927 (1919). 
6. Errors and defects. 
Under "legalizing act", recorded plat made in 1905 was accorded validity 
not withstanding irregularities which attended the filing and recordation 
thereof. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1976). 
In case of discrepancy between plats, the one with respect to which lots 
have been sold will be deemed to be the true and correct one as far as the 
rights of the owners of those lots are concerned. Id. 
Effect of intent of platter in case of error. Liddle v. Blake, 131 Iowa 
165, 105 N.W. 649 (1906). 
Defective dedication could be withdrawn prior to acceptance. Minneapolis 
& St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa 198, 74 N.W. 933 (1898). 
409.2 Covenant of Warranty (No Annotations) 
409.3 Conveyances According to Plat 
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1. ~onstruction and atplication. 
Owners of inlandots seeking to establish easement to beach front 
property as result of 1905 plat. Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1982). 
Grantee of lot designated on plat takes only according to the plat. 
Willson v. Beck, 160 Iowa 276, 142 N.W. 78 (1913). 
Plat referred to in deed considered to furnish true description. Quade 
v. Pillard, 135 Iowa 359, 112 N.W. 646 (1907). 
River constituted an identified monument controlling courses and 
distances. Board of Park Com'rs v. Taylor, 133 Iowa 453, 108 N.W. 927 (1906). 
Deed conveying lot by number does not pass title to any part not numbered 
as a lot. Young v. Cosgrove, 83 Iowa 682, 49 N.W. 1040 (1891). 
2. Survey, effect of. 
Boundaries of city lots should not be established in quiet title suit, to 
vary with survey locating lines in accordance with recorded plat. Jackson v. 
Snyder, 202 Iowa 262, 208 N.W. 321 (1926). 
Occupancy and improvement in accord with lines and corners which may have 
been marked at time of filing plat held better evidence than survey based on 
assumed corners. Harris v. Lewis, 156 Iowa 413, 136 N.W. 674 (1912). 
Boundaries of lot determined by lines actually run on ground as shown by 
surveyor's stakes. Thrush v. Graybill, 110 Iowa 585, 81 N.W. 798. 
Purchaser of lot by number takes according to lines run rather than as on 
plat. Root v. Town of Cincinnati, 87 Iowa 202, 54 N.W. 206. 
Lot line governed by street as surveyed and marked not by plat. 
Bradstreet v. Dunham, 65 Iows 248, 21 N.W. 592 (1884). 
3. Metes and bounds, description b~. 
Reservation of mineral rights in plat not conclusive against conveyance 
containing description normally sufficient to convey entire title. Hyde Park 
Investment Co. v. Glenwood Coal Co., 170 Iowa 593, 153 N.W. 181 (1915). 
Custom of locating division lines by tops of ridges not justified where 
different line was established by metes and bounds in deed from original 
owner. Palmer v. Osborne, 115 Iowa 714, 87 N.W. 712 (1901). 
Grantors acquired title by descent, and description excluding north half, 
it was held north half was not conveyed. Waldin v. Smith, 76 Iowa 652, 39 
N .W. 82 (1888). 
4. Boundary recognized by parties. 
Boundary recognized for 10 or more years may be controlling. Dows Real 
Estate & Trust Co. v. Emerson, 125 Iowa 86, 99 N.W. 724 (1904). 
Where original lines of platted tract are lost, fact of claiming and 
occupying to a certain boundary, acquiesced in by adjoining owner for many 
years is strong circumstance tending to establish correctness of claim. Corey 
v. City of Ft. Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1903). 
5. Streets and public grounds. 
Filing and acceptance of plat dedicating highway in unincorporated 
village does not convey the fee in the streets. Town of Kenwood Park v. 
Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Evidence supported finding that vendor had not undertaken to dispose of 
platted street to purchaser. Backman v. City of Oskaloosa, 130 Iowa 600, 104 
N.W. 347 (1905). 
Acquisition of vested right in adjacent grounds designated on plat as 
public grounds. Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa 346 (1871). 
In sale of lots by number ownership is conveyed to center of street 
unless clearly excluded. City of Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa 450, 74 Am. Dec. 
358 (1859). 
386 
"' I 
\I 
:I 
I. 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
409.6 
409.4 Streets and Blocks 
1. Construction and apllication. 
When a sublriitted p at request meets all state, county and municipal 
subdivision regulations, the county board of supervisors has a duty to approve 
the plat. O.A.G. Oct. 30, 1979. 
Generally limits of platted block are marked by streets enclosing it. 
Clear Lake Amusement Corp. v. Lewis, 236 Iowa 132, 18 N.W.2d 192 (1945). 
Loe at ion of street cannot be determined by mere "sighting," especially 
where official plats show otherwise. Blakesley v. Standard Oil Co., 193 Iowa 
315, 187 N.W. 28 (1922). 
Stakes held to constitute monuments controlling boundaries between owners 
and city as to boundaries of street. Tomlinson v. Golden, 157 Iowa 237, 138 
N.W. 448 (1912). 
When land is subdivided into three or more parcels, the size of the 
parcel is irrelevant criterion; rather, it is the location of the land or the 
intended use to which the land will be put which determines whether or not the 
land must be platted according to the terms of this chapter. O.A.G. Sept. 11, 
1974. 
2. Compliance with statutory requirements - in general. 
Burden on plaintiff to establish allegations that addition did not 
·substantially conform to existing system of streets, lots and blocks in 
city. Neilan v. Lytle Inv. Co., 223 Iowa 987, 274 N.W. 103 (1937). 
For special assessment purposes tract treated as if platted in streets 
and alleys to conform to those laid out on either side. Gray v. City of Des 
Moines, 150 Iowa 299, 130 N.W. 582 (1911). 
3. Effect of noncompliance. 
No duty on council to approve plat under section 409.7 unless it complies 
with this section. O.A.G. 1906, p. 346. 
4. Encroachments. 
Nothing in record to support a finding of estoppel in favor of landowners 
in suit by town against them for causing nuisance by building and maintaining 
garage which encroached in public street and alley. Town of Marne v. Goeken, 
259 Iowa 1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
409.5 Grade of Streets 
1. Construction and application. 
Duty of city to approve and certify plat. Tuttle Bros. & Bruce v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 176 F. 86, 99 C.C.A. 606 (1910). 
2. Discretion of council • 
. council could not withhold approval till bond be furnished indemnifying 
city against possible expenditures for street improvements. Carter v. City 
Council of City of Council Bluffs, 180 Iowa 227, 163 N.W. 195 (1917). 
409.6 Alleys 
1. Construction and application. 
"Alley", When referred to in a deed conveying platted land the inference 
is that an alley platted for public purposes is intended. Talbert v. Mason, 
136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918, 14 L. R. A., N. S., 125 Am. St. Rep. 259 (1907). 
Not necessary that there be a dedication of alleys through blocks not 
subdivided into lots. Giltner v. City Council of City of Albia, 128 Iowa 658, 
105 N.W. 194 (1905). 
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Facts showed narrow strips on plat between blocks were intended to be 
alleys. Taradlson v. Town of Lime Springs, 92 Iowa 187, 60 N.W. 658 (1894). 
409.7 F111ng - Approval 
1. Construction and application. 
Substantial compliance with statutory requirements concerning acceptance 
of plat by city is generally sufficient. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 
N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1976). 
Duty of city to approve and certify plat. Tuttle Bros. & Bruce v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 176 F. 86, 99 C.C.A. 606 (1910). 
·Not necessary that there be a dedication of alleys through blocks not 
subdivided into lots. Giltner v. City Council of Albia, 128 Iowa 658, 105 
N.W. 194 (1905). 
Failure of original proprietors and subdividers to follow statutory 
procedure for filing plat with county recorder did not result in dedication .or 
easement appurtenant to roadway passing to subdivision owners. Farmers and 
Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 1238, 141 N.W.2d 917 (1966). . 
2. Discretion of council. 
Council could not withhold till bond be furnished indemnifying city 
against possible expenditures for street improvements. Carter v. City Council 
of City of Council Bluffs, 180 Iowa 227, 163 N.W. 195 (1917). 
Council must approve plat which conforms to law. Giltner v. City Council 
of City of Albia, 128 Iowa 658, 105 N.W. 194 (1905). 
No duty in council to approve plat unless it complies with section 
409.4 O.A.G. 1905, p. 346. . 
409.8 Acknowledgement 
1. Construction and application. 
Fact that plat was defect1vely acknowledged did not avail as a9ainst the 
dedication. Shea v. City of Ottumwa, 67 Iowa 39, 24 N.W. 582 (1885). 
Certificate of judge that he was satisfied that the law had been complied 
with was conclusion that acknowledgement was valid. Scott v. City of Des 
Moines, 64 Iowa 438, 20 N.W. 752 (1884). 
2. Description of land subdivided. 
Under the facts there was no valid dedication. Minneapolis & St. L. R. 
Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa 198, 74 N.W. 933 ·(1898). 
409.9 Abstract of Title - Opinion - Certificates - Utility Easements 
1. Construction and application. 
A proprietor of a rural tract of land of 40 acres or less need not file a 
plat until such time as the proprietor subdivides the tract into three or more 
parts. The county recorder can accept a deed for a subdivided tract even if 
the proprietor has failed to file a plat, but the recorder should not accept a 
subdivision plat unless it meets all the requirements of chapter 409. If a 
rural subdivider fails to record a plat as required by this chapter, the 
auditor may order a plat made. O.A.G. Feb. 27, 1980. 
Record fee title is a condition precedent to filing and recording a 
plat. O.A.G. Nov. 21, 1978. 
Contract purchaser may not plat land without joinder by record title 
holder and release of all encumbrances. O.A.G. July 3, 1978. 
All subdivision platting must be done in compliance with provisions of 
section 409.l et. seq., and if these requirements are met, the recorder must 
record the plat. O.A.G. Oct. 23, 1969. 
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Fact that plat was defectively acknowledged did not avail as against the 
dedication. Shea v. City of Ottumwa, 67 Iowa 39, 24 N.W. 582 (1885). 
Certificate of judge that he was satisfied that the law had been complied 
with was conclusion that acknowledgement was valid. Scott v. City of Des 
Moines, 64 Iowa 438, 20 N.W. 752 (1884). 
409.10 Encumberances - Payment - Creditor's Refusal (No Annotations) 
409.11 Encumbrance - Bond 
1. Construction and application. 
Section 409.13, providing acknowledgement and recording shall be 
equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as 
is set apart for streets or other public uses, or as is dedicated to 
charitable, religious or educational purposes, and this section have no 
application to plats of rural areas outside cities and towns, and the filing 
of a plat for such an area dedicates streets to the general public if the 
facts show that there has been an acceptance of the dedication. O.A.G. May 
26, 1964. 
409.12 Record - Filing 
1. Construction and aeplication. 
Recorder's certificate endorsed upon plat is prima facie evidence that 
plat was properly recorded. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519 
(Iowa 1976). 
Failure of original proprietors and subdividers to follow statutory 
procedure for filing plat with county recorder did not result in dedication or 
easement appurtenant to roadway passing to subdivision owners. Farmers and 
Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 1238, 141 N.W.2d 917 
(1966). 
County recorder should accept plats and accompanying documents for filing 
if they conform to law regardless of whether or not the recorder has a 
preferance for size and type of paper. O.A.G. Nov. 4, 1971. 
Platting papers should be recorded in town deed record. O.A.G. 1946, p. 
183. 
Where plat was filed but not recorded till after death of proprietor it 
was held as against his heirs that plat took effect from date of filing. 
Scott v. City of Des Moines, 64 Iowa 438, 20 N.W. 752 (1884). 
Plats to be entered in ordinary plat book in auditorium office. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 240. 
2. Abstract. 
An abstract of title, not to be recorded as part of the platting under 
this chapter, remains a public document and may not be destroyed or otherwise 
disposed of except by legislative authority. O.A.G. Oct. 22, 1g62. 
Abstract of title attached to plat should be recorded. O.A.G. 1946, p •. 
183. 
Abstract should be treated as part of statement attached to plat. O.A.G. 
1904, p. 276. 
3. Fees. 
No fee may be exacted for filing or entering plat in plat book. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 240. 
4. Estoppel. 
Original proprietors not estopped to deny that roadway passed to 
subdivision owners has appurtenant to their land for proprietors' failure to 
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comply with statutory procedure for filing of plat. Farmers and Mechanics 
Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 1238, 141 N.W.2d 917 (1966). 
Grant considered to have been made with statutory authority of 
municipalities to control its streets in view. Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 
677, 155 N.W.2d 502 (1968). 
409.13 Effect of Record 
1. Construction and application. 
Dedicated land is considered continuing un'til something done to indicate 
to the public that tender has been permanently withdrawn. Marksbury v. State, 
322 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1982). 
Under "legalizing act," recorded plat made in 1905 was accorded validity 
notwithstanding irregularities which attended the filing and recordation 
thereof. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1976). 
Code 1897 relating to plats did not apply to unincorporated villages. 
Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Platting and recording does not change owners title thereto. Hyde Park 
Inv. Co. v. Glenwood Coal Co., 170 Iowa 593, 153 N.W. 181 (1915). 
The person who bought and sold lots held to have recognized the plat and 
not entitled to question legality of plat. Schultz v. Stringer, 168 Iowa 668, 
150 N.W. 1063 (1915). 
Where plat was properly recorded and the lots sold by proprietor 
according to the plat, intent to dedicate was sufficiently established. Shea 
v. City of Ottumwa, 67 Iowa 39, 24 N.W. 582 (1885). 
Town site must have been laid out by one having title. Porter v. Stone, 
51 Iowa 373, 1 N.W. 601 (1879). 
Section 409.11 requiring a person filing a plat and developing area in a 
county, to purchase a performance bond, and this section have no application 
to plats of rural areas outside cities and towns, and the filing of a plat for 
such an area dedicates streets to the general public if the facts show there 
has been an acceptance of the dedication. O.A.G. May 26, 1964. 
2. Lands for ~ublic use, generall¥. 
Elementso establish ded1cat1on are appropriation of land for public 
use, evidenced by positive act or declaration of intent to surrender land, 
parting with property! and acceptance by public. Marksbury v. State, 322 
N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 19821. 
When land is dedicated for a public purpose in an unincorporated area, 
the fee title remains in the grantor, and the public receives an easement. 
O.A.G. July 3, 1978. 
Acknowledgement and recording of plat held equivalent to deed in fee. 
Incorporated Town of Ackley v. Central States Electric Co., 206 Iowa 533, 220 
N.W. 315 (1928). 
Filing of acknowledged plat for record operated as deed in fee simple. 
Burroughs v. City of Cherokee, 134 Iowa 429, 109 N.W. 876 (1906). 
Where survey and plat are properly dedicated, it amounts to a deed in fee 
simple. Coe College v. City of Cedar Rapids, 120 Iowa 541, 95 N.W. 267 
(1903). 
When property platted and recorded such acts amount to a conveyance of 
streets, squares, etc. City of Pella v. Scholte, 21 Iowa 463 (1966). 
Inclusion in plat of streets or other public use or dedication of part to 
charitable, religious or educational purposes operates as deed. O.A.G. 1946, 
p. 183. 
3. Depot grounds. 
Instrument of vacation of depot grounds properly filed vacated dedication 
where railway company did not accept dedication. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Homan, 
151 Iowa 404, 131 N.W. 878 (1911). 
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Mere dedication as depot grounds did not endow entire tract with 
incidents of public use. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Hanken, 140 Iowa 
372, 118 N.W. 527, 19 L. R. A., N. S., 216 (1908). 
4. Religious purposes. 
Where plat showed "church square," it was a grant for church purposes, 
yet did not confer title on the only church then on the place. Christian 
Church at Pella v. Scholte, 2 Iowa 27, 2 Clarke 27 (1855). 
5. Public squares - in general. 
Individual acquired rights in abandoned public square so that it could 
not be taken without compensation. Independent School District of Marietta, 
Marshall County v. Tirrmons, 187 Iowa 1201, 175 N.W. 498 (1919). 
Platting of land as public square amounts to dedication for public use. 
Moore v. Kleppish, 104 Iowa 319, 73 N.W. 830 (1898). 
Where square was set aside on condition it be improved by city in 
reasonable time, equity would give no remedy for failure to improve. Leffler 
v. City of Burlington, 18 Iowa 361 (1865). 
6. Dedication, public squares. 
Facts showed dedication. Bayliss v. Pottawattamie County, C. C. 1878, 
Fed. Cas. No. 1, 142, 5 Dill. 549. 
Filing of plat with public square included, followed by its use and 
improvement, constituted dedication. Lace v. City of Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 
121 N.W. 542 (1909). 
Facts showed sufficient dedication. Edwards & Walsh Construction Co. v. 
Jasper County, 117 Iowa 365, 90 N.W. 1006 (1902). 
Evidence showed term "public ground" was not intended to include tract 
designated as "public square." Youngennan v. Bd. of Sup' rs of Polk County, 
110 Iowa 731, 81 N.W. 166 (1899). 
Platting of land as public square amounts to dedication for public use. 
Moore v. Kleppish, 104 Iowa 319, 73 N.W. 830 (1898). 
Where county platted public square and for 50 years asserted no rights to 
the square, intent to dedicate was established. Young v. Oskaloosa County, 88 
Iowa 681, 56 N.W. 177 (1893). 
Designation of parcel of land on plat as "market square" does not 
necessarily show dedication to public. Scott v. City of Des Moines, 64 Iowa 
438, 20 N.W. 752 (1888). 
Dedication of square to public use was held sufficiently established. 
Livermore v. City of Maquoketa, 35 Iowa 358 (1872). 
"Garden square" marked on plat insufficient to establish dedication. 
Extrinsic evidence to fix meaning should be resorted to. City of Pella v. 
Scholte, 24 Iowa 283 (1868). 
7. Parks and playgrounds. 
Property dedicated and accepted for public use may not be diverted. 
Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38 N.W.2d 168 (1949). 
8. Streets and alleys - in general. 
Where lots were sold with reference to recorded plat, accepted by the 
public, purchasers or public could not be deprived of streets and alleys. 
Kuehl v. Town of Bettendorf, 179 Iowa 1, 161 N.W. 28 (1917). 
Acknowledgement and recording plat were equivalent to deed in fee. 
Backman v. City of Oskaloosa, 130 Iowa 600, 104 N.W. 347 (1905). 
Platting and designation of streets and alleys equivalent to a deed in 
fee simple. Blennerhassett v. Town of Forest City, 117 Iowa 680, gl N.W. 1044 (1902). 
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Mere nonuse by public did not defeat right of city to open street. 
Chica90, R. I. & P. R. v. City of Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425, 80 N.W. 564 
(1899). 
Land dedicated by acts in pais and accepted by the public, its rights 
cannot be defeated by subsequent filing of plat of same land. Getchell v. 
Benedict, 57 Iowa 121, 10 N.W. 321 (1881). 
Dedication in plat to county ineffective to deprive city of rights or 
control in streets. City of Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234 (1868). 
9. Dedication, streets and alleys. , . 
Where owner platted lots, blocks and streets, he adopted it by reference 
when selling and such as irrevocable dedication of streets. Wolfe v. Kemler, 
228 Iowa 733, 293 N.W. 322 (1940). 
Road existing prior to plat and marked thereon as portion of lot held not 
dedicated. Shuler v. Independent Sand & Gravel Co., 203 Iowa 134, 209 N.W. 
731 (1926). 
Plat of town filed with petition for incorporation does not show 
dedication. De Nefe v. Agency City, 143 Iowa 237, 121 N.W. 1049 (1909). 
Portion of land was, under the facts, excluded from dedication. Town of 
Mt. Vernon v. Young, 124 Iowa 517, 100 N.W. 694 (1904). 
Strip along river bank adjoining street, too narrow for lots held to be 
part of street by dedication. Boehler v. City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 417, 82 
N.W. 914 (1900). 
Defective statutory dedication may be sustained as a common law 
dedication. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa 198, 74 
N.W. 933 (1898). 
Facts showed dedication. City of Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa 450 (1859). 
10. Title, streets and alleys. 
On incorporation and acceptance of village streets shown on plat, streets 
become streets of incorporated town. Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 
161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
On acceptance of original plat road becomes street and title vests in 
city. McKinney v. Rowland, 197 Iowa 180, 197 N.W. 88 (1924). 
Dedication though not conveying fee in streets to buyers of lots does 
convey on easement to use streets. Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs of 
Polk County, 187 Iowa 160, 174 N.W. 97 (1919). 
Dedication of highway in unincorporated village conveys an easement only 
to public title remaining owner. Kitzman v. Greenhalgh, 164 Iowa 166, 145 
N.W. 505 (1914). 
Purchasers of lots abutting on street take no title thereto. Lake City 
v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569, 98 N.W. 505 (1904). 
Fee in streets vested in town in trust for the public. Milburn v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 (1861). 
11. Reservations. 
City acquires fee simple title of land dedicated for street use but when 
land is dedicated with limitations on the dedication and city accepts the plat 
as dedicated, such action is not void and the limitations have been 
recognized. Leverton v. Laird, 190 N.W.2d 427 (1971). 
Reservation held to have been easement retained. City of Waterloo v. 
Union Mill Co., 59 Iowa 437, 13 N.W. 433 (1882). 
Reservation that a certain street should not be public held repugnant to 
the grant. Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199, 4 Clarke 199 {1856). 
12. Mi nera 1 rights. 
City, in land dedicated to public use, could maintain action for mining 
of coal though there was no interference with public use. City of Des Moines 
v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234 (1868). 
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Held fee and mineral rights reserved to dedicator. City of Dubuque v. 
Benson, 23 Iowa 248 (1867). 
13. Reversion. 
Where highway was dedicated by plat to unincorporated village the fee 
reverts to original owner on vacation. Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 
Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
When vacated by city title in dedicated street does not revert to 
original owner. Lake City v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569, 98 N.W. 376 (1904). 
Title did not revert to dedicator on failure to use portions of land as 
indicated on plat. Pettingill v. Devin, 35 Iowa 344 (1872). 
14. Water frontaae. 
strip of lan alonr river held 
Davenport, 18 Iowa 179 1865). 
reserved to dedicator. Grant v. City of 
Strip of land along river, not 
Gray, 14 Iowa 1 (1862). 
included in plat not dedicated. Cowles v. 
15. Esto22el. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Purchasers' rights. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Injunction. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Evidence. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
19. Burden of 2roof. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
20. Review. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
409.14 Approval Condition to Filing and Recording 
1. Construction and a122lication. 
City councils may consider access in subdivision plats even though access 
not enumerated as requirement in chapter governing plats. Oakes Const. Co. v. 
City of Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1981). 
Substantial compliance with statutory requirements concerning acceptance 
of plat by city is generally sufficient. Pearson v. City of Guttenberg, 245 
N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1976). 
The cities have authority to impose requirements on certain rural 
subdivisions pursuant to sections 306.21, 409.14 and 558.65. O.A.G. April 20, 
1979. 
This section prevails over 409.l for plats within cities over 25,000 
population, and within two miles of such cities, and cities which have, by 
ordinance, adopted this section and within two miles of such cities. O.A.G. 
Dec. 3, 1976. 
Acceptance necessary to make land public property. Kelroy v. City of 
Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). Brewer v. Claypool, 223 Iowa 
1235, 275 N.W. 34 (1937). 
An original proprietor's plat must be prepared by an original owner who 
subdivides any tract or parcel of land into three or more parts for the 
purpose of laying out a town or city or a part or addition thereof. O.A.G. 
Dec. 21, 1962. 
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3. Effect of sale of lots, right to vacate. 
Owner of other lots could not be divested of right to use street. Kelroy 
v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
Right or privileges of other proprietors may not be abridged. Town of 
Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Addition cannot be replatted so as to vacate certain streets therein 
unless all owners of lots in the plat join in vacating. Uptagrafft v. Smith, 
106 Iowa 385, 76 N.W. 733 (1898). Yost v. Leonard, 34 Iowa 9 (1871). 
4. Requisites and sufficiency of vacation. 
Notation by recorder on record of original plat that a certain part had 
been vacated was sufficient to validate vacation. Kelroy v. City of Clear 
Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
Vacation of part of plat by filing written instrument held valid. Town 
of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Conveyance of alley with all reversionary interest did not revoke 
dedication. Zollinger v. City of Newton, 172 Iowa 352, 154 N.W. 611 (1915). 
Conveyance of land prior to acceptance constituted revocation of 
dedication. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa 198, 74 
N.W. 933 (1898). . 
Where owner vacates streets and alleys council cannot determine, exparte, 
that vacation is void. Conner v. Iowa City, 66 Iowa 419, 23 N.W. 904 (1885). 
5. Effect of vacation. 
Action of board of supervisors did not constitute vacation of city 
streets where town's corporate existence terminated. McKinney v. Rowland, 197 
Iowa 180, 197 N.W. 88 (1824). 
Vacation of a plat was also vacation of proposed streets in the portion 
vacated. Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Plat, though cancelled, remains on record and descriptions based on it 
are capable of identification. Chicago Lumber Co. v. Des Moines Driving Park, 
97 Iowa 25, 65 N.W. 1017 (1896). 
Vacation of plat does not impair liability of plat for its portion of 
existing debts incurred by the corporation. Deeds v. Sanborn, 26 Iowa 419 
(1868). 
409.19 Partial Vacation by Proprietor 
1. Construction and application. 
Where dedication was not accepted owner could vacate by filing instrument 
removing area from plat. Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Homan, 151 Iowa 404, 131 N.W. 
878 (1911). 
Where street had been accepted and town was dissolved, lot owners had no 
greater right to vacate. Chrisman v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co. 125 Iowa 
133, 100 N.W. 63 (1904). 
Where street as platted was vacated a proportionate part thereof did not 
become a part of each abutting lot. Brown v. Taber, 103 Iowa 1, 72 N.W. 416 
(1897). 
Where right to vacate was exercised, authority of corporation to take 
vacated part out of corporation limits was not affected. McGrew v. Town of 
Lettsville, 71 Iowa 150, 32 N.W. 252 (1887). 
Enactments not intended as means of giving owners of lots fee simple to 
street by election to vacate. O.A.G. 1898, p. 146. 
Person owning lot on each side of street has no authority to vacate and 
become owner of street. O.A.G. 1898, p. 139. 
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2. Rishts of proprietors. 
Right to vacate exists provided rights and privileges of other 
proprietors in such plat are not affected. Brown v. Taber, 103 Iowa 1, 72 
N.W. 416 (1897). 
"Proprietors" held to be present owners, not merely original platter, and 
they could exercise right to vacate. McGrew v. Town of Lettsville, 71 Iowa 
150, 32 N.W. 252 (1887). 
City council could not make ex parte determination that vacation was 
void. Conner v. Iowa City, 66 Iowa 419, 23 N.W. 904 (1885). 
Vacation was valid where there was reasonably convenient access so that 
no substantial right was abridged. Lorenzen v. Preston, 53 Iowa 580, 5 N.W. 
764 (1880). 
3. Highways or streets. 
Statutes held to refer to traveled street as distinguished from mere 
space laid out between lots. Chrisman v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 125 
Iowa 133, 100 N.W. 63 (1904). Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 
158 N.W. 655 (1916). 
Partial vacation could not affect right of other lot owners to use 
street. Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 5 N.W.2d 12 (1942). 
Statute held to not inhibit vacation of streets never used nor 'needed for 
public use. Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 
(1916). 
Facts showed street to be needed for public use. Hunter v. City of Des 
Moines, 144 Iowa 541, 123 N.W. 215 (1909). 
409.20 Streets, Alleys, and Public Grounds 
1. Construction and application. 
Unopened and unaccepted streets in an unincorporated village plat do not 
require vacation proceedings by the county. Title to such streets remains in 
the original platter, his heirs or assigns, unless lost under the doctrine of 
adverse possession. O.A.G. May 29, 1975. 
Provisions as to vacation of plats intended for owner of realty to 
reconsider his act when it might be done without prejudice to rights of 
others. O.A.G. 1898, p. 139. 
2. Abutting owner's rights. 
Owners of lots in village were not entitled to vacation of street which 
had not been accepted by village as against abutters gaining title to part of 
street by adverse possession. Brewer v. Claypool, 223 Iowa 1235, 275 N.W. 34 
(1937). Where street was vacated a proportionate part thereof did not become 
part of each of abutting lots. Brown v. Taber, 103 Iowa 1, 72 N.W. 416 ( 1897). 
Statutes on vacation not intended as a means of giving owner a fee simple 
in street by election to vacate. O.A.G. 1898, p. 146. 
Person owning lot on each side of street has no authority to vacate and 
become owner of street. O.A.G. 1898, p. 139. 
3. Abandoned railroad right of way. 
Record sustained finding in quiet title action wherein defendants asked 
that title to abandoned railroad right-of-way be quieted in them in proportion 
to their abutting holdings, that certain streets had not been established. 
Jacobs v. Miller, 253 Iowa 213, 111 N.W.2d 673 (1962). 
409.21 Correction of Plat (No Annotations) 
409.22 Vacation by Lot Owners - Petition - Notice 
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409.44 Contest - Decree (No Annotations) 
409.45 Sale or Lease without Plat 
1. Construction and application. 
Note given for purchase money of lots sold prior to recordation of plat 
was not rendered void. Watrous & Snouffer v. Blair, 32 Iowa 58 (1871). 
Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa 546 (1973). 
A tract of land subdivided into three tracts or parcels must be platted; 
the auditor may require a survey plat to be made by the county engineer or a 
licensed surveyor. O.A.G. June 8, 1972. 
409.46, 407.47 Repealed by Acts 1970 (63 G.A.) ch. 1025, ~ ~ 72, 73 
409.48 Assessment of Platted Lots 
Where building sites and streets on plat filed by taxpayer had no legal 
significance, plat was of one area, and thus this section governing assessment 
of unimproved individual lots in plat was not applicable. K-Line Farms Inc. 
v. Waterloo Bd. of Review, 275 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1979). 
P 1 atted 1 ots were "improved" for tax assessment purposes. Bu i1 ders Land 
Co. v. Martens, 255 Iowa 231, 122 N.W.2d 189 (1963). 
Real estate assessments - adjustment for full taxation - timing. O.A.G. 
December 26, 1969. 
This section applies to all platted ground, no matter when the plat was 
made, filed and recorded. O.A.G. June 20, 1967. 
Procedure for the assessment of platted lots enacted by this section 
applies not only to plats recorded after July 4, 1965, but also to plats 
recorded within three year prior to that date. O.A.G. September 22, 1966. 
Where an auditor's plat has been prepared because owners of the tracts 
land involved failed to comply with auditor's request pursuant to section 
409.31, total cost of preparing plat is to be prorated over the several 
subdivisons. O.A.G. August 1, 1963. 
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Chapter 420 
Cities Under Special Charter 
420.45 Claims for Personal Injury - Limitation 
In all cases of personal injury or damage to property resulting from 
defective streets or sidewalks, or from any cause originating in the neglect 
or failure of any municipal corporation or its officers to perform their 
duties, no suit shall be brought against any such city after three months from 
the time of the injury or damage, and not then unless a written verified 
statement of the amount, nature, anrl cause of such injury or damage, and the 
time when and the place where such injury occurred, and the particular defect 
or negligence of the city or its officers which it is claimed caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage, shall be presented to the council or 
filed with the clerk within thirty days after said alleged injury or damage 
was sustained. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
401 
455 .118 
5. Evidence. 
Mandamus proper to compel construction of bridge where highway not 
abandoned. Robinson v. Board of Sup'rs of Davis County, 222 Iowa 663, 269 
N.W. 921 (1936). 
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Chapter 460 
Highway Drainage Districts 
460.1 Establishment 
1. Construction and application. 
Paving of former dirt highway, without substantial change of grade did 
not necessitate establishing highway drainage district. Grimes v. Polk 
County, 34 N.W.2d 767 (1949). 
Joint drainage could not be formed to drain county line highway and land 
tributary to same drainage area lying in two or more counties. O.A.G. 1918, 
p. 512. 
How cost is payable. O.A.G. 1909, p. 249. 
2. Nature of drainage districts. 
Drainage district has no rights or powers other than found in the 
statutes authorizing its existence. Board of Trustees of Monona-Harrison 
Drainage Dist. No. 1 in Monona and Harrison Counties v. Board of Sup' rs of 
Monona County, Iowa, 232 Iowa 1og8, 5 N.W.2d 189 (1g42). 
Drainage districts have characteristics peculiar to them. Miller v. 
Monona County, 229 Iowa 165, 2g4 N.W. 308 (1940). 
3. Ri~ht to discharge water absent drainage district. 
Highway commission and county could discharge surface waters from 
highways by connecting ditch with private tile where plaintiffs' land was 
servient estate and prescriptive right had been acquired. Grimes v. Polk 
County, 34 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 1949). 
4. Attorney, employment of. 
Board of supervisors may employ county attorney or other attorney. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 238. 
460.2 Powers 
1. Construction and application. 
Board of supervisors may employ county attorney or other attorney. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 328. 
460.3 Initiation Without Petition (No Annotations) 
460.4 Engineer (No Annotations) 
460.5 Survey and Report (No Annotations) 
460.6 Assessment - Report 
1. Rail roads. 
Board of supervisors could not include railroad right of way in highway 
drainage district. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Plymouth 
County, 197 Iowa 903, 196 N.W. 284 (1923). 
2. Assessments. 
Reduction by court held equitable. Held v. Board of Sup' rs of Plymouth 
County, 201 Iowa 418, 205 N.W. 529 (1925). 
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460.7 Advanced Payments 
1. Construction and application. 
Statute not retroactive in reducing interest rate and warrants stamped 
"not paid for want of funds" bear interest rate prescribed by law in effect 
that timely warrants were so stamped. O.A.G. 1944, p. 37. 
460.8 Payment fran Road Funds (No Annotations) 
460.9 Dismissal - Costs (No Annotations) 
460.10 Condemnation of Right of Way 
1. Railroads, ditches across. 
Measure of damages in proceedings to condemn right of way for drainage 
ditch across railroad right of way. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 182 F. 291, 104, C.C.A. 573, 31 L.R.A.N.S., 1117 (1910). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2. Instructions. 
Meaning of terms "establishment" and "constructions." Larson v. Webster I 
County, 150 Iowa 344, 130 N.W. 165 (1911). 
460.11 Laws Applicable (No Annotations) 
460.12 Removal of Trees fran Highway I 
1. Construction and application. 
Removal of trees on highway necessary in improvement not controlled by 
provisions of this section. Rabiner v. Humboldt County, 224 Iowa 1190, 278 I 
N.W. 612, 116 A.L.R. 89 (1938). 
Depth of ditches within discretion of road authorities. O.A.G. 1938, p. 
184. 
460.13 Trees Outside of Highways 
1. Construction and application. 
Removal of trees on highway necessary in improvement not controlled by 
provisions of this section. Rabiner v. Humboldt County, 224 Iowa 1190, 278 
N.W. 612, 116 A.L.R. 89 (1938). 
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Chapter 465 
Individual Drainage Rights 
465.1 'Drainage Through Land of Others - Application 
1. Validity. 
Fleming v. Hull, 73 Iowa 598, 35 N.W. 673 (1887). 
2. Construction and application. 
Failure to mention compensation for attorneys and trial preparation for 
plaintiff's challenge to state drainage rights does not deprive objectors of 
due process. Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1972). 
Land owner had no right to dam old ditch to force water along new 
ditch. Allen v. Berkheimer, 194 Iowa 871, 186 N.W. 683 (1922). 
Purpose of this section discussed. Trustees could not enlarge natural 
ditch wholly on plaintiff's land to stop flooding of applicant's land. Cowan 
v. Grant Tp., Monona County, 190 Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921). 
Remedies of dominant owner wishing to open drains across adjoining 
land. Miller v. Hester, 167 Iowa 180, 149 N.W. 93 (1914). 
Board of supervisors decides whether a drainage title may be projected 
across or through a road right of way to a suitable outlet. O.A.G. March 26, 
1970. 
3. Establishment. 
Right of owner to drain water naturally to or over land of another. Dorr 
v. Simmerson, 127 Iowa 551, 103 N.W. 806 (1905). Sheker v. Machovec, 110 N.W. 
1055 (1907). 
4. Prescriptive right. 
Artificial channel may become natural watercourse after period of 
prescription has run. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). 
Assent for over 10 years gave prescriptive right of drainage. Pascal v. 
Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152 N.W. 26 (1915). 
If use is permissive no prescriptive right of drainage. Jones v. Stover, 
131 Iowa 119, 108 N.W. 112, 6 L.R.A., N.S., 154 (1906). 
Defeat of claim of easement growing from adverse user. Schofield v. 
Cooper, 126 Iowa 334, 102 N.W. 110 (1905). 
5. Abandonment of prescriptive right. 
Construction of new drain held not abandonment. Pascal v. Hynes, 170 
Iowa 121, 152 N.W. 26 (1915). 
6. Contracts. 
Tile line established by agreement has same status as if established by 
trustees. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). 
Agreement for drainage substantially benefitting property may give 
interest in nature of easement. Morse v. Rhinehart, 195 Iowa 419, 192 N.W. 
142 (1923). 
Where contract refers to plans, work must conform. Whitsett v. Griffis, 
168 N.W. 878 (Iowa 1918). 
Claim for insufficient capacity of drain settled by agreement. Taylor v. 
Frevert, 183 Iowa 799, 155 N.W. 474 (1918). 
Agreement to extend drain not waiver of pre-existing easement. Pascal v. 
Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152 N.W. 26 (1915). 
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Promise to pay part cost for joint outlet supported by consideration. 
Dugger v. Kelly, 168 Iowa 129, 150 N.W. 27 {1914). 
Contract right to discharge water by drain over defendants land subject 
to extension in accordance with usages of good husbandry. Schlader v. 
Strever, 158 Iowa 61, 138 N.W. 1105 (1g12). 
Contract to lay tile to drain both farms supported by sufficient 
consideration. Fallon v. Amond, 153 Iowa 504, 133 N.W. 771 (1911). 
Acquiesence by owner of drain may confer right of maintenance. Hatton v. 
Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132 N.W. 1101 (1911). 
Easement for drain could not be revoked after grantee has extended money 
or labor thereon. Robinson v. Luther, 140 Iowa 723, 11g N.W. 146 (1909). 
Evidence supported finding that parties intended to make ditch a 
permanent improvement. Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 414, 116 N.W. 731 
(1908). 
Right to drain could not arbitrarily be cut off. Thompson v. Normanden, 
108 N.W. 315 (Iowa 1906). 
7. Easements. 
owner of dominant estate has legal and natural easement in lower or 
servient estate for drainage of surface waters, and natural flow cannot be 
interrupted or prevented by servient owner to detriment or injury of estate of 
dominant owner. Witthauer v. City of Council Bluffs, 257 Iowa 493, 133 N.W.2d 
71 (1965). 
Evidence held not to warrant inference of agreement granting easement. 
Lehfeldt v. Bachmann, 175 Iowa 202, 157 N.W. 456 (1916). 
Easement of permanent nature passes with grant of the adjacent lands. 
Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 414, 116 N.W. 731 {1908). 
8. License. 
Right to forfeit or revoke license to extend drain not inferred unless 
agreement was without consideration. Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152 N.W. 
26 (1915). 
Assent to construction of ditch once accepted cannot be disregarded. 
Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 414, 116 N.W. 731 (1908). 
License held revocable under its term. Thompson v. Normanden, 134 Iowa 
720, 112 N.W. 188 (1907). 
License without consideration is revocable at pleasure of licensor. 
Jones v. Stover, 131 Iowa 119, 108 N.W. 112 (1906). 
Evidence showed license to conduct waters was for terms of lease. Hansen 
v. Farmer's Coop. Creamery, 106 Iowa 167, 76 N.W. 652 (1898). 
9. Abandonment, neglect, obstruction. 
Where two owners had participated in expense and work of construction of 
ditch neither could disregard it without consent of the other. Vanneat v. 
Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 N.W. 906 (1890). 
10. Maintenance. 
Responsibility for maintenance. Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 414, 116 
N.W. 731 (1908). 
11. Improvement, extension or alteration. 
Change of course of ditch does not extinguish easement unless quantity of 
water will increase damage of servient estate. Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 
414, 116 N.W. 731 (1908). 
Construction. Neuhring v. Schmidt, 130 Iowa 401, 106 N.W. 630 (1906). 
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465.1 
Land owner not estopped to fill ditch under circumstances. Schofield v. 
Cooper, 126 Iowa 334, 102 N.W. 110 (1905). 
12. Elevation of tracts. 
Disposition of ordinary surface water is determined by relative 
elevations of adjacent tracts. Witthauer v. City of Council Bluffs, 257 Iowa 
493, 133 N.W.2d 71 (1965). 
13. Crediting value of ditch. 
Presence of private ditch does not deprive owner of right to compensation 
for land taken. Johnston v. Drainage Dist. No. 80 Palo Alto County, 184 Iowa 
346, 168 N.W. 886 (1918). 
Fact that owner built tile drain considered in assessing-benefit. Obe v. 
Board of Sup' rs of Hamilton County, 169 Iowa 449, 151 N.W. 453 (1915). 
14. Purchasers of lands, notice. 
Notice of right of adjoining owners to use tile drain. Morse v. 
Rhinehart, 1g5 Iowa 419, 192 N.W. 142 (1923). 
15. Injunction. 
Dominant owner of land who sought only to have natural flow of surface 
water from his fann over servient owner's land was not precluded from 
obtaining injunctive relief to restrain defendant from obstructing the natural 
flow of the water on ground that dominant owner had adequate remedy at law. 
DeWitt v. DeWitt, 259 Iowa 1037, 147 N.W.2d 32 (1966). 
Plaintiff had burden to prove that changes made by defendant changed 
general direction of flow or substantially increased volume of surface water 
cast upon plaintiff's land. Witthauer v. City of Council Bluffs, 257 Iowa 
493, 133 N.W.2d 71 (1965). 
To require removal of obstruction placed in tile line. McKean v. 
Brammer, 238 Iowa 113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). 
Plaintiff must show damage. Dullard v. Phelan, 204 Iowa 716, 215 N.W. 
g55 (1927). Morse v. Rhinehart, 195 Iowa 419, 192 N.W. 142 (1923). 
To restrain connection with private tile drain where flow of water would 
be increased to plaintiff's damage. Hilton v. Hawthorne, 181 N.W. 259 (Iowa 
1921). 
Where laying of tile under contract would not be advantageous. Calhoun 
v. Robinson, 180 Iowa 538, 163 N.W. 374 (1917). 
Denied where new drain would cause no material increase in flowage. 
Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152 N.W. 26 (1915). 
Restraint of unauthorized extensions. Randau v. Stultz, 140 Iowa 272, 
115 N.W. 507 (1908). 
Maintenance of ditch could not be enjoined where plaintiff had used the 
drain. Grosjean v. Lulow, 118 Iowa 346, 92 N.W. 64 (1902). 
Injunction not granted where plaintiff was benefited. James v. 
Bondurant, 86 N.W. 274 (Iowa 1901). 
Action to restrain interference with rights conveyed to dig and maintain 
ditch. Joslin v. Sones, 80 Iowa 534, 45 N.W. 917 (1890). 
16. Breach of contract. 
Remedy was to repair and sue for compensation. Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 
121, 152 N.W. 26 (1915). 
Measure of damages for failure to construct tile drain. Fallon v. Amond, 
153 Iowa 504, 133 N.W. 771 (1911). 
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16.5 Attorney's fees. 
If law changes regarding payment of trial preparation expenses, 
attorneys, and witnesses incurred by owners of condemned land for agricultural 
drainage is advisible, it should be affected by general assembly. Peel v. 
Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1972). 
17. Actions - in general. 
Action for breach of agreement to build drain. Robinson v. Luther, 140 
Iowa 723, 119 N.W. 146 (1909). 
18. Evidence. 
Evidence showed oral agreement to erect dike for drainage. Young v. 
Scott, 216 Iowa 1253, 250 N.W. 484 (1933). 
Evidence held to contract for drainage. Schlader v. Strever, 158 Iowa 
61, 138 N.W. 1105 (1912). 
Evidence failed to show abandonment of right to maintain drain. Hatton 
v. Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132 N.W. 1101 (1901). 
I 
I 
I 
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19. Instructions. 
Action on note for additional cost of putting in larger drain tile. I 
Rorem v. Pederson, 199 Iowa 304, 201 N.W. 784 (1925). 
Recovery of balance due on contract price. Gorton v. Moeller Bros., 151 
Iowa 729, 130 N.W. 910 (1911). 
20. Damages. I 
Owner of dominant estate may cast additional quantity of surface water 
upon servient estate, if in doing so he does not do substantial damage to 
servient estate. Witthauer v. City of Council Bluffs, 257 Iowa 493, 133 
N.W.2d 71 (1965). I 
Value of growing crops - proof of. Jefferis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 
147 Iowa 124, 124 N.W. 367 (1910). 
465.2 Notice of Hearing - Service 
1. Construction and application. 
Board of supervisors has power to determine whether proposed drainage 
project is beneficial for sanitary agriculture or mining purposes so as to 
determine whether county is responsible for projecting such drain across 
secondary road right of way at location different from the present drain. 
O.A.G. January 3, 1973. 
Trustees could not enlarge natural ditch wholly on plaintiff's land to 
stop flooding of applicant's land. Cowan v. Grant Tp., Monona County, 1go 
Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921). 
465.3 Service upon Nonresident (No Annotations) 
465.4 Service on Omitted Parties - Adjournment (No Annotations) 
465.5 Claims for Damages - Waiver 
1. Parties liable. 
Participation by township in construction of tile did not relieve 
defendant from liability. Costello v. Pomeroy, 120 Iowa 213, 94 N.W. 490 
(1903). 
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2. Measure of damaqes. 
Measure of damages for loss of growing crops from water erosion is their 
value in field at time of injury, or their value in matured condition less 
reasonable expense of maturing and marketing. Witthauer v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 257 Iowa 4g3, 133 N.W.2d 71 (lg65). 
Must be substantial increase in quantity of water discharged. Sheker v. 
Machovec, 139 Iowa 1, 116 N.W. 1042 (1908). 
Increased flow of water must harm plaintiff to be actionable for more 
than nominal damages. McCormick v. Winters, 94 Iowa 82, 62 N.W. 655 (1895). 
3. Waiver. 
Failure to file claim for damages with supervisors was waiver of 
remedy. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 329. 
465.6 Hearing - Sufficiency of Application - Damages 
1. Construction and application. 
Trustees could not enlarge natural ditch wholly on plaintiff's land to 
stop flooding of applicant's land. Cowan v. Grant Tp., Monona County, 190 
Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921). 
Board of supervisors decides whether a drainage tile may be projected 
across or through a road right of way to a suitable outlet. O.A.G. March 26, 
1970. 
465.7 Shall Locate When - Specifications 
1. Construction and application. 
Trustees could not enlarge natural ditch wholly on plaintiff's land to 
stop flooding of applicant's land. Cowan v. Grant Tp., Monona County, 190 
Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921). 
465.8 Findings - Record 
1. Construction and application. 
Ditch not legally established without record showing actinn of trustePs 
and that ditch was necessary for public health. Hull v. Baird, 73 Iowa 5c8. 
35 N.W. 613 (1887). 
Board of supervisors decides whether a drainage tile may be projected 
across or through a road right of way to a suitable outlet. O.A.G. March 26, 
1970. 
465.9 Appeal - Notice (No Annotations) 
465.10 Transcript (No Annotations) 
465.11 Appeal - How Tried - Costs (No Annotations) 
465.12 Parties - Judgment - Orders (No Annotations) 
465.13 Cost and Damages - Payment (No Annotations) 
465.14 Construction 
1. Construction and application. 
Trustees could not enlarge natural ditch wholly on plaintiff's land to 
stop flooding of applicant's land. Cowan v. Grant Tp., Monona County, 190 
Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921). 
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2. Injunction. 
Will issue to prevent construction till compensation has been ascertained 
and paid. Horton v. Hoyt, 11 Iowa 496 (1861). 
465.15 Construction through Railroad Property 
1. In genera 1. 
Land owner could not enter railroad right of way to dig ditch to drain 
water discharged on his land by construction of embankment on the right of 
way. Klopp v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 483, 119 N.W. 377. 
465.16 Deposit (No Annotations) 
465.17 Failure to Construct (No Annotations) 
465.18 Repairs 
1. In~unction. 
l'fere owner never complained of dike for 20 years he was not entitled to 
enjoin its repair. Dodd v. Aitken, 227 Iowa 679, 288 N.W. 898 (1939). 
465.19 Obstruction 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1. Construction and application. . I 
This section does not apply to counties. O.A.G. March 17, 1961. 
Under section 465.23, a county is under no obligation to repair drainage 
tile installed by private party across farm-to-market road. Id. 
2. Acquiescence, ditch established by. 
Ditch cannot be obstructed by servient owner, such rights and duties pass 
to their grantees with the land. Vanneat v. Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 N.W. 906 (1890), 8 L.R.A. 277, 18 Am. St. Rep. 387. 
3. Cleaning of ditches. 
A ditch constructed by agreement could be cleaned by either party but 
neither would be compelled to clean it. O'Mara v. Jensma, 143 Iowa 297, 121 
N.W. 518 (1909). 
4. Allowing obstruction, effect. 
Bars action in damages for overflow. Hull v. Harker, 130 Iowa 190, 106 
N.W. 629 (1906). 
I 
I 
I 
5. lnjuncti on. I 
Complete defense that defendants acted for land owner to prevent wrongful 
diversion of water on such land. Orcutt v. Woodard, 136 Iowa 412, 113 N.W. 
848 (1907). 
6. Actions. I 
Evidence did not show agreement for construction of ditch. Lehfeldt v. 
Bachmann, 175 Iowa 202, 157 N.W. 456 (1916). 
For damage to tile for negligent exposure to frost. Swanson v. Ft. 
Dodge, D. M. & S. R. Co., 153 Iowa 78, 133 N.W. 351 (1911). I 
Obstruction of ditch by construction of too small a tile. Walker v. 
Gorman, 150 Iowa 455, 130 N.W. 393 (1911). 
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Where bridge constructed as to obstruct flow of high waters. Delashmutt 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 148 Iowa 556, 126 N.W. 359 (1910). 
For obstruction of drainage ditch. Brown v. Honeyfield, 139 Iowa 414, 
116 N.W. 731 (1908). 
465.20 Drains on Abutting Boundary Lines (No Annotations) 
465.21 Boundary Between Two Townships (No Annotations) 
465.22 Drainage in Course of Natural Drainage - Reconstruction - Damages 
1. Construction and application. 
Facts showed drainage system should be looked upon as being wholly on 
buyer's land. Johannsen v. Otto, 225 Iowa 976, 282 N.W. 334 (1938). 
Additional remedy provided. Miller v. Hester, 167 Iowa 180, 149 N.W. 93 
(1914). 
Consent to discharge of water on one's land. Schlader v. Strever, 158 
Iowa 61, 138 N.W. 1105 (1912). 
Right to conduct water into natural courses a consideration in assessing 
benefits under improvement. Lyon v. Board of Sup'rs of Sac County, 155 Iowa 
367, 136 N.W. 324 (1912). 
Water may not be discharged contrary to natural drainage. Valentine v. 
Widman, 156 Iowa 172, 135 N.W. 599 (1912). 
This section declaratory only of existing law - new rights not created. 
Parizek v. Hinek, 144 Iowa 563, 123 N.W. 180 {1909). 
2. Water course. 
No prescriptive right against the public. Droegmiller v. Olson, 40 
N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1950). Hull v. Harker, 130 Iowa 190, 106 N.W. 629 (1906). 
Hinkle v. Avery, 88 Iowa 47, 55 N.W. 77 (1893), 45 Am. St. Rep. 224. 
What will constitute a water course. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Board of 
Sup'rs of Appanoose County, Iowa, 182 F. 291, 104 C.C.A. 573, 31 L.R.A., N.S. 
1117 (1910). 
Well defined banks not necessary. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 113, 29 
N.W.2d 518 (1947). Heinse v. Thorborg, 210 Iowa 435, 230 N.W. 881 (1930). 
Natural easement in every natural watercourse. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & 
Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 N.W. 842 (1927). 
Waterway to carry water to public highway could not come natural 
course. Brightman v. Hetzel, 183 Iowa 385, 167 N.W. 89 (1918). 
Natural water course may be partly artificial. Falcan v. Boyer, 157 Iowa 
745, 142 N.W. 427 (1913). 
Swale or depression natural course though lacking defined banks. Parizek 
v. Hinek, 144 Iowa 563, 123 N.W. 180 (1909). 
Eight years acquiescence established natural water course. Sheker v. 
Machovec, 110 N.W. 1055 (Iowa 1907). 
3 through 10 - Reserved 
11. Rights and liabilities in general. 
No rights acquired against the public. Droegmiller v. Olson, 40 N.W.2d 
292 ( Iowa 1950) • 
Injury to building by water seepage from adjoining structure. Dravis v. 
Sawyer, 218 Iowa 742, 254 N.W. 920 (1934). 
Owner on whose land artificial ditch was constructed had duty to remove 
obstruction. Miller v. Perkins, 204 Iowa 782, 216 N.W. 27 (1927). 
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Reasonable detention and use of water by upper riparian owner proper. 
Harp v. Iowa Falls Electric Co., 196 Iowa 317, 191 N.W. 520 (1923), modified 
in other respects, 196 Iowa 317, 194 N.W. 353. 
In every natural water course there is easement for benefit to all land 
naturally draining onto it. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 5 
Sac County, 142 Iowa 607, 121 N.W. 193 (1909). Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co. v. 
Board of Sup'rs of Wright County, 144 Iowa 10, 121 N.W. 39 (1909). Maben v. 
Olson, 187 Iowa 1060, 175 N.W. 512 (1919). 
Right to discharge water from roof of house into street and alley. 
Reynolds v. Union Savings Bank, 155 Iowa 519, 136 N.W. 529 (1912). 
Right of riparian owner to have water leave his property at its lowest 
level. Bramley v. Jordan, 153 Iowa 295, 133 N.W. 706 (1911). 
Fences not to unreasonably interfere with drainage. Trumbo v. Pratt, 148 
Iowa 195, 126 N.W. 1122 (1910). 
If natural water course owners at or near outlet must care for the water 
coming from above. Jenison, 145 Iowa 215, 123 N.W. 979 (1909). 
Acquisition of right by prescription, to discharge subterranean waters. 
Parizek v. Hinek, 144 Iowa 563, 123 N.W. 180. 
Owner must receive all natural flow from higher ground. Pohlman v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 131 Iowa 89, 107 N.W. 1025 (1906), 6 L.R.A., N.S. 
146. 
12. Drainage districts as affecting rights of landowners. 
Function of drainage district on servient land. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 
Iowa 1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). 
Public drainage improvement does not abridge owners right to avail 
himself of natural watercourse. Crowley v. Reynolds, 178 Iowa 701, 160 N.W. 
241 (1917). 
13. Dominant estate owner, rights and liabilitites - in general. 
Evidence did not show drainage pipe installation so altered natural 
system of drainage as to substantially increase burden on servient estate. 
Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Owner of upper or dominant estate has legal and natural easement in lower 
or servient estate for drainage of surface waters. Ditch v. Hess, 212 N.W.2d 
442 (Iowa 1973). 
Owner of dominant estate - right to have water flow unobstructed on 
servient estate. Cundiff v. Kopseiker, 61 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1954). Young v. 
Scott, 216 Iowa 1253, 250 N.W. 484 (1933). Clark v. Pierce, 224 Iowa 1068, 
227 N.W. 711 (1938). 
Function of drainage district on servient land. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 
Iowa 1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). 
Estopped owner of dominant estate to object to interference of flow of 
water. Fennema v. Menninga, 236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1954). 
Owner of servient estate must not obstruct flow of water in natural 
course. Herman v. Drew, 126 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 227 (1933). 
Owner may drain water through natural watercourse to and over servient 
estate. Parizek v. Hinek, 114 Iowa 563, 123 N.W. 180 (1909). Board of Sup'rs 
of Pottawattamie County v. Board of Sup'rs of Harrision County, 214 Iowa 655, 
241 N.W. 14 (1932), motion denied, 54 S.Ct. 47, appeal dismissed, 54 S.Ct. 
125, 290 U.S. 595, 78 L. Ed. 523. 
Owner of servient estate may not artificially prevent flow of water in 
natural course. Heinse v. Thorborg, 210 Iowa 435, 230 N.W. 881 (1930). 
Servient estate burdened with water naturally flowing on it. Miller v. 
Perkins, 204 Iowa 782, 216 N.W. 27 (1927). 
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Relative elevation determines dominance of estate. Downey v. Phelps, 201 
Iowa 826, 208 N.W. 499 (1926). 
Owner of dominant estate may not collect and cast water on servient 
estate in an unnatural manner. Wirds v. Vierkandt, 131 Iowa 125, 108 N.W. 108 
(1906). 
Owner of dominant estate may conduct water by tile to its natural 
channel. Vanneat v. Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 N.W. 906 (1890), 8 L.R.A. 277, 
18 Am. St. Rep. 387. 
14. Waiver of rights. 
Owner of dominant land in private drainage district could waiver rights 
which he or his successors in ownership might otherwise have under this 
section, permitting preservation of drainage in course of natural drainage. 
Halsrud v. Brodale, 247 Iowa 273, 72 N.W.2d 94 (1956). 
15. Servient estate owner, rights and liabilities. 
For annotations, see ~ 465.22, Note 13. 
16. Railroads, rights and liabilities - in general. 
Not liable without fault or act. Hinkle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 
208 Iowa 1366, 227 N.W. 419 (1929). 
Destruction of dam, restoring natural flow created no liability in 
railroad. Miller v. Perkins, 204 Iowa 782, 216 N.W. 27 (1927). 
Rights of natural water course are paramount to rights of railroad. 
Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 N.W. 842 (1927). 
Exercise of care by plaintiff was necessary to a recovery for damage due 
to overflow. Brous. v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Iowa 701, 142 N.W. 416 (1913). 
Abandonment of culvert and later reopening. Brainard v. Chicago, R. I. 
Ry. Co., 151 Iowa 466, 131 N.W. 649 (1911). 
Care required of railroad to not dam up channel. Tretter v. Chicago 
Great Western Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 375, 126 N.W. 339 (1910), 140 Am. St. Rep. 
304. 
Where flood necessarily results from construction in the usual manner it 
is not actionable as it is presumed that such damages were awarded 
originally. Blunck v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. 142 Iowa 146, 120 N.W. 737. 
Railroad company may pass down water according to laws of gravitation. 
Bones v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 145 Iowa 222, 120 N.W. 717 (1909). 
Railroad has no right to construct solid roadbed in interference with 
natural drainage. Albright v. Cedar Rapids, & I. C. Ry. & Light Co., 133 Iowa 
644, 110 N.W. 1052 (1907). 
Responsibility of railroad for construction of bridge producing 
overflows. Vyse v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 127 Iowa 90, 101 N.W. 736 (1904). 
Railroad could not fill trestlework where overflow would be caused. Noe 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 76 Iowa 360, 41 N.W. 42 (1888). 
17. Drainage through railroad right of way. 
Sluices or culverts must be constructed to conduct water in its natural 
course. Hinkle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 208 Iowa 1366, 227 N.W. 419 
(1929). 
Purchaser not entitled to damages for obstruction for which railroad had 
a release. Johnson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 N.W. 842 
(1927). 
Railroad not liable for damages which would have occurred despite its act 
of obstruction. McAdams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 732, 205 
N.W. 310 (1925). 
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Bridge causing overflow - railroad liable for its negligence. Thompson I 
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 177 Iowa 328, 158 N.W. 676 (1916). 
Railroad may continue to drain water in its natural course. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 163 Iowa 283, 143 N.W. 1083 (1913). . 
Railroad must provide for floods but not for unprecedented floods. Estes I 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 159 Iowa 666, 141 N.W. 49 (1913). 
Railroad bridges must not obstruct passage of water. Delashmutt v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 148 Iowa 556, 126 N.W. 359 (1910). 
Surface waters and streams may not be diverted to damage of others. 
Albright v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway & Light Co., 133 Iowa 644, 110 I 
N.W. 1052 (1878). 
Railroad liable for damages caused by insufficient culvert. Houghtaling 
v. Chicago G. W.R. Co., 117 Iowa 540, 91 N.W. 811 (1902). Sullens v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 659, 38 N.W. 545 (1888). Van Orsdal v. 
Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 56 Iowa 470, 9 N.W. 379 (1881). I 
Railroad must take note of rainfall in the climate country. Cornish v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 49 Iowa 378 (1878). 
18. Highways, drainage through or across. 
Landowner's access road, the traveled surface of which is raised above I 
adjoining land, must be ditched and must have transverse bridges, culverts, or 
pipes which permit free passage of water from one side to the other. Ditch v. 
Hess, 212 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1973). 
Drainage through culverts in highway proper where in natural course. I 
Jacobson v. Camden, 236 Iowa 976, 20 N.W.2d 407 (1945). 
Highway authorities may use culverts to drain waters in their natural 
course. Herman v. Drew, 216 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 277 (1933). 
Supervisors could not be restrained from building culverts in natural 
course of drainage. Schwartz v. Wapello County, 208 Iowa 1229, 277 N.W. 91 I 
(1929). 
Where culverts were improperly discontinued by county land owner was 
liable for opening them. Martin v. Schwertley, 155 Iowa 347, 136 N.W. 218 
(1912), 40 L.R.A., N.S. 160. 
Right of owner to open drain on his own land which goes to public I 
highway. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 330. 
19. Street railroads, rights and liabilities. 
May not construct embankment so as to flood land above. Nelson v. Omaha 
& c. B. St. Ry. Co., 158 Iowa 81, 133 N.W. 831 (1912). I 
Street railway liable for removal of bridge and insertion of inadequate 
tile. Hoppes v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 580, 126 N.W. 783 (1910). 
20. Municipalities, rights and liabilities. 
Where city constructed dam prior to condemnation it was liable for flood I 
damages. Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936). 
Measure of damages. Conklin v. City of Des Moines, 189 Iowa 181, 178 
N.W. 353 (1920). 
Owner could not recover from city assessment he paid on grounds that the 
improvement had to be made because of wrongful construction of ditch by I 
city. Conklin v. City of Des Moines, 184 Iowa 384, 168 N.W. 874 (1918). 
Drainage of water from culvert under street to private property. Cech v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 247, 126 N.W. 166 (1910). 
City must not disturb natural flow of water in street improvement. Baker 1 v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 145 Iowa 485, 122 N.W. 926 (1909), 30 L.R.A., N.S. 619. 
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21. Counties rights and liabilities. 
May not divert excessive volumes of water from natural course. Anton v. 
Stanke, 217 Iowa 166, 251 N.W. 153, (1933). 
22. Surface waters - in general. 
Water leaving channel of river in flood time not surface water. Sullens 
v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co., 74 Iowa 55g, 38 N.W. 545 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 
501. Moore v. Chicago, B. & O. R. Co., 75 Iowa 263, 3g N.W. 390 (1888). 
Owner cannot interfere with flow of surface water from adjoining land. 
Besler v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 212 N.W. 120 (1927). 
Landowner not liable for surface waters carried off by gravitation. 
Thompson v. Board of Sup' rs of Buena Vista County, 201 Iowa 109g, 206 N.W. 624 
(1925). 
That water diverted by defendant mingled with other water could not 
defeat plaintiff's right to recover. Whitsett v. Griffis, 168 N.W. 878 (Iowa 
1918). 
Rule that dominant owner may not artificially discharge water on lower 
land does not apply to natural depressions. Miller v. Hester, 167 Iowa 180, 
149 N.W. 93 (1914). 
Owner cannot complain of water gate by lower owner at entrance of his 
land of water course because it impedes debris gathered by water on land of 
upper owner. Trumbo v. Pratt, 148 Iowa 195, 126 N.W. 1122 (1910). 
One who relieves his land of water must respect right of his neighbor. 
Hume v. City of Des Moines, 146 Iowa 624, 125 N.W. 846 (1910) 29 L.R.A., N.S. 
126, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 904. 
Owner of higher land may not use device to alter natural flow of water. 
Baker v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 145 Iowa 485, 122 N.W. 926 (1909), 30 
L.R.A., N.S., 619. 
Owner not relieved from harm caused by change in natural flow, though 
such water flows along highway prior to causing damage. Sheker v. Machovec, 
139 Iowa 1, 116 N.W. 1042 (1908). 
If surf ace water has no defined channel it may be returned by owner in 
any direction. Brown v. Armstrong, 127 Iowa 175, 102 N.W. 1047 {1905). 
Owner of city lot may bring lot to grade although thereby diverting 
surface water to other lots. City of Cedar Falls v. Hansen, 104 Iowa 189, 73 
N.W. 585 (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 439. 
Water leaving creek and being turned back by embankment into culvert no 
surface water. Sullens v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 659, 38 N.W. 
545 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
23. Right to surface waters. 
Owner of upper land discharges water into its natural course on lower 
land. Schwartz v. Wapello County, 208 Iowa 1229, 227 N.W. 91 {1929). 
Owner may convert to his own use all surface water coming from higher 
9round. Pohlman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 89, 107 N.W. 1025 
(1906), 6 L.R.A., N.S., 146. 
24. Drainage in course of natural draina~e. 
Upper owner may drain water by a drain in natural course of drainage 
unless volume is materially increased to damage of lower owner. Cundiff v. 
Kopseiker, 245 Iowa 179, 61 N.W.2d 443 (1954). McKean v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 
1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). Dorr v. Simmerson, 127 Iowa 551, 103 N.W. 806 
(1905). Sheker v. Machovec, 110 N.W. 1055 (Iowa 1907). Board of Supervisors 
of Pottawattamie County v. Board of Supervisors of Harrison County, 214 Iowa 
655, 241 N.W. 14 (1932), motion denied, 54 S.Ct. 47 appeal dismissed, 54 S.Ct. 
125, 290 U.S. 595, 78 L. Ed. 523. 
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Dominant owner may drain surface water from pond by ditches over course 
of natural drainage and more closely confine flowage. Tennigkeit v. Ferguson, 
192 Iowa 841, 185 N.W. 577 (1921). 
Dominant owner may not gather large quantities of water out of ordinary 
and natural course of drainage and discharge same on lower owner in increased 
quantity. Conklin v. City of Des Moines, 184 Iowa 384, 168 N.W. 874 (1918). 
25. Drainage other than through watercourse. 
Drainage in other than natural course to substantial damage of lower 
owner is actionable. Cundiff v. Kopseiker, 45 Iowa 179, 61 N.W.2d 443 (1954). 
Water discharged on lower lands may not be in place or manner different 
from natural water course. Schwartz v. Wapello County, 208 Iowa 1229, 227 
N.W. 91 (1929). Beers v. Incorporated Town of Gilmore City, 197 Iowa 7, 196 
N.W. 602 (1924). 
Water may not be concentrated in one place and discharged in a body on 
lower owner. Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172, 168 N.W. 803 (1918), 
5 A.L.R. 1523. 
Owner may not collect and discharge water at place other than natural 
course so as to increase flow on land of his neighbor. Kaufmann v. Lenker, 
164 Iowa 680, 146 N.W. 823 (1914). Sheker v. Machovec, 139 Iowa 1, 116 N.W. 
1042 (1908). 
26. Natural depression, discharge of surface water. 
I 
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Water may be collected and discharged into natural depression unless so I 
increased that it causes damage to lower owner. Jontz v. Northup, 157 Iowa 6, 
137 N.W. 1056 (1912), Ann. Cas. 1915C, 967. 
27. Increase in flow of surface water, liability. 
City was not liable for minor increase in flowage due street 
improvement. Cole v. City of Des Moines, 212 Iowa 1270, 232 N.W. 800 (1930). 
Upper owner may not collect water and discharge it, even though a water 
course is an unusual manner or quantity. Martin v. Schwertley, 155 Iowa 347, 
136 N.W. 218 (1912). Valentine v. Widman, 156 Iowa 172, 135 N.W. 599 (1912). 
Lower owner may not complain unless damages are substantial due to 
increased flow. Obe v. Pattat, 151 Iowa 723, 130 N.W. 903 (1911). 
Upper owner may not ditch to a swale through which surface water flows. 
Trumbo v. Pratt, 148 Iowa 195, 126 N.W. 1122 (1910). 
The statute is declaratory of the common law. Pohlman v. Chicago, M. & 
St. P. R. Co., 131 Iowa 89, 107 N.W. 1025 (1906), 6 L.R.A., N.S., 146. 
There is no right to construct artificial channels to increase flow of 
water in unnatural manner. Geneser v. Healy, 124 Iowa 310, 100 N.W. 66 
(1904). 
It is improper to gather surface water and use ditch to discharge water 
in a volume on other lands. Stinson v. Fishel, 93 Iowa 656, 61 N.W. 1063 
(1895). 
28. Artificial barriers to surface water. 
Servient owner cannot obstruct natural flow of water to dominant owner's 
detriment. Fennema v. Menninga, 236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1945). 
Owner will be restrained from obstructing flow from adjoining land. 
Belser v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 212 N.W. 120 (1927). 
Artificial barriers may not be used to prevent flow. Pester v. Smith, 
167 N.W. 580 (Iowa 1918). 
418 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ll 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
465.22 
29. Natural barriers to surface waters, removal. 
No right to open or remove natural barriers to flow of water. Lessenger 
v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172, 168 N.W. 803 (1918), 5 A.L.R. 1523. 
30. Protection from diversion of surface water. 
No right exists to alter the natural system of drainage from a dominant 
estate in such manner as to substantially increase the burden on the survient 
estate. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Each owner must exercise his rights with due regard for rights of 
others. Lamb v. Stone, 178 Iowa 1268, 160 N.W. 907 (1917). 
Dikes or ditches may be used to defend against unlawful diversion of 
waters. Thiessen v. Claussen, 135 Iowa 187, 112 N.W. 545 (1907). 
Artificial diversion of water may be protected against. Matteson v. 
Tucker, 131 Iowa 511, 107 N.W. 600 (1906). 
31. Natural water course, interference - in general. 
Owner may not arrest or interfere with flow to injury of another. 
Fennema v. Menninga, 236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1945). 
Liability where diversion results in damage due to increased quantity of 
flowage. Anton v. Stanke, 217 Iowa 166, 251 N.W. 153 (1933). 
Cutting through natural barrier to discharge water is prohibited. 
Kaufmann v. Lenker, 164 Iowa 680, 146 N.W. 823 (1914). 
Improper diversion may be restrained •. Falcon v. Boyer, 157 Iowa 745, 142 
N.W. 427 (1913). 
32. Obstruction of flow of natural waterwat. 
OWner of land through which non-naviga le and non-meandered stream runs 
has a right to have such water flow without obstruction. Watt v. Robbins, 160 
Iowa 587, 142 N.W. 387 (1913). 
One not entitled to obstruct flow of natural waterway. Schlader v. 
Strever, 158 Iowa 61, 138 N.W. 1105 (1912). 
33. Elevations, cutting through. 
Shortening of natural water route. Crowley v. Reynolds, 178 Iowa 701, 
160 N.W. 241 (1917). 
34. Covered drains. 
Use in natural course held proper. Besler v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 
212 N.W. 120 (1927). 
35. Tile drains. 
Claim of right to use tile drain is corroborated by lon9 unmolested 
use. Besler v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 212 N.W. 120 (1927). 
Tile could not connect with ditch artificially dug to change water 
course. Lessenger v. City of Harlan, 184 Iowa 172, 168 N.W. 803 (1918), 5 
A.L.R. 1523 
Owner of land may have tile outlets to natural water course. Parizek v. 
Hinek, 144 Iowa 563, 123 N.W. 180 (1909). Pascal v. Donahue, 170 Iowa 315, 
152 N.W. 605 (1915). Miller v. Hester, 167 Iowa 180, 149 N.W. 93 (1914). 
Owner may substitute tile for open ditch if outlet from adjoining land is 
not rendered less efficient. Valentine v. Widman, 156 Iowa 172, 135 N.W. 599 
(1912). Walker v. Gonnan, 150 Iowa 455, 130 N.W. 393 (1911). 
Tile should not increase flowage. Hull v. Harker, 130 Iowa 190, 106 N.W. 
629 (1906). Plagge v. Mensing, 126 Iowa 737, 103 N.W. 152 (1905). 
Where no damage other than increased flow is shown plaintiff may recover 
only nominal damages. McCormick v. Winters, 94 Iowa 82, 62 N.W. 655 (1895). 
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Owner may construct tile to drain into a lake or other depression. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 102. 
36. Lakes, artificial changes. 
Recovery for artificial changes affecting level of water. Merrill v. 
Board of Sup' rs of Cerro Gordo County, 146 Iowa 325, 125 N.W. 222 (1910). 
37. Deposit of earth and sand, liability. 
Liabili.ty for damages caused thereby. Geneser v. Healy, 124 Iowa 310, 
100 N.W. 66 (1904). 
38. Seepage or percolation. 
Liability for damages caused thereby. Covell v. Sioux City, 224 Iowa 
1060, 277 N.W. 447 (1938). 
39. Prescription. 
Prescriptive right to maintain a dam did not authorize its maintenance at 
greater height than old dam as used for prescriptive period. Iowa Power Co. 
v. Hooper, 166 Iowa 415, 147 N.W. 858 (1914). 
Right of riparian owner to natural flow of stream may be lost by 
prescription. Marshall Ice Co. v. La Plant, 136 Iowa 621, 111 N.W. 1016 
(1907), 12 L.R.A., N.S., 1073. 
Drainage by prescription. Wilson v. Duncan, 74 Iowa 491, 38 N.W. 371 
(1888). 
40. Easements and counter easements. 
Owner of upper or dominant estate has legal and natural easement in lower 
or servient estate for drainage of surface waters. Ditch v. Hess, 212 N.W.2d 
442 (Iowa 1973). 
Dominant owner may estop himself from objecting to interference with flow 
of water. Fennema v. Menninga, 236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1945). 
Grantee to be o.k. land burdened with permanent drainage assessment shown 
in chain of tile. Ehler v. Stier, 205 Iowa 678, 216 N.W. 637 (1927). 
Where owner settled for present and prospective damages for overflow 
created permanent easement to overflow. Kellogg v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 204 
Iowa 368, 213 N.W. 253 (1927), rehearing denied, 2024 Iowa 368, 215 N.W. 258. 
Facts held to constitute notice for owner of railroad's easement in 
bridge for damages. Johnson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 
N.W. 842 (1927). 
Drainage rights by prescription. Hayes v. Oyer, 164 Iowa 697, 146 N.W. 
857 (1914). 
41. Levees. 
Maintenance not enjoinable because land may be possibly flooded. Kellogg 
v. Hottman, 226 Iowa 1256, 286 N.W. 415 (1939). 
Construction not enjoined where level would not increase land which would 
flood. Black v. Escher, 186 Iowa 554, 173 N.W. 50 (1919). 
Levee could not be constructed where it might cause water to accumulate 
on land of plaintiff. Mumm v. Holst, 184 Iowa 821, 169 N.W. 140 (1918). 
42. Embankments. 
Where damage is partially due to overflow of creek. Pfannebecker v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 208 Iowa 752, 226 N.W. 161 (192g). 
Natural flow of water could not be obstructed by embankment. Means for 
escape of water must be provided. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 Iowa 283, 
143 N.W. 1083. 
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For damages there must be a showing that course of flow was altered or 
that flow has been increased. Steber v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 
153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
Prescriptive right to maintain embankment gained by 30 years use without 
objection. Matteson v. Tucker, 131 Iowa 511, 107 N.W. 600 (1906). 
Riparian owner could not embank where effect was increased discharge of 
water on land of another. Keck v. Venghause, 127 Iowa 529, 103 N.W. 773 
(1905), 4 Ann. Cas. 716. 
Erection of railroad embankment for track was permanent damage. 
Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & 0. R. Co., 53 Iowa 341, 5 N.W. 495 (1880). 
43. Dikes. 
County was entitled to enjoin owner of land from maintaining dike which 
altered flow under bridge across road. Droegmiller v. Olson, 40 N.W.2d 292 
(1950). 
Prescriptive period may run from time dike acts as barrier to natural 
drainage. Taylor v. Frevert, 183 Iowa 799, 166 N.W. 474 {1918). 
Dike may not obstruct natural flow and cast water in increased quantities 
at different places. Priest v. Maxwell, 127 Iowa 744, 104 N.W. 344 (1905). 
Right acquired by use, to drain by use of dike. Brown v. Armstrong, 127 
Iowa 175, 102 N.W. 1047 (1905). 
44. Dams. 
Landowners could not maintain dam which held water back on highway. 
Herman v. Drew, 216 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 277 (1933). · 
Owner not liable for unauthorized construction of dam by tenant. Miller 
v. Perkins, 204 Iowa 782, 216 N.W. 27 (1927). 
Construction of dam which causes backwater onto plaintiff's land not 
authorized. Healey v. Citizen's Gas & Electric Co., 199 Iowa 82, 201 N.W. 118 
(1924), 38 A.L.R. 1226. 
Flashboards are part of a dam and can be maintained to the highest of the 
old flashboard. Watters v. Anamosa-Oxford Junction Light & Power Co., 184 
Iowa 566, 167 N.W. 765 (1918). 
Dam which would interfere with flow and backwaters to plaintiffs land 
could not be maintained. Wharton v. Stevens, 84 Iowa 107, 50 N.W. 562 (1891). 
15 L.R.A. 530, 35 Am. St. Rep. 296. 
45. Removal of natural dike or dam. 
Right to remove where no prescriptive right is shown in servient land 
owners. Taylor v. Frevert, 183 Iowa 799, 166 N.W. 474 (1918). 
Chapter 465.22, Notes 46 through 110, Reserved 
111. Actions in general. 
Proper for trial court to retain jurisdiction to the end that the 
litigation be equitably terminated by means of the building of a sufficient 
retaining wall between the properties. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 
(Iowa 1976). · 
Against railroad for damages caused by overflow. Use of plans and 
specifications. Kellogg v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 239 N.W. 557 (Iowa 1931). 
Damages sought by purchaser for obstruction of floodwaters by railroad 
bridge. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & O. ~- Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 N.W. 842 
(1927). 
Proper parties to action. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 163 Iowa 
283, 143 N.W. 1083 (1913). 
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Action against railroad for injury to tile drain by excavation of borrow 
pit. Swanson v. Ft. Dodge, D.M. & S.R. Co., 153 Iowa 78, 133 N.W. 351 (1911). 
Action for flooding of land by railroad embankment. Steber v. Chicago & 
G.W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
112. Rights of action and defenses. 
Maintenance of barrier or ditch for 10 years or more may bar right to 
enjoin. Fennema v. Menninga, 236 Iowa 543, 19 N.W.2d 689 (1945). 
Recovery of damages caused by permanent embankment. Thomas v. City of 
Cedar Falls, 223 Iowa 229, 272 N.W. 79 (1937). 
Liability may exist for negligent construction of bridge causing 
damage. Wm. Tackaberry Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 170 Iowa 203, 152 N.W. 
779(1915). 
Rights of person in possession of land where possessor is not holder of 
entire title. Brous v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Iowa 701, 142 N.W. 416 (1913) •. 
Prescriptive right to maintain water gate. Trumbo v. Pratt, 148 Iowa 
195, 126 N.W. 1122 (1910). 
That owner caused flooding not complete defense. Steber v. Chicago & 
G.W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
Owners right to recover not affected where he was not shown to have 
augmented flow of water into culvert. Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. 
Co., 129 Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 3 L.R.A., N.S., 973, 113 Am. St. Rep. 
483. 
Cutting of ditch through highway for drainage actionable. Geneser v. 
Healey, 124 Iowa 310, 100 N.W. 66 (1904). 
Fact that there was standing water on plaintiffs land at time of wrongful 
diversion of more water would not necessarily defeat recovery. Warner v. 
Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 120 Iowa 159, 94 N.W. 490 (1903). 
Not a defense to railroad that culvert was constructed according to plans 
of competent engineers. Houghtaling v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., J.17 Iowa 540, 91 
N.W. 811 (1902). 
To be actionable a culvert must increase quantity of water thrown on 
plaintiff's land. Schrope v. Trustees of Pioneer Tp., 111 Iowa 113, 82 N.W. 
466 (1900). 
Injury caused by increasing volume of water, or changing manner of 
discharge is actionable. Williamson v. Oleson, 91 Iowa 290, 59 N.W. 267 
(1894). 
Estoppel without prescription. Slocumb v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 57 
Iowa 675, 11 N.W. 641 (1882). 
113. Injunction. 
Dominant owner not precluded from obtaining injunctive relief to restrain 
defendant from obstructing natural flow of water on ground that dominant owner 
had adequate remedy at law. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 259 Iowa 1037, 147 N.W.2d 32 
(1966). 
Plaintiff entitled to injunction against obstruction of flow of water 
from his land onto that of defendant. Dodd v. Blezek, 245 Iowa 1112, 66 
N.W.2d 104 (1954). 
Owner of easement entitled to injunction. McKean v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 
1113, 29 N.W.2d 518. 
Where obstructions placed in artificial ditch did not hold back natural 
overflow injunction would not lie. Clark v. Pierce, 224 Iowa 1068, 227 N.W. 
711 (1938). 
Wrongful diversion of surface waters enjoined. Anton v. Stanke, 217 Iowa 
166, 251 N.W. 153 (1933). 
422 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
465.22 
Owner not enjoined from constructing ditch to expedite flow of water 
discharged near point of natural discharge. Fennema v. Nolin, 212 N.W. 702 
(Iowa 1g27). 
Interference with use of spring enjoined. De Bok v. Ooak, 188 Iowa 5g7, 
176 N.W. 631 (1g20). 
Where damages are problematic and injunction would deprive defendant of 
reclaiming his own land, plaintiff's remedy was at law. Black v. Escher, 186 
Iowa 554, 173 N.W. 50 (1g1g). 
Diversion of natural watercourse on plaintiff's land was enjoined. Ourst 
v. Puffett, 181 Iowa 14, 163 N.W. 201 (1917). 
Diversion of percolating waters not enjoined where diversion would not 
materially affect plaintiff. Thomas v. City of Grinnell, 171 Iowa 571, 153 
N.W. 91 (1915). 
Order that plaintiff lay tile sufficient to carry flow as before, held 
proper. Pascal v. Donahue, 170 Iowa 315, 152 N.W. 605 (1915). 
Injunction granted to restrain diversion from stream by ditch where 
damage is continuing. Falcon v. Boyer, 157 Iowa 745, 142 N.W. 427 (1913). 
Interference with flow of water from plaintiff's land to his injury 
enjoinable. Watt v. Robbins, 160 Iowa 587, 142 N.W. 387 (1913). 
Obstruction of flow causing sediment deposit but not decreasing tillable 
area, not enjoinable. Grimes v. Willey, 134 N.W. 574 (Iowa 1912). 
Plaintiff could not restrain discharge of water into natural ditch unless 
damage was shown. Obe v. Pattat, 151 Iowa 723, 130 N.W. 903 (1911). 
Permission to defendant to correct a drain from defendant's land to 
plaintiff's drain did not bring defendant within the protections of section 
465.22. Oxley v. Corey, 116 N.W. 1041 (Iowa 1908). 
Continued obstruction of natural flow by construction of railroad 
restrained. Albright v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway & Light Co., 133 
Iowa 644, 110 N.W. 1052 (1907). 
Servient owner must show injury to be entitled to injunction. Resser v. 
Davis, 100 Iowa 745, 69 N.W. 524 (1896). 
Injunction granted to restrain maintenance of drain casting out unusual 
amounts of water. Holmes v. Calhoun County, 97 Iowa 360, 66 N.W. 145 (1896). 
Where plaintiff wrongfully diverted stream he could not enjoin defendant 
from turning the water to railroad right of way because it might thereby 
return to plaintiff's land. Preston v. Hull, 77 Iowa 309, 42 N.W. 305 (1889). 
114. Pleadings. 
Defendant had adequate notification to remove levy which was wrongfully 
constructed in effort to drain a natural water course. Anderson v. Yearous, 
249 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa 1977). 
Prayers would be liberally construed in action of servient estate against 
dominant estate seeking relief of drainage nuisance. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 
N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Railroad maintaining bridge obstructing flood waters not required to 
plead source of tile. Johnson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 
N.W. 842 (1927). 
That drainage system was visible may be a defense in that purchaser was 
put on inquiry as to existing agreements for drainage. Salinger v. 
Winthouser, 200 Iowa 755, 205 N.W. 309 (1925). 
Petition alleging failure to disconnect drain as agreed shows no cause of 
action because of improper construction of new drain. Taylor v. Frevert, 183 
Iowa 799, 166 N.W. 474 (1918). 
Plaintiff had to trace injury to his land to thing alleged to have caused 
such injury. Watt v. Robbins, 160 Iowa 587, 142 N.W. 387 (1913). 
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Petition must show the interference with flow where it alleges damage due I 
to obstruction of flow. Hoppes v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 580, 126 
N.W. 783 (1910). 
Equity may restrain contemplated obstruction of flow of stream without 
proof of insolvency of defendant. Moore v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 75 Iowa I 
263, 39 N.W. 390 (1888). 
115. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Plaintiff had burden of showing damages caused by nuisance complained 
of. Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936). I 
Burden of proving oral agreement for drainage. Young v. Scott, 216 Iowa 
1253, 250 N.W. 484 (1936). 
Proximate cause must be shown. Whittington v. City of Bedford, 202 Iowa 
442, 210 N.W. 460 (1926). 
Owner seeking to enjoin construction of levees and ditches had burden of I 
showing his was dominant estate. Downey v. Phelps, 201 Iowa 826, 208 N.W. 499 
(1926). 
Burden on the merits in trial court and supreme court and burden of 
record is on plaintiff. Schuster v. Miller, 188 Iowa 704, 176 N.W. 798 I (1920). 
Presumption that supply of a spring came from percolating waters. De Bok 
v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920). 
Burden of proving that plaintiff could have prevented the damage was on 
defendant. Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 934, I 
167 N.W. 705 (1918). 
116. Evidence - in general. 
Common .knowledge that rapidly receding water does not damage growing 
crops as much as standing water. Downey v. Phelps, 201 Iowa 826, 208 N.W. 499 I 
(1926). 
Servient estate benefits if flow of surface waters from dominant lands 
are controlled. Kurtz v. Gramenz, 198 Iowa 222, 198 N.W. 325 (1924). 
117. Admissibility of evidence. 
Evidence of depreciated value for rental of land admissible. Conklin v. 
City of Des Moines, 184 Iowa 384, 168 N.W. 874 (1918). 
Measure of damages to leasehold. Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. 
P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 934, 167 N.W 705 (1918). 
Expert testimony as to customary method of bridge construction was 
excluded. Thompson v. Illinois Central R. Co., 153 N.W. 174 (Iowa 1915). 
That railroad men went to bridge when storms occurred was admissable to 
show defendants knowledge of condition of the bridge. Estes v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 159 Iowa 666, 141 N.W. 49 (1913). 
Testimony of usual crop yield on land proper. Jefferis v. Chicago & N.W. 
Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 124, 124 N.W. 367 (1910). 
Evidence admissible that opening for passage of water was restricted by 
culvert. Houghtaling v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 117 Iowa 540, 91 N.W. 811 
(1902). 
Testimony by engineers that more culverts would materially help in 
draining land was admissible. Willitts v. Chicago, B. & K. C. Ry. Co., 88 
Iowa 281, 55 N.W. 313 (1898), 21 L.R.A. 608. 
Admissibility of evidence of deposits of earth where not specifically 
pleaded. Hunt v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 86 Iowa 15, 52 N.W. 668 (1892), 41 Am. 
St. Rep. 473. 
Testimony as to value of land with and without use of culverts. Van 
Orsdal v. Burlington, C.R. & N.R. Co., 56 Iowa 470, 9 N.W. 379 (1881). 
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465.22 
118. Sufficient evidence. 
Evidence that landowners removed drainage pipe from their access road to 
highway, thereby causing surface water to remain on adjoining land, damaging 
adjoining landowners crops, soil, and fences, was sufficient to justify award 
of damages. Ditch v. Hess, 212 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1973). 
Decree supported by the evidence. Schwab v. Behrendt, 13 N.W.2d 692 
(Iowa 1944). 
Evidence failed to show substantial damages. Johannsen v. Otto, 225 Iowa 
976, 282 N.W. 334 (1938). 
Evidence held to establish natural watercourse. Heinse v. Thorborg, 210 
Iowa 435, 230 N.W. 881 (1930). 
Plaintiff must establish case by preponderance of evidence. Schemmel v. 
Kramer, 228 N.W. 561 (Iowa 1930). 
Evidence did not prove damage was due to obstruction of flow of surface 
waters. Besler v. Greenwood, 202 Iowa 1330, 212 N.W. 120 (1927). 
Evidence held not to show defendant's land was servient to plaintiff's 
land. Downey v. Phelps, 201 Iowa 826, 208 N.W. 499 (1926). 
Evidence was insufficient to authorize injunctive relief. Pleak v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 1018, 183 N.W. 402 (1921). 
Findings that watercourse was natural and that defendant obstructed it 
were sustained by the evidence. Maxson v. Cress, 189 Iowa 362, 178 N.W. 370 
(1920). 
Evidence was insufficient to sustain finding that defendant caused 
plaintiff's damage. Fisher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 184 Iowa 1261, 
169 N.W. 635 (1918). 
Evidence held to establish prescriptive right to use flashboard of 
certain height. Watters v. Anamosa-Oxford Junction Light & Power Co., 184 
Iowa 566, 167 N.W. 765 (1918). 
Evidence held to sustain finding of natural watercourse and that tiles 
did not change amount or course of flow. Pester v. Smith, 167 N.W. 580 (Iowa 
1918). 
Evidence held to not sustain findinq that defendants act caused harm 
complained of. Durust v. Puffett, 181 Iowa 14, 163 N.W. 201 (1917). 
Evidence showed ditch would not discharge more water on plaintiff's land 
than would otherwise reach it. Lamb v. Stone, 178 Iowa 1268, 160 N.W. 907 
(1917). 
Evidence in action regarding drainage contract showed paper attached to 
contract was part of it. Carey v. Walker, 172 Iowa 236, 154 N.W. 425 (1915). 
Evidence held to show flood was unprecedented and could not have been 
forseen. Wm. Tackaberry Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 170 Iowa 203, 152 N.W. 
79g (1915). 
Evidence that drains of defendant gathered more water and cast it 
differently could not be applied by theory. Pascal v. Donahue, 170 Iowa 315, 
152 N.W. 605 (1915). 
Evidence did not show injuries to land were caused by flashboards 
subsequent to date to which his damages had been paid. Watt v. Robbins, 160 
Iowa 587, 142 N.W. 387 (1913). 
Evidence held to show that defendant had duty to improve so as to avoid 
injury to plaintiff's crops. Tretter v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 147 
Iowa 375, 126 N.W. 339 (lglQ), 140 Am. St. Rep. 304. 
Where evidence showed negligent acts of defendant's employees plaintiff 
had only to show that his harm was the result. Jefferis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 
Co., 147 Iowa 124, 124 N.W. 367 (1910). 
Evidence showed damage due to very heavy rainfall rather than from acts 
of defendant. Bones v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 145 Iowa 222, 120 N.W. 717 
(1909). 
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Evidence showed acts of dominant owner did not materially increase flow 
of waters. Wirds v. Vierkandt, 131 Iowa 125, 108 N.W. 108 (1906). 
Evidence showed actionable injury due to insufficiency of culvert. 
Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 129 Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 
113 Am. St. Rep. 483. 
Facts held to have shown a watercourse. Hinkle v. Avery, 88 Iowa 47, 55 
N.W. 77 (1893), 45 Am. St. Rep. 224. 
119. Insufficient evidence. 
For annotations, see Note 118. 
120. Jury ~uestions. 
Separa ion of damages from natural causes and damages caused by defendant 
was for the jury. Healey v. Citizens' Gas & Electric Co., 199 Iowa 82, 201 
N.W. 118 (1924). 
Where there is no controversy over facts as to construction of ditch, the 
question of whether it is a watercourse is one of law. Falcon v. Boyer, 157 
Iowa 745, 142 N.W. 427 (1913). 
Whether tiles were insufficient to carry off water which might reasonable 
be expected to accumulate. Hoppes v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 580, 
126 N.W. 783 (1910). 
Question of negligence. Jefferis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 
124, 124 N.W. 367 (1910). 
Whether damage arose from negligent obstruction of a stream. Crook v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 119 N.W. 696 {Iowa 1909). 
Question of whether plaintiff's acts tended to augment flow of water. 
Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 129 Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 3 
L.R.A., N.S., 973, 113 Am. St. Rep. 483. 
121. ~uestions of law. 
l'fere there is no controversy over facts as to construction of ditch, 
question of whether it is watercourse is one of law. Falcon v. Boyer, 157 
Iowa 745, 142 N.W. 427 (1913). 
122. Instructions. 
Jury's disobedience of instructions held error. Pfannebecker v. Chicago, 
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 208 Iowa 752, 226 N.W. 161 (1929). 
Measure of recovery. McAdams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 
732, 205 N.W. 310 (1925). 
Action for damages caused by diversion of surface water to plaintiff's 
land. Whitsett v. Griffis, 168 N.W. 878 (Iowa 1918). 
Permanent damage. Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 
183 Iowa 934, 167 N.W. 705 (1918). 
Whether injury to land was permanent or continuing. Irvine v. City of 
Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674 (1915), L.R.A. 1916E, 990. 
Reasonable care in construction of bridge. Delashmutt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 148 Iowa 556, 126 N.W. 359 (1910). 
Action for construction of a levee and filling of a ditch. O'Mara v. 
Jensma, 143 Iowa 297, 121 N.W. 518 (1909). 
Substantial increase in water discharged or material change in method of 
discharge. Sheker v. Machovec, 139 Iowa 1, 116 N.W. 1042 (1908). 
Action for overflow alleged to have been caused by negligent construction 
of bridge. Vyse v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 126 Iowa 90, 101 N.W. 736 (1904). 
Measure of damages. Mulverhill v. Thompson, 122 Iowa 229, 97 N.W. 1077 
(1904). Podhaisky v. City of Cedar Rapids, 106 Iowa 543, 76 N.W. 847 
(1898). Willitts v. Chicago B. & K.C. R. Co., 88 Iowa 281, 55 N.W. 313 
(1893), 21 L.R.A. 608. 
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Clogging of culvert by debris. Houghtaling v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 117 
Iowa 540, 91 N. W. 811 ( 1902). 
Liability of owner for casting waste on neighbor's land. Mulvihill v. 
Thompson, 114 Iowa 734, 87 N.W. 693 (1901). 
Knowledge of rights of landowner. Oliver v. Burlington, C.R. & N.R. Co., 
111 Iowa 221, 82 N.W. 609 (1900). 
Insufficient passageway for water of river. Noe v. Chicago B. & W. R. 
Co., 76 Iowa 360, 41 N.W. 42 (1888). 
Failure to construct culvert. Van Orsdal v. Burlington, C.R. & N.R. Co., 
56 Iowa 470, 9 N.W. 379 (1881). 
123. Dama7es - .in general. 
Mereact that plaintiff alleging drainage nuisance sought compensatory 
redress in addition to equitable relief, did not, per se, mean that the case 
stood in law. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Damage to interest of landlord in crop and peniianent injury to soil. 
Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 934, 167 N.W. 705 
(1918). 
Recovery for damage to entire farm for flooding of a part. Hastings v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 148 Iowa 390, 126 N.W. 786 (1910). 
Measure of damages resulting from insufficiency of a culvert. Harvey v. 
Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 129 Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 3 L.R.A., 
N.S. 973, 113 Am. St. Rep. 483. 
Damages for flooding recoverable despite prior recovery for similar 
injury. Benson v. Connors, 63 Iowa 670, 19 N.W. 812 (1884). 
124. Measure of damages. 
From drainage nuisance. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
For flooding a part of plaintiff's farm. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. 
Co., 177 Iowa 328, 158 N.W. 676 (1916). Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & 
St. P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 934, 167 N.W. 705 (1918). 
To leasehold by flooding. Straight Bros. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co., 183 Iowa 934, 167 N.W. 705 (1918). 
For turning water on growing crops. Martin v. Schwertley, 155 Iowa 347, 
136 N.W. 218 (1912). Jefferis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 124, 124 
N.W. 367 (1910). Wilson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 144 Iowa 99, 121 N.W. 
1102 (1909). Drake v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 302, 19 N.W. 215, 
50 Am. St. Rep. 746. 
For flooding land. Steber v. Chicago & G.W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 
N.W. 304 (1908). Kopecky v. Benish, 138 Iowa 362, 116 N.W. 118 (1908). 
Blunck v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 115 N.W. 1013 (Iowa 1908), reversed on other 
grounds, 142 Iowa 146, 120 N.W. 737. Sullens v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 
74 Iowa 659, 38 N.W. 545 (1888), 7 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
125. Waiver of right to damaSes. 
Rights to damages from o struction of natural water course may be 
waived. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 1282, 211 N.W. 842 
(1927). 
126. Findings. 
Findings that plaintiff failed to show destruction of or detriment to use 
and enjoinment of servient estate were not entirely supported by the record. 
Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Finding that equity of the case is with plaintiff is equivalent to a 
finding of wrongful diversion. Benson v. Connors, 63 Iowa 670, 19 N.W. 812 (1884). 
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127. Judgment or decree. 
Culvert size within discretion of officers under decree modifying 
injunction affecting drainage. Ehler v. Stier, 205 Iowa 678, 216 N.W. 637 
(l927 lhjunction against obstruction limited to removal of obstructions placed 
in water course. Fennema v. Nolin, 212 N.W. 702 (Iowa 1927). 
Decree should restrain maintenance of ditch so as to cause overflows on 
land of plaintiff. Mickelwait v. Wright, 194 Iowa 1265, 191 N.W. 291 (1922). 
That drain be constructed adequate to prevent collection of water. 
Johnson v. Ruth, 144 Iowa 693, 123 N.W. 326 (1909). 
Meaning of "natural channel" and "water course." Benson v. Connors, 63 
Iowa 670, 19 N.W. 812 (1884). 
128. Review - in general. 
Relief from alleged drainage nuisance - review in Supreme Court was de 
novo despite trial court's finding that the action was one for damages. 
Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Refusal to allow damages. Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. D. Ry. Co., 129 
Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 3 L.R.A., N.S. 973, 113 Am. St. Rep. 483. 
Verdict would not be disturbed where evidence showed no injury. Dorr v. 
Simerson, 73 Iowa 89, 34 N.W. 752 (1887). 
129. Harmless error. 
Allowance of damages. Sheker v. Machovec, 139 Iowa 1, 116 N.W. 1042 (1908). 
Verdict of jury precluded prejudice to plaintiff. Dorr v. Simerson, 73 
Iowa 89, 34 N.W. 752 (1887). 
465.23 Drainage Connection with Highway 
1. Construction and application. 
This section, which provides that governing body with jurisdiction over 
highway is to pay costs of material and labor in installing tile line or 
drainage ditch across highway, is only applicable when tile line or drainage 
ditch on individual land must be project across right-of-way to suitable 
outlet, and was not applicable to county drainage districts claims against 
city and DOT for cost of construction of culvert crossings. Drainage Dist. 
No. 119, Clay County v. Incorporated City of Spencer, 268 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 
1978). 
Board of supervisors has power to determine whether proposed drainage 
project is beneficial for sanitary agriculture or mining purposes, so as to 
determine whether county is responsible for projecting such drain across 
secondary road right of way location different from the present drain. O.A.G. 
January 3, 1973. 
Rule that artificial ditch may become natural water course does not apply 
where rights of public are involved. Droegmiller v. Olson, 40 N.W.2d 2g2 
(Iowa 1950). 
County, town and school district could make tile drainage connections in 
highway ditches. Grimes v. Polk County, 34 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 1949). 
Right of owner to open a drain on his land going to public highway. 
O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 330. 
2. Rights of public. 
Owners of land may drain the same in the general course of natural 
drainage by constructing tile lines and may connect same to any drain or ditch 
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along or across any public highway, such connections to be made in accordance 
with specifications furnished by highway authorities having jurisdiction 
thereof. O.A.G. January 3, 1974. 
Rule that artificial ditch may become natural water course does not apply 
where rights of public are involved. Droegmiller v. Olson, 40 N.W.2d 292 
(Iowa 1950). 
3. Easements. 
Due to knowledge and use defendant could not deny existence of 
easement. Hayes v. Oyer, 164 Iowa 697, 146 N.W. 857 (1914). 
Defeat of claim of easement by adverse user. Schofield v. Cooper, 126 
Iowa 334, 102 N.W. 110 (1905). 
4. Repairs. 
County under no obligation to repair drainage tile installed by private 
party across farm-to-market road. O.A.G. March 17, 1961. 
5. Actions - in general. 
Liability for wrongfully changing water course. Mulvihill v. Thompson, 
114 Iowa 734, 87 N.W. 693 (1901). 
465.24 Private Drainage System - Record (No Annotations) 
465.25 Drainage Plat Book (No Annotations) 
465.26 Record Book and Index (No Annotations) 
465.27 Original Plat Filed (No Annotations) 
~ 465.28 Record Not Part of Title (No Annotations) 
465.29 Fees for Record and Copies (No Annotations) 
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465.30 Lost Records - Hearing 
1. Construction and application. 
Provisions of this section may be utilized to resolve problems of a 
common drain involving private property and state owned property devoted to 
use as a primary highway when said property is not part of an established 
drainage district, and records of said common drain are lost or non-
existent. O.A.G. November 17, 1975. 
Provisions of this section may be utilized to solve problems of cormnon 
drain involving private and state property. O.A.G., November 17, 1975. 
2. R~hts of public. , 
ners .of land may ·drain same natural drainage by constructing tile and 
may connect same to drain or ditch along or across public highway, in 
accordance with specifica!ions of highway authority. O.A.G., January 3, 1974. 
465.31 Mutual Drains - E~tablishment as District (No Annotations) 
465.32 Appeal (No Annotations) 
465.33 Record Filed with Established District (No Annotations) 
465.34 Lost or Incomplete Records (No Annotations) 
465.35 Petition to Combine with Established District (No Annotations) 
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Chapter 467B 
Flood and Erosion Control 
467B.1 Authority of Board (No Annotations) 
467B.2 Federal Aid (No Annotations) 
467B.3 Co-operation (No Annotations) 
467B.4 Structures or Levees (No Annotations) 
467B.5 Maintenance Cost (No Annotations) 
467B.6 Estimate (No Annotations) 
467B.7 Structures on Private Land (No Annotations) 
467B.8 Conservation Conmissioners (No Annotations) 
467B.9 Tax (No Annotations) 
467B.10 Assumption of Obligations (No Annotations) 
467B.ll Highway Law Applicable (No Annotations) 
467B.12 Payments from Federal Government (No Annotations) 
467B.13 Allocation to Secondary Road Construction Fund (No Annotations) 
467B.14 Allocation to County Board of Education Fund (No Annotations) 
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471.1 
Chapter 471 
Eminent Domain 
471.1 Exercise of Power by State 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
Counties have aut ority to condemn property for self liquidating sanitary 
disposal projects under 1 394.1, but do not have power of eminent domain for 
projects under ~ 471.1. O.A.G., February 2, 1972. 
Statutes delegating powers of eminent domain are strictly construed. 
Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1969). Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Hipp, 259 Iowa 1082, 147 N.W.2d 195 (1966). Aplin v. Clinton 
County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
2. Compliance with statute. 
Procedure provided for determination of damages in chapters 471 and 472 
is not exclusive. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 
1969). 
Compliance with condemnation statute is essential. Aplin v. Clinton 
County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Right of eminent domain may be exercised by designated agencies acting 
under statutory authority if its use is proper. R. & R. Welding Supply Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). 
To condemn tract of land to provide suitable material for improvement of 
highway, county board of supervisors must proceed under chapters 471, 472, and 
denominating this tract "right-of-way" does not permit board to proceed under 
~ 306.51 et. seq. (See now1 ~ 306.28 et. seq.) O.A.G. 1953, p. 84. Where poles carrying e ectric transmission lines were located on a 
private easement acquired from abutting owners of property adjacent to 
highway, more than a notice in compliance with 6 1 319.3 and 319.4 would be 
required of highway authority, and rights of tr~nsmission line owner in 
easement so acquired must be purchased or acquired under provisions of 306.l 
et. seq. or by proceedings under eminent domain. O.A.G. 1950, p. 174. 
3. Powers of eminent domain, in general. 
Owner of peninsular lot land locked by state land under control of board 
of regents as lakeside laboratory had no power to condemn any portion of 
state's property for ingress and egress to his lot. State v. Johann, 207 
N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1973). 
State statutes, under which board of supervisors may proceed in 
condemnation of right-of-way for secondary road without affording condemnees 
number of general procedural advantages available under other statutes, do not 
violate state constitution. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 39 
(1973). -
Executive council may use-:lts power of eminent domain to assist highway 
commission in acquiring site for maintenance facility. O.A.G. September 24, 
1969. 
Necessity for just compensation. Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 
Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Proceeding by which state undertakes establishment of drainage district 
is exercise of taxing power, not power of eminent domain, except to property 
actually taken or appropriated for ditches. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Board 
of Sup'rs of Hamilton County, 182 Iowa 60, 162 N.W. 868 (1917). 
City does not have power of eminent domain with reference to acquisition 
of access, light, air and view affecting properties abutting on street in area 
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that will be occupied by proposed viaduct over railroad tracks. O.A.G. 1949, 
p. 11. 
4. Private property. 
May not be taken for private use. Vittetoe v. Iowa Southern Utilities 
Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 878 (1963). 
Flooding or overflowing of private property constitutes a taking. Lage 
v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Private property cannot be taken for public use without compensation, 
whether by condemnation proceedings or otherwise. State ex rel. Board of R. 
R. Com'rs of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 
366 (1933). 
5. Public use - in general. 
Where zoning ordinance has been shown to produce an unreasonable 
restraint on a property's use, the ordinance may be disregarded in an eminent 
domain hearing. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 
1975). 
It is for court to say whether condemnor has brought itself within the 
law so that it is empowered to condemn. Aplin v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 
1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Power of eminent domain may be exercised only where a public use is 
involved. Vittetoe v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 
878 (1963). 
Necessity for just compensation. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 (1937). 
"Public use" and "public benefit" defined. Ferguson v. Illinois Cent. R. 
Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926). 
Where public used is declared by legislature, courts will ordinarily hold 
the use public. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
6. legislative determination, public use. 
Courts will not interfere unless it is clear, plain and palpable that 
uses are private in character. Abolt v. City of Ft. Madison, 252 Iowa 626, 
108 N.W.2d 263 (1961). 
Determination of necessity for taking for public use is a legislative and 
not a judicial function. Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona County, 238 Iowa 
1399, 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
Constitution of the United States does not require the legislature to 
afford potential condemnees an opportunity to be heard on questions of 
necessity or expediency of such taking. O.A.G. March 26, 1970. 
7. Property previously devoted to public use. 
Highway commissions construction of bridge with piers in creek channel 
would be taking of property of drainage district. Harrison, Pottawattamie 
Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. State, 261 Iowa 1044, 156 N.W.2d 835 (1968). 
Generally, property devoted to public use is exempted. Lage v. 
Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
If two uses of private land for public purposes are not inconsistent, 
authority for the second use may be implied from a general grant. Town of 
Alvord v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917). 
8. Urban renewal, public use. 
Condemnation of property under urban redevelopment laws is a taking for a 
"public use" or "public purpose." R. & R. Welding Supply Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). 
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471.1 
.9. Extent, public use. 
Because of changing circumstances, zoning ordinance may operate as 
arbitrary and unreasonable restraint. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 
234 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1975). 
If use is public, its extent is immaterial. Dubuque & S.C R. Co. v. Ft. 
Dodge, D.M. & S.R. Co., 146 Iowa 666, 125 N.W. 672 (1910). 
10. Necessity for taking, in general. 
Use of private property can be limited by a reasonable exercise of police 
powers in matters of health and welfare of the general public. State v, 
Steenhoek, 182 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1970). 
Absolute necessity for taking particular land need not exist, but 
reasonable necessity is sufficient to authorize condemnation. Vittetoe v. 
Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 878 (1963). 
Test for right to condemn is public convenience. Minear v. Plowman, 197 
Iowa 1188, 197 N.W. 67 (1924). 
Condemnation of land to widen highways is proper where such action is 
shown to be advisable. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 261. 
11. Property condemnable. 
Right of access a subject of compensation. Liddick v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Private property subject to taking unless exempted by statute. Hoover v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 210 Iowa 1, 230 N.W. 561 (1930). 
Land owned jointly by individual and corporation engaged in 
transportation was not exempt from condemnation. Diamond Jo Line Steamers v. 
City of Davenport, 114 Iowa 432, 87 N.W. 399 (1901). 
Right to free flow of waters. McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868). 
12. Leases. 
Lessee under the contract of lease had no property rights in the land as 
would entitle it to a portion of condemnation award. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. 
R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 138 F.2d 268 (1943). 
Lessee is entitled to reasonable compensation for its leasehold taken 
under condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 
N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
Leasehold estate is "property" and when taken in exercise of eminent 
domain, is compensable. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
13. Title or rights acquired. 
Taking of fee title is a taking of entire title, and necessarily includes 
all lesser estates embraced in the whole. Henderson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 260 Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 (1967). 
Rights acquired to improve road by use of cuts and fills. Pillings v. 
Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 567, 176 N.W. 314 (1920). 
State may obtain good title to property by condemnation where same is 
desired for addition to fairgrounds. O.A.G. 1911-12, p. 653 
14. Easements. 
Right of ingress and egress. Dawson v. McKinnon, 226 Iowa 756, 285 N.W. 
258 (1939). 
Public property of state may sometimes be exempted. State ex rel. Board 
of R.R. Com' rs of State of Iowa v. Stanoland Pipe Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 
366 (1933). 
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15. Access - in aeneral. A taking byestruction of access is compensable. Skaff v. Sioux City, 
168 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1969). 
When beneficial use of property is destroyed by city, a property right 
has been taken. Id. 
Denial of rights of access to highway where none previously existed is 
not compensable to landowner in condemnation case. Linge v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 150 N.W.2d 642 (1967). 
Taking right of access to highway by eminent domain is compensable, 
however, taking through exercise of police power is not compensable. Fort 
Dodge D.M. & S.Ry. v. American Community Stores Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 131 
N.W.2d 515 (1965). 
Property owner abutting condemned property cannot be deprived of all 
access by public authorities without just compensation. Jones v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277, (1966). 
Denial of reasonable access to a street constitutes compensable taking of 
property. In re Primary Road 1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (lg64). 
16. Reasonable and convenient access. 
Highway commission should be held liable for damages if in fact 
reasonable and convenient access was denied to landowners subsequent to 
condemnation. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 
N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
17. Tenants for years. 
As an estate separate and distinct from the estate of the owner of the 
fee. Skaff v. Sioux City, 255 Iowa 4g, 120 N.W.2d 439 (lg63). 
18. Delay in condemnation. 
City not relieved from its obligation to property owners for unreasonable 
delay in perfecting condemnation because of shift of property from flood 
control project to urban renewal where change in project was for benefit of 
city in financing of condemnation. Skaff v. Sioux City, 168 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 
1969). 
19. Damages. 
Trial court has discretion in awarding attorney fees in eminent domain 
proceedings, but if allowance is inadequate or excessive, supreme court can 
change. Iowa State Highway Comm. v. Dubuque Sand and Gravel Co. 258 N.W.2d 
153 (Iowa 1977). 
In determining compensation for land taken by eminent domain, jury given 
instruction to consider best use of property without regard to zoning, such 
instruction became law of the case and jury was entitled to hear experts 
regarding value of property without alleged zoning restraints. Business 
Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Condemnee, part of whose livestock sale business premises was taken by 
condemnation, was not required to effect substitute livestock pen arrangements 
to minimize damage resulting to him from condemnation proceedings. Wilkes v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1971). 
The correct measure of damages in partial taking is the difference 
between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before and 
immediately after condemnation, without regard to resultant benefit or 
betterment. Powers v. City of Dubuque, 176 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1970). 
Owner of property may be entitled to damages for taking for public use, 
even though he has parted with his title and ownership before award is paid. 
Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1964). 
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471.4 
Right of access a subject of compensaton. Liddick v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
20. Mandamus. 
Drainage district was not entitled to injunction prohibiting highway 
department from proceeding with construction of bridge on highway. Harrison-
Pottawattamie Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. State, 261 Iowa 1044, 156 N.W.2d 835 
(1968). 
471.2 On Behalf of Federal Government 
1. Construction and application. 
Federal government, to aid navigation, may not permanently convert to 
public use, by use of dams, land of riparian owners above mean high water line 
without just compensaton. Goodman v. U.S., C.C.A. 113 F.2d 914 (Iowa 1940). 
If biological survey desires land not under some state board or 
commission it may condemn. O.A.G. 1934, p. 667. 
471.3 Conveyance by State to Federal Government 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Section 471.2 andhis section of code 1966 characterized the nature of 
the grant of authority contained in § 28E.12 of said Code, which section 
authorizes not only the joint exercise of mutually possessed powers, but also 
the exercise by one agency of the power of the other in accordance with 
contract. O.A.G. April 4, 1969. 
471.4 Right Conferred 
1. Validity. 
Right of way condemned to a mine by owner for purpose of railway is not a 
taking for private use. Morrison v. Thistle Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 N.W. 
507 (1903). 
Acts authorizing public ways to mineral lands valid. Phillips v. Watson, 
63 Iowa 28, 18 N.W. 659 (1874). 
Act providing for power of condemnation for private roads was void. 
Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
2. Construction and application. 
Provision of Home Rule Act granting cities the power of eminent domain 
did not violate home rule amendment of constitution. Bechtel v. City of Des 
Moines, 225 N.W.2d 326 (Iowa 1975). 
Land condemned by land locked owner becomes a public way. The lane may 
be taxed to the condemnee. The lane is a public way and the county should 
maintain it as it does other county roads. O.A.G. February 28, 1975. 
Owner of peninsular lot land locked by property owned by state, had no 
power to condemn state's property for ingress and egress to his lot. State v. 
Johann, 207 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1973). 
Constitutional provisions concerning eminent domain are not grants of 
power but limitations on its exercise. Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 
Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
Compensation required for damage for overflow caused by cutting banks of 
drainage ditch in completing road improvement. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 
232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Revision 1860, section 1278, to be strictly construed. Sandford v. 
Martin, 31 Iowa 67 (1870). 
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County could acquire lawfully constructed dam only by condemnation 
proceedings. O.A.G. 1g25-26, p. 124. 
3. Public use and necessity for taking. 
In determining whether public use necessary for condemnation exists, test 
is reasonable insurance that intended use will come to pass. Mann v. City of 
Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307 (Iowa 1978). 
This section does not authorize condemnation of land by county for 
landfill. O.A.G., November 4, 1971. 
Determination of necessity for taking property for public use is a 
legislative, not a judicial function. Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona 
County, 238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
Weight given to determination of bodies organized for public purposes 
concerning necessity for taking. In re Primary Road No. U.S. 30, 230 Iowa 
1069, 300 N.W. 287 (1941). 
Dealer selling items to public bodies has no right of condemnation. 
Ferguson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926). 
4. Particular uses or purposes. 
Cities have power to establish streets and condemn right of ways under 
constitution article 3, section 38A, augmented by this section giving city 
eminent domain. Oakes Construction Company v. City of Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 
7 97 ( Iowa 1981 ) • 
A municipality, through eminent domain may take over private water system 
bond payment of just compensation. O.A.G., April 26, 1978. 
Must be a public purpose. Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 
261 N.W. 652 (1935). 
Under statutes authorizing appropriation of land for railroad right of 
way land of individual could not be taken for ferry landing •. Sandford v. 
Martin, 31 Iowa 67 (1870). 
5. Property and rights subject of compensation. 
Lessee is entitled to reasonable compensation for its leasehold taken 
under condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 
N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
Leasehold estate is "property" and when taken in exercise of eminent 
domain is compensable. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
Property devoted to public purpose cannot be taken for another 
inconsistent public use, and this rule applies to property about to be 
lawfully appropriated. Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 246 Iowa 
874, 68 N.W.2d 320 (1955). 
Easement for cattle pass under road may not be taken without just 
compensation. Licht v. Ehlers, 234 Iowa 1331, 13 N.W.2d 688 (1944). 
Overflow of land due to road construction was a taking. Lage v. 
Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
Tenant for years entitled to compensation. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry 
v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486 (1924), 34 A.L.R. 1517. 
Easement in land must be compensated for. O.A.G. 1928, p. 112. 
6. Priorities. 
Where railroad commenced condemnation proceedings before city commenced 
condemnation proceedings against same property, railroad took priority as 
condemnor. Connolly v. Des Moines Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 246 Iowa 874, 68 N.W.2d 
320 (1955). 
436 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
471.4 
7. Courthouses and jails. 
Selection of site in discretion of supervisors. Wells v. Boone County, 
171 Iowa 377, 153 N.W. 220 (1915). 
8. County highways. 
Evidence sustained finding that trees materially obstructed highway and 
interfered with its maintenance and improvement. Carstensen v. Clinton 
County, 250 Iowa 487, 94 N.W.2d 734 (1959). 
9. Road to private property. 
Right of owner of farm to condemn a way to the highway. Anderson v. Lee, 
191 Iowa 248, 182 N.W. 380 (1921). 
Party seeking to condemn way to highway must show he has no public or 
private way from his land to a street or highway. Strawberry Point Dist. Fair 
Soc. v. Ball, 189 Iowa 605, 177 N.W. 697 (1920). 
Where one opened road over land of another with consent of owner, the 
former has powers of public official concerning disposal of wood, grass and 
fences. Wrede v. Grothe, 183 Iowa 60, 166 N.W. 686 (1918). 
Damages payable. Miller v. Kramer, 148 Iowa 460, 126 N.W. 931 (1910). 
Statutes providing for public way over land of another contemplated 
unobstructed way. Carter v. Barkley, 137 Iowa 510, 115 N.W. 21 (1908). 
Where one has no public way to his land he may acquire one by 
condemnation. Perry v. Board of Sup'rs of Clarke County, 133 Iowa 281, 110 
N.W. 591 (1907). 
Railroad right of way as laid substantially complied with requirement 
that it should be on or irrmediately adjacent to division line. Morrison v. 
Thistle Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 N.W. 507 (1903). 
Private way cannot be established by supervisors wholly on land of one to 
serve another having access to public highway. Richards v. Wolf, 82 Iowa 358, 
47 N.W. 1044 (1891), 31 Am. St. Rep. 501. 
Road condemned to a mine became public way. Jones v. Mahaska County Coal 
Co., .47 Iowa 35 (1877). 
Road could have been established under general law. Bankhead v. Brown, 
25 Iowa 540 (1868). 
Where outlet to highway is lost by vacation owner may secure right of way 
by condemnation. O.A.G. 1932, p. 100. 
Way established becomes public highway. O.A.G. 1922, p. 207. 
10. Mineral lands. 
Mining company having private way to highway could not condemn way for 
establishment of railroad switch. Fisher v. Maple Block Coal Co., 171 Iowa 
486, 151 N.W. 823 (1915). 
Right of way for railway to mine may be public way. Morrison v. Thistle 
Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 N.W. 507 (1903). 
11. Foreign corporations. 
Corporations not having power of eminent domain in state of its creation 
may exercise such power in another state if vested therewith by statutes of 
such state. Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., D.C., 202 F. 776 (lgl3). 
12. Waiver or estoppel as to compensation. 
Contract by which land for borrow put was sold construable as contract 
for sale of the land involved and as not including damages accruing by cutting 
through drainage ditch in which owner did not have the fee. Lage v. 
Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 94_4, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
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13. Injunction. 
An independant suit to enJ01n condemnation proceedings may be had where 
there are allegations of fraud, oppression, illegality or abuse of power or 
discretion by the condemnor. Mann v. City of Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307 
(Iowa 1978). 
Interference with exercise of power of eminent domain - fraud, abuse of 
discretion, or other gross impropriety. Gardner v. Charles City, 259 Iowa 
506, 144 N.W.2d 915 (1966). 
471.5 Right to Purchase 
1. Construction and application. 
owner of penisular lot land locked by state's property had no power to 
condemn state's property for ingress and egress to his lot. State v. Johann, 
207 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1973). 
Statutes providing for eminent domain must be strictly complied with and 
restricted to their intent. Id. 
Though husband forged name of wife to deed of land to city for park 
purposes, the city could hold against her dower, land being subject to power 
of eminent domain. Caldwell v. City of Ottumwa, 198 Iowa 666, 200 N.W. 336 
(1924). 
Authority of supervisors to condemn - procedure. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 289. 
2. Contract to convey. 
Agreement to leave to railroad engineers to determine whether or not 
undercrossing was advisable bound owner. Coy v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 
116 Iowa 558, 90 N.W. 344 (1902). 
Stipulation of time in contract held to refer to running of trains not to 
construction of depot. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Cox, 76 Iowa 306, 41 
N.W. 24 (1888), 14 Am. St. Rep. 216. 
Contract to convey right of way held sufficiently certain in regard to 
description to be specifically enforced. Ottumwa, C. F. & St. P. R. Co. v. 
McWilliams, 71 Iowa 164, 32 N.W. 315 (1887). 
3. Specific performance. 
Effect of pending action by heir against railroad for building road over 
decedent's land where railroad sues widow in specific performance of her 
contract to convey right of way. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 180 
Iowa 149, 161 N.W. 69 (1917). 
Petition held sufficient in action for specific performance. Wisconsin, 
I. & N. R. Co. v. Braham, 71 Iowa 484, 32 N.W. 392 (1887). 
Specific performance not refused because value of land taken exceeded 
agreed sum. Ottumwa, C. F. & St. P. R. Co. v. McWilliams, 71 Iowa 164, 32 
N.W. 315 (1887). 
Substantial compliance on part of railroad was found entitling it to 
specific performance. Fitzgerald v. Britt, 43 Iowa 498 (1876). 
After lapse of 14 years railroad could not enforce contract without 
making certain showings. Larimer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 38 Iowa 679 (1874). 
Railroad could compel specific performance where it had complied with the 
conditions of its contract. Chicago & S.W.R. Co. v. Swinney, 38 Iowa 182 
(1874). 
4. Waiver or Esto~~el. 
Condemnat1on1m1ted to one of two tracts owned by condemnees - statutory jurisdiction. Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1968). 
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Heir not estopped where after learning of widow's contract for right of 
way he made no objection during construction of railroad. Waterloo, C.F. & 
N.Ry. Co. v. Harris, 180 Iowa 149, 161 N.W. 69 (1917). 
Under facts vendor estopped to claim non compliance on part of 
purchaser. Coy v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 558, 90 N.W. 344 
(1902). 
5. Property and rights subject of compensation. 
Unity of property required to compel condemnor to take both properties is 
quite different and much more difficult to establish than unity which would 
permit evaluation of whole for purpose of establishing severance damages. 
Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1968). 
Easement in land is a right subject to payment of compensation. O.A.G. 
1928, p. 112. 
Supervisors cannot secure clear title to land until all lien holders are 
provided for. O.A.G. 1923-24, p. 179. 
471.6 Railways 
1. Construction and application. 
Power of eminent domain to be exercised with due respect for 
constitutional rights. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895, 
affirmed in part and reversed in par on other grounds, 204 F.2d 117 (D.C. 
1952), rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, affirmed, 75 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 
98 L.Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S.Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 92 L.Ed. 1078. 
This section and certain others constitute a legislative determination 
that certain uses are public. Reter v. Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 
Iowa 112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952), 35 A.L.R.2d 1306. 
Condemnation documents having been lost, the fact of condemnation and 
payment were sufficiently established by other evidence. Marling v. 
Burlington C.R. & N. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa 331, 25 N.W. 268 (1885). 
Fair presumption that railroad has easement by purchase or condemnation 
to land it occupies. Drake v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 63 Iowa 
302, 19 N.W. 215 (1884), 50 Am. Rep. 746 • 
. Restriction as to what is "necessary" applies to quantity of land to be 
taken, not to quantity of materials that may be removed from the land. 
Winklemans v. Des Moines N.W. R. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
Agreement that for a consideration a railroad will adopt a certain line 
instead of one already surveyed is not contrary to public policy. Cedar 
Rapids & St. P. R. Co. v. Spafford, 41 Iowa 292 (1875). 
2. Right to acquire or condemn land. 
Power to change natural course of stream did not extend to acquisition of 
easement for relocation of channel on private land. Branderhorst v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 202 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1972). 
Test of public character of use. Reter v. Davenport R. I. & N. W. Ry. 
Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (1952), 35 A.L.R.2d 1306. 
Nothing can be acquired by condemnation without authority to condemn the 
particular place condemned. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines Union 
Ry. Co, 165 Iowa 35, 144 N.W. 54 (1913). 
If agreement can be reached condemnation should not be had. Minneapolis 
& St. L. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N.W. 1082 
(1902). 
Consent of railroad commissioners was not necessary to acquisition of 
right of way by railroad. Morgan v. Des Moines Union R. Co, 113 Iowa 561, 85 
N.W. 902 (1901). 
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Statute did not prevent condemnation of additional right of way for 
construction of an additional laterial road. Lower v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 59 Iowa 563, 13 N.W. 718 (1882). 
That company owns land adjacent to that it seeks to condemn does not 
restrict its right of condemnation. Stark v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa 
501 (1876). 
Right to condemn based on ground that object is public one, for public 
use, within constitution. Stewart v. Board of Sup'rs of Polk County, 30 Iowa 
9 (1870), 1 Am. Rep. 238. 
3. Conflicting interests of companies. 
Railroad could not, by purchase and laying of track, debar another 
company which had previously surveyed and staked out a branch line thereon. 
Sioux City & D. M. Ry. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 27 F. 770 (C.C. 
1886). 
Railroad which purchased is not affected by condemnation proceedings 
against grantor by another company. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Chicago M. 
St. P.R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N.W. 1082 (1902). 
Right of condemnation against another company whose property is in the 
public use. Diamond Jo Line Steamers v. City of Davenport, 114 Iowa 432, 87 
N.W. 399 (1901), 54 L.R.A. 859. 
Construction of crossing so as to interfere with right of way of other 
company. Chicago, I. & D. R. Co. v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. W. R. Co., 86 
Iowa 500, 53 N.W. 305 (1892). 
4. Foreign corporations. 
Foreign railroad has no power to acquire or possess ri~ht of way in 
Iowa. Holbert v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 45 Iowa 23 (1877). 
5. Right of way in general. 
Evidence showed right of way obtained for company under which plaintiff 
claimed. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 165 Iowa 
35, 144 N.W. 54 (1913). 
Methods of acquisition of right of way. Clark v. Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 
11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906). 
6. Trespassing on or occupying unacguired land. 
Trespasser may not plead statute of limitations against proceedings to 
assess damages. Gates v. Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Iowa 690, 159 N.W. 456 
(1916). 
That railroad was constructed on land to which company had not acquired 
title did not make it property of landowner. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. 
Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 165 Iowa 35, 144 N.W. 54 (1913). 
Remedies of owner of land on which railroad is situated. Clark v. Wabash 
R. Co., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906). 
Where railroad uses land outside its right of way plaintiff must show 
absolute freehold title. Wattemeyer v. Wisconsin, I. & N. R. Co., 71 Iowa 
626, 33 N.W. 140 (1887). 
Remedies of landowner against railroad occupying part of his land. Birge 
v. Chicago M. St. P. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa 440, 21 N.W. 767 (1884). 
Owners rights to recover damages for trespass as well as damages of 
permanent nature. Drady v. Des Moines & Ft. D. R. Co., 57 Iowa 393, 10 N.W. 
754 (1881). 
Consent of all tenants in common necessary. Rush v. Burlington C. R. & 
N. R. Co., 57 Iowa 201, 10 N.W. 628 (1881). 
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Right of owner to bring action for possession. Jackson v. Centerville, 
· M. & A. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 2g2, 20 N.W. 442 (1884). 
Stature of railroad entering without permission or condemnation is that 
of trespasser. Hibbs v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co., 39 Iowa 340 (1874). 
Remedies against taking of property without tender of compensation. 
Daniels v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35 Iowa 129 (1872), 14 Am. Rep. 490. 
7. Possession, payment or deposit condition precedent. 
Where railroad condemned certain property subsequent acts did not render 
it liable to pay the award. Dimmick v. Council Bluffs & St. L. R. Co., 58 
Iowa 637, 12 N.W. 710 (1882). 
Occupancy by railroad during appeal from assessment was proper. Peterson 
v. Ferreby, 30 Iowa 327 (1870). 
Company is given right to enter upon payment of sum assessed. Gear v. 
Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 20 Iowa 523. (1866), 89 Am. Dec. 550. 
Legislature could not authorize taking for use till compensation was made 
to owner. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 10 Iowa 540 (1859). 
8. Contracts to convey. 
For annotations, see I.C.A., this section. 
9. Conveyances and gifts. 
Grant of right of way gave strip of full statutory width. Iowa Ry. & 
Light Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 241 F. 581, 154 C.C.A. 357 (1917). 
Liberal construction of deeds of right of way to railroad. Keokuk county 
v. Reinier, 227 Iowa 499, 288 N.W. 676 (1939). 
Company acquires land by purchase where it takes deed prior to assessment 
of damages in condemnation proceedings. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N.W. 1082 (1902). 
Grant to railroad held binding on subsequent purchaser. Hileman v. 
Chicago G. W. R. Co., 113 Iowa 591, 85 N.W. 800 (1901). 
Landowner, under the circumstances, could not restrain operation of 
railroad till damages had been assessed and paid. Bentley v. Wabash, St. L. 
R. Co., 61 Iowa 229, 16 N.W. 104 (1883). 
Proceedings to condemn strip wider than that conveyed by deed do not 
affect the deed. Gray v. Burlington & M. R. Co., 37 Iowa 119 (1873). 
Deed held valid despite question of uncertainty of description. Barlow 
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 29 Iowa 276 (1870). 
10. Conditions and covenants - in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A., this section. 
11. Performance of conditions, conditions and convenants. 
For annotations, see I.C.A., this section. 
12. Adoption by acts, conditions and covenants. 
For annotations, see I.C.A., this section. 
13. Roads, streets, bridges, etc., occupying. 
Railroad constructed with consent of city not enjoined from continuing 
operation as public nuisance. Milburn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 
(1861). Hughes v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 12 Iowa 261 (1861). 
"Along," "on" and "over" defined. Heath v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 
61 Iowa 11, 15 N.W. 573 (1883). 
Laying of second track through city not necessarily a nuisance. Davis v. 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 46 Iowa 389 (1877). 
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Imposing of conditions on railroad by ordinance. City of Council Bluffs 
v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 45 Iowa 338 (1876), 24 Am. Rep. 773. 
Railway laying track ·on highway bound to put highway in as good repair. 
Gear v. C. C. & D. R. Co., 43 Iowa 83 (1876). 
Railway could be laid on city street without consent of city 
authorities. Hine v. Keokuk & D. M. R. Co., 42 Iowa 636 (1876). 
Right to lay tracks on bridge discussed. City of Des Moines v. Chicago, 
R. I. & P. R. Co., 41 Iowa 569 (1875). 
City could not grant same rights to occupy streets as company could 
acquire under statute. Ingram v. Chicago D. & M. R. Co., 38 Iowa 669 (1874). 
Power of city to grant rights conferred by ordinance. Slatten v. Des 
Moines Valley R. Co., 29 Iowa 148 (1870), 4 Am. Rep. 205. 
I 
I 
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14. Amount of land acquired or taken. 1 Company may anticipate growth and development. Town of Alvord v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917). 
15. Right to compensation. 
Where city held title to land dedicated for public use, adverse 
possession could not run in favor of individual so as to give him right to 
recover damages for construction of depot. Simplot v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co., 16 F. 350, (C.C. 1883). 
Where strip condemned separated buildings from rest of farm, owners 
refusal to move them not basis for denying damages for separation. Wilson v. 
Fleming, 31 N.W. 2d (Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
That an act is authorized by statute does not mean company may act 
without liability for damage to property owners. Wulke v. Chicago, M. & St. 
P. Ry. Co., 189 Iowa 722, 178 N.W. 1009 (1920). 
Construction of embankment destroying use of avenue creates liability. 
Dairy v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 113 Iowa 716, 84 N.W. 688 (1900). 
Damages could not be claimed on a change of law. Merchants' Union Barb 
~~re Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co, 70 Iowa 105, 28 N.W. 494 (1886), 
rehearing denied, 70 Iowa 105, 29 N.W. 822. 
Where track was laid on street where owners kept the fee damages were 
payable to owners. Kucheman v. C. C. & C. Ry. Co., 46 Iowa 366 (1877). 
Owner of adjacent property has interest in street entitling him to 
maintain action against railway for location of track on street. Cadle v. 
Muscatine Western R. Co., 44 Iowa 11 (1876). 
Interference with access renders company liable to pay damages. Park v. 
Chicago & S. W. Ry. Co., 43 Iowa 636 (1876). · 
Owner of private way may recover damages for its occupancy by railroad. 
Gear v. C. C. & D. Ry. Co., 39 Iowa 23 (1874). 
Where city owns fee in street owner of lot has no interest entitling him 
to sue for damages for the use of street by railroad. City of Davenport v. 
Stevenson, 34 Iowa 225 (1872). 
Construction of railway along bank of navigable stream, between high and 
low water marks did not make railroad liable in damages to one deprived of 
access of stream. Tomlin v. Dubuque B. & M. Ry. Co., 32 Iowa 106 (1871), 7 
Am. Rep. 176. 
Where railroad appeals from condemnation award right of land owner to 
receive amount suspended till hearing of appeal. Peterson v. Ferreby, 30 Iowa 
327 (1870). 
Streets not private property of city in such sense as to entitle it to 
compensation for additional public use by railroad. City of Clinton v. Cedar 
Rapids & M. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa 445 (1868). 
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16. Retroactive laws, right to compensation. 
Where city held title to land dedicated for public use, adverse 
possession could not run in favor of individual so as to give him right to 
recover damages for construction of depot. Simplot v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
Ry. Co., 16 F. 350 (1883). 
Damages could not be claimed on change of law. Merchants' Union Barb 
Wire Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 70 Iowa 105, 28 N.W. 494 (1886). 
17. Estoppel, forfeiture, waiver, and other defenses to claim. 
Even unauthorized improvements could not be taken without compensation. 
Davenport & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Renwick, 102 U.S. 180, 267 L.ED. 51 (1880). 
Acceptance of award on condition created no estoppel. Mason v. Iowa 
Cent. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 468, 109 N.W. 1 (1906). 
Where railroad was not built along line specified in contract railroad 
was liable for damages for land taken. Hartley v. Keokuk & N. W.R. Co., 85 
Iowa 455, 52 N.W. 352 (1892). 
Consent of other co-tenant of plaintiff's lot was not essential to render 
waiver effective as to his interest in the lot. Merchants' Union Barb Wire 
Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co., 79 Iowa 613, 44 N.W. 900 (1890). 
Where railroad put right of way over land not granted to it by owner he 
could bring action for damages. Chicago, I. & D.R. Co. v. Estes, 71 Iowa 
603, 33 N.W. 124 (1887). 
Even unauthorized improvements could not be taken without compensation. 
Renwick v. Davenport & N. W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 102 U.S. 
180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
Fact that city granted right to lay track on city street does not deprive 
owner from maintaining action where he suffers special injury. Frith v. City 
of Dubuque, 45 Iowa 406 (1877). 
Acceptance of award by one of the tenants in common does not conclude the 
other. Ruppert v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
Where owner permitted construction of railway on his land he was not 
estopped to maintain ejectment. Conger v. Burlington & S. W. R. Co., 41 Iowa 
419 (1875). 
Owner could not maintain injunction against lessee company where he 
donated right of way to lessor company. Holbert v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. 
Co., 38 Iowa 315 (1874). 
18. Persons entitled to compensation. 
Mortgagee has claim prior to that of attachment. Sawyer v. Landers, 56 
Iowa 422, 9 N.W. 341 (1888). 
19. Damages - in general. 
Instructions that in connection with testimony jury could use own judgment was not error. Hoyt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 117 Iowa 296, 90 
N.W. 724 (1902). 
Damages held not excessive. Dudley v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 77 Iowa 
408, 42 N.W. 359 (188?). Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 
110 (1888). 
20. Measure of damages, in general. 
Where part of tract is taken measure is difference in market value of 
tract as a whole before the taking and afterwards. Watkins v. Wabash R. Co., 
137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 (1907). Klopp v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142 
Iowa 474, 119 N.W. 373 (1909). 
Fair and just compensation of value of whole tract before and after 
improvement is made. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 
(1855). Hamm v. Wisconsin I. & N. R. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 (1883). 
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Where evidence shows farm depreciated as a whole recovery not limited to 
value of land taken. Watkins v. Wabash R. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 
(1907). 
Measure of damages to leasehold. Werthman v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 
128 Iowa 135, 103 N.W. 135 (1905). 
Damages awarded as of time of entry by railroad. Van Husan v. Omaha 
Bridge & Terminal R. Co., 118 Iowa 366, 92 N.W. 47 (1902). 
Differences between fair market value of farm before and after the taking 
exclusive of any benefits. Lough v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 
89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
Value of land at time of assessment not at time of appeal governs. 
Ellsworth v. Chicago & I. W. R. Co., 91 Iowa 386, 59 N.W. 78 (1895). 
Kitterman v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 69 Iowa 440, 30 N.W. 174 (1886). 
Damages properly awarded on basis of market value of land there being no 
evidence of minerals. Hollingsworth v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 
443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
Instruction did not raise inference that court meant forced sales in 
instructing on measure of damages. Everett v. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 
13 N.W. 109 (1882). 
Measure of damages to leasehold. Renick v. Davenport & N. W.R. Co., 49 
Iowa 664 (1878), affirmed, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
Damages measured as of time of appropriation. Daniels v. C. I. & N. R. 
Co., 41 Iowa 52 (1875). 
Owner entitled to only what will compensate him for appropriation of his 
land. Gear v. C. C. & D. R. Co., 39 Iowa 23 (1874). 
Instruction held not erroneous. Harrison v. Iowa Midland R.R. Co., 36 
Iowa 323 (1873). 
Jury not to consider benefits. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 5 Iowa 
(Cole Ed.) (1858). 
21. Before and after taking, measure of damages. 
For annotations, see ~ 471.6, Note 20. 
22. Land as entity, and separate lots, parts or tracts 1 in general damares. Instructions on consideration of each quarter section as an ent1rearm 
were not misleading. Mccaskey v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 652, 
135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
Platted area not built up, owned by one person could be assessed as a 
whole. Gray v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 129 Iowa 68, 105 N.W. 359 (1905). 
Diminution of value of farm estimated on basis of entire farm. Parrott 
v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 127 Iowa 419, 103 N.W. 352 (1905). 
Recovery for damages to farm as entirety. Cook v. Boone Suburban 
Electric R. Co., 122 Iowa 437, 98 N.W. 293 (1904). 
Acreage held to not be part of farm. Hoyt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
Co., 117 Iowa 296, 90 N.W. 724 (1902). 
Owner was entitled to have his farm valued as a whole. Lough v. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
Instruction on determining if several tracts constituted one farm. 
Westbrook v. Muscatine N. & S. R. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202 (1901). 
Whether all tracts should be treated as an entire farm a question for the jury. Ellsworth v. Chicago & I. W. R. Co., 91 Iowa 386, 59 N.W. 78 (1894). 
Where railroad took city lots, measure of damages to owner of block is 
measured by the whole block. Cox v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 77 Iowa 20, 
41 N.W. 475 (1889). 
Charge that only tract covered by right of way was damaged, as opposed to 
whole farm, properly refused. Doud v. Mason City & F. D. R. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 
41 N.W. 65 (1888). 
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471.6 
Village property taken and adjacent farm property considered 
.separately. Haines v. St. Louis, D. M. & N. R. Co., 6~ Iowa 216, 21 N.W. 573 
(1884). 
Injury to farm as a whole was proper measure though farm was separated by 
a highway and railroad took only along one tract. Hamm v. Wisconsin, Iowa and 
Nebraska Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 (1883). 
Testimony offered as to damage to separate portions of fann properly 
excluded. Winklemans v. Des Moines N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 
(1883). 
Farm as a whole should be considered. Hartshorn v. Burlington, C. R. & 
N. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613, 3 N.W. 648 (1879). 
Jury should consider injury to entire leasehold. Renwick v. Davenport & 
N. W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1878), affinned, 102 U.S. 180, 26 L. Ed. 51. 
Value of acreage taken as well as that cut off from farm may be 
considered. Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 36 Iowa 323 (1873). 
Separate lots measured separately. Fleming v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co., 
34 Iowa 353 (1872). 
23. Construction and operation of railroad, damages. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Evidence as to damages. 
Cross examination improper on per acre value where on direct examination 
testimony to that effect was objected to and objection sustained. Westbrook 
v. Muscatine N. &. S; R. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202 (1901). 
25. Admissibility of evidence. 
Instructions on consideration of each quarter section as an entire farm 
were not misleading. Mccaskey v. Ft. Dodge, D. N. & S. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 652, 
135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
Error to limit witness testimony on value of farm to consideration of one 
particular type of use. Lough v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 
N.W. 77 (1902). 
Effect of construction on farming operations admissible. Ellsworth v. 
Chicago & I. W.R. Co., 91 Iowa 386, 59 N.W. 78 (1894). 
Evidence of value per acre of land taken admissible. Pingrey v. Cherokee 
& D. R. Co., 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285 (1889). 
Evidence showing fences maintained by company, crossings, value and 
convenience of use is admissible. Bell v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 74 Iowa 
343, 37 N.W. 768 (1888). 
Evidence of value per acre before and that land was worth a number of 
dollars less per acre after was not prejudicial error. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110 (1888). 
Evidence on damage per acre, without definite proof of acreage, should 
not be allowed. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. Ry. Co., 71 Iowa 306, 32 N.W. 354 
(1887). 
Speculative use of land not admitted. La Mont v. St. Louis, D. M. & N. 
R. Co., 62 Iowa 193, 17 N.W. 465 (1883). 
Where spring was destroyed by right of way, not error to allow witness 
that testified to damage to be cross examined as to how much damage 
destruction of spring of certain capacity would be. Winklemans v. Des Moines 
N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
In action to recover for damage for right of way through farm it was not 
allowable to ask witness to give his opinion of damages sustained by the 
taking. Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 36 Iowa 323 (1873). 
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Price at which right of way was purchased through adjoining tracts not 
admissible. King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 Iowa 458 (1872). 
26. Instructions. 
Instructions on consideration of each quarter section as an entire farm 
were not misleading. Mccaskey v. Ft. Dodge, D. N. & S. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 652, 
135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
Instruction that jury could consider every element of annoyance and 
disadvantage resulting from railroad was erroneous. Simons v. Mason City & 
Ft. D. R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 (1905). 
Owner was entitled to have his farm valued as a whole. Lough v. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
Instruction on determining if several tracts constituted one farm. 
Westbrook v. Muscatine N. & S. R. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202 (1901). 
For additional annotations, see I .C.A. 
27. Interest as damages. 
Where plaintiff sued to recover value of right of way he was entitled to 
interest from date he acquired title to the property. Clark v. Wabash R. Co., 
132 Iowa 22, 109 N.W. 309 (1906). 
Interest in condemnation awarded as of date railroad takes possession and 
cannot be awarded in absence of testimony as to when it took possession. 
Quinn v. Iowa & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209 (1906). 
I 
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28. Assignment of damages. ·1 
Vendor of property involved could not assign damages. Clark v. Wabash R. . 
Co., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906). 
29. Matters considered in determining damages. 
It is proper to consider effect the use of land taken may have on entire 
tract. lewis v. Omaha & C. B. S. Ry. Co., 158 Iowa 137, 138 N.W. 1092 (1912). 
Adequacy and quality of crossings. Quinn v. Iowa & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 
Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209 (1906). 
Instruction that jury could consider every element of annoyance and 
disadvantage resulting from railroad was erroneous. Simons v. Mason City & 
Ft. D.R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 (1905). 
Fact that railroad allowed telegraph company to erect poles on the right 
of way did not entitle an accounting for rents and profits received from 
telegraph company. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Snyder, 120 Iowa 31, 8g 
N.W. 183 (1903). 
Adequacy and quality of crossing. Lough v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 
116 Iowa 31, 8g N.W. 77 (1902). 
Jury may consider prospective location of depot thereon at time of 
taking. Snouffer v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 105 Iowa 681, 75 N.W. 501 (1898). 
Effect of construction on farming operations admissible. Ellsworth v. 
Chicago & I. W. R. Co., 9 Iowa 386, 59 N.W. 78 (1894). 
Evidence showing fences maintained by company, crossings, value and 
convenience of use is admissible. Bell v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 74 Iowa 
343, 37 N.W. 768 (1888). 
That it was valuable for residences before and that afterwards it was not 
admissible. McClean v. Chicago, I. & D. R. Co., 67 Iowa 568, 25 N.W. 782 
(1885). 
Defendant was estopped to claim buildings on land condemned by it did not 
become its-property. Hollingsworth v. Des Moines & St. L. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 
443, 1g N.W. 325 (1884). 
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Proper to consider that track will lie in a cut. Cummins v. Des Moines & 
St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 268 (1884). 
Evidence relating to effects on farm and stream and access thereto, 
grades, depth of ditches is admissible. Dreher v. Iowa S. W. R. Co., 59 Iowa 
599, 13 N.W. 754 (1882). 
Value is what it is worth in condition at time condemned, not prospective 
value as city lots when not in fact so laid out. Everett v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 59 Iowa 243, 13 N.W. 109 (1882). 
Owner could introduce plat though not recorded. Hartshorn v. Burlington 
C. R. & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613, 3 N.W. 648 (1879). 
Remote and contingent consequences must not be considered. Fleming v. 
Chicago, D. & M. R. Co., 34 Iowa 353 (1872). 
All circumstances inmediately depreciating value of premises by taking 
are proper for consideration. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 
Clarke 288 (1855). 
30. Crops, springs, minerals, matters considered in determining damages. 
Evidence that the land contains coal beds admissible. Doud v. Mason City 
& F. D.R. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N.W. 65 (1888). 
Destruction of valuable spring should be considered in estimating 
damages. Winklemans v. Des Moines N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 
(1883). 
Value of growing crops destroyed by.construction are an element of 
damages. Lance v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 57 Iowa 636, 11 N.W. 612 
(1882). 
31. Fences and cattle guards, matters considered in determining damages. 
Additional fencing required due to construction not proper matter to 
consider in estimating compensation. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa 
288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). Kennedy v. Dubuque & P.R. Co., 2 Iowa 521, 2 
Clarke 521 (1856). 
Failure of company to erect cattle guards could not be considered in 
estimation of damages. King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 Iowa 458 (1872). 
While jury cannot allow for fencing as such it can consider that the land 
would be thrown open and left unfenced. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 5 Iowa 
(Cole Ed.) 576 (1858). 
Where land was fenced and the taking opened it, this fact could be 
considered. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). 
32. Inconveniences, obstructions, annoyances, and danger of fire, matters 
considered in determining damages. 
Damage resulting from obstruction of flow of surface water. Blunck v. 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 146, 120 N.W. 737 (1909). 
Interference with access to town. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 
128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 (1905). 
Obstruction to the use of property - instruction. Diamond Jo Line 
Steamers v. Davenport R. I. & N. W. R. Co., 115 Iowa 480, 88 N.W. 959 (1902). 
Offer by company to show minimization of fire hazard properly refused. 
Pingrey v. Cherokee & D.R. Co., 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285 (1889). 
Inconvenience considered as bearing market value. Dudley v. Minnesota & 
N. W. R. Co., 77 Iowa 408, 42 N.W. 359 (1889). 
Providing of crossing under trestle work. Bell v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 74 Iowa 343, 37 N.W. 768 (1888). 
Evidence as to noise, smoke and fire admissible. Wilson v. Des Moines, 
O. & S. R. Co., 67 Iowa 509, 25 N.W. 754 (1885). 
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Obstruction of view, interference with privacy and noise are proper items 
to consider as bearing on damages. Ham v. Wisconsin, Iowa & Nebraska Ry. Co., 
61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 (1883). 
Actual damages only are allowable. Dreher v. Iowa S. W.R. Co., 59 Iowa 
599, 13 N.W. 754 (1882). 
Evidence of danger of fire. Lance v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 57 
Iowa 636, 11 N.W. 612 (1882). 
Inconvenience in cultivation or use of farm. Hartshorn v. Burlington C. 
R. & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613, 3 N.W. 648 (1879). 
Obstruction of public highway not considered in estimating damages to 
which owner of adjacent land is entitled for taking of right of way by 
railroad. Gear v. C. C. & D.R. Co., 43 Iowa 83 (1876). 
33. Possible use of right of way by railroad, matters considered in 
determining dama~es. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
34. Benefits, matters considered in determining damages. 
Instructions to not consider benefits accruing by reason of contemplated 
construction of depot not misleading. Snouffer v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 105 
Iowa 681, 75 N.W. 501 (1898). 
Instruction that it was not proper to set off benefits on account of 
improvement was properly given. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. R. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 
37 N.W. 110 (1888). 
Appreciation in value of adjacent land belonging to same owner cannot be 
considered in estimating damages. Koestenbader v. Peirce, 41 Iowa 204 (1875). 
Instruction that value was to be arrived at without considering benefit 
which might accrue was not erroneous. Brooks v. Davenport & St. P. R. Co., 37 
Iowa 99 (1873). 
35. Title, estate, and interest acquired by railroad. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
36. Rights of, and use of land by railroad company. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
37. Use of land by former owner and successors. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
38. Transfers by owner. 
In action against railroad for damages by owner who bought subsequent to 
occupation of street, company may show plaintiff's grantor consented to 
construction and operation of road along street. Pratt v. Des Moines N. W. R. 
Co., 72 Iowa 249, 33 N.W. 666 (1887). Jolley v. Des Moines N. W. R. Co., 72 
Iowa 759, 33 N.W. 668 (1887). 
That both parties knew railroad was in operation across the land conveyed 
made its existence none the less a breach of covenant in the conveyance. 
Barlow v. McKinley, 24 Iowa 69 (1867). Gerlad v. Elley, 45 Iowa 322 (1876). 
Flynn v. White Breast Coal & Mining Co., 72 Iowa 738, 32 N.W. 471 (1887). 
Defendants title to right of way was not established. Montgomery County 
v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150 (1930). 
Land conveyed for railroad right of way did not pass to second grantee 
when land in which right of way went through was conveyed. Monarch Coal Co. 
v. Phillips Coal Co., 178 Iowa 660, 156 N.W. 297 (1916). 
Deed excepting land occupied by railroad right of way excepted the soil 
itself, and not merely the right of way. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 11, 
109 N.W. 309 (1906). 
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471.6 
Railroad right of way is encumbrance on land constituting breach of 
·covenant of warranty. Fierce v. Houghton, 122 Iowa 477, 98 N.W. 306 (1904). 
Conveyance "subject to all right of way ..• " did not include portion 
claimed by railroad as depot grounds. Mead v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 112 Iowa 
291, 83 N.W. 979 (1900). 
Conveyance held to pass whatever right of reversion grantor had. Smith 
v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N.W. 427 (1897). 
Purchaser charged with notice of railroad's license to operate in street 
fronting lot. Merchants' Union Barb-Wire Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 79 
Iowa 613, 44 N.W. 900 (1890). 
Breach of warranty exists where grantor conveys without reservations land 
on which is situated a railroad. Flynn v. White Breast Coal Co., 72 Iowa 738, 
32 N.W. 471 (1887). 
Railroad right of way across land conveyed is not a breach of covenant of 
warranty in a deed of such lands. Brown v. Young, 69 Iowa 625, 29 N.W. 941 
(1886). 
Lessee of land has no greater right to question validity of company's 
right of way than lessor had when lease was made. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 
v. Bean, 69 Iowa 257, 28 N.W. 585 (1886). 
Purchaser of trespassing railroad liable as trespasser after purchase to 
a grantee of prior owner of the land. Donald v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 
52 Iowa 411, 3 N.W. 462 (1879). 
Existence of railroad is breach of covenants against encumbrances, but 
mere use of right of way does not show right thereto. Jerald v. Elly, 51 Iowa 
321, 1 N.W. 639 (1879). 
Right of way is acquired when damages assessed are paid to sheriff, and 
conveyances made thereafter are subject to title of company. Ruppert v. 
Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
39. Transfers, mortgages, licenses, and permits by company. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
40. Adverse possession of right of way. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
41. Condemning land condemned or acquired. 
City or town cannot condemn for street purposes property already devoted 
to public use by railway where such taking would require removal of depot 
building. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Incorporated Town of Lost Nation, 
D. C., 237 F. 709 (1916). 
City could reopen streets by condemnation where it had previously vacated 
and conveyed streets to railroad. City of Osceola v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 
196 F. 777, 116 C. C. A. 72 (1912). 
Railroad property may be taken, under proper conditions, for public 
use. Ferguson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926). 
In condemnation for street purposes evidence showed railroad had not 
overestimated ground required in present and future for depot. Town of Alvord 
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917). 
42. Proceedings in general. 
Proceeding before sheriff is administrative until appeal. Chicago R. I. 
& P. R. Co. v. Stude, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing 
denied, 74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 989 L. Ed. 1078 (1954). 
No error in permitting railroad to file waiver of right to claim damages 
because of any future street crossings. Purdy v. Waterloo C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 
172 Iowa 676, 154 N.W. 881 (1915). 
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Sheriff conducting condemnation proceedings not a part to proceedings, 
and is not disqualified from serving notice of appeal. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & 
N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (1882). 
Notice of appeal constitutes presumptive evidence that assessment has 
been made. Hahn v. Chicago, 0. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333 (1876). 
Appeal in absence of statutory regulation. Robertson v. Eldora Railroad 
& Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 (1869). 
Trial of cause anew and award of damages without notice of appeal was 
erroneous. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Sinnamon, 9 Iowa 293 (1859). 
53. Filing papers on appeal. 
On appeal it was not required that report of jury be filed in appellate 
court, the notice of appeal being presumptive evidence that award had been 
made. Hahn v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333 (1876). 
Failure of officer to file papers until first day of next term after 
appeal was taken, not sufficient grounds for dismissal. Robertson v. Eldora 
Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 (1869). 
Not error to file bond with clerk instead of sheriff. Grinnell v. 
Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 (1865). 
54. Pleadings on appeal. 
Motion to dismiss properly denied where based on agreement to arbitrate, 
since such defense should be set up by answer. Hynes v. S. A. & D. Ry. Co., 
38 Iowa 258 (1874). 
Answer, on appeal, alleged delivery of deed for right of way. Plaintiff 
objected to admission of deed in evidence for reason that copy of deed was not 
attached to answer. Held objection overruled. Taylor v. Cedar Rapids & St. 
P. R. Co., 25 Iowa 371 (1868). 
Filing of petition in district court on an appeal did not violate 
statute. Grinnell v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 (1864). 
55. Trial on appeal or in action for damages. 
In action for damages defendants plea of estoppel by agreement to accept 
$600.00 in full settlement was adequately submitted in instructions that if 
jury found agreement as contended plaintiff could recover $600.00 and no 
more. Darst v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. Co., 1g4 Iowa 1145, 191 N.W. 288 
(1922). 
Railroad could not set up defendants breach of agreement to donate right 
of way where instead of entering it condemned. Burrell v. Waterloo, C. F. & 
N. Ry. Co., 173 Iowa 441, 155 N.W. 809 (1916). 
Instruction that jury should not be influenced by fact that company took 
possession iITTTiediately after condemnation was not erroneous. Purdy v. 
Waterloo, C. F. N. Ry. Co., 172 Iowa 676, 154 N.W. 881 (1915). 
If assessment of damages included a portion of land not owned by 
plaintiff, error could be corrected on appeal. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 141 
Iowa 250, 119 N.W. 927 (1909). 
Trial court did not abuse discretion in granting new trial where jury's 
verdit was excessively small. Werthman v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 128 
Iowa 135, 103 N.W. 135 (1905). 
Matter for jury to consider in regard to duty of railroad keeping its 
track and cattle guards in proper condition. Pingrey v. Cherokee & D. R. Co., 
78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285 (1889). 
Plaintiff was entitled to prove damage to entire farm though it consisted 
of more land than was described in notice of appeal. Dudley v. Minnesota & N. 
W. R. Co., 77 Iowa 408, 42 N.W. 359 (1889). 
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471.6 
Improper for plaintiff's council to refer to amount of award appealed 
from, but such is not ground for discharging jury on motion of defendant. 
Ball v •. Keokuk & N. W. R. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110. 
Where court decided it had no jurisdiction it properly refused to 
determine what rights of parties would have been. Slough v. Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 71 Iowa 641, 33 N.W. 149 (1887). 
Not competent to ask commissioners who assessed damages whether their 
assessment correctly expressed their judgment. Winklemans v. Oes Moines N. W. 
R. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
It was not error for court to refuse to instruct that law does not 
require railroad to fence its road where court indicated liability for 
injuries to stock from failure to fence. Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 36 
Iowa 323 (1873). 
Appeal from assessment brought case before district court on its own 
merits. Runner v. City of Keokuk, 11 Iowa 543 (1861). 
Where case was in district court in appeal on merits, certain 
irregularities below were immaterial. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rosseau, 8 
Iowa 373, 8 Clarke 373 (1859). 
16. Verdict, judgment and orders on appeal. 
Jury to assess damages as of date of assessment by sheriff's jury and 
court makes order regarding interest. Reed v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 
C. C., 25 F. 886 (1885). 
No judgment should be entered for owner since proceedings can be 
abandoned with liability for costs only. Klopp v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co., 142 Iowa 474, 119 N.W. 373 (1909). 
Judgment of pleadings properly rendered. Burns v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. 
M. R. Co., 110 Iowa 385, 81 N.W. 794 (1900). 
Judgment assessing damages to be paid does not bind company to take the 
land and pay damages. Gear v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 20 Iowa 523, 89 Am. 
Dec. 550 (1866). 
Judgment reversed because of improper consideration of certain items of 
damage by jury. Kennedy v. Dubuque & Pac. R. Co., 2 Iowa 521, 2 Clarke 521 
(1856). 
57. Review by appellate court. 
Appeal does not lie from decision of sheriff's commission in Iowa to 
Federal District Court. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kay, D. C., 107 F. 
Supp. 895 (lg52), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 204 
F.2d 116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, 
affirmed, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S. 
Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Contention that condemner by bringing such proceedings, estopped itself 
to claim plaintiff had no title may not be made for first time on appeal. 
Watkins v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 123 Iowa 390, 98 N.W. 910 (lg04). 
Where court in instruction omitted one-tenth of an acre and company 
offered to add value of such part to judgment, judgment should not be reversed 
on that ground. Hoyt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 117 Iowa 296, 90 N.W. 
724 (1902). 
Not presumed that injuries by fire to fences and timber a mile from the 
tracks were considered in estimating damages. Rademacher v. Milwaukee & St. 
P. Ry. Co., 41 Iowa 297, 20 Am. Rep. 592 (1875). , 
Presumption that findings on question of what lands were considered by 
jury in making assessment was correct. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Byington, 
14 Iowa 572 (1863). 
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58. Certiorari. 
Proceedings to condemn land not set aside upon mere allegations of 
petition for certiorari without further showing. Everett v. Cedar Rapids & M. 
R.R. Co., 28 Iowa 417 (1869). 
59. Award of judgment, payment and enforcement. 
Where railroad refuses to pay award injunction is available to owner. 
Gates v. Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Iowa 690, 159 N.W. 456 (1916). 
Whether land taken was for use of railroad is not determinable in 
equitable action to enjoin use of tracks laid. Davis v. Des Moines & Ft. D. 
R. Co., 155 Iowa 51, 135 N.W. 356 (1912). 
Payment by company to sheriff, without payment to owner, not a defense to 
action for restitution of premises on failure to pay award. Burns v. Chicago, 
Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 110 Iowa 385, 81 N.W. 794 (1900). 
Owner cannot maintain separate action to recover interest. Jamison v. 
Burlington & W. R. Co., 78 Iowa 562, 43 N.W. 529 (1889). 
Where landowner has received amount awarded he cannot object to fact that 
no notice of proceedings was given to him. Marling v. Burlington, C. R. & N. 
R. Co., 67 Iowa 331, 25 N.W. 268 (1885). 
Payment by company to sheriff, without payment to owner, not a defense to 
action for restitution of premises on failure to pay award. White v. Wabash, 
St. L. & P. R. Co., 64 Iowa 281, 20 N.W. 436 (1884). 
Allowing award of damages to be recorded not a tort, and no title passes 
thereby, so as to raise implied contract to pay amount thereof till mistake is 
made known to company and reasonable time elapses. Dimmick v. Council Bluffs 
& St. L. R. Co., 58 Iowa 637, 12 N.W. 710 (1882). 
Owner may enjoin use till compensated. Holbert v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. 
R. Co., 45 Iowa 23 (1876). 
Action of ejectment proper against company failing to compensate owner 
for right of way appropriated. Conger v. Burlington & S. W. R. Co., 41 Iowa 
419 (1875). 
Injunction will lie to restrain use of land taken till compensation has 
been paid. Hibbs v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co., 39 Iowa 340 (1874). Richards v. 
Des Moines Val. R. Co., 18 Iowa 259 (1865). 
60. Costs and attorney's fees. 
Absent statute, attorney fees not taxable in condemnation proceedings. 
Woodcock v. Wabash Ry. Co., 135 Iowa 559, 113 N.W. 347 (1907). 
In proceeding to recover value of property appropriated attorney's fees 
allowable to plaintiff. Clark v. Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 
(1906). 
Where company took land it was precluded from questioning 
constitutionality of statute imposing liability for attorney's fees. Gano v. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 114 Iowa 713, 87 N.W. 714 (1901), 55 L. R. A. 
263, 89 Am. St. Rep. 393, affirmed, 23 S. Ct. 854, 190 U. S. 575, 47 L. Ed. 
1183. 
Purchaser of railroad during appeal liable for attorney's fees incurred 
on appeal by company from whom purchased. Frankel v. Chicago, B. & P. R. Co., 
70 Iowa 424, 30 N.W. 679 (1886), rehearing denied, 70 Iowa 424, 32 N.W. 488. 
61. Conclusiveness of proceedings. 
Where real owner is party to proceedings, the proceedings are valid 
against him though it is indicated commissioners thought unknown lessee also 
had interest therein. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Bean, 69 Iowa 257, 28 
N.W. 585 (1886). 
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471.9 
Presumed from record of proceedings where it had not entered and had not 
paid the award. Kostendader v. Pierce, 37 Iowa 645 (1873). 
62. Dismissal of proceedings. 
Company could dismiss proceedings where it had not entered and had not 
paid the award. Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Sater, 1 Iowa 421, 1 Clarke 421 
(1855). 
63. Priority. 
Where railroad commenced proceedings prior to city it had priority over 
city. Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 68 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1g55). 
471.7 Cemetery Lands (No Annotations) 
471.8 Limitation on Right of Way 
1. Construction and application. 
Condemnation of additional independent right of way to construct and 
maintain original road not prevented by statute. Lower v. Chicago B. & 0. R. 
Co., 59 Iowa 563, 13 N.W. 718 (1882). 
Judgment in form of debt construed to have no greater effect than if 
conforming to statute authorizing it. Gear v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 20 Iowa 
523, 89 Am. Dec. 550 (1866). 
2. Buildings, land for. 
Additional realty outside of one hundred feet could not be taken. 
Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 58 Iowa 537, 12 N.W. 576 (1882). 
471.9 Additional Purposes 
1. Validity. 
Validity upheld as not authorizing taking for private use. Reter v. 
Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863, 35 A. L. R.2d 
1306 ( 1952). 
Right of way to mine is public way. Morrison v. Thistle Coal Co., 119 
Iowa 705, 94 N.W. 507 {1903). 
Public ways are contemplated. Phillips v. Watson, 63 Iowa 28, 18 N.W. 
659 (1874). 
2. Construction and application. 
Statute constitutes legislative determination of public use. Reter v. 
Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863, 35 A. L. R.2d 
1306 (1952). 
Petition to condemn land did not have to show necessity. Eikenberry v. 
St. Paul & K. C. S. L. R. Co., 174 Iowa 6, 156 N.W. 163 (1916). 
Where railroad desired land for additional depot grounds, action of 
commissioners was to precede effort to condemn. Crandall v. Des Moines, N. & 
W. R. Co., 103 Iowa 684, 72 N.W. 778 (1897). 
3. Depots. 
Condem~ation authorized for new stations where necessary. Jager v. Dey, 
80 Iowa 23, 45 N.W. 391. 
Under former statute, completed railroad could not condemn for depot. 
Forbes v. Delashmutt, 68 Iowa 164, 26 N.W. 56 (1886). 
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4. S~ur tracks. 
est of public character use is whether industries are enabled thereby to 
be reached by public. Reter v. Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 
1112, 54 N.W.2d 863, 35 A. L. R.2d 1306 (1952). 
Corporation organized to engage in business of generating electricity to 
be sold is not a "manufacturing corporation." Hagerla v. Mississippi River 
Power Co., D. C., 202 F. 776 (1913). 
Right of public to use spur track sufficient public use. Dubuque & S. C. 
R. Co. v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. R. Co., 146 Iowa 666, 125 N.W. 672 (1910). 
Right of way to a mine may be a public way though it cannot be used for 
travel except by railway cars. Morrison v. Thistle Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 
N.W. 507 (1903). 
5. Double tracks~ curves, grades, relocations 1 excavations, etc. Company buil ing overhead crossing authorized to condemn land necessary 
to raising or lowering of highway. Eikenberry v. St. Paul & K. C. S. L. R. 
Co., 174 Iowa 6, 156 N.W. 163. 
Plaintiff could show inconvenience of being deprived of crossing. Klopp 
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 474, 119 N.W. 373 (1909). 
6. Water stations, etc. 
Reservation by landowners of right to use water in reservoir conveyed to 
railroad deemed easement appurtenant to remaining land. McCoy v. Chicago, M. 
& St. P. Ry. Co., 176 Iowa 139, 155 N.W. 995 (1916). 
7. Lateral road. 
Condemnation of land for additional road authorized for construction and 
maintenance of original road. Lower v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 59 Iowa 563, 
13 N.W. 718 (1882). 
471.10 Finding by Transportation Regulation Board 
1. Construction and app 1 i ca ti on. 
Statute authorizing condemnation strictly construed. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
R. Co. v. Kay, D. C. 107 F. Supp. 895 (1952), affirmed in part and reversed in 
part on other grounds, 204 F.2d 116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, affirmed, 
74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U. S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 512, 
347 U. S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Necessity and expediency of taking may be determined by public body or 
agency. Reter v. Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 
863, 35 A. L. R.2d 1306 (1952). 
When ·petition showed inquiry had been made ,as to necessity, and was so 
certified by railroad commissioners, it was sufficient without showing need 
for embankments for which land was desired. Eikenberry v. St. Paul & K. C. S. 
L. R. Co., 174 Iowa 6, 156 N.W. 163 (1916). 
Where railroad desired land for additional depot grounds, action of 
commissioners was to precede effort to condemn. Crandall v. Des Moines, N. & 
W.R. Co., 103 Iowa 684, 72 N.W. 778 (1897). 
Commissioners had authority to grant certificate for condemnation for 
depot purposes where railroad had no depot. Jager v. Dey, 80 Iowa 23, 45 N.W. 
391 (1890). 
471.11 land for Water Stations - How Set Aside (No Annotations) 
471.12 Access to Water - Overflow limited 
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1. Construction and application. 
Landowner's right to use water in reservoirs conveyed to railroad deemed 
an easement appurtenant to remaining land. McCoy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co., 176 Iowa 139, 155 N.W. 995 (1916). 
471.13 Change in Streams 
1. Validity. 
Statute authorizing change in course of stream to promote safety of 
travel was constitutional. Reusch v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 57 Iowa 687, 11 
N.W. 647 (1882). 
2. Construction and ap~lication. 
Even if changing t e "natural course" of stream so that it would join 
river before, rather than after, crossing under highway, thereby eliminating a 
bridge upon reconstruction of the highway, was to be regarded as being for the 
purpose of draining the highway, within ~ 306.19 conferring upon the state 
highway commission its power of eminent aomain, such power did not extend to 
the acquisition of an easement for relocation of the channel of the stream on 
private land. Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Commission on Behalf of 
State, 202 N.W.2nd 38 (Iowa 1972). 
Where in a first suit object of plaintiff was to recover original and 
permanent damage he was estopped in second suit to deny such though additional 
damage had occurred. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 Iowa 35, 179 N.W. 
181 (1920). 
Land may be taken to erect embankment instead of bridge. Reusch v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 57 Iowa 687, 11 N.W. 647 (1882). 
471.14 Unlawful Diversion Prohibited 
1. Construction and application. 
Condemnation of right of way did not give right to divert surface water 
to damage of landowner. Albright v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway & Light 
Co., 133 Iowa 644, 110 N.W. 1052. Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 43 
Iowa 26, 22 Am. Rep. 210 (1876). 
471.15 Repealed by Act 83, ch. 121, ~ 15 (See~ 471.16). 
471.16 Right to Condemn Abandoned Right of Way 
1. Validity. 
Right of way for railroad, is taken by state for public use; and it is 
competent for legislature to provide for its transfer under certain 
conditions. Noll v. Dubuque B. & M. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66 (1871). 
471.17 Repealed by Act 83, ch. 121, ~ 15 (See ~ 471.16). 
471.18 Parties Entitled to Damages 
1. Validity. 
Right of way for railroad, is taken by state for public use; and it is 
competent for legislature to provide for its transfer under certain 
conditions. Noll v. Dubuque, B. & M. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66 (1871). 
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2. Construction and application. 
Where land was abandoned for over eight years and another company entered 
without authority it was a trespasser. McGinnis v. Wabash R. Co., 114 N.W. 
1039 (1908). 
Where right of way was abandoned for over eight years another company 
cannot condemn without compensation to owners. Remey v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 
116 Iowa 133, 89 N.W. 218 (1902). 
Where right of way was condemned and paid for and abandoned, when 
acquired by defendant company be condemnation, land being sold to plaintiff 
before defendant's acquisition, plaintiff could not recover compensation. 
Remey v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 83 N.W. 1059 (Iowa 1900). 
Where right of way was condemned and owner did not take award and did not 
appeal, and land was not used for long time; when road was built owner could 
not proceed for second award for damages. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. 
Bean, 69 Iowa 257, 28 N.W. 585 (1886). 
Grantee of owner who received compensation had no greater rights than 
former owner. Dubuque & D. R. Co. v. Diehl, 64 Iowa 635, 21 N.W. 117 (1884). 
471.19 Interpretative Clause 
1. In general. 
A leasehold interest is property, and when taken in exercise of eminent 
domain, the owner is entitled to compensation. R. & R. Welding Supply Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964). 
471.20 Description of Land Furnished 
1. In general. 
County auditor must accept deed describing original tract less 
description of highway as legal description when land may accurately be 
located by a competent surveyor. O.A.G. July 2, 1973. 
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472.1 
Chapter 472 
Procedure Under Power of Eminent Domain 
472.l Procedure Provided 
1. Construction and application. 
statutory regulation of eminent domain must be strictly construed and 
complied to protect constitutional property rights of owner. City of Des 
Moines v. Geller Glass and Upholstery, 319 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1g82). 
Court must determine whether land taken by eminent domain is for public 
purpose when constitionality is challenged. Simpson v. Low-rent Housing 
Agency of Mt. Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1974). 
Road project for which plaintiff's land was condemned did not involve 
federal funds where bridge project was discrete from road building for which 
such land was taken. Cahill v. Cedar County, Iowa, 367 F. Supp. 39 (1973). 
Statutes providing for exercise of eminent domain must be strictly 
complied with. State v. Johann, 207 N.W.2d 21 (1973). 
Implementing agreement between city and state highway commission 
concerning highway construction project. Halweg v. City of Sioux City, 189 
N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1971). 
Removal costs - buildings or fences. O.A.G. November 20, 1970. 
Power of eminent domain to be exercised with due respect to 
constitutional right and guarantees. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Kay, 107 
F. Supp. 895 (1952), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 
205 F.2d 116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, affirmed, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 
574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S.Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 
1089. 
Supervisors must proceed under Chapter 471, 472 to condemn land to 
provide suitable material for highway improvement. O.A.G. 1953, p. 84. 
Electric transmission poles located on private easement acquired from 
abutting owner must be purchased or acquired under section 306.1 or under this 
section. O.A.G. 1950, p. 174. 
Condemnation procedure under Code 1873 by city under special charter 
granted in 1853. Arnold v. City of Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa 441, 52 N.W. 347 
(1892). Williams v. City of Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa 735, 52 N.W. 349 (1892). 
Power company may do what is reasonable necessary to carry out public 
purpose. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 83 N.W.2d 349 (Iowa 1892). 
General chapter on eminent domain does not apply where other procedure is 
provided by law. Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 
N.W. 876 (1930). 
Commencement of condemnation proceeding impliedly admits taking or 
contemplated taking. Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 
N.W. 979 (1925). 
In establishing drainage district damages were not assessable by 
sheriff's jury. Shaw v. Board of Sup'rs of Greene County, 195 Iowa 545, 192 
N.W. 525 (1923). 
Under code 1873, sheriff's jury could only assess damages for land taken 
by railroad, not for injury to property abutting on street where railroad was 
laid. Slough v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 71 Iowa 641, 33 N.W. 149 (1887). 
Where owner agreed to accept sum to be fixed by one and sold land to 
another and company took no steps toward having compensation fixed, vendee was 
entitled to have commissioners fix compensation. Corbin v. Wisconsin, I. & N. 
R. Co., 66 Iowa 269, 23 N.W. 662 (1885). 
Order establishing road without provision for payment was not 
unconstitutional where owner made no claim for damages in method prescribed by 
statute. Abbott v. Scott County Sup' rs, 36 Iowa 354 (1873). 
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2. Ad quod damnum proceedings 
Rights of purchaser at tax sale not extinguished where he had not been 
made a party by proper notice. Garmoe v. Sturgeon, 65 Iowa 147, 21 N.W. 493 
(1884). 
Where first writ was quashed another could be granted without notice to 
opposite party. Burnham v. Thompson, 35 Iowa 421 (1872). 
3. Conditions precedent. 
Land cannot be taken for state park and lake and final determination to 
proceed with project must await some determination of damages. Mathiasen v. 
State Conservation Comm., 70 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1955). 
Proceedings were without jurisdiction where owner did not refuse to give 
deed and there was no disagreement on compensation. Minneapolis & St. L. R. 
Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 N.W. 1082 (1902). 
Proceedings authorized only where owner refused to grant right of way or 
agreement on compensation could not be reached. Council Bluffs & St. L. R. 
Co. v. Bentley, 62 Iowa 446, 17 N.W. 668 (1883). 
Conditions which owner must comply with prior to recovery of damages for 
opening of street. Blake v. City of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 66 (1862). 
Acts showed owner refused to grant right of way. Mississippi & M. R. Co. 
v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373, 8 Clarke 373 (1859). 
4. Title of landowner. 
Owner could not recover damages from county without showing title in 
himself. Montgomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150 {1930). 
Facts showed title sufficiently for purpose of proceeding. Hartley v. 
Keokuk & N. W. R. Co., 85 Iowa 455, 52, N.W. 352 (1892). 
5. Proceedings in general. 
Installation of median strips for purpose of regulating flow of traffic -
within exercise of police power - must be proper and reasonable and not amount 
to taking of property without due process. Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 
N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
Procedure provided for determination of damages in this section and 
following, relative to taking of private property for public use by 
condemnation, is not exclusive. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 164 
N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1969). 
Legislature has power to prescribe and fix terms and conditions upon 
which condemnations may be made. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 
N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Unity of property required to compel condemnor to take both properties is 
quite different and much more difficult to establish than unity which would 
permit evaluation of whole for purpose of establishing severance damages. 
Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1968). 
Only question involved in eminent domain procedure is value of property 
taken, and the only appeal that can be taken is from the award of damages. 
Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, 249 Iowa 179, 85 N.W.2d 912 (1957). 
Only by process of appeal does district court obtain jurisdiction, and 
then appellate only. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 571, 63 N.W.2d 
218 (1954). 
Proceeding before sheriff is administrative till appeal has been taken. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v Stude, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338 
(1954), rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
That only part of land required according to approved plans, was acquired 
did not invalidate condemnation. Mill v. City of Denison, 237 Iowa 1335, 25 
N.W.2d 323 (1945). . 
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472.1 
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act would safeguard appeal rights of 
.soldier-owner. Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1945). 
Legislative power in fixing terms and conditions on which condemnation 
may be made. Richardson v. City of Centerville, 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071 
(1908). 
Absent special provision so requiring there is no right to trial by jury 
in condemnation cases. Bradley, 108 Iowa 476, 79 N.W. 280 (1899). Question whether grade crossings should be allowed cannot be determined 
in condemnation proceedings. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. 
M. R. Co., 91Iowa16, 58 N.W. 918 (1894). 
Party entitled only to compensation in manner prescribed by law. 
Connolly v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 416, 7 Clarke 416 (1858). 
Statutory provisions must be strictly complied with. Walters v. Houck, 7 
Iowa 72, 7 Clarke 72 (1858). 
6. Actions for dama~es. 
In determining Just compensation for land taken by eminent domain, 
evidence of comparable sales is admissable as substantive evidence of value, 
and it is for jury to determine weight and credit of such evidence. Business 
Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Appeal from condemnation awards involves appellate, not original, 
jurisdiction of the district courts. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Plaintiff not entitled to severance damages on basis of partial taking of 
single unit composed of two tracts. Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 
(Iowa 1968). 
Location of corner established by government survey held question of fact 
for court sitting without jury. Fair v. Ida County, 204 Iowa 1046, 216 N.W. 
952 (1927). 
County condemning land not liable to owner, not served with notice, for 
damages in trespass. Gibson v. Union County, 208 Iowa 314, 223 N.W. 111 
(1929). 
Suit for damages was not adequate remedy to owner whose land was seized 
under eminent domain. Scott v. Price Bros. Co., 207 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 75 
(1927). 
Rule that failure to condemn gives owner right to elect action at law 
does not apply to county. Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341, 195 N.W. 363 
(1923). 
Proceeding to assess damages to land could not be collaterally attacked 
in action of trespass. Carlisle v. Des Moines & K. C. R. Co., 99 Iowa 345, 68 
N.W. 784 (1896). 
7. Ejectment. 
Ejectment would lie where property was taken by railroad without tender 
of payment. Daniels v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35 Iowa 129 (1872), Am. Rep. 
490. 
8. Injunction. 
In suit to enJom condemnation proceeding plaintiff must show equitable 
gound to justify interference. Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona County, 
238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W.2d-841 (1947). 
Action to enjoin improvement properly dismissed where no wrongful acts or 
proceedings were shown. Mill v. City of Denison, 237 Iowa 1335, 25 N.W.2d 323 
(1947). 
Injunction proper remedy to prevent establishment of highway through 
orchard and ornamental grounds. Hoover v. State Highway Commission, 207 Iowa 
56, 222 N.W. 438 (1938). 
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Equity cannot enjoin or impose conditions precedent to prosecution of 
condemnation proceedings. Herman v. Board of Park Com'rs of City of Boone, 
200 Iowa 1116, 206 N.W. 35 (1925). 
Injunction arresting proceedings before stage of assessment of damages 
and prior to appeal was improperly invoked. Minear v. Plowman, 197 Iowa 1188, 
197 N.W. 67 (1924). 
Certain persons were neither necessary nor proper parties in action to 
enjoin proceeding to establish public way. Miller v. Kramer, 154 Iowa 523, 
134 N.W. 538 (1912). 
Question of waiver of objections could not be considered for first time 
on appeal. Scott v. Frank, 121 Iowa 218, 96 N.W. 764 (1903). 
Since objection can be made that property sought is already devoted to 
public use no action will lie to enjoin condemnation. Waterloo Water Co. v. 
Hoxie, 89 Iowa 317, 56 N.W. 499 (1893). 
Grounds insufficient for injunction against proceedings. Keokuk & N. W. 
R. Co. v. Donnell, 77 Iowa 221, 42 N.W. 176 (1889). 
Owner could not maintain suit in equity to have proceedings declared void 
for irregularity since he had statutory right of appeal. Phillips v. Watson, 
63 Iowa 28, 18 N.W. 659 (1884). 
Railway could compel specific performance of contract to convey right of 
way after complying·with conditions and enjoin condemnation proceedings. 
Chicago & S. W. R. Co. v. Swinney, 38 Iowa 182 (1874). 
9. Mandamus. 
Mandamus will lie to compel condemnation where land has been taken 
without authority and without compensation. Hammer v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 
896 (Iowa 1975). Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). Baird v. 
Johnston, 230 Iowa 161, 297 N.W. 315 (1941). 
Highway commission's construction of bridge with piers in creek channel 
would be a taking of property of drainage district. Harrison-Pottawattamie 
Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. State, 261 Iowa 1044, 156 N.W.2d 835 (1968). 
Under the facts, plaintiff was entitled to compel assessment of 
damages. Dawson v. McKinnon, 226 Iowa 756, 285 N.W. 258 (1939). 
10. Agreements, settlements, stipulations, and waiver. 
Issue of waiver cannot be raised by special appearance. State ex rel. 
Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
If damages may be avoided by waiver or stipulation, which will fully 
protect all parties concerned such waiver should be received and acted upon. 
De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
Evidence insufficient to authorize finding that there has been a 
settlement or compromise. Mason v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 468, 109 N.W. 
1 (1906). 
11. Property, estates, or interests subject to eminent domain. 
Although a landowner whose property abuts upon public highway is not 
entitled to access to his land at all points between property and highway, 
such landowner does have property right in nature of easement appurtenant to 
ownership of free and convenient ingress to and egress from property to 
particular highway upon which land abuts. Simkins v. City of Davenport, 232 
N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
Eminent domain can be exercised only for public use and cannot be 
utilized for taking private property from one person for private use of 
another. Simpson v. Low-rent Housing Agency of Mt. Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 
1974). 
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472.1 
One whose personal property is damaged, destroyed, or reduced in value in 
a condemnation is entitled to compensation. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 
(Iowa 1973). 
Leasehold estate is "property" and when taken in exercise of eminent 
domain is compensible. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). Wicks v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
998, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
City lacks power of eminent domain with reference to acquisition of 
light, air and view affecting properties abutting on street in area to be 
occupied by viaduct. O.A.G. January 14, 1949, p. 11. 
Dower right subordinate to right of eminent domain. Caldwell v. City of 
Ottumwa, 198 Iowa 666, 200 N.W. 336 (1924). 
12. Payment. 
Payment of award by condemnor, prior to g1v1ng notice of appeal, did not 
divest district court of jurisdiction of subject matter of appeal by condemnor 
from compensation commission award. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Iowa Relocation Assistance Act, section 316.l et. seq., provides for 
payments separate from and in addition to just compensation payable in 
condemnation proceedings. O.A.G. Nov. 20, 1970. 
Payment of damages to be in money. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 
33 N.W.2d 503. 
13. Title, estate, interest, or rights acquired. 
Power company condemning strip acquired easement. De Penning v. Iowa 
Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503. 
14. Foreign corporations. 
Foreign corporation lacks power of eminent domain and owner cannot 
maintain such proceeding against such corporation. Holbert v. St. Louis, K. 
C. & N. C. R. Co., 45 Iowa 23 (1876). 
15. Tenants for years. 
A tenant for years is the owner of property subject to condemnation. 
Skaff v. Sioux City, 255 Iowa 49, 120 N.W.2d 439 (1963). 
16. Compliance with statute. 
Landowner who is dissatisfied with assessment by condemnation 
commissioners and who desires to appeal to district court must substantially 
follow procedure prescribed by this chapter, and if he fails to do so, the 
commissioners' award stands. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 
N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Landowner, who on appeal had increased highway condemnation award of 
damages, not entitled to attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup'rs, 
163 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1968). 
Compliance with condemnation statute is essential. Aplin v. Clinton 
County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
17. Pleadings. 
Waiver is an affirmative defense, and is not jurisdictional. State ex 
rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Allowing landowners in condemnation case to amend their petition was 
within sound discretion of trial court. Jones v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
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472.2 By Whom Conducted (No Annotations) 
472.3 Application for Condemnation 
1. Construction and application. 
Appointment of compensation commission by chief judge of judicial 
district of county in which private land sought to be condemned is located. 
State v. Johann, 207 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1973). 
Failure to name and serve contract vendors and mortgagee constituted 
substantive error and rendered eminent domain proceedings and award a 
nullity. Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1969). 
Determination as to necessity of taking private property for public use 
is ordinarily a legislative, not judicial function. Thornberry v. State Bd. 
of Regents, 186 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1971). 
Right to enter on land for purpose of making preliminary surveys and 
investigations in contemplation of highway condemnation could not reasonably 
be implied from this section requiring that condemnor file application 
describing property and a plat showing location of right of way. Iowa State 
Highway Commission v. Hipp, 259 Iowa 1082, 147 N.W.2d 1g5 (lg66). 
Only by process of appeal does district court obtain jurisdiction, and 
then appellate only. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 571, 63 N.W.2d 
218 (1954). ' 
Proceeding before sheriff is administrative till appeal has been taken. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 
338 (1954), rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Compliance with statutes gave jurisdiction of proceedings to assess 
damages whether or not equitable owners were properly joined as plaintiffs. 
Longstreet, 200 Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925). 
Prior survey, if made, is not commencement of condemnation proceedings. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681, 88 
N.W. 1082 (1902). 
2. Limitations. 
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Right of landowner to prosecute condemnation proceedings was not cut off I 
in five years by statute of limitations relative to injuries to real 
property. Gates v. Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Iowa 690, 15g N.W. 456 
(lgl6). 
3. List of owners and parties. 
Where provision of this section requires that all persons holding liens 
or encumbrances on land to be condemned be named in the application and be 
given notice of proceedings, due process requires no less as to those holding 
liens or encumbrances of record on personal property which may be damaged, 
destroyed or reduced in value by condemnation proceedings against real 
state. Forst v. Sioux City, 2og N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Listing of all record owners of property affected is not jurisdictional 
requirement. Mill v. City of Denison, 237 Iowa 1335, 25 N.W.3d 323 (1947). 
Purchaser of property sought to be condemned was real party in 
interest. Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. g19 (lg25). 
Compliance with statutes gave jurisdiction of proceedings to assess 
damages whether or not equitable owners were properly joined as plaintiffs. 
Longstreet, 200 Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 (1g25). 
Company taking right of way could not complain that contract purchasers 
were made parties. Wolfe v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 173 Iowa 277, 155 N.W. 324 
(1915). 
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472.3 
4. Particular facts. 
Application to sheriff by landowner asking assessment of damages, need 
not allege that he refused to grant right of way. Hartley v. Keokuk & N. W. 
R. Co., 85 Iowa 455, 52 N.W. 352 (1892). 
Foreign corporation lacks power of eminent domain and owner cannot 
maintain such proceeding against such corporation. Holbert v. St. Louis, K. 
C. &·N. R. Co., 45 Iowa 23 (1877). 
5. Extent of property or ri.ghts to be taken. 
Where limited right is desired by condemnor, limitations should be made 
part of record by placement in petition or order of condemnation. De Penning 
v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
That notice stated right of way was for a "suburban and interurban 1 i ne" 
did not prevent operation of steam trains without new condemnation. Lewis v. 
Omaha & C. B. S. Ry. Co., 158 Iowa 137, 138 N.W. 1092 (1912). 
6. Damages. 
Form of application did not limit claim to damages to lots particularly 
described. Cox v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 77 Iowa 20, 41 N.W. 475 (1889). 
7. Amendments. 
Petition for damages can be amended by increase in amount claimed. 
Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932). 
8. Answer. 
Formal pleadings not required in condemnation proceedings. Mason v. Iowa 
Cent. R. Co., 131 Iowa 468, 109 N.W. 1 (1906). 
Objection can be made by answer to application. Bennett v. City of 
Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
9. Leases. 
Leasehold estate is "property" and when taken in exercise of eminent 
domain, is compensable. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). Wicks v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
998, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). Batcheller v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 
Iowa 364, 101 N.W.2d 30 (1960). 
10. Tenants for years. 
A tenant for years is the owner of property subject to condemnation. 
Skaff v. Sioux City, 255 Iowa 49, 120 N.W.2d 439 (1963). 
11. Entry. 
Highway Commission did not have, under power of eminent domain.granted to 
it, right to enter upon or explore land before proceedings to acquire it. 
Iowa State Highway Commission v. Hipp, 259 Iowa 1082, 147 N.W.2d 195 (1966). 
12. Review. 
Challenge of appointment of condemnation commission. Koss v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 271 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978). 
13. Notice. 
Condemnation notice which stated it was for right of way of transmission 
line sufficiently specified property interest of utility to comply with 
statute which required notice to describe land for condemnation. SMB 
Investments v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 329 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1983). 
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472.4 Comnission to Assess Damages 
1. Validity. 
No deprivation of jury trial since such can be had on appeal. Tharp v. 
Witham, 65 Iowa 566, 22 N.W. 677 (1885). 
2. Construction and application. 
Specification of mode that chief judge must use in selecting 
commissioners. State v. Johann, 207 N.W.2d 21 (Iowa 1973). 
Condemnation commission which assessed damages was properly 
constituted. Halweg v. City of Sioux City, 189 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1971). 
On appeal from commissioner's awards in condemnation proceedings, trial 
court has authority to make proper assessment of costs. Fanning v. Mapco, 
Inc., 181 N.W.2d 190 (Iowa 1970). 
Presence of metal deposits in land is proper element to consider in 
valuing property condemned. Townsend v. Mid-American Pipeline Co., 168 N.W.2d 
30 (1969). 
Measure of damages for partial taking is the difference in actual, or 
fair market value of property immediately before and after condemnation. 
Reeder v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 166 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1969). 
Condemnation commission is an impartial and independent body organized 
for purpose of awarding a price for condemned property fair to both condemnee 
and condemnor. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 (1962). 
Proceeding is administrative till appeal has been taken to district 
court. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 
L. Ed. (1954), rehearing denied, 74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Sheriff's commission is in no sense a judicial tribunal. Chicago, R. I. 
& P. R. Co. v. Kay, D. C., 107 F. Supp. 895 (1952), affirmed in part and 
reversed in part on other grounds, 204 F2d 116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 
954, affirmed, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 
74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
3. Qualified persons. 
Appointment of persons eligible to serve on compensation commission. 
O.A.G. July 22, 1971. 
That five or six members of commission, though freeholders of county, 
were not freeholders of city, was no basis for action to set aside 
proceedings. Mill v. City of Denison, 237 Iowa 1335, 25 N.W.2d 323 (1947). 
Commissioners could be reappointed after injunction was dissolved. 
Miller v. Kramer, 154 Iowa 523, 134 N.W. 538 (1912). 
Code 1897 did not require jury to assess damages to be composed of same 
members as in previous years. Gray v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 129 Iowa 68, 105 
N.W. 359 (1905). 
Party had right to have compensation determined by competent tribunal. 
Ragatz v. City of Dubuque, 4 Iowa 343, 4 Clarke 343 (1857). 
4. Bias or prejudice. 
Bias or prejudice of commissioners to assess damages from their previous 
services as such did not vitiate the proceedings. Price v. Town of Earlham, 
175 Iowa 576, 157 N.W. 238 (1916). 
On appeal it is immaterial whether sheriff was agent of railroad, or 
whether jury expressed opinions adverse to rights of owners. Mississippi & M. 
R. Co. v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373, 8 Clarke 373 (1859). 
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5. Fees and cos ts . 
Compensation of sheriff. Robb v. A. K. & D. M. R. Co., 44 Iowa 440 
(1876). 
6. Settlement. 
Where easement had been taken by condemnation and land was entered into, 
alleged settlement of damages was not contract involving real estate within 
statute of frauds, and trial court properly admitted evidence of claimed 
settlement. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 243 Iowa 1377, 55 
N.W.2d 552 (1952). 
7. Amount of award. 
Condemnation award on appeal less than award of commissioners. State ex 
rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Measure of damages in eminent domain proceedings is the property's 
reasonable market value at the "time of taking." Heldenbrand v. Executive 
Council of Iowa, for Use and Benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1974). 
Measure of recovery where part of property is taken in condemnation 
proceeding. Townsend v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 168 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1969). 
Plaintiff not entitled to severance damages on basis of partial taking of 
single unit composed of two tracts. Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 
(Iowa 1968). 
Damage award not excessive. Hostert v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
250 Iowa 253, 93 N.W2d 773 (1959). 
8. Evidence. 
Value of removable product resulting in complete depletion of value of 
land is proper evidence in proving before and after value. Townsend v. Mid-
America Pipeline Co., 168 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1969). 
Unity of property required to compel condemnor to take both properties is 
quite different and much more difficult to establish than unity which would 
permit evaluation of whole for purpose of establishing severance damages. 
Hutchinson v. Maiwurm, 162 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1968). 
Record of commissioners' proceedings in highway condemnation case 
established that commissioners had substantially complied with statutory 
requirements and given due consideration to all elements of damages, even 
though they had not closely examined farm buildings and other portions of farm 
not taken. Aplin v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
9. Misconduct. 
To justify new trial because of misconduct of jurors, it must appear that 
misconduct was calculated to influence verdict and that it is reasonably 
probable that it did so. Townsend v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 168 N.W.2d 30 
(Iowa 1969). 
472.5 Vacancies (No Annotations) 
472.6 Repealed by Acts 1970 (63 G.A.) ch. 1225, ~ 3. 
472.7 Comnissioners to Qualify 
1. Construction and application. 
Compliance with statutory provisions relating to filing of oath of 
assessment by commissioners is essential to validity of oath. Miller v. Palo 
Alto Bd. of Sup' rs, 248 Iowa 1132, 84 N.W.2d 38 (1957). 
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2. Evidence. 
Action contesting validity of assessment of damages for taking of 
property - evidence insufficient to show oath administered. Miller v. Palo 
Alto Bd. of Sup'rs, 248 Iowa 1132, 84 N.W.2d 38 (1957). 
472.8 Notice of Assessment 
1. Construction and application. 
Notice in condemnation proceedings is commencement of the action. 
Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1946). 
Compliance with statutes as to application for appointment of jury and 
notice of time of viewing premises gave jurisdiction. Longstreet, 200 Iowa 
723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925). 
Where application and notice were duly made and ·owner was present at 
viewing, took part, and made statements as to value, freeholders had jurisdiction to assess damages. Carlile v. Des Moines & K. C. R. Co., 99 Iowa 
345, 68 N.W. 784 (1896). 
Public offense not committed where condemnee informs condemnation 
appraisal commission as to what similarly situated land had recently sold 
for. O.A.G. April 5, 1965. 
2. Persons entitled to notice. 
Mortgagee entitled to notice. Severin v. Cole, 38 Iowa 463 (1874). 
3. Necessit* of notice. 
Althoug condemnees owned two adjacent tracts, one encumbered by federal 
land bank mortgage, where transmission line right of way was sought by power 
company, easement did not traverse any portion of land encumbered by 
mortgage. Federal land bank was not entitled to notice of condemnation. 
Yoder v. Iowa Power and Light Company, 215 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1974). 
Owner on whom no notice was served was not bound. Gibson v. Union 
County, 208 Iowa 314, 223 N.W. 111 (1929). 
Where appeal is made on merits it is immaterial whether notice was 
given. Borland v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 8 Iowa 148, 8 Clarke 148 (1859). 
4. Effect of notice. 
By suitable statements in application condemnor may limit rights to be 
acquired. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
5. Waiver of notice or defects. 
Owner not named in notice is not charged with notice of proceedings, but, 
if he appeals, such objection is waived. Ellsworth v. Chicago & I. W.R. Co., 
91 Iowa 386, 59 N.W. 78 (1894). 
472.9 Fonli of Notice 
1. Construction and application. 
Though there must be strict compliance with statute regulating exercise 
of eminent domain, such does not necessarily mean literal compliance with 
notice statute, and substantial conformity is sufficient. SMB Investments v. 
Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 329 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1983). 
Notice of condemnation must be given in substantial compliance with 
statute. Koss v. City of Cedar Rapids, 271 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978). 
Company could, by reservation in application and notice, limit 
condemnation, but failure to do so was not fatal to right of company to have 
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472.14 
matter considered on appeal. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 
503 (1948). 
Compliance with statutes as to application for appointment of jury and 
notice of time of viewing premises gave jurisdiction. Longstreet, 200 Iowa 
723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925). 
2. Naming eersons. 
Plaintiffs shown to hold record legal title to personal property alleged 
to have been damaged, destroyed, or reduced in value pursuant to condemnation 
are entitled to notice. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Failure to name and serve contract vendors and mortgagee constituted 
substantive error and rendered eminent domain proceedings and award a 
nullity. Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1969). 
Persons must be named if their land is to be taken. Birge v. Chicago M. 
& St. P.R. Co., 65 Iowa 440, 21 N.W. 767 (1884). 
3. Description of land. 
Condemnation notice for transmission line substantially complied with 
statute for notice required to describe the land in such a manner as to be 
clearly identified. SMB Investments v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 329 
N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1983). 
Notice describing land to be taken as a certain number of feet on each 
side of center line of railroad "as same is located, staked and marked," was 
sufficient. Lower v. Chicago B. & O. R. Co., 59 Iowa 563, 13 N.W. 718 (1882). 
4. Persons entitled to object. 
Koss v. City of Cedar Rapids, 271 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978). 
472.10 Signing of Notice {No Annotations) 
472.11 Filing of Notices and Return of Service (No Annotations) 
472.12 Notice to Nonresidents 
1. Construction and application. 
Condemnation statutes required strict construction and strict compliance, 
and service of notice must comply with R. C. P. 60. Gilbride v. City of 
Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.d 905 (1946). 
2. Affidavit as to personal service. 
To justify notice by publication under R. C. P. 60, an affidavit must be 
filed with sheriff that personal service cannot be had on owner in Iowa. 
Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1946). 
3. Sufficiency of notice. 
Notice by publication to holder of legal title, and "al 1 other persons 
interested," did not charge holder of tax sale certificate with notice of 
proceedings. Cochran v. Independent School Dist. of Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa 
663 (1879). 
472.13 Service Outside State (No Annotations) 
472.14 Appraisement - Report 
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1. Construction and application. 
In this section, the legislature intended to include as compensable, 
damages to personal property on land owned or leased by condemnee and used in 
connection with property taken by eminent domain proceedings, regardless of 
whether it is actually located on the land condemned. Wilkes v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1969). 
Only valid and legal appraisement can sustain taking on highway 
condemnation. Aplin v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Presence and participation of landowner at viewing conferred jurisdiction 
on freeholders to assess damages. Carlisle v. Des Moines & K. C. R. Co., 99 
Iowa 345, 68 N.W. 784 (1896). 
2. Proceedings in general. 
Landowner dissatisfied with assessment by condemnation commissioners and 
who desires to appeal to district court must substantially follow procedure 
prescribed by this chapter. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 
N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
State has right to diminish its condemnation during trial. Henderson v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 (1967). 
In condemnation proceedings, it was proper for each expert witness to 
state what he considered was principal element of value of property, and to · 
give little or no value to other elements. Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 1166, 104 N.W.2d 458 (1960). 
It is duty of sheriff's jury to personally examine premises. City of Des 
Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa 153 (1866). 
There must be a full, intelligent and competent inquiry into question of 
individual loss or damage. Walters v. Houck, 7 Iowa 72, 7 Clarke 72 (1858). 
3. Issues. 
Question of right to condemn for purposes named was not concern of 
commissioners. Forbes v. Delashmutt, 68 Iowa 164, 26 N.W. 56 (1885). 
4. Damages - in general. 
Owner of remainder area not entitled in condemnation proceeding to 
recover for damages caused by taker's use of property acquired from adjoining 
landowners. Hammer v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1975). 
In eminent domain proceedings, where parties differ as to highest and 
best use, they are entitled to present evidence of market value based on their 
differing theories of highest and best use. Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1974). 
Duty of sheriff's jury to assess condemnee's damages according to notice 
given and application filed with sheriff. Henderson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 260 Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 (1967). 
Owner of property may be entitled to damages for taking for public use, 
even though he has parted with his title and ownership before award is paid. 
Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1964). 
Separate item of damages not required to be found for each element of 
value included in condemnation award. Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 1166, 104 N.W.2d 458 (1960). 
5. Measure of damages, in general. 
Evidence of mineral deposits is only a permissible consideration and not 
a yardstick for measuring damages. Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line 
Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687 (1954). 
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6. Before and after taking, in ~eneral 1 measure of damaqes. Measure of damages for partial taking is difference in actual, or fair 
market value of property immediately before and after condemnation. Reeder v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 166 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1969). 
Use of pencil and paper in computation is not proof of use of improper 
unit rule in measure of damage. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
Where all property was taken, reasonable market value of property 
immediately before condemnation was measure of damages. Kaperonis v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 1166, 104 N.W.2d 458 (1960). 
Basis of award was difference between reasonable market value of entire 
tract immediately before the condemnation and of the remaining portion after 
the taking. Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 734 
(1954). 
Difference in value of entire farm should be considered. Wheatley v. 
City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 (1932). 
Damages not to be awarded be assessment of a series of specific items. 
Kosters v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
Proper to consider effect which proper use of condemned strip will have 
on remainder. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 
(1922). 
Only question involved is value before and after the taking. Eggleston 
v. Town of Aurora, 233 Iowa 559, 10 N.W.2d 104 (1943). 
7. Fair reasonable, market value, measure of damages. 
Mar,et value of property condemned is true test in condemnation 
proceedings. Redfield v Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 
N.W.2d 397 (1961). 
Fair value may be more or even less than owner's investment. Foster v. 
U.S., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
8. Time of taking, measure of damages. 
Instruction that amount recoverable by lessee for destruction or 
reduction in value of personal property on taking was fair and reasonable 
value of such personal property to the extent that the same was destroyed, 
damaged, or reduced in value was reversibly erroneous. Nidy & Co. v. State, 
189 N.W.2d 583 (1971). 
Measure of damages for condemned land is its reasonable market value at 
time of taking. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 
N.W.2d 424 (1963). Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 415, 
100 N.W.2d 901 (1960). 
Measure of damages is value as a whole in condition it was in at date of 
condemnation. Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027 
(1go7). 
Benefits to owner should be excluded. Bennett v. City of Marion, 106 
Iowa 628, 76 N.W.844 (18g8). 
9. Remote, contingent and speculative, measure of damages. 
Not to be considered as evidence of value of condemned property. Johnson 
County Broadcasting Corp. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 
N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
In condemnation proceedings, excluding evidence concerning price paid by 
owner for entire tract eight years previously, was not an abuse of 
discretion. Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 734 
(1954). 
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10. Leaseholds, measure of damages. 
Fee interest distinctively separate from leasehold interest and both 
interests are subject to separate valuations. Fritz v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 270 N.W.2d 835 (Iowa 1g78). 
Measure of damage to leaseholder ordinarily its market value. Korf v. 
Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1948). 
Benefits to owner should be excluded. Sater v. Burlington & Mt. P. Plank 
Road Co., 1 Iowa 386 (1855). 
11. Land as entity, or separate lots, parts, or tracts, damages. 
Owners of land condemned for road relocation not entitled to recover as 
part of condemnation award for damage to remainder of land when occupied road 
was elevated in conjunction with relocation, resulting in drainage pattern and 
flooding. Hanmer v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 3g5 (Iowa 1975). 
Damage from loss of lateral support due to construction of new road was 
not within contemplation of original award, and owners could compel new 
condemnation. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 N.W.2d 62 (1961). 
Two tracts of land contiguous to each other, owned by same person and not 
used in connection with each other considered as separate tracts. Hoeft v. 
State, 221 Iowa 694, 266 N.W. 571, 104 A. L. R. 1008 (1936). 
Damages not normally measured on whole of two separately owned tracts. 
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1g32). 
Where it appeared that plaintiff never acquired ground from which right 
of way over one of two tracts was taken, it was presumed that sheriff's jury 
took into account only appropriation over other tract. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 
141 Iowa 250, 119 N.W. 927. 
Where two lots are used as one, property owner entitled to damages for 
injury to property as a whole. Cummins v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 
397, 19 N.W. 268 (1884). 
12. Unauthorized, unlawful or negligent acts, damages. 
When damage to property owner arises by reason of defects or negligence 
in connection with building of new road, damage suffered is not included in 
original condemnation allowance. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 
N.W.2d 62 (1961). 
Damages resulting from unauthorized or unlawful acts or from neglect to 
perform duty to fence are to be redressed in proper action. Fleming v. 
Chicago, D. & M. R. Co., 34 Iowa 353 (1872). King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 
Iowa 458 (1872). 
Jury must not permit damages for improper or unlawful use of highway. 
Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930). 
Owner cannot recover damages for improper construction of improvement. 
Richardson v. City of Centerville, 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071 (1908). 
13. Amount of damages - in general. 
All of condemnee's property substantially interfered with by a taking in 
condemnation proceeding should originally be considered by the condemnation 
commission. Wilkes v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 
1969). 
Where evidence shows a compensible loss to both real estate and personal 
property due to condemnation, it is proper to permi.t the jury to consider each 
as a separate cause and to render verdicts accordingly. Id. 
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14. Real estate, amount of damaqes. 
Awards not excessive. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963). 
Jury award of $20,500 for condemnation of leasehold was not excessive. 
Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 
(1963). 
This section does not permit addition of consequential damages to the 
before and after value. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 
(1962). 
Owner of furnishings sold prior to any taking not entitled to allowance 
for personal property destroyed or damaged. Gaar v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 252 Iowa 1374, 110 N.W.2d 558 (1961). 
When a condemnee has no compensible rights, the highway commission is 
unauthorized to disburse public money to him. Manrique v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 252 Iowa 553, 107 N.W.2d 432 (1961). 
Award not so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice. Korf v. 
Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 3 A. L. R.2d 270 (1948). 
Defining "just compensation" as sum which would make owner whole was not 
prejudicial error. Witt v. State, 223 Iowa 156, 272 N.W. 419 (1937). 
Award held not excessive. Besco v. Mahaska County, 200 Iowa 684, 205 
N.W. 459. 
Award not so excessive as to indicate prejudice. Kosters v. Sioux 
County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
15. Matters considered in determining damages. 
Damages to condemned land are assessed once and for all and presumed to 
include all present and future damages. Hammer v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 896 
(Iowa 1975). 
Proceeding to determine value of portion of farm condemned for highway 
purposes. Harmsen v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d 
660 (1960). 
Evidence of royalty income of owners and presence of mineral deposits 
properly admitted as bearing on value of farm. Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin 
Pipe Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687 (1954). 
In condemnation proceedings, damages are not limited to value of land 
taken, but include all matters, present or future, that necessarily and 
proximately affect market value of tract. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 
Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
16. Decrease in value, matters considered in determining damages. 
Decrease in value caused by percolation of water from reservoir or 
condemned portion may be considered. Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 
1187, 240 N.W. 628. 
Effect on value of remaining property and extent of inconvenience may be 
considered. Bennett v. City of Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 (1898). 
17. Finality of determination, matters considered in determining damages. 
For market value evidence in eminent domain proceeding, assessment 
valuation by property tax is heresay. Vine Street Corporation v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1974). 
Damages, when once assessed include all injuries which may result for 
all time to come from construction and operation of improvement. Lage v. 
Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942). 
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18. Separate estates or interests, matters considered in determining damages. 
Interests of landlord and tenant in condemned real estate are several, 
and it is proper to value each estate or interest separately. Batcheller v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 101 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1960). 
19. Unusual damages, matters considered in determining damages. 
Unusual changes or those made necessary by artificial conditions, or 
which inflict special damage are not presumed to have been contemplated when 
land was acquired from owners. Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 
197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
20. Necessities of public, matters considered in determining damages. 
Necessities of public cannot be taken into consideration in fixing value 
of property taken. U.S. v. Foster,C.C.A., 131 F.2d 3, (1942), certiorari 
denied, 63 S.Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L.Ed. 1138. U.S. v. Buescher, C.C.A., 
131 F.2d 3 (1942), certiorari denied, 63 S.Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L.Ed. 
1138. 
21. Profits, personal property, crops, buildings, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
A condemnee is entitled to compensation for damage to, destruction of, or 
reduction in value of personal property even if it is not located on the 
condemned land, as long as it was used in connection with a business operated 
on that land. Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1973). 
Losses incident to necessity of selling personal property by owner are 
not elements to include in fixing fair market value. Foster v. U.S., 145 F.2d 
873 (1945). 
One occupying land under a leasehold upon which he has personal property 
used exclusively with his condemned land may recover for resulting reduction 
in value of his personal property in order to be made whole. Wilkes v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1969). 
Profit of a business is to uncertain to be accepted in condemnation case 
as evidence of usuable value of property. Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
Commissioners had substantially complied with statutory requirements and 
given due consideration to all elements of damages, even though they had not 
closely examined farm buildings and other portions of farm not taken. Aplin 
v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Contemplated profits from use of real estate is not measure of damages in 
condemnation case. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 
121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
Value of growing crops on land taken was included in the award of 
damages. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 
108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
Evidence of royalty income of owners and presence of mineral deposits 
properly admitted as bearing on value of farm. Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin 
Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687 (1954). 
Losses incident to necessity of selling personal property by owner are 
not elements to include in fixing fair market value. Foster v. U. S., C. C. 
A.,· 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Evidence that leasehold was profitable is admissible to illustrate value 
of premises for rent. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 3 A. L. R.2d 270 (1948). 
Value of growing crops lost by condemnation admissible. Bracken v. City 
of Albia, 194 Iowa 596, 189 N.W. 972 (1922). Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 
193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
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Cost of rebuilding structure to quality and condition prior to taking and 
loss sustained by being deprived of its use when such loss was the irrmediate 
and necessary consequence, should be considered. Freeland v. City of 
Muscatine, 9 Iowa 461 (1859). Kahn v. City of Muscatine, 9 Iowa 461 (1859). 
Value of buildings on land condemned considered in determining 
compensation. O.A.G. 1930, p .. 184. 
22. Uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in determining damages. 
Trial court justified in permitting collateral attack on zoning ordinance 
by owners of property against which city brought eminent domain action. 
Business Ventures, Inc. v. Io1~a City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
In eminent domain procee·:ling, where condemnor conceded the existing use 
was not the highest and best use of the property, condemnor's evidence of 
market value based on one use did not have probative value in establishing 
market value based on an unrelated use. Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1974). 
Where there was evidence of industrial development in the territory, 
question of adaptability for industrial uses could be considered. Hall v. 
City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 734 (1954). 
Value determined by consideration of uses to which property is adapted 
and all circumstances that affect such value. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 
3 A.L.R.2d 270 (1948). 
Compensation payable in view of physical condition of premises, present 
use and improvement, and fitness and desirability for other future uses. 
Hubbell v. City of Des Moine~;. 183 Iowa 715, 167 N.W. 619 (1918). 
23. Most advantageous and valuable use, uses and adaptability of land, 
matters considered in determining damages. 
Jury may consider all uses to which land is adapted and may award 
compensation on basis of most advantageous and valuable use. U.S. v. Foster, 
C.C.A., 13 F.2d 3 (1904). U.S. v. Buescher, C.C.A., 131 F.2d 3 (1904). 
24. Comparable use, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
The market value of a leasehold is to be appraised by considering what it 
is worth as improved by the tenant and includes such elements as location, 
accessibility, possible uses, improvements and fixtures and their use •. Nidy & 
Co. v. State, 189 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 1971). 
Use of condemned lot, which was owned jointly by husband and wife in 
connection with two other lots, which were owned individually by husband and 
which had been condemned in separate proceeding, could be considered in fixing 
fair market value of jointly-owned lot. Crist v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
25. Particular use, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
Fact that farm is operated differently from condemned farm does not 
render its sale price inadmissible as comparable sale if it is otherwise 
sufficiently similar to subject property. Crozier v. Iowa - Illinois Gas & 
Elec. Co., 165 N.W.2d 833 Iowa (1969). 
Owner may show property to be peculiarly adaptable to particµlar purpose 
for which taken. Tracy v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914). 
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26. Reasonable use, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. · 
Condemned property must be evaluated, with its potentialities and its 
highest and best reasonable uses, as it_ was immediately before the taking. 
Crist v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (lg63). 
Owner of property condemned is entitled t_o have the jury informed of all 
the capabilities of the property as to the business or use if any to which it 
has been devoted and any use to which it might reasonably be adapted or 
applied. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 
108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
27. Lawful and proper use, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered 
in determining damages. 
In proceeding to condemn land for relocation of a highway, an instruction 
to the jury to assume that the highway and access road upon completion would 
be used in a lawful and proper manner was unnecessary. Bryan v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 1093, 104 N.W.2d 562 (1960). 
28. Industrial use, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
Where there was evidence of industrial development in the territory, 
question of adaptability for industrial uses could be considered. Hall v. 
City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 734 (1954). 
29. Rental income, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
Rental income not to be taken as sole test of market value, but is only 
one of the elements to be taken into consideration. Kaperonis v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 100 N.W.2d 901 (Iowa 1960). 
30. Rights acquired, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
In assessing damages, it is not what the condemner intends to do, but 
what it acquires the right to do, that determines the quantum of damages. 
Henderson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 
(1967). 
31. Present intention, uses and adaptability of land, matters considered in 
determining damages. 
Fact that condemner has no present intention·of exercising all rights 
acquired or probability that its use may be a limited one are not proper 
matters for consideration in fixing compensation. De Penning v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
32. Benefits, matters considered in determining damages. 
Appreciation in value of owner's adjacent land cannot be considered in 
estimating damages. Koestenbader v. Pierce, 41 Iowa 204 (1875). 
Advantages resulting to owner not to be considered. Israel v. Jewett, 29 
Iowa 475 (1870). 
33. Interest. 
Where land and possession are taken prior to payment of damages interest 
should be allowed on award. Lough v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 
31, 89 N.W. 77 (1902). 
476 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
472 .14 
34. Findings, award, and report. 
Award not so excessive a~; to permit interference by Supreme Court. Crist 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Evidence did not establ i~;h that awards in condemnation proceedings were 
excessive. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 
978, 108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
Total damage suffered by condemnee is allowed in a single jury award, and 
it is presumed that all proper elements upon which evidence is accepted are 
evaluated and considered in that award. Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 251 Iowa 1166, 104 N.W.2d 458 (1960). 
Condemnor entitled, on demand, to have assessment on tract, if entitled 
to consequential damages, separated from assessment on tract subject to 
improvement. Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1932). 
Assessment of damages in lump sum to two tracts taken was harmless where 
court directed and jury found damages to each tract separately. Longstreet, 
200 Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925). 
Damages to tenants in common should be assessed separately if their 
respective interests can be ascertained. Rupp.ert v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. 
Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
Authority to set aside findings of commissioners will not be sustained on 
doubtful implications. Hiatt v. City of Keokuk, 9 Iowa 438 (1859). 
35. Notice of award. 
Mailing of notice of award, properly addressed, with proper postage 
raised rebuttable presumption that it was received by him. Gregory v. Kirkman 
Consol. Independent School Dist., 186 Iowa 914, 173 N.W. 243 (lgl9). 
36. Objections to commissioners and award. 
Objections could not be considered for first time on appeal. Scott v. 
Frank, 121 Iowa 218, 96 N.W. 764 (1903). 
Objections to jurisdiction of sheriff's jury are not waived by an appeal 
from their award of damages. Slough v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 71 Iowa 641, 
33 N.W. 149 (1887). 
37. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Taxpayer has no duty to protest under evaluation of his property, and 
failure to do so would thus not constitute an admission concerning the value 
of his property. Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860 
( Iowa 197 4) • 
Burden was upon allege·:! lessees to prove that they would suffer damage if 
highway commission was not required to condemn their leasehold and compensate 
them after commission purchased premises from owners. Hawbaker v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 573, 113 N.W.2d 296 (1962). 
Proceeding to determine value of strip of land condemned for highway 
purposes resulting in proposed creek channel change. Harmsen v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d 660 (196D). 
38. Enhancement of value. 
In proceeding to conde,mn realty for highway purposes, admitting evidence 
of enhancement of value by making of the improvement is proper. Redfield v. 
Iowa State Highway Commissi1on, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 397 (1961). 
39. Leases. 
Lessee's loss by condemnation of right to use leasehold improvements 
which it paid for and which were not removable was realistic element of value 
which lessee lost by condemnation. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 26D 
Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
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Interests of lessor and lessee were several and not joint and award to 
one would in no way affect or prejudice other's rights in condemnation case. 
Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 
(1963). 
Damages award for condemnation of leasehold to be decided upon particular 
facts of each case under consideration. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Right of lessee to compensation for taking of leasehold interest by 
eminent domain cannot be obliterated by agreement between owner and highway 
commission. Hawbaker v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 573, 113 
N.W.2d 296 (1962). 
40. Cost of property. 
Witnesses cannot testify as to cost of buildings and equipment as part of 
damage to a leasehold, even if buildings and equipment are completely 
destroyed or disposed of. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
41. Comparable land or location. 
Trial court's action in permitting evidence as to sales price of nearby 
farms which were similar in size, use, location and character to farm involved 
in condemnation proceeding was not an abuse of discretion. Crozier v. Iowa -
Illinois & Elec. Co., 165 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa 1969). 
Size, use, location and character of land and time, mode and nature of 
sale of other lands have a bearing on admissibility thereof in condemnation 
proceedings. Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 150 
N.W.2d 642 (1967). 
Admission of testimony in condemnation case of price paid by condemner 
for other land in same project or amount fixed by its appraisers has value of 
other land in same project was prejudicial error. Jones v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Evidence of sales of comparable property is admissable as substantive 
evidence of fair market value of subject property. Martinson v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
Extent of comparability and wait and credit to be given evidence of other 
sales in a condemnation proceeding is for the jury. In re Primary Road 1-80, 
256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Evidence of comparable sales. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Trial court properly admitted evidence that lessees could find no 
comparable location on which to continue their restaurant business after 
condemnation of their leasehold for highway purposes. Estelle v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Public offense not committed where condemnee writes condemnation 
appraisal commission to inform it what similarly situated land owned by 
condemnee had recently sold for. O.A.G. April 5, 1965. 
42. Witnesses. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
43. Reduction in value. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
44. Actual or market value. 
"Fair market value of land" is the price a willing buyer under no 
compulsion to buy would pay and a willing seller under no compulsion to sell 
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would accept. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 
N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Value of removable product, resulting in complete depletion of value, is 
proper evidence in proving before and after value. Comstock v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
45. Time of appraisement. 
Appraisal made one year before date of condemnation of land admissible 
when evidence showed that conditions on date of condemnation as to location, 
use and general condition of property was the same as the year before. Crist 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
46. Admissibilit*. 
Trial courtas discretion as to admission of testimony concerning 
appraisal of land made some time prior to condemnation. Crist v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Four-year lapse between date of condemnation and valuation placed on 
property by condemnor's expert witness did not render inadmissible his 
valuation testimony. Hammer v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1975). 
47. Purchase price. 
Prices condemnees had recently paid for two portions of partially 
condemned tract were properly to be considered on question of value of tract 
at time of condemnation. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 Iowa 711, 124 
N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
48. Denial or loss of access. 
Landowners were entitled to damages for loss of access where proceeding 
instituted by condemnor specifically condemned all rights of direct access to 
a street and provided that no rights of direct access should inure. In re 
Primary Road 1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
49. Future improvements. 
Contemplated future improvements by condemnor were not a proper element 
for consideration of damages in a condemnation proceeding, even though 
testimony relative thereto was admitted. In re Primary Road 1-80, 256 Iowa 
43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
50. Earnings and income from property. 
Evidence of gross income and projected gross income from business was in 
admissible in condemnation proceeding. Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
51. Access. 
While access to highway may not be entirely cut off, an owner is not 
entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at all points between 
it and the highway. Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 
150 N.W.2d 642 (1967). 
Question of fact whether a property owner abutting condemned property has 
been denied access that is reasonable and convenient. Jones v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
52. Partial taking. 
Measure of damages for partial taking of landowners' property is 
difference in fair market value of subject property immediately before and 
immediately after condemnation. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 
Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
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53. Moving expenses. 
472.15 Guardianship (No Annotations) 
472.16 Power of Guardian (No Annotations) 
472.17 When Appraisement Final · 
1. Construction and application. 
Measure of damages in eminent domain proceedings is the property's 
reasonable market value at the "time of taking" which is the date upon which 
the condemnation commission views the premises and fixes the damages to which 
the condemnee is entitled. Heldenbrand v. Executive Council of Iowa, for Use 
and Benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1974). 
Only by process of appeal does district court obtain jurisdiction. 
Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 571, 63 N.W.2d 218 (1954). 
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act would safeguard appeal rights of 
soldier owners, if they wished to assert appeal rights. Gilbride v. City of 
Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1946). 
Damages as awarded by commissioners are final until on appeal or 
otherwise decision is reversed or changed. McCrory v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 248, 7 
Clarke 248 (1858). 
472.18 Notice of Appraisement - Appeal of Award 
1. Validity. 
Presumed constitutional. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 
141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
2. Construction and application. 
In public utility condemnation, there can be two appealable 
determinations: overruling new trial motion and attorney fee award. Sykes v. 
Iowa Power and Light Co., 262 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1978). 
In public utility condemnation, landowners had thirty days to appeal 
denial of new trial, but time ran unaffected by unrelated motion to reconsider 
where motion was only for attorney fees, supreme court was without jurisdiction to review district court on merits. Id. 
Appeal procedure to be strictly followed. Ross v. Linn County Bd. of 
Sup'rs, 182 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1970). 
3. Procedure of Appeal. 
Appeal does not lie from decision of sheriff's commission in Iowa to the 
Federal District Court. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895, 
affirmed in part and reversed in part on other gounds, 204 F.2d 290, 346 U.S. 
574, 98 L.Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S.Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L.Ed. 1078 
(1952). 
Appeal is taken by merely servicing written notice that appeal has been 
taken. O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. 
State, 243 N.W. 604 (Iowa 1932). 
If owner is aggrieved by award he should have appealed as provided by 
statute. McCrory v. Griswold, 7 Iowa 248, 7 Clarke 248 (1858). Connolly v. 
Griswold, 7 Iowa 416, 7 Clarke 416 (1858). 
Appeal rights of soldier-owners safeguarded by Soldiers and Sailors Civil 
Relief Act. Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1946). 
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472.18 
Injunction arresting condemnation proceedings prior to assessment of 
damages or time for appeal was improperly invoked. Minear v. Plowman, 197 
Iowa 1188, 197 N.W. 67 (1924). . 
Statutory provisions for appeal must be pursued. Thorson v. City of Des 
Moines, 194 Iowa 565, 188 N.W. 917 (1922). 
Appeal does not lie from part of entire award of damages assessed on two 
tracts to one person. Cedar Rapids, I.F. & N.W. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. 
P. R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (1882). 
Relevant matters overlooked by the condemnation commission can and should 
be brought before the district court in an appeal petition. Wilkes v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1969). · 
This section prescribes time limit and procedure by which appeal may be 
taken. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
Legislature had power to prescribe terms and conditions upon which 
condemnations may be made, including reasonable terms and conditions upon 
which landlord may perfect his appeal to district court. Harrington v. City 
of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
Section 472.14 applies only to proceedings by condemnation commission and 
does not apply to proceedings in court when appeal is taken from commissions 
award. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 (1962). 
4. Right to Appeal. 
Legislature has power to prescribe and fix terms and conditions upon 
which condemnations may be made, including reasonable terms and conditions 
upon which landowner may perfect his appeal to the district court. Kenkel v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Notice must be given for statutory right of appeal. Merritt v. 
Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
Right to appeal or to have a judicial determination of damages in 
condemnation case is limited by reasonable and proper statutory procedure for 
protecting an appeal to the district court. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 
Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
Failure to serve an adverse party within the time provided by this 
section is fatal to the jurisdiction of the district court. Scoular - Bishop 
Grain Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 1003, 140 N.W.2d 115 
(1966). 
Right to appeal is purely statutory. Kremar v. Independent School Dist. 
of Cedar Rapids, 192 Iowa 734, 185 N.W. 485 (1921). 
Settlement with one tennant in common does not deprive others of right of 
appeal. Ruppert v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
Appeal lay from action of supervisors establishing a private road. 
Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868}. 
5. Time for appeal. 
Court cannot extend time within which appeal may be taken from 
condemnation award. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 
(Iowa 1968). 
6. Persons who may or must appeal. 
Condemnees special appearance did not raise issue of waiver by condemnor 
of right to appeal compensation. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission 
v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
No appeal from award could be taken by a purchaser of the land who had 
not been made a party to the proceeding before the commissioners. Connable v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 60 Iowa 27, 14 N.W. 75 (1882). Cedar Rapids, 
I.F. & N.W. R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (1882). 
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District court did not acquire jurisdiction by appeal taken by person not 
a party to the proceeding. Gibson v. Union County, 208 Iowa 314, 223 N.W. 111 
(1929). 
Where railroad appealed the landowner did not have to take an appeal in 
order to procure greater damages. McKinnon v. Cedar Rapids & I. C.R. & Light 
Co., 126 Iowa 426, 102 N.W. 138 (1905). 
Contract vendees who were served in condemnation proceeding were 
"interested parties" and had standing to raise issue that proceedings were 
nullity for failure of condemnor to serve contract vendors and mortgagee. 
Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1969). 
7. Parties on appeal. 
A mortgagee is an adverse party upon whom notice of appeal must be served 
when a condemnation award is appealed to the district court. Carmichael v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). 
Plaintiffs' appeal could not be dismissed on ground that certain other 
persons with an interest in the land in question were not joined in 
plaintiffs' appeal. Bales v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 24g Iowa 57, 86 
N.W.2d 244 (lg57). 
Party to whom land had subsequently been conveyed could not, as an 
intervenor, be made a party to an appeal. Connable v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 
Co., 60 Iowa 27, 14 N.W. 75 (1882). Cedar Rapids, I.F. & N.W. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (1882). 
Where after appraisement owner died, administratrix was proper party to 
be substituted in his place for appeal instead of heirs. Conklin v. City of 
Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 35 N.W. 444 (1887). 
Where owner failed to claim damages before supervisors, he could not be 
made a party on appeal. Hanrahan v. Fox, 47 Iowa 102 (1877). 
Where damages were assessed jointly to two owners, appeal could not be 
taken without uniting the other or making him a party thereto. Chicago, R. I. 
& P. R. Co. v. Hurst, 30 Iowa 73 (1870). 
8. Se~arate or joint appeals. 
W ere award is made to owner and mortgagee jointly, owner may appeal 
without joining mortgagee. Lance v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 57 Iowa 636, 
11 N.W. 612 (1882). Dixon v. Rockwell, S. & D.R. Co., 75 Iowa 367, 39 N.W. 
646 (1888). 
Where owner and tennant were made parties in condemnation proceedings and 
owner alone was awarded damages, neither was bound to join the other in an 
appeal. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 106 N.W. 129 
(1905). 
9. Jurisdiction - in general. 
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred or ousted by parties or 
procedures of particular litigation. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Jurisdiction of subject matter is power to hear and determine cases of 
general class to which proceeding belongs and is unrelated to rights of 
parties on merits of case. Id. 
It was not necessary for district court to have in personum jurisdiction 
of landowners to try sole issue of condemnation amount. Id. 
Proceeding on appeal from allegedly excessive condemnation award, in 
which condemnee filed special appearance challenging jurisdiction of court, 
was a special proceeding not triable in equity or de novo in appellate 
court. Spencer Concrete Products Co. v. City of Spencer, 254 Iowa 87, 116 
N.W.2d 455 (1962). 
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Under statute, city council could not set aside report of commissioners. 
Hiatt v. City of Keokuk, 9 Iowa 438 (1859). 
10. Notice requirement, jurisdiction. 
Failure to serve notice of appeal on condemnation commission withing 
thirty days of assessment - district court without jurisdiction. Kenkel v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1g68). 
To envoke appellate jurisdiction of district court in condemnation case, 
this section must be followed and notice of appeal given in substantial 
compliance with its terms. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 
N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). 
If district court review is desired by either party to condemnation 
proceeding, notice thereof must be given in substantial compliance with the 
statutes. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
11. District court, jurisdiction, in general. 
In an appeal from an award of a condemnation commission, the district 
court hears the matter de nova and has jurisdiction over matters improperly 
considered or overlooked by the condemnation commission. \~ilkes v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1969). 
12. Appellate jurisdiction, district court, jurisdiction. 
Only by process of appeal does district court obtain jurisdiction over 
both subject matter and parties in a condemnation case. Carmichael v. Iowa 
State Highway Conrnission, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). 
Failure to notify sheriff of appeal to district court in condemnation 
proceeding would defeat jurisdiction of district court to proceed with the 
review. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
The district court is an appellate court in condemnation cases. Schoular 
- Bishop Grain Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 1003, 140 N.W.2d 
115 (1966). 
District court had appellate jurisdiction of causes originating in county 
court, justices court and appeals from condemnation awards. Runner v. City of 
Keokuk, 11 Iowa 543 ( 1861). · 
13. Concurrent jurisdiction, district court, jurisdiction. 
District court had concurrent jurisdiction with circuit court of 
appeals. City of Ottumwa v. Derks, 32 Iowa 506 (1871). 
14. State district court, district court~ jurisdiction. 
Where appeal has been perfected and Jurisdiction of state court is 
involved, proceeding then can be removed to U.S. District Court by 
defendant. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954). 
15. Notice - in general. 
Right of appeal is waived when condemnor, with knowledge of 
circumstances, voluntarily and intentionally pays award other than under s 
472.25. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 
(Iowa 1975). 
Where either party, within 30 days of time of assessment, filed with 
clerk of district court, his claim for appeal, with bond, appeal would not be 
dismissed for reason that other party did not receive notice within 30 days of 
the assessment. Dubuque & P. R. Co. v. Crittenden, 5 Iowa 514, 5 Clarke 514 
(1857). 
Notice of appeal is in no sense "original notice" for commencing civil 
action. O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. 
State, 243 N.W. 604 (1932). 
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Provision providing for notice applies to all types of condemnation 
proceedings. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 
N.W.2d 187 (1956). 
16. Parties entitled, notice. 
A condemned tract encumbered by mortgage of federal land bank for 
easement of transmission line was not involved in portion encumbered by the 
bank and bank had no interest in land being sought for easement. Yoder v. 
Iowa Power and Light Co., 215 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1974). 
Where real estate taxes on condemned land were not fully paid, county as 
lien holder was entitled to notice of condemnee's appeal from condemnation 
award. Reeder v. City of Cedar Rapids, 201 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 1972). 
Failure of condemnor to serve contract vendors within time provided by 
this section was fatal to jurisdiction of district court. Griffel v. Norther 
Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 136 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
Test applied in determining whether one is adverse party who must be 
given notice of appeal. Bisenius v. Palo Alto County, 256 Iowa 196, 127 
N.W.2d 128 (1964). 
Where report of commissioners was brought before district court 14 months 
after filing appeal bond, it was error to try cause anew and assess damages 
without notice of appeal to company. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Sinnamon, 9 
Iowa 293 (1859). 
17. Written notice. 
Appeal is taken by merely serving written notice that appeal has been 
taken. O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. 
State, 243 N.W. 604 (Iowa 1932). 
18. Service of notice. 
Failure to serve mortgagee within the 30-day period deprived the district 
court of jurisdiction. Scoular - Bishop Grain Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 140 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1966). 
R.C.P. 49, on commencement of action for purposes of computing 
limitations by giving notice to sheriff, is not applicable to proceeding for 
condemnation of leasehold interest. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 
571, 63 N.W.2d 218 (1954). 
Absent statutory regulation on manner of appeal, any act sufficient to 
indicate intent to appeal was sufficient as notice. Robertson v. Eldora 
Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 (1869). 
19. Effect of no jurisdiction, notice. . 
Failure to serve adverse party in condemnation proceeding within time 
provided by this section authorizes interested party to appeal from assessment 
to district court is fatal to jurisdiction of district court. Merritt v. 
Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
20. Appeal bond. 
In case of appeal by landowner no bond was necessary. Robertson v. 
Eldora Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 (1869). 
There was no error in filing bond with clerk instead of sheriff. 
Grinnell v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 (1865). 
21. Persons named and notified. 
Test usually applied in determining whether one is an "adverse party" who 
must be given notice of appeal is whether he will be prejudiced or adversely 
affected by reversal or modification of judgment appealed from. Bales v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 57, 86 N.W.2d 244 (1957). 
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Notice of appeal not served on sheriff conferred no jurisdiction on 
district court. Thorson v. City of Des Moines, 194 Iowa 565, 188 N.W. 917 
(1922). 
Notice of appeal served on sheriff was insufficient where proceedings had 
been instituted before county superintendent of schools. Kremar v. 
Independent School District of Cedar Rapids, 192 Iowa 734, 185 N.W. 485 
(1921). 
That sheriff was named on notice of appeal served on defendant and 
sheriff did not prejudice defendant or make sheriff party of action. 
Buckmiller v. Creston W. & D. M. Ry. Co., 164 Iowa 5D2, 146 N.W. 447 (1914). 
It was proper on appeal to serve notice of appeal on county school 
superintendent instead of sheriff. Haggard v. Independent School District of 
Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Under provision permitting service on "agent", service could be made on 
railroad company's civil engineer. Jamison v. Burlington & W. R. Co., 69 Iowa 
670, 29 N.W. 774 (1886). 
Notice of appeal accepted by deputy sheriff where directed to do so by 
sheriff, in writing, signed by sheriff's name, is sufficient. Waltmeyer v. 
Wisconsin, I. & N. R. Co., 64 Iowa 688, 21 N.W. 139 (1884). 
It was not essential that service also be made on sheriff. Hahn v. C. 
0., & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333 (1876). 
22. Limitations. 
Failure to serve an adverse party within time provided by this section 
governing appeals from condemnation awards is fatal to district court's jurisdiction. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 N.W.2d 332 
(Iowa 1968). 
Failure to appeal within time provided by law is fatal to jurisdiction of 
appellate court. Bisenius v. Palo Alto County, 256 Iowa 196, 127 N.W.2d 128 
(1964). 
Where notice was not given within time required by statute district court 
did not obtain jurisdiction. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 571, 63 
N.W.2d 218 (1954). 
Time for appeal runs from time assessment is actually made and reduced to 
writing, and in a legitimate way brought to notice of the parties. Jamison v. 
Burlington & W.R. Co., 69 Iowa 670, 29 N.W. 774 (1886). 
23. Certiorari. 
Certiorari is available in condemnation cases involving jurisdictional 
questions, substantial departure from statutory requirements, and other 
illegalities by lower tribunal, board or commission. Aplin v. Clinton County, 
256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 (1964). 
Certiorari to review proceedings to establish road was limited to steps 
taken after a former decree was entered. Miller v. Kramer, 154 Iowa 523, 134 
N.W. 538 {1912). 
Certiorari lies to review case where appraisers had no jurisdiction. 
Abney v. Clark, 87 Iowa 727, 55 N.W. 6 (1893). 
Where there is remedy by appeal certiorari will not lie. Cedar Rapids, 
I.F. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Whelan, 64 Iowa 694, 21 N.W. 141 (1884). 
Court will not consider errors or irregularities dependent on facts not 
set out in petition. Everett v. Cedar Rapids & M. Ry. Co., 28 Iowa 417 
(1870). 
Where proceedings of commissioners are irregular such should be brought 
up for review by certiorari to district court. Runner v. City of Keokuk, 11 
Iowa 543 {1861). 
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Three separate owners of distinct parcels of land, could not join for 
writ, when object was to ascertain damages. Chambers v. Lewis, 9 Iowa 583 
(1859). 
Where damages were given for removal of a road, appeal was proper remedy 
to obtain reversal on ground that no cause for damages known to law had been 
shown. Spray v. Thompson, 9 Iowa 40 (1859). 
24. Effect of appeal. 
Rule that action commences with delivery of notice to sheriff is not 
applicable in determining whether or not appeal has been served within 
statutory period provided for in condemnation appeals. Kenkel v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
Right to compensation for property taken for public use is guaranteed by 
the constitution, but property owner is only entitled to it in manner 
prescribed by law, and if an appeal is not taken the commissioner's ~ward 
stands. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa !043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
Condemnation proceedings are administrative in nature until appeal taken 
to state district.court when it becomes a civil action before a judicial 
body. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574 (1954). 
Objections to jurisdiction of sheriff's jury not waived by appeal from 
award of damages. Slough v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 71 Iowa 641, 33 N.W. 149 
(1887). 
Notice of appeal constitutes presumptive evidence that assessment has 
been made. Hahn v. Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333 (1876). 
25. Attorneys' fees. 
General eminent domain statute providing for taxing of attorney fees did 
not entitle landowner, who on appeal had increased highway condemnation award 
of damages, to tax his attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup' rs, 
163 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1968). 
Landowners were not entitled to attorney's fees for services rendered on 
trial under count of petition seeking such relief before trial of issue under 
second count as to damages to be awarded. Reter v. Oavenport, R. I. & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N.W.2d 863 (19520, 35 A.L.R.2d 1306. 
26. Federal court, removal. 
Prior to appeal being taken in state court, railroad could not remove 
appeal directly to Federal Court. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kay,. 107 F. 
Supp. 895, affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 204 F.2d 
116, rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, affirmed, 74 ·s.ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 
L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S.Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078 (1952). 
27. Review. 
Question of whether landlord and tenant were required to serve notice of 
appeal from condemnation assessment upon joint award mortgagee did not become 
moot due to mortgage being payed off and release where release was more than 
four months after award and two and one-half months after landlord and tenant 
attempted appeal. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 
1967). 
District court's findings of fact on hearing of special appearances 
attacking jurisdiction of district court had status of jury verdict and were 
binding on supreme court if supported by substantial evidence. Griffel v. 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 1.36 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
District court is appellate court in condemnation cases. Bisenius v. 
Palo Alto County, 256 Iowa 196, 127 N.W.2d 128 (1964). 
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472.18 
Refusal to award a new trial to condemnor which claimed that verdict was 
excessive was abuse of discretion. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 Iowa 
711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Trial court in action by state highway commission to condemn leasehold 
for highway purposes properly rejected commission's requested instruction in 
view of record which did not sustain commission's contention as to testimony 
of witnesses in reference to including renewal of lease in considering 
appraisal of damages. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (lg63). 
Landowner claiming on appeal from award in eminent domain proceeding that 
the amount awarded by the trial court was grossly out of proportion to value 
as shown by evidence assumed a heavy burden. Kaperonis v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 100 N.W.2d 901 (Iowa 1960). 
Where district court, without objection of the parties tried the case 
without a jury, its decision had effect of jury verdict and Supreme Court 
could not determine appeal de novo but was limited to review of claimed 
errors. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 243 Iowa 1377, 55 
N.W.2d 552 (1952). 
28. Settlement. 
On appeal from assessment, trial court properly ordered contract of 
settlement be specifically performed. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & 
Electric Co., 243 Iowa 1377, 55 N.W.2d 552 (1952). 
29. Interest. 
Except where landowner alone appeals to the district court and recovers 
less than the condemnation award, he is entitled to interest from the date of 
taking possession. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 
Iowa 978, 108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
30. Evidence. 
Evidence of value of mortgaged property was immaterial for purpose of 
determining whether joint condemnation award mortgagee was an adverse party 
within statute authorizing appeal by interested party upon notice to adverse 
party. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
Evidence of amount paid by condemnor to other condemnees in same project 
was inadmissible. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 
N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
In proceeding to condemn realty for highway purposes, holding a previous 
opinion involving the same proceeding that certain exhibits were comparable 
propertys became the law of the case, and the Supreme Court could not consider 
the admission of such exhibits as error on subsequent appeal. Redfield v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 397 (1961). 
Permitting adjoining landowners appealing to the district court from 
assessment of damages by the condemnation commissioners to adopt the evidence 
of the other upon the trial was not improper. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
31. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Legislature would have specifically altered judicial interpretation of 
legislative intention if it so desired. Kenkel v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 162 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1968). 
In view of direct attacks upon jurisdiction of court to entertain 
condemnor's appeal, condemnor had burden of proving jurisdiction. Griffel v. 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 136 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
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Burden rests with appellant to show that parties not served with notice I 
of appeal would not be adversely affected by reversal or modification of 
judgment. Bisensius v. Palo Alto County, 256 Iowa 196, 127 N.W.2d 128 (1964). 
32. Discretion. I 
Order granting new trial in condemnation proceeding in which jury fixed 
damages for taking portion of property at less than that testified to by any 
expert witness was not an abuse of discretion. Larew v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 1089, 120 N.W.2d 462 (1963). 
33. Mineral deposits. 
Amount and value of recoverable mineral deposits were not only proper but 
necessary elements to be considered in determining before and after value of 
property underlaid with sand and gravel. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
34. New trial. 
Trial court's denial of condemnee's motion for new trial on ground of 
' inadequacy of verdict was not an abuse of discretion. Crozier v. Iowa-
I llinois Gas & Elec. Co., 165 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa 1969). 
Trial court in condemnation case properly awarded new trial because of 
inadequacy of verdict coupled with possible errors in the proceedings.. In re 
Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 N.W.2d 566 (1964). 
35. Adverse parta, in general. 
Joint - awar mortgagee was "adverse party" upon whom notice of appeal by 
mortgagor from condemnation award was required to be served. Carmichael v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). 
"Adverse party" is one who will be prejudiced or adversely affected by 
reversible or modification of judgment appealed from. Merritt v. Interstate 
Power Co., 153 N.w:2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
A mortgagee is an "adverse party" upon whom notice of appeal must be 
served when a condemnation award is appealed. Id. 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
36. Special appearance. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
37. Pleadings. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
38. Jury questions. 
Sufficient evidence existed in condemnation case to warrant submitting of 
an instruction on a change in zoning of landowners' property. Jones v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
39. Instructions. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
40. Dismissal. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
472.19 Service of Notice - Highway Matters 
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1. Validity. 
Presumed constitutional. Harrington v City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 
N.W.2d 633 (lg66). 
2. Construction and application. 
Jurisdiction of district court in condemnation cases is appellate only, 
and notice required by § 472.18 authorizing appeal by interested party is a 
notice of appeal. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 48g (Iowa 
lg67). 
If district court review is desired by either party to condemnation 
proceeding, notice thereof must be given in substantial compliance with the 
statutes. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (lg66). 
This section applies only to appeals having reference to highway 
commission. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 
N.W.2d 187 (lg56). 
Only by process of appeal does district court obtain jurisdiction. 
Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 571, 63 N.W.2d 218 (lg54). 
Compliance with statute regulating appeal is sufficient. O'Neal v. 
State, 214 Iowa g77, 243 N.W. 601 (1g32). 
This section furnished civilian co-owners a method of serving notice of 
appeal on soldier co-owners and justified denial of stay sought on ground that 
co-owners could not perfect appeal for inability to serve notice on 
soldiers. Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d go5 (lg46). 
3. Service. 
Question of whether landlord and tenant were required to serve notice of 
appeal from condemnation assessment upon joint award mortgagee did not become 
moot due to mortgage being paid off and released where release was more than 
four months after award and two and one-half months after landlord and tenant 
attempted appeal. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 4gg (Iowa 
lg67). 
Substantial compliance is sufficient as to type of information given by 
notices of appeal to district court in condemnation cases, but requirements of 
this section as to "manner of service" must be strictly followed. Harrington 
v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (lg66). 
Service on sheriff was not necessary in a highway commission condemnation 
case. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 N.W.2d 187 (lg56). 
R.C.P. 4g, on commencement of action for purposes of computing 
limitations by giving notice to sheriff, is not applicable to proceeding for 
condemnation of leasehold interest. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 245 Iowa 
571, 63 N.W.2d 218 (lg54). 
Sheriff not a party to the action. Buckmiller v. Creston, W. & D. M. Ry. 
Co., 164 Iowa 502, 146 N.W. 447 (lg14). 
Sheriff not disqualified to serve notice of appeal. Cedar Rapids, I.F. & 
N.W. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (1882). 
4. Return. 
Service of notice of appeal gives jurisdiction, and at any time, sheriff 
can amend defective return so as to give court jurisdiction. Buckmiller v. 
Creston, W. & D. M. Ry. Co., 164 Iowa 502, 146 N.W. 447 (lgl4). 
5. Adverse party. 
"Adverse party" within ~ 472.lg authorizing appeal by interested party 
from condemnation assessment upon serving notice upon adverse party is one who 
will be prejudiced or adversely affected by reversal or modification of 
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judgment appealed from. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 43g (Iowa I 
1967). 
A mortgagee is an "adverse party" on whom notice of appeal must be served 
when condemnation commission award is appealed to district court, whether such 
proceedings are instituted by the highway commission or others. Scoular - I 
Bishop Grain Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 1003, 140 N.W.2d 
115 (1966). 
6. Jurisdiction. 
Statutes of time limitation and procedure for appeal taken from I 
compensation corrnnission award do not confer personal jurisdiction but give 
district court power to determine appeal. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission. v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Jurisdiction of district court in condemnation cases is appellate only. 1 Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968). Where landowner and tenant did not serve notice of appeal from condemnation award on joint award of mortgagee, district court did not have 
jurisdiction of appeal. Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 
1967). I If one fails to follow legally prescribed procedure in giving notice of 
appeal in condemnation case, the district court obtains no jurisdiction. 
Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
7. Special appearance. I 
Notice of appeal to district court in condemnation proceeding did not 
substantially comply with statute, so that condemnor's special appearance was 
properly sustained. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 
633 (1966). 
8. Failure to give notice. 
District court had duty to refuse, on its own motion, to sustain 
condemnees' appeal from condemnation award for failure to satisfy notice 
requirements. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Corrnnission, 156 N.W.2d 332 
(Iowa 1968). 
472.20 Sheriff to File Certified Copy 
1. Construction and application. 
Appeal from award of sheriff's jury lies only to district court of 
state. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kay, D.C., F. Supp. 895, affirmed in 
part and reversed in part on other grounds, 204 F.2d 116, rehearing denied, 
204 F.2d 954, affirmed, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L.Ed. 338, rehearing 
denied, 74 S.Ct. 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078 (1952). 
Sheriff need not actually file transcript until case is reached for 
trial. O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. 
State, 243 N.W. 604 (1932). 
Appellant's failure to file transcript until case reached for trial not a 
fatal defect. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 
129 (1905). 
Not requisite that report of jury be filed in appellate court. Hahn v. 
Chicago, O. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 333 (1876). 
Failure to file papers until first day of next term after appeal was 
taken insufficient ground for dismissal of appeal. Robertson v. Eldora 
Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 (1869). 
472.21 Appeals - How Docketed and Tried 
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1. Construction and application. 
Proceeding administrative till appeal is taken. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
Co. v. Stude, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 
S.Ct. 512, 346 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078 (1954). 
Provision that appeal shall be tried as ordinary proceeding is applicable 
to notice of appeal. O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1g32). 
Williams v. State, 243 N.W. 604 (Iowa 1932). 
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act would amply safeguard appeal rights 
of soldier landowner. Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 
(1946). 
Compliance with statutes gave jurisdiction. Longstreet, 200 Iowa 723, 
205 N.W. 343 (1925). 
2. Appearance. 
Special appearance raises only jurisdictional issues. State ex rel. 
·Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Appearance by company to object to service of notice of appeal operated 
as a 9eneral appearance. Robertson v. Eldora Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 245 
(1869). 
3. Consolidating appeals. 
Separate appeals were properly consolidated. Genco v. Northwestern Mfg. 
Co., 203 Iowa 1390, 214 N.W. 545 (lg27). 
Where separate appeals were taken it was not error to refuse 
consolidation on company's refusal to agree to rendition of separate 
verdicts. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 
(1905). 
4. Dismissal and affirmance. 
Where condemnees contested right of condemnor to dismiss appeal from 
award, they could not at the same time successfully assail jurisdiction to 
make award. Felker v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 886, 124 N.W.2d 
435 (1963}. 
Highway commission was not entitled to dismissal of condemnation action, 
wherein condemnees had appealed, on ground that condemnees had failed to prove 
title. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 Iowa 711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Condemnor may dismiss its appeal. Hanley v. Iowa Electric Co., 187 Iowa 
590, 174 N.W. 345 (1919). 
Partition of premises pending appeal does not dismiss it. Ruppert v. 
Chicago, 0. & St. J. R. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (1876). 
Payment of filing fees. Robertson v. Eldora Railroad & Coal Co., 27 Iowa 
245 (1869). 
5. Rejection of award. 
Court's rejection of award disposed of it as statutory award, and left it 
open for action as common-law award. Bureker v. Jefferson County, 201 Iowa 
251, 208 N.W. 115 (1926). 
6. Settlement or waiver of rights. 
Waiver is an affirmative defense and is not jurisdictional. State ex 
rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Right acquired by condemnation may be waived during pendency of appeal to 
court. De Penning & Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
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7. Change of venue. I 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by overruling of motion for change of venue 
where when verdict was reached he did not complain. Neddermeyer v. Crawford 
County, 190 Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339 (1919). 
8. Removal of causes. I 
Removal possible when requisite grounds appear. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. 
Co. v. Stude, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 
S.Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078 (1954). 
When appeal is perfected ·it can be removed to Federal Court. Hagerla v. I 
Mississippi River Power Co., 202 F. 771 (1912). 
Where cause had been appealed it was subject to removal. Myers v. 
Chicago N. W.R. Co., 118 Iowa 312, 91 N.W. 1076 (1902). 
9. Issues and extent of review and relief. I 
Sole issue for determination in condemnation appeal is amount of damages 
owed by condemnor by reason of taking. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
It is for the legislature to initially determine whether condemnation of 
1 private property is for a public use. Simpson v. Low-Rent Housing Agency of Mount Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1974). Failure to limit condemnation not fatal to right of company to have 
matter considered on appeal. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 
503 (Iowa 1948). 
Where parties proceed as if damages are to be assessed separately to I 
owner and tenant, objections to this should be raised prior to time for 
instructing jury. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393, motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 
798 (1948). 
District Court acts in appellate capacity and its power to review is I 
circumscribed only by presumption in favor of action of condemning body in 
exercising its legislative discretion. Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona 
County, 238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
Authority to condemn may be subject of appeal. Town of Alvord v. Great 
Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917). I 
Where company did not enter, but instead condemned the property, it 
cannot set up in appeal, breach of agreement to donate right of way. Burrell 
v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 173 Iowa 441, 155 N.W. 809 (1916). 
Appeal by either party brings question of damages for review de nova. 
Wolfe v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 173 Iowa 277, 155 N.W. 324 (1915). I 
Where plaintiff contested only damages he could not deny right to condemn 
because of his refusal to consent. Dennis v. Independent School Dist. of 
Walker, 166 Iowa 744, 148 N.W. 1007 (1914). 
In proceeding for license for construction of dam plaintiff was not 
prejudiced by order requiring it to have damages assessed. Iowa Power Co. v. I 
Hoover, 166 Iowa 415, 147 N.W. 858 (1914). 
On appeal, issues raised are not different from those presented to 
sheriff's jury. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 141 Iowa 250, 119 N.W. 927 (1909). 
Where company appealed landowner could be awarded larger damages. 
McKinnon v. Cedar Rapids & I. C.R. & Light Co., 126 Iowa 426, 102 N.W. 138 I (1905). 
Question of whether taking should be allowed not determinable by the 
sheriff's jury. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 91 
Iowa 16, 58 N.W. 918 (1894). 
Court having decided that it had no jurisdiction properly refused to I 
entertain other objections and determine what rights of parties would be if 
properly presented to the court. Slough v. Chicago & N. W.R. Co., 71 Iowa 
641, 33 N.W. 149 (1887). 
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Appeal from report of commissioners took case to District Court for trial 
on merits of report. Runner v. City of Keokuk, 11 Iowa 543 (1861). 
When case was properly in district court on appeal, it was there for 
trail on the merits. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373, 8 Clarke 
373 (1859). 
Appeal brought cause to district court on its merits and it became 
immaterial whether appellate had notice. Borland v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 
8 Iowa 148, 8 Clarke 148. 
10. Trial. 
Court's refusal to allow plaintiff to cross-examine on matters developed 
on direct examination, but not in dispute, not an abuse of discretion. 
Watters v. Platt, 184 Iowa 203, 168 N.W. 808 (1918). 
Court could, in absence of statutory provisions, adopt a procedure not 
inconsistent with parties' constitutional rights. Jones v. School Board of 
liberty Tp., 140 Iowa 179, 118 N.W. 265 (1908). 
On appeal defendant not prejudiced by examination of jurors on their voir 
dire, of amount of award by sheriff's jury, merely for purposes of identifying 
case. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 
(1905). 
Not a violation of constitution to refuse jury trial in condemnation 
proceeding. In re Bradley, 108 Iowa 476, 79 N.W. 280 (1889). 
Plaintiff entitled to have his damages found by a jury on appeal. Deaton 
v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 594 (1859). 
11. Burden of proof. 
Burden of proving a zoning ordinance unreasonable, arbitrary, capr1c1ous 
or discriminatory is upon the one ascerting the invalidity. Business 
Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Burden of proof is on the condemnee - plaintiff, irrespective of which 
party first takes the appeal to the district court. Heins v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971). 
Plaintiff in appeal in condemnation proceeding has burden of proof to 
show value of property taken. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 122 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1963). 
In view of direct attacks upon jurisdiction of court to entertain 
condemner's appeal, condemner had burden of proving jurisdiction. Griffel v. 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 136 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
Owner assumes burden of proof on appeal. Randell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). 
When condemnor alleged ownership in certain persons they did not have to 
prove title. Tracy v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914). 
12. Evidence. 
Trial courts are permitted wide latitude of discretion in admitting 
opinions of valuation witnesses in appeals from condemnation awards. Hammer 
v. Ida County, 231 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1975). 
Admission of hearsay evidence of assessed valuation was reversible 
error. Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1974). 
Objection that testimony was inadmissable must be interposed at time the 
testimony was admitted. Foster v. U.S., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Admission of evidence that owner lived in another state not 
prejudicial. Purdy v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 172 Iowa 676, 154 N.W. 
881 (1915). 
Where defendant denied plaintiff's title to part of land affected and 
certain questions were asked of defendant's attorney, tending to show title, 
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their exclusion was not prejudicial error. Pingrey v. Cherokee & D. R. Co., I 
78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285 (188g). 
13. Questions of law or fact. 
Jury was entitled to expert op1n1on regarding value of property without 
alleged illiegal zoning restraint. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 
N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Location of corner established by government survey was question of fact 
for court sitting without jury. Fair v. Ida County, 204 Iowa 1046, 216 N.W. 
952 (1927). 
14. Instructions. 
City ordinances establishing control access facilities on all state 
highways within corporate limits of the city, including highway which crossed 
tract of landowners involved in condemnation proceedings, would not lead jury 
to believe that city had already limited landowners' right of access to 
highway and that State Highway Commission was thus not required to pay 
therefor. Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 150 N.W.2d 
642 (1967). 
In proceedings to condemn a tract of land for relocation of highway, 
requested instruction that jury should not allow damages for taking of owner's 
direct access unless the access provided was not reasonable and not free and 
convenient was properly refused. Bryan v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 
Iowa 1093, 104 N.W.2d 562 (1960). 
Failure of court to explain term "if necessary" in instruction, was not 
error where no issue as to necessity had been raised. Hoeft v. State, 221 
Iowa 694, 266 N.W. 571, 104 A. L. R. 1008 (1936). 
15. Rehearing and new trial. 
Reopening case tried to court for material testimony was not error. Fair 
v. Ida County, 204 Iowa 1046, 216 N.W. 952 (1927). 
16. Review in appellate court. 
Where city in eminent domain action did not make objection to testimony 
on ground that it constituted a collateral attack on zoning ordinance, city's 
motion at close of evidence to strike and withdraw all evidence of alternate 
value of landowners' property as if no zoning ordinance were present, because 
such evidence constituted collateral attack on the ordinance, did not preserve 
city's objection for review. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 
376 (Iowa 1975). 
Legislature has power to prescribe terms and conditions upon which 
landlord may perfect his appeal to district court. Harrington v. City of 
Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 141 N.W.2d 633 (1966). 
District court's findings of fact on hearing of special appearances 
attacking jurisdiction of district court had status of jury verdict. Griffel 
v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 136 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
Ruling on prior appeal that plat was admissible as to each of tracts 
condemned was law of case. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (lg63). 
Appeals in condemnation cases are to be tried as other civil cases. Id. 
Motion for change of venue overruled. Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 
190 Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339 (1919). 
Where court made mistake of one tenth of an acre and company offered to 
add to damages value of such piece, judgment should not be reversed on that 
ground. Hoyt v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 117 Iowa 296, 90 N.W. 724 (1902). 
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Judgment reversed where plaintiff claimed roadway running east, when in 
fact agreement was for one running west and mistake was undiscovered till 
after appeal. White v. Farlie, 67 Iowa 628, 25 N.W. 837 (1885). 
Appeal lies to Supreme Court from order overruling motion to set aside 
verdict and quash writ in condemnation proceeding. Burham v. Thompson, 35 
Iowa 421 (1872). 
17. Jurisdiction. 
Railroad had no right to appeal to federal court directly. Chicago, R. 
I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 116 (1953), rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, 
affirmed, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S. 
Ct. 512, 346 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred or ousted by acts of 
parties or procedures employed in particular litigation. State ex rel. Iowa 
State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
District court's decision that it had no jurisdiction of appeal by 
landowner and tenant who failed to serve notice of appeal did not deprive 
landowner and tenant of fair compensation for easement taken. Merritt v. 
Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1967). 
In absence of service upon contract vendors of notice of appeal from 
condemnation commission's award in favor of contract vendors and purchasers, 
district court lacked jurisdiction of the appeal against vendors. Griffel v. 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 136 N.W.2d 265 (1965). 
18. Jury trial. 
There is no constitutional protection in respect to jury trial available 
to State Highway Commission in condemnation case if Commission fails to demand jury trial. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 
292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963). 
19. Pleadings. 
Condemner could not dismiss appeal without consent of condemnees. Felker 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 886, 124 N.W.2d 435 (1963). 
472.22 Pleadings on Appeal 
1. Construction and application. 
Regarding right to appeal by landowner in· condemnation proceeding. 
Simpson v. Low-rent Housing Agency of Mt. Ayr, 224 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1974). 
Condemnor could not dismiss appeal without consent of condemnees. Felker 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 886, 124 N.W.2d 435 (1963). 
Railroad had no right of appeal to federal court directly. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 204 F.2d 116 (1953), rehearing denied, 204 F.2d 954, 
affirmed, 74 S. Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338, rehearing denied, 74 S. 
Ct. 512, 346 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Compliance with statute regulating appeals is sufficient. O'Neal v. 
State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. State, 243 N.W. 604 
(Iowa 1932). 
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act would protect rights of soldier-
owner. Gilbride v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905 (1946). 
Provision that petition on appeal should specify items of damage did not 
alter measure of damages. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 
159, 271 N.W. 883, 118 A. L. R. 862 (1937). 
To effectuate appeal, petition provided for by statute was to be filed in 
appellate court, on which a report in nature of a bill of exceptions could be 
made. City of Ottumwa v. Derks, 32 Iowa 506 (1871). 
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On appeal to district court there was no error in filing a petition in 
district court. Grinnell v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 (1864). 
2. Limitations. 
Requirement that on owner's appeal, petition be filed on or before the 
first day of the tenn was procedural, not jurisdictional. O'Neal v. State, 
214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601 (1932). Williams v. State, 243 N.W. 604 (1932). 
J. F. Wilcox & Sons v. City of Omaha, 220 Iowa 1131, 264 N.W. 5 (1936). 
3. Petition. 
Condemnees seeking general compensation for the taking of land pleaded 
loss of access to railroad and sewer. Heins v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
185 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971). 
Pleader required to state specifically items of damage and amount 
thereof. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 
(1939). 
This section did not require amount of each separate item to be stated, 
only total amount claimed. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 
159, 271 N.W. 883, 118 A. L. R. 862 (1937). 
4. Answer. 
Company condemning strip could waive its right of access to strip over 
remainder of fann by answer to petition on appeal. Oe Penning v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
Refusal to permit defendant to plead or prove matters relating to manner 
of construction of improvement tending to minimize damages not error where 
such mat.!!'~s had gotten before the jury in one way or another. Stoner v. Iowa 
~~--------~-=~cc--r1ighway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (1939) • 
. Affirmative defenses not pleaded could not be used. Mason v. Iowa Cent. 
Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 468, 109 N.W. 1 (1906). 
Objection that appellee failed to properly file transcript and pay docket 
fee in prescribed time, was properly submitted on motion to dismiss. Simons 
v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129 (1905). 
Where answer alledged that plaintiff had, for a consideration, made and 
delivered a deed for the right of way and defendant offered deed in evidence, 
objections that it was neither original nor copy was properly overrruled. 
Taylor v. Cedar Rapids & St. P. R. Co., 25 Iowa 371 (1868). 
5. Amendments. 
Petition may be amended by increase in amount claimed. Kemmerer v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932). 
Owners of dam could amend petition for license to show that owner had 
waived right to damages or had settled. Wapsipinicon Power Co. v. Waterhouse, 
186 Iowa 524, 167 N.W. 623 (1918). 
6. Evidence. 
Burden of proof is on the condemnee - plaintiff, irrespective of which 
party first takes the appeal to the district court. Heins v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1971). 
Evidence of use of condemned property in conjunction with other 
properties was admissible. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 
615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
7. Dismissal. 
Condemnees contested right of condemnor to dismiss appeal from award. 
Felker v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 886, 124 N.W.2d 435 (1963). 
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472.23 Question Determined 
1. Construction and application. 
Entry of judgments on jury verdicts in consolidated public utility 
condemnation proceeding constituted appealable final adjudication. Sykes v. 
Iowa Power and Light Company, 263 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1978). 
Presumption was that on trial adequate damages would be awarded. 
Browneller v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 
(1943). 
In event of injustice in fixing of damages by commissioners remedy is by 
appeal for hearing before a jury. Price v. Town of Earlham, 175 Iowa 576, 157 
N.W. 238 (1916). 
2. Agreements, stipulations and waiver. 
Issue of waiver cannot be raised by special appearance. State ex rel. 
Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Because evidence of agreement showed it to be a compromise it was not 
admissible. Miller v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 34 N.W.2d 627 (1949). 
If damages may be avoided by waiver or stipulation, such waiver should be 
received and acted upon. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 
(Iowa 1948). 
Acceptance of such part of award over which there is no controversy on 
appeal does not waive right of appeal to that part in controversy. Globe 
Machinery & Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 156 Iowa 267, 136 N.W. 518 (1912). 
3. Sale pending condemnation. 
One who sells while condemnation proceedings are pending is entitled to 
damages finally awarded as against his vendee. Crawford v. City of Des 
Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1964). 
4. Damages - in general. 
Whether, in determining just compensation for land taken by eminent 
domain, evidence of other sale of land is admissible in determining value of 
such land must be left to sound discretion of trial court. Business Venture, 
Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
It was not necessary for district court to have in personam jurisdiction 
of landowners in order to try sole issue of amount of condemnation damages. 
State ex rel .• Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 
1975). 
Court makes proper order in regard to interest. Reed v. Chicago, M. & 
St. P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 886 (1885). 
Where proposed elevation of new road was clearly shown in blueprints in 
original condemnation proceeding, and award exceeded value of land taken, 
owners were not entitled to compel new condemnation brought on ground that 
elevation of highway damaged them. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 
N.W.2d 62 (1961). 
Owner was permitted to prove damage to entire farm, though it consisted 
of more land than described in his notice of appeal. Dudley v. Minnesota & N. 
W.R. Co., 77 Iowa 408, 42 N.W. 359 (1889). 
5. Persons entitled to damages. 
Owner of property may be entitled to damages for taking for public use, 
even though he has parted with his title and ownership before award is paid. 
Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1964). 
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Where record title holder contracted to sell to equitable owners and all 
were plaintiffs on appeal instruction that issue was damages all plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover was not objectionable on theory that equitable owners 
alone were entitled to recover. Eggleston v. Town of Aurora, 233 Iowa 559, 10 
N.W.2d 104 (1943). 
6. Land as entity, or separate lots, parts or tracts, damages. 
Where evidence was sufficient to warrant jury in finding that property 
consisted of either one or two tracts, permitting jury to assess against each 
separately not error where jury assessed against each separately not error 
where jury assessed against entire tract. Hoeft v. State, 221 Iowa 694, 266 
N.W. 571, 104 A. L. R. 1008 (1936). 
Permitting witnesses to show valuation based on separate parcels of one 
farm was prejudicial error. Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 
625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930). 
Owner entitled to recover damages to farm as a whole despite the fact 
only a part of farm was described in condemnation proceedings. Cook v. Boone 
Suburban Electric R. Co., 122 Iowa 437, 98 N.W. 293 (1904). 
Court properly refused to submit interrogatories, asking opinion of jury 
as to damages to separate parts of the farm. Winklemans v. Des Moines N. w. 
Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883). 
-·7 • Minimizing damages. 
Owner under no duty to minimize damages. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 
393 (1948), motion denied, 32 N.W. 2d 798. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932). 
8. Interest as damages. 
Date from which interest should be allowed on condemnation award was 
matter for trial court in condemnation proceeding. Schrader v. Sioux City, 
167 N.W.2d 669 (Iowa 1969). 
Matter of interest is duty of court. Harris v. Green Bay Levee and 
Drainage Dist. No. 2, Lee County, 246 Iowa 416, 68 N.W.2d 69 (1955). 
Interest computed from time of possession. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (1948). 
Where amount of interest was merely matter of computation trial court 
could add interest to the verdict. Beal v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 209 
Iowa 1308, 230 N.W. 302 (1930). 
Interest at six percent may be allowed from time railroad was 
constructed, the action being in trespass. Darst v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. 
Co., 194 Iowa 1145, 1g1 N.W. 288. 
Where date of possession is undisputed, question of allowance of interest 
was for court. Lough v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 
(1902). 
Where award was affirmed on appeal to Supreme Court and owner received 
award from sheriff, and costs were paid, it was then too late to have court 
allow interest. Jamison v. Burlington & W. R. Co., 87 Iowa 265, 54 N.W. 242 (1893). 
Where court did not mention interest it is presumed jury did not add 
interest to its verdict and court could allow interest on excess of verdict 
over commissioners award. Hollingsworth v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 
Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
Failing to raise issue of interest on appeal owner could not, after 
payment of amount awarded, maintain separate action for interest. Hays v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 64 Iowa 753, 19 N.W. 245 (1884). 
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Interest allowable on damages found to date of trial. Hartshorn v. 
Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613, 3 N.W. 64B (1879). 
9. Unlawful or negligent acts, damages. 
When damage to property owner arises by reason of defects or negligence 
in connection with building of new road, damage suffered is not included in 
original condemnation allowance. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 
N.W.2d 62 (1961). 
Damage caused by overflow due to negligent construction of culvert cannot 
be deemed to have been considered when right of way was acquired. Hunt v. 
Iowa Cent. R. Co., 86 Iowa 15, 52 N.W. 668, 14 Am. St. Rep. 473 (1892}. 
Damages for negligent construction may be recovered in later action. 
Miller v. Keokuk & D. M. R. Co., 63 Iowa 680, 16 N.W. 567 (1883}. 
lD. Amount of damages. 
Sole issue for determination in condemnation appeal is amount of damages 
owed by condemnor by reason of taking. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Total of specified amounts of loss resulting from condemnation is 
improper as proof of dama~es. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 
Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 34D (1965). 
Award to condemnees not excessive. Newland v. Linn County Bd. of Sup'rs, 
256 Iowa 424, 127 N.W.2d 625 (1964). Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
Award for taking strip of land along side of farm for highway purposes 
and for damages to remainder of farm was not inadequate. Trachta v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 49 Iowa 374, 86 N.W. 849 {1958). 
Evidence sufficient to sustain award. Miller v. Iowa Electric Light & 
Power Co., 34 N.W.2d 627 (1949}. 
Awards not excessive under evidence. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 
(Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
Award not so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice. Kosters v. 
Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
Verdict indicated plaintiff did not have a fair trial. Neddermeyer v. 
Crawford County, 190 Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339 (1919). 
11. Pa~ent of damages. 
Ju~ment for costs in favor of condemnor on appeal may be set up against 
condemnation award. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 
N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Absent a statute court could fix time within which award should be 
paid. City of Des Moines, Iowa, v. Des Moines Water Co., 230 F. 570, 144 C. 
C. A. 624 (1916). 
12. Matters considered as to damages - in general. 
By virtue of changing circumstances, a zoning ordinance may come to 
operate as an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint. Business Ventures, Inc. 
v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Although installation of median strips for purpose of regulating flow of 
traffic is within exercise of police power, particular action of condemning 
authority in exercise of that power must be proper and reasonable and must not 
amount to taking of property without due process of law. Simkins v. City of 
Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
In establishing fair market value, landowner entitled to show any factor 
that would impress a willing buyer purchasing farm. Dolezal v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1973). 
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Landowner in condemnation case entitled to show any factors that would 
impress a willing buyer in purchasing property. Jones v. State Highway 
Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Evidence too speculative to be considered. Johnson County Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 897, 140 N.W.2d 714 (1966). 
Damages to be determined as of date of condemnation. In re Primary Road 
1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Right to lateral support is a proprietary right which owner does not part 
with when adjacent land is acquired for highway purposes. Mapes v. Madison 
County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 N.W.2d 62 (1961). 
Testimony of estimates of value in a condemnation case must be left to 
discretion of judge. Trachta v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 
86 N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Though company failed to limit its rights in condemnation it could have 
the matter considered on appeal. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 
N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
Mere purchase of other land to take place of that condemned could not be 
considered. Schoonover v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 99 (1948). 
All facts which would naturally influence a person of ordinary prudence 
desiring to purchase may be considered. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 3 A. 
L. R.2d 270 (1948). 
Consideration of tracts as separate. Cutler v. State, 224 Iowa 686, 278 
N.W. 327 (1938). 
Refusal to permit condemnor to show distance of farm from various market 
centers and character of roads was not error. Moran v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa g36, 274 N.W. 59 (1937). 
Evidence tending to show specific items of damage admissible as bearing 
on value. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 
883, 118 A. L. R. 862 (1937). 
Testimony on specific sum required to hire help to drive cattle across 
highway inadmissible as speculation. Randell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). 
Award of damages is conclusively presumed to include all damages, present 
and future resulting from proper use of condemned land. Wheatley v. City of 
Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 (1932). 
Refusing to permit cross-examination of value witness regarding distance 
of landowner's farm to market and type of road was error. Welton v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1931). 
Evidence of location, use for which improvements were constructed, 
character and condition of machinery and cost of removal and installment 
elsewhere, admissible as descriptive of injury suffered though not to be 
considered as substantive elements of damage. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. 
City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486, 34 A. L. R. 1517 (1924). 
Testimony of witness that his valuation was partly based on appearance of 
place not objectionable. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 
209 (1922). 
Award of damages is conclusively presumed to include all damages, present 
and future, resulting from proper use of condemned land. Wissmath Packing Co. 
v. Mississippi River Power Co., 179 Iowa 1309, 162 N.W. 846, L. R. A. 117F. 
790 (1917). 
Deducing valuation from consideration of prices of properties in the 
"neighborhood." Youtzy v. City of Cedar Rapids, 150 Iowa 53, 129 N.W. 351 
(1911). 
Evidence that situation was well adapted to and valuable for a particular 
business had bearing on value of property. Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 
Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027 (1907). 
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Hypothetical questions to witnesses to consider surrounding circumstances 
as they saw them after construction, and situation of farm as seen, and 
location of road with reference to a lake were not improper, when witnesses 
were directed to assume proper construction and adequate crossing. Quinn v. 
Iowa & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209 (1906). . 
13. Benefits, matters considered as to damages. 
Generally, damage and benefits resulting from separate works which do not 
form part of continuous improvement cannot be assessed in the same 
proceeding. Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 
(1964). 
Refusal to permit defendant to cross-examine expert on value, unless 
question excluded benefits, was error. Dean v. State, 211 Iowa 143, 232 N.W. 
36 (1930). 
Advantages resulting from improvement cannot be considered. Israel v. 
Jewett, 29 Iowa 475 (1870). 
14. Buildings and improvements, matters considered as to damages. 
Realtor's determination of before value of condemned portion of farm by 
valuing land and improvements separately and rounding off total was proper. 
Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 
(1965). 
Commissioners substantially complied with statutory requirements and gave 
due consideration to all elements of damages, even though farm buildings not 
closely examined. Aplin v. Clinton County, 256 Iowa 1059, 129 N.W.2d 726 
(1964). 
Contemplated future improvements not a proper element for consideration 
of damages in a condemnation proceeding. In re Primary Road 1-80, 256 Iowa 
43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Jury award for condemnation of leasehold on which business was conducted 
was not excessive where lessees had constructed a building plus 
improvements. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 
N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Evidence of cost of relocating septic tank removed when highway was 
improved was inadmissible where necessity for relocation of tank was due in 
part to improper location in the first instance. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 
Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 (1962). · 
Evidence of separate values of needed improvements is not admissible as 
an independent item of damage in a condemnation case. Trachta v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Exclusion of evidence showing farm could be more efficiently operated by 
removal of buildings, and such cost of removal was not reversible error. 
Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1948), motion denied 32 N.W.2d 798. 
Refusal to permit owner to testify on separate value of dwellin9 house 
was not error. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 
1948). 
Testimony that buildings would eventually have to moved not objectionable 
as immaterial and irrelevant. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 
N.W. 2og (1922). 
15. Comparable lands or sales, matters considered as to damages. 
Evidence of sales of comparable property is admissible as substantive 
evidence of fair market value of subject property. Martinson v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
Extent of comparability and weight and credit to be given evidence of 
other sales in a condemnation proceeding is for the jury. In re Primary Road 
1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
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Proximity of comparable lands. In re Primary Road Iowa No. 141, 255 Iowa 
711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Evidence of comparable sales is competent as substantive evidence in 
condemnation cases. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 
N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
16. Fences, bridges, crossings, cattle ways, etc., matters considered as to 
damages. 
Admission of testimony as to inadequacy of cattleway not reversible 
error. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 
{1932). 
Cost of removing and replacing fence cannot be recovered for as such and 
jury should be so instructed. Randell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 
Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 {1932). 
Instruction on damages for constructing drainage ditch not erroneous as 
permitting jury to consider cost of bridges. Kerr v. Tysseling, 239 N.W. 233 
(1931). 
Error in admitting cost of fencing was not cured by instruction. Dean v. 
State, 211 Iowa 143, 233 N.W. 36 (1930). 
Error to admit cost of constructing adequate cattle pass. Kosters v. 
Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
Failure or refusal to provide proper crossing not matter for 
consideration of jury. Pingrey v. Cherokee & D. R. Co., 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 
285 (1889). 
17. Future use of land, matters considered as to damages. 
If there is reasonable probability that zoning classification will be 
changed in the near future to permit more profitable use of land than had 
previously been permitted, landowner is entitled to have that probability 
considered in determining the proper value of the condemned property. Dolezal 
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1973). 
Plan or subjective intent to use property for a particular purpose in the 
future was admissible evidence. Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
Considerable latitude allowed in admission of evidence of capabilities of 
land affected by condemnation. In re In re Primary Road No. 141, 255 Iowa 
711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Condemned property must be evaluated with its potentialities and its 
highest and best reasonable uses, as it was immediately before the taking. 
Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Condemnee may properly show burdens or detriments to his remaining 
land. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 {1962). 
To warrant admission of testimony of value of land taken for purposes 
other than for which actually used, regard must be had for conditions and 
wants of community as may be reasonably expected in immediate future. U.S. v. 
Foster, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 {1942), certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 
U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. U.S. v. Buescher, C. C. A., 131 F.2d 3 {1942), 
certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 760, 318 U.S. 767, 87 L. Ed. 1138. 
Damages must be paid for rights appropriated though full use thereof may 
not be immediately contemplated. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 
N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
Whether value of property for use for which condemned, may be separately 
proven is matter of court's discretion depending on particular facts. Tracy 
v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914), modified on other 
grounds, 148 N.W. 637. 
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17.5 Highest and best use, matters considered as to damages. 
City's objection to jury instruction relating to best use of land taken 
by city by eminent domain was not based on theory that such instruction 
constituted collateral attack on city's zoning. City did not preserve 
objection based on such theory. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 
N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Owners were entitled to present evidence in condemnation proceeding 
concerning the highest and best. use of property being taken. Dolezal v. City 
of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1973). 
17.7 Zoning restrictions. 
Where zoning ordinance has been shown to produce an unreasonable 
restraint on a property's use, the ordinance may be disregarded in an eminent 
domain hearing. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 
1g75). 
18. ·Inconveniences, annoyances, dangers, etc. , matters considered as to 
damages. 
Danger, or fear of danger, resulting from the exercise of condemnation 
rights may be shown as affecting market value. Dolezal v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1g73), 
Evidence of substantial impairment of "free and convenient" access 
previously existing for corrmercial property was proper. Wicks v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 998, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
Circuity of travel to reach landowner's property, occasioned by a median 
ditch dividing four lanes of travel, was not compensable. Nelson v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
No loss of access to secondary road when access was as free after 
vacation of portion of road as before. Christensen v. Bd. of Sup' rs of 
Woodbury County, 253 Iowa g78, 114 N.W.2d 897 (1962). 
Permitting jury to consider danger to children in fixing damages, not 
error. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 
798. 
Jury may consider annoyance, danger and inconvenience resulting in use 
and enjoyment. Wheatley·v. City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 
(1932). 
Testimony of danger to crops and occupants properly admitted under 
instruction to consider such only as affecting market value. Evans v. Iowa 
Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 205 Iowa 283, 218 N.W. 66 (1928). 
1g. Minerals, matters considered as to damages. 
Amount and value of recoverable mineral deposits were proper elements to 
be considered in determining before and after value of property underlaid with 
sand and gravel. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 
121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
Evidence of mineral deposits admissible as bearing on value. Doud v. 
Mason City & F. D. R. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N.W. 65 (1888). 
20. Measure of damages - in general. 
Property's reasonable market value at the "time of taking" which is the 
date upon which the condemnation commission views the premises and fixes the 
damages to which condemnee is entitled. Heldenbrand v. Executive Council of 
Iowa, for use and benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1974). 
Use of pencil and paper in computation is not proof of use of improper 
unit rule in measure of damage. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
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Basic rule as to measure of damages in eminent domain case is constant, 
and when there is a partial taking, measure is difference in value before and 
after taking. Id. 
Right of owner to recover not to be measured by generosity, necessity or 
estimated advantage or fear or dislike of litigation which may have induced 
others to part with title to their realty. Steensland v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & 
Elec. Co., 242 Iowa 534, 47 N.W.2d 162 (1951). 
Inconvenience and damage to land as a whole affect value. Schoonover v. 
Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1949). 
Proper measure is difference in market value just before taking and 
market value after taking. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 3 A. L. R.2d 270 
(1948). 
Difference between reasonable value before and immediately after. 
Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883, 118 A. 
L. R. 862 (1937). 
Owner may show difference in value before and after taking. Randell v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). 
Where there is evidence that the taking depreciated market value of farm 
as a whole, value of land appropriated is not alone, measure of damages. 
Watkins v. Wabash R. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 (1907). 
Permitting witnesses to state value of farm before, and that after taking 
it lost a value of so much per acre, was not error where witness afterwards 
gave a value of farm as a unit. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 
37 N.W. 110 (1888). 
It is proper to ask plaintiff how much less his farm was worth 
iTmlediately after the taking than it was worth iTmlediately before, not taking 
into account any benefits. Harrison v. Iowa M. R. Co., 36 Iowa 323 (1873). 
21. Actual or market value of property, measure of damages. 
Evidence of sale price of comparable real estate is admissible upon issue 
of fair market value in condemnation proceedings. Yoder v. Iowa Power & Light 
Co., 215 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1974). 
Proper basis for award of damages was difference in fair market value 
iTmlediately before and iTmlediately after condemnation. Dolezal v. City of 
.. Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1973). 
"Fair market value of land" is the price a willing buyer under no 
compulsion to buy would pay and a willing seller under no compulsion to sell 
would accept. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 
N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Measure of damages for condemned land is its reasonable market value at 
time of taking. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 
N.W.2d 424 {1963). Skaff v. Sioux City, 255 Iowa 49, 120 N.W.2d 439 (1963). 
Measure of damage by condemnation is difference between fair and 
reasonable market value before and immediately after appropriation. Wicks v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 99B, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
Market value of land, togeth~r with improvements, taken as a whole and 
not separately, is to be shown, and value of improvements, apart from land, 
may not be shown. Trachta v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 
N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Proper measure is difference in market value just before taking and 
market value after taking. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1948). 
"Market value" of farm is matter of approximation at best. Cory v. 
State, 214 Iowa 222, 242 N.W. 100 (1932). 
Where there is evidence that the taking depreciated market value of farm 
as a whole, value of land appropriated is not alone, measure of damages. 
Watkins v. Wabash R. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 (1907). 
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· 22. Diminution in value of land, measure of damages. 
Condemnee is damaged to extent his property is diminished in value by 
condemnation. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 
N.W.2d 340 (lg65). 
Every element which can fairly enter into question of value and which an 
ordinary prudent man would consider before forming judgment in making a 
purchase should be considered •. Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 
(Iowa 1973). 
23. Partial condemnation, measure of damages. 
Correct measure of damages in partial taking is difference in fair market 
value of subject property immediately before and immediately after 
condemnation. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 
N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
Fact that portion of property was already subject to easement in favor of 
condemnor was not to be overlooked. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 Iowa 
711, 122 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Sole measure of damages in cases of partial taking is difference in 
reasonable market value before and after taking. Freshwater v. Wildman, 254 
Iowa 404, 117 N.W.2d 910 (1962). 
Owner of farm, strip of which was condemned for highway, may show 
increased burden thereon because of additional hazard. Randell v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). 
Award of damages to remaining real estate in condemnation cases is 
conclusively presumed to include all damages, present and future, resulting 
from property use of condemned portion for purpose for which it was 
condemned. Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 (1932). 
24. Profits, measure of damages. 
Profit of a business is too uncertain to be accepted in condemnation case 
as any evidence of the usable value of property. Johnson County Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
Contemplated profits from use of real estate is not measure of damages in 
condemnation case. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 
121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
25. Value of property - in general. 
Evidence as to the before and after value of leasehold was inadmissible 
in condemnation proceeding. Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
26. Leasehold estate, value of property. 
Right of lessee to use improvements over term of lease is ownership right 
and compensable upon condemnation of leasehold. Interstate Finance Corp. v. 
Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 14g N.W.2d 308 (1967). 
Court's discretion to evaluate valuations given by experts. Iowa 
Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963). 
Value of removable product, resulting in complete depletion of value, is 
proper evidence in proving before and after value. Comstock v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
That landowner has given a lease on the property may be considered in 
determining compensation for property taken. Wicks v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa gg3, 11g N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
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In proceeding to condemn short term farm leasehold, profits lost are not I 
recoverable by way of damages. Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 
(lg48}. 
Testimony as to value of land partially based on appearance was not 
objectionable. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 I 
(1922). 
Wide discretion in trial court in considering valuation testimony. 
Youtzy v. City of Cedar Rapids, 150 Iowa 53, 129 N.W. 351 (1911). 
27. Loss estimates, value of property. I 
In condemnation proceedings, estimates of losses are not used to arrive 
at after value, but after value is used to determine actual loss. Martinson 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
28. Purchase price, value of property. 
Whether original purchase price of property being condemned is too remote 
is in court's discretion. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 
N.W.2d 566 (1964). 
29. Trial in general. 
Court's comment that land value had nothing to do with the case resulted 
in no prejudice. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 
121 N.W.2d 205 (1963}. 
In condemnation proceeding for strip of ground for highway purposes, 
trial court's statement of issues was not objectionable, as being a mere copy 
of the pleading. Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 
N.W. 269 (1939). 
Improper to refer to amount of award appealed from but can be remedied by 
instruction. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W.R. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110 (1888). 
30. Evidence - in general. 
Substantial competent evidence that regulatory measure entirely deprived 
landowner of reasonable and convenient access. Simkins v. City of Davenport, 
232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
Speculative matters are not to be considered as evidence of value of 
condemned property. Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 256 Iowa 1251, 130 N.W.2d 707 (1965). 
Where only issue in condemnation case was value of property held by fee 
owners who had given leasehold interest to others, evidence confined to damage 
to whole estate was improper. Wicks v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 
Iowa 998, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963}. 
In condemnation proceedings, evidence of other similar sales need not be 
identical, but must have a resemblance to be admissible. Iowa Development Co. 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
In proceeding to condemn land bordering navigable stream evidence of 
government surveyor's field notes showing meander lines was inadmissible; they 
not being legal boundaries. Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 147 
N.W. 908, Ann. Cas. 1916E. 592 (1914). 
Absent showing to contrary it is assumed that assessment of condemnation 
commissioners is in accord with his good faith judgment. Moran v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 (1937). 
Incompetent evidence as to cost of constructing larger cattle pass could 
not be said to be harmless. Kosters v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 
993 (1923). 
In condemnation of land for sewer disposal plant admission of testimony 
concerning odors from another plant was not prejudicial. Bracken v. City of 
Albia, 194 Iowa 596, 189 N.W. 972 (1922). 
506 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
472.23 
In proceeding to assess damages for construction of electric line, 
admission of cross-examination of defendant's witness as to certain matters 
concerning electric lines, held not prejudicial. Foley v. Iowa Electric Co., 
193 Iowa 128, 185 N.W. 13 (1921). 
Where witness stated what his property in neighborhood sold for, and over 
objection, was allowed to state value of improvements on property, there was 
no prejudice to defendant where these values corresponded to price sold for. 
Haggard v. Independent School District of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 
(1901). 
On appeal report of appraisers is not conclusive. Deaton v. Polk County, 
9 Iowa 594 (1859). 
31. Opinion evidence. 
In determining just compensation of land taken by eminent domain, sales 
of land not comparable to the land being taken may also furnish a foundation 
for an expert's opinion testimony. Business Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 
N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Cross examiner may learn of ability of witness to judge in premises, and 
what he takes into consideration in arriving at decision. Sater v. Burlington 
& Mt. P. Plank Road Co., 1 Iowa 386 (1855). Henry v. Dubuque & P.R. Co., 2 
Iowa 288 (1855). 
Prices paid for realty in locality not controlling criterion of "market 
value" of a particular farm. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Carmody, 
131 F.2d 318 (1942). 
Evidence of comparable sales may be used to test qualification of an 
opinioned witness in a condemnation proceeding. In re Primary Road 1-80, 256 
Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Corporate officer who was competent to testify in condemnation case as to 
value of corporation's tract of land in industrial district could also express 
an opinion as to value of adjoining tract. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State 
Highway Corrmission, 255 Iowa 292, 122 N.W.2d 323 (1963). 
Proceeding to determine value of farm-land condemned. Harmsen v. Iowa 
State Highway Corrmission, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d 660 (1960). 
Opinion stated by witness as to whether additional trouble in driving 
stock over highway would affect value of farm was not prejudicial. Stoner v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (1939). 
Admission of testimony of how much less land was worth, after taking than 
before, was improper, as calling for opinion of witness concerning amount of 
damages. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Permitting witness for defendant to testify that farm was not damaged by 
change in highway was without prejudice. Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 190 
Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339 (1920). 
Where half lot was condemned, it was proper to allow witness to be asked 
what value of half lot in question would be worth to rest of owner's 
property. Haggard v. Independent School Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 
N.W. 777 (1901). . 
Reversible error to allow witness to state what were damages caused by 
the taking. Hartley v. Keokuk & N. W.R. Co., 85 Iowa 455, 52 N.W. 352 
(1892). 
It was proper to ask witness to "state how embankements affect 
communication with different sides of railroad" as question did not call for 
opinion of witness. Smalley v. Iowa P. R. Co., 36 Iowa 571 (1873). 
Opinions as to value must be confined to premises over which right of way 
is taken. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 2 Clarke 288 (1855). 
Personal knowledge of the land or right of way is necessary for witnesses 
to testify as to value. Grinnell v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 
(1864). 
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32. Burden of proof, evidence. 
Burden of proving zoning ordinance unreasonable, arbitrary, capr1c1ous or 
discriminatory is upon the one asserting the invalidity. Business Ventures, 
Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
Owners of condemned property had burden of establishing case and showing 
that their property had the reasonable market value claimed. Crist v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Burden of showing legal services rendered in condemnation proceeding and 
value thereof rests on the claimant. Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
In proceeding to condemn realty for highway purposes, where condemnor 
claimed error in admitting evidence of sale price of other land when it was 
enhanced in value by benefit of the highway, burden was on condemnor to show 
enhancement of value was considered and affected the claimed comparable 
sales. Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 
397 (1961). 
· Burden of proof on owner in appeal. Randell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. 
Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. 979 (1925). 
33. Exclusion of evidence. 
Objection of condemnor to testimony of expert witnesses for condemnees as 
to sales prices of several separate tracts. Sustained. Yoder v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 215 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1974). 
Answer to question of value that "we had $48,811 into it" was properly 
stricken as unresponsive. Foster v. U.S., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Testimony by landowners' experts in condemnation case as to separate 
valuations they placed on separate portions of condemned land should have been 
excluded where landowners always farmed the land as a unit. Jones v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (1966). 
Evidence in condemnation proceeding of resolutions entered into between 
town and highway commission properly excluded. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 
141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 N.W.2d 566 (1964). 
Exclusion on cross examination of witness to value of farm before and 
after taking, of how much he paid for a farm crossed by a railroad bought by 
him at auction, not an abuse of discretion. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 
(Iowa 1948). 
Excluding evidence that several farms intersected by railroad sold at 
good prices not an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 
(Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
Photographs of property a distance away properly excluded for 
remoteness. Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 147 N.W. 908, 
(1914). 
Where assessment record did not show value owner put on his property 
exclusion of return not regarded as error. Haggard v. Independent School 
Dist. of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Where witness stated grounds of estimate of value, some of which were not 
proper, it was not error to refuse to exclude all as defendant could have 
asked jury be instructed on such. Smalley v. Iowa Pac. R. Co., 36 Iowa 571 
(1873). 
Evidence of value of other lots in vicinity is properly rejected where no 
similarity between lots and condemned property is shown. Hollingsworth v. Des 
Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
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34. Admissibility of evidence qenerally. 
Evidence of offer to purchase should be accepted only in absence of 
evidence of comparable sales. Hardaway v. City of Des Moines, 166 N.W.2d 578 
(Iowa 1969). 
Admissibility of collateral facts in support of estimates of value is 
matter which must largely be left to discretion of presiding judge. Martinson 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
Evidence of contract sales price admissible, but contract should not be 
based on speculation as to prospects of development of tracts sold. Redfield 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 1256, 110 N.W.2d 397 (1961). 
In condemnation proceedings, defendant could not complain of the receipt 
of plat or other evidence because of lack of timely objection upon the 
trial. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 
108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
35. Admissible evidence. 
Regarding evidence of land value in city's condemnation of land by 
eminent domain. Business Ventures Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 
1975). 
Evidence of existence of median strips was admissible to show effect of 
loss or impainnent of access on value of service station. Simkins v. City of 
Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
Admitting photographs of exterior and interior views of condemned 
business realty taken within four months after condemnation was not reversible 
error. Hardaway v. City of Des Moines, 166 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1969). 
In eminent domain proceeding, evidence concerning recent bona fide offer 
to purchase land in question was admissible. Id. 
Evidence of cost of equipment purchased several years before condemnation 
was admissible. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 N.W.2d 566 
(1964). 
In condemnation case involving widening of highway so as to take filling 
station driveway which had extended into right of way pursuant to license from 
town, proof of nature and extent of property owners' rights and use of the 
right of way was properly admitted. Id. 
Testimony as to comparable sales is admissible. In re Primary Road 1-80, 
256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Sales of gas station on property condemned were admissible evidence. 
Wicks v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 998, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
Photographs taken of railroad cut admissible as bearing on inconvenience 
and damages suffered by tenant from construction in operation of farm. Korf 
v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1948). 
Assessment rolls signed by owner admissible to show value of tract. 
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98 (1932). 
Admission of original petition for damages after filing of amended 
petition increasing claim, not prejudicial, where petitioners testified fully 
as to all elements of damage asserted. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932). 
Evidence of value of land at time of trial was not incompetent because it 
should have been confined to time irnnediately after taking, where there was no 
showing of change in value of farm lands since taking. Kosters v. Sioux 
County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923). 
Photographs of property a distance away properly excluded for remoteness. 
Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 147 N.W. 908 (1914), 908 Ann. 
Cas. 1916E, 592. 
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36. Inadmissible evidence. 
In increased award proceeding for partial taking of service station for 
highway construction, err in admitting testimony offered through plaintiff's 
witnesses relating to median strips was cured by jury instruction. Simpkins 
v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
Admissions against interest. U.S. v. Foster, C.C.A. 131 F.2d 3 (1942). 
U.S. v. Buescher, C.C.A. 131 F.2d 3 (1942). 
Witness may be asked selling price of land similarly situated to test 
knwoledge and competence as expert, but such testimony is not admissible as 
substantive evidence of value of property in controversy. Watkins v. Wabash 
R. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 (1907). Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 (1937). 
Evidence of value of other lots in vicinity is properly rejected where no 
similarity between lots and condemned property is shown. Cummins v. Des 
Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 268 (1884). Hollingsworth v. Des 
Moines & St. L. R. Co., 63 Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
Permitting cross examination as to amount paid for farm some years 
theretofore not prejudicial error, in that the fact that sale was remote went 
to weight rather than admissibility. Foster v. U.S., C.C.A. 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Generally, unaccepted offer for purchase of condemned property should not 
be received as evidence of value. Hardaway v. City of Des Moines, 166 N.W.2d 
578 (Iowa 1969). 
Evidence of amount paid by condemnor to other condemnees in same project 
is inadmissible, since the price paid in such instance is result of a 
compromise. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 
277 (1966). 
Testimony that median ditch dividing a four lane highway necessitated 
circuity of travel to reach landowners property was improperly admitted. 
Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
Evidence of separate values of needed improvements is not admissible as 
an independant item of damage in a condemnation case. Trachta v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1958). 
Price paid for property cannot be shown where purchase is so remote as to 
have no bearing on value at time of condemnation. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & 
P. Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1948). 
Permitting witness who testified as to value, to testify as to sale price 
of other nearby farms was prejudicial error. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 (1937). 
Evidence as to what railroad paid for other lands not similarly situated 
was inadmissible. Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 
N.W. 129 {1905). Hollingsworth v. Des Moines & St. L. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 443, 
19 N.W. 325 (1884). 
Evidence of value of land sold 10 or 12 years before not competent to 
prove value at time of trial. Everett v. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 13 
N.W. 109 (1882). 
37. Witnesses - in general. 
Valuation witness in condemnation proceeding may support his valuation by 
relating matters which affected his judgment. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 {1965). 
Witness who had testified to improper measure of damage in condemnation 
proceeding. Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 
N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
Witness may testify as to what other lands in vicinity sold for and what 
he heard others say as to prices they received to show his knowledge of land 
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in vicinity. Winklemans v. Des Moines N.W. R. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 
.(1883). 
38. Expert witnesses. 
Valuation expert in condemnation case may accredit his testimony by 
showing that separate parcels are reasonably adaptable to specific uses, an 
expert may be cross-examined as to valuation he placed on such parcels to test 
his credibility, knowledge and basis of opinion. Jones v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 25g Iowa 616, 144 N:W.2d 277 (1966). 
Considerable latitude allowed in cross-examination of experts, including 
those who testify to property values. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 
Iowa 711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
Whether sinking of well would be helpful in operation of farm was not 
matter calling for expert opinion. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, (Iowa 
1948). 
In testing expert's knowledge defendants had right to question expert 
concerning value of separate tracts in farm. Dean v. State, 211 Iowa 143, 233 
N.W. 36 (1930). 
Opinion of expert as to value based on non existent facts was of no 
value. Tracy v. City of ~t. Pleasant, 148 N.W. 637 (Iowa 1914). 
Questions of whether cutting of certain ditches was necessary was proper 
subject for expert testimony. Guinn v. Iowa & St. L. R. Co., 125 Iowa 301, 
101 N.W. 94 (1904). 
Where persons are shown to be familiar with value of land in question 
they may testify as to value before and after the taking. Britton v. Des 
Moines, O. & S. R. Co., 59 Iowa 540, 13 N.W. 710 (1882). 
39. Qualifications of witnesses. 
Witness qualified to testify as to market value on showing that he was 
real estate broker and had grown up on a farm in vicinity and had sold 20 or 
25 farms in the county. Foster v. U.S., C.C.A. 145 F.2d 873 (Iowa 1945). 
Permitting person engaged in real estate business to express opinion on 
behalf of condemnees as to his before-condemnation valuation of farm was not 
improper. Newland v. Linn County Bd. of Sup' rs, 256 Iowa 424, 127 N.W.2d 625 
(1964). 
Farmers and landowners competent to testify on value of land. Evans v. 
Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 205 Iowa 283; 218 N.W. 66 (1928). 
Witnesses were qualified to express opinion as to value of property in 
controversy. Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. 979 (1925). 
Witness must be shown to be familiar with local conditions. Tracy v. 
City of Mt. Pleasant, 154 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914), modified on other 
grounds, 148 N.W. 637. 
Circumstances warranted court in finding that witnesses knew of date of 
location of improvement and were competent to testify. Pingrey v. Cherokee & 
D. R. Co., 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285 (1889). 
General objection goes to testimony not to competency of witness to 
express an opinion. Ball v. Keokuk & N. W. R. Co., 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110 
(1888). 
Whether witness discloses sufficient knowledge to testify as to damages 
largely matter of discretion of court. Small v. Iowa P. R. Co., 36 Iowa 571 
(1873). 
Personal knowledge of the land or right of way is necessary for witnesses 
to testify as to value. Grinnell v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa 570 
(1864). 
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40. Cross-examination of witnesses. 
Scope of cross-examination of value witnesses largely in discretion of 
court, though considerable latitude is usually allowed. Hayes v. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1948). Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 
(Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
As to value placed on land on listing for trading purposes. Foster v. 
U.S., C.C.A. 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Cross-examination testimony of plaintiff's value witness as to whether or 
not he expressed opinion on reasonable value of other land before and after 
railroad went through, properly excluded. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 
(Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
Permitting cross-examination of expert on value who had been member of 
condemnation commission as to whether his assessment correctly expressed his judgment as to damages sustained by plaintiff, not cause for reversal. Moran 
v, Iowa State Highway Commission, 23 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 (1937). 
Excluding cross-examination of plaintiff on value of farm and livestock 
sworn to become tax assessor was error in view of plaintiffs testimony. 
Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1931). 
Witness who testified as to value of land for purpose condemned could be 
asked on cross-examination as to purposes for which he thought the property 
available and its market value for such purposes. Tracy v. Mt. Pleasant, 165 
Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78 (1914), modified on other grounds, 148 N.W.2d 637. 
Where defendant's objection to evidence of value per acre was sustained, 
defendant could not complain that on cross-examination it was not allowed to 
show value per acre of land taken. Westbrook v. Muscatine N. & S. R. Co., 115 
Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202 (1901). 
Value witness may be cross-examined on value of lots in vicinity to test 
knowledge of values. Snouffer v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 105 Iowa 681, 75 
N.W. 501 (1898). 
Distinction in condemnation cases between questions permissible on direct 
examination and to those permissible on cross-examination has been abrogated 
with respect to testimony of comparable sales. Wicks v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 9g3, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1963). 
Curtailing cross-examination of expert witness as to how much parcel, if 
no condemnation had occurred, would have sold for per acre was nonprejudicial 
in proceeding to condemn portion of farm. Newland v. Linn County Bd. of 
Sup' rs, 256 Iowa 424, 127 N.W.2d 625 (1964). 
41. Instructions - in general. 
Instruction in condemnation case on possibility of a future change in 
zoning of landowners' property. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 259 
Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 (lg66). 
Difference between opinion testimony and substantive evidence is a proper 
subject for jury instruction in a condemnation proceeding. In re Primary Road 
1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
In action to condemn leasehold for highway purposes, trial court properly 
refused to give instruction that jury was not to consider the matter of court 
costs, interest, or lessees' attorneys fees in awarding damages. Estelle v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Court need not instruct on each particular claimed element of damage. 
Eggleston v. Town of Aurora, 233 Iowa 559, 10 N.W.2d 104 (1943). 
Where it appears that witnesses have included in their estimate of value 
consequences too remote, it was duty of court to instruct jury to disregard 
such considerations. Sater v. Burlington & Mt. P. Plank-Road Co., 1 Iowa 386, 
1 Clarke 386 (1855). 
512 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
472.23 
42. Definitions 1 instructions. In instructing Jury regarding fair and reasonable market value of 
condemned property, it is proper to define fair and reasonable market value as 
the "cash price". Hardaway v. City of Des Moines, 166 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1g5g). 
Instruction defining "just compensation" as payment of such sum as would 
make owner whole, not prejudicial. Witt v. State, 223 Iowa 156, 272 N.W.419 
(1937). 
43. Failure to instruct. 
Owner's valuation witness concerning apprehension of prospective 
purchaser because of trimmed trees and clearance light did not relate to 
aircraft flight path over owner's farm, trial court properly refused jury 
instruction that no aviation easement over the fanTI was acquired by 
condemnation of clearance easement. Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 2og 
N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1g73). 
Failure to instruct jury on present value of leasehold interest was not 
improper. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 308 
(1967). 
44. Cure of error by instruction. 
Did court's instructions remove prejudicial error in admitting testimony 
of alleged property loss due to median strip in front of service station. 
Simpkins v. City of Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1975). 
In condemnation proceeding, failure to limit jury to specific elements of 
damage pleaded was not error in view of instruction that measure of damages 
was difference between reasonable value of property immediately before 
condemnation and immediately thereafter. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 (1937). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
45. Erroneous instructions. 
Trial court erred in submitting instructions with reference to date of 
trial as time for fixing fair and just compensation to landowners, even though 
evidence of valuation by condemnor and condemnee was directed to value 
property at time of trial rather than at time of taking. Heldenbrand v. 
Executive Council of Iowa, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1g74). 
Instruction on comparable sales was improper were there was no evidence 
on subject, but question of propriety was not presented in absence of 
exceptions. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 
N.W.2d 340 (1965). 
Although evidence of comparable sales is of high probative quality in 
detenTiining damges in a condemnation proceeding, an instruction to that effect 
is not proper. In re Primary Road 1-80, 256 Iowa 43, 126 N.W.2d 311 (1964). 
Instruction relating to comparable sales was error where plaintiffs' 
evidence related only to construction costs of new service stations. Wicks v. 
Iowa State Hi~hway Commission, 254 Iowa 998, 11g N.W.2d 781 {1963). 
Instruction, in condemnation proceeding as to ascertaining market value 
of property sought to be condemned, was erroneous under evidence. Millard v. 
Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W.979 (1925). 
Instruction assuming that owner has right to cross railroad, superior to 
right of railroad to use it for its purposes was properly refused. Clayton v. 
Chicago, I. & D. R. Co., 67 Iowa 238, 25 N.W. 150 (1885). 
46. Particular instructions. 
Damages instruction, by use of words "intrisic or actual value to an 
owner," was not unclear and did not penTiit award based on sentiment. Comstock 
v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205 (1963). 
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Trial court in condemnation proceeding by state highway commission 
properly instructed jury that measure of damages for condemnation of leasehold 
was the fair and reasonable market value of the unexpired term of the lease 
with building, fixtures and other personal property located thereon 
immediately before the appropriation less the rental reserved for remainder of 
lease and less reasonable value of any personal property removed by lessees 
after the condemnation. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 
1238, 119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Instruction on measure of damages to tenant did not indicate a double 
recovery for damage to his interest was·recoverable. Wilson v. Fleming, 31 
N.W.2d (Iowa 1948), motion denied, 32 N.W.2d 798. 
Not error to charge jury that they have right to weight and judge 
opinions expressed by their own judgment and experience and observation with 
respect to such matters. Cutler v. State, 224 Iowa 686, 278 N.W. 327 (1938). 
In view of proper instruction on measure of damages it was not error to 
instruct that real right of which owner is deprived is right to undistrubed 
possession, for which he is to be compensated. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 (1937), 118 A.L.R. 862. 
Use of term "value" instead of "fair and reasonable market value" in 
instruction was not error in view of other instructions. Hoeft v. State, 221 
Iowa 694, 266 N.W. 571 {1936), 104 A.L.R. 1008. 
Instruction to consider character of land, number of acres taken, 
location of highway, etc., in fixing damages, not erroneous as emphasizing 
speculation. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 
N.W. 693 (1932). 
Trial court's discrepancy in misdescribing land in submitting issue not 
prejudicial error. Sherwood v. Reynolds, 213 Iowa 539, 239 N.W. 137 (1931). 
Instruction on saleability of land involved not erroneous. Neddermeyer 
v. Crawford County, 1go Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339 (1919). 
Where judge instructed jury that it was not bound by return of sheriff jury and named the figure, and jury returned much larger verdict, there was no 
error. Bell v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 74 Iowa 343, 37 N.W. 768 (1888). 
47. Jur~ questions. 
Inetermining just compensation for land taken by eminent domain, 
evidence of comparable sales is admissible as substantive evidence of value, 
and it is for jury to determine weight and credit of such evidence. Business 
Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
The extent to which owners' farm had been damaged or reduced in value was 
ultimate fact to be determined by the jury in condemnation proceeding. 
Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1973). 
Sufficient evidence existed in condemnation case to warrant submitting of 
an instruction on a change in zoning of landowners' property. Jones v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277 {1966). 
Where valuation witness retracted valuation based on improper method and 
then gave same value purportedly arrived at by proper method, it was for jury 
to determine whether similarity in after values arrived at was contrived. 
Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 134 N.W.2d 340 
(1965). 
Whether property owners had been denied reasonable access to their 
business property by highway improvement was properly submitted to jury. In 
re Primary Road No. 141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 N.W.2d 566 (1964). 
Amount allowed for condemned property is peculiarly within province of jury. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
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Refusal to require jury to award in gross and then apportion it between 
owner and tenant was not error. Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1948). 
48. View of premises. 
It is within discretion of court to permit view of premises. Draker v. 
Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 182 N.W. 896 (1921). 
It was proper to instruct that view was to better enable jury to 
understand testimony and more intelligently apply it to issues, that they must 
consider the evidence in light of such view, but determine facts from evidence 
alone. Guinn v. Iowa & St. L. R. Co., 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209 (1906). 
Action of court in refusing a view will not be disturbed on appeal where 
no abuse of discretion appears. King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 Iowa 458 
(1872). 
Jury not authorized to base verdict on view, as its object is to better 
enable them to apply the testimony. Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503 (1869). 
49. Attorney's fees. 
In awarding attorney fees in condemnation proceedings, trial court has 
considerable discretion although the exercise must be reasonable and not 
arbitrary. Schrader v. Sioux City, 167 N.W.2d 669 (Iowa 1969). 
50. Judgment and award. 
No personal judgment rendered. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co. v. Boynton, 
158 F. 599, 85 C.A.A. 421 (1907). 
Not established that verdict was result of passion and prejudice. 
Crozier v. Iowa-Illinois & Elec. Co., 165 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa 1969). 
Award for condemned property not so excessive as to permit interference 
by Supreme Court. Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 
N.W.2d 424 (1963). 
Judgment entry in condemnation proceeding wherein court entered judgment 
for a specified amount with specified interest, and an allowance of cost and 
attorneys' fees, was a final judgment from which an appeal could have been 
taken. Neff v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 98, 111 N.W.2d 293 
(1962). 
Evidence did not establish that awards in condemnation proceedings were 
excessive. Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 
978, 108 N.W.2d 487 (1961). 
There was no judgment in favor of owner so as to entitle him to mandamus 
to compel city to levy and pay same where injunction requiring city to pay 
award or furnish bond in case of appeal had been issued. Wheatley v. City of 
Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936). 
It was improper to enter judgment on appeal, and it would be set aside 
and case stand affirmed as to award of jury and attorney fees awarded by 
court. Richardson v. City of Centerville, 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071, 
(1908). 
Where three appeals were consolidated for trial and two were settled, the 
third remained unaffected. Mason v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 468, 109 
N.W. 1 (1906). 
Where company appealed owner might properly be awarded larger damages. 
McKinnon v. Cedar Rapids & I. C.R. & Light Co., 126 Iowa 426, 102 N.W. 138 
(1905). 
It was error to enter judgment for amount of damages. Haggard v. 
Independent School District of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Order of court regarding payment did not constitute a defense to owner's 
action for restitution on failure of sheriff to pay award over to owner. 
Burns v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 110 Iowa 385, 81 N.W. 794 (1900). 
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Judgment entered in usual form of judgment in action of debt, had no 
greater effect than if entered in conformity to statutes. Gear v. Dubuque & 
S. C.R. Co., 20 Iowa 523, 89 Am. Dec. 550 (1866). 
51. New trial. 
Trial court in condemnation case properly awarded new trial because of 
inadequacy of verdict coupled with possible errors in proceedings. In re 
Primary Road No. 141, 256 Iowa 380, 127 N.W.2d 566 (1964). 
Trial court has larger discretion rather to grant new trial for award of 
excessive damages than reviewing court. Besco v. Mahaska County, 200 Iowa 
684, 205 N.W. 45g (1925). 
52. Scope of review - in general. 
City's objection that expert witnesses' op1n1ons without regard to zoning 
of property value city which sought to expropriate, constituted incompetent 
irrelevant evidence, was lacking in specificity and would not serve to 
preserve error based on trial court's adverse ruling. Business Ventures Inc. 
v. Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1975). 
City preserved right to complain on appeal regarding challenged evidence 
in proceeding for taking service station property. Simpkins v. City of 
Davenport, 232 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1g75). 
Statutes establishing time limit and procedure by which appeal may be 
taken from compensation commission award are a means of giving district court 
power to hear and determine appeal. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway 
Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Court must correctly state the law and confine the law to factual 
situation appearing in the record, and a misstatement of the law in an 
instruction to the jury is reversible error. Heldenbrand v. Executive Council 
of Iowa for Use and Benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1974). 
Only question involved in eminent domain procedure is the value of the 
property taken, and the only appeal that can be taken is from the award of 
damages. Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, 249 Iowa 179, 85 N.W.2d 912 (1957). 
Where value is disputed and there is competent evidence from which jury 
could reach verdict it did, Supreme Court will not interfere. Stoner v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 287 N.W. 269 (1939). Miller v. Iowa 
Elec. Light & Power Co., 34 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1949). 
Damages, if sustained by evidence, will not be interfered with, in 
absence of indications of passion and prejudice. Schoonover v. Fleming, 32 
N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1948). 
Supreme Court could disregard owner's claim to interest where such claim 
was not called to' attention of trail court and record did not disclose date 
possession was entered into. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 
743 (1948). 
Court on appeal cannot review exercise of discretion of condemning body 
when such body acts within its authority and determination is fairly made. 
Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona County, 238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947). 
Supreme Court will reverse for excessive damages where record clearly 
shows verdict to be so. Luthi v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 Iowa 678, 
276 N.W. 586 (1938). 
Reviewing tribunal will not substitute its judgment for that of jury as 
to amount of damages. Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 
N.W. 979 (1925). 
Amount allowed is peculiarly within province of jury. Longstreet, 200 
Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925). Korf v. Fleming, 32 N.W.2d 85, 3 A.L.R.2d 270 
(1948). 
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Answer, while improper, should have been properly objected to. Kukkuk v. 
City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (1922). 
Discretion of trial court in defining boundaries of neighborhood within 
which property values will be considered not reversible unless abuse is 
shown. Youtzy v. City of Cedar Rapids, 150 Iowa 53, 129 N.W. 351 (1911). 
Return of assessment properly excluded where it did not show what value 
owner put on property. Haggard v. Independent School Dist. of Algona, 113 
Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777 (1901). 
Where record of appeal did. not contain description of the property it was 
presumed that finding of trial court on question of what lands were considered 
was correct. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Byington, 14 Iowa 572 (1863). 
53. Verdict or award, scope of review. 
When ~ 472.25 providing means by which condemnor may deposit award with 
sheriff in order to obtain immediate possession of condemned property is 
inapplicable in condemnation case, only judgment entered on appeal is for 
costs. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 
(Iowa 1975). 
Error in allowing testimony as to value of property at time of trial was 
properly preserved for appeal. Heldenbrand v. Executive Council of Iowa, for 
Use and Benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628 (1974). 
Amount allowed is peculiarly within province of jury. Korf v. Fleming, 
32 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1948). 
Verdict of jury, supported by substantial evidence, though it be 
conflicting, must be sustained. Foster v. IJ.S., 145 F.2d 873 (1945). 
Unless amount awarded by jury is shown to be so extravagant so as to be 
wholly unreasonable Supreme Court will not interfere. Miller v. Iowa Elec. 
Light & Power Co., 34 N.W.2d 627 (1949). 
Supreme Court will not disturb verdict merely because it is liberal·. 
Cutler v. State, 224 Iowa 686, 278 N.W. 327 (1938). 
Supreme Court will reverse for excessive damages where record clearly 
shows verdict to be so. Luthi v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 Iowa 678, 
276 N.W. 586 (1938). 
Jury's verdict should not be interfered with in absence of showing of 
passion and prejudice. Kemmerer v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 
136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932). 
Award not disturbed on appeal unless wholly unfair and unreasonable. 
Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 (1932). 
Where award was sustained by the evidence it could not be attacked on 
appeal, there being no claim of passion and prejudice. Burgess v. Bremer 
County, 189 Iowa 168, 178 N.W. 389 (1920). 
472.24 Reduction of DC111ages 
1. Construction and application. 
This section providing that if amount of damages awarded by commissioners 
is decreased on trial the appeal, reduced amount only shall be paid to 
landowner, as reference to amount of verdict only, and does not involve 
interest on delayed payment to landowner. Strange Bros. Hide Co. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 450, 93 N.W.2d 99 (1959). 
Judgment entered in usual form of judgment for debt had no greater effect 
than if entered in conformity with statutes. Gear v. Dubuque & S. C.R. Co., 
20 Iowa 523 (1886), 89 Am. Dec. 550. 
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2. Delay in paying compensation. 
Under this section jury may award damages for delay in making 
compensation and it is immaterial that such damages are denominated as 
"interest." Noble v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 61 Iowa 637, 17 N.W. 26 
(1883). 
3. Cost, interest and attorney's fees. 
In action be state highway commission to condemn leasehold for highway 
purposes, trial court properly refused to give requested instruction that jury 
was not to consider the matter of court, costs interest or lessees' attorneys 
fees in awarding. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 
119 N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Where highway commission deposited amount of award in favor of property 
owner with court and took immediate possession of property and appealed from 
the award, property owner was entitled to interest on award from date highway 
commission took possession although it filed a cross appeal, even though 
amount of award was decreased on appeal. Strange Bros. Hide Co. v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 450, 93 N.W.2d 99 (1959). 
Even after final determination of appeal from assessment damages, 
condemnor may decline to take property and pay damages awarded, although in 
such event he must pay costs and damages actually suffered by owner, including 
reasonable attorney fees. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 239 Iowa 950, 
33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
Where on appeal, verdict was smaller, owner was not allowed interest from 
time of taking. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 
1948). 
4. Jury verdict. 
Amount of verdict is peculiarly question for jury and neither trial court 
nor reviewing court should interfere. Newland v. Linn County Bd. of Sup'rs, 
256 Iowa 424, 127 N.W.2d 625 (1964). 
Jury verdict in condemnation case should not be disturbed because of its 
size unless it is flagrantly excessive. Nelson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
5. New trial. 
Prior verdicts rendered upon substantially the same evidence in the same 
case are proper consideration for court in passing on motion for a new trial 
on basis of inadequacy or excessive of award. Larew v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 257 Iowa 64, 130 N.W.2d 688 (1965). 
Refusal to award new trial to condemnor which claimed that verdict was 
excessive was abuse of discretion. In re Primary Road No. Iowa 141, 255 Iowa 
711, 124 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
6. Remittitur. 
Trial court ordering a remittitur or a new trial in an eminent domain 
case should show something beyond its mere unsupported statement that the 
verdict is inadequate or excessive. Larew v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 
257 Iowa 64, 130 N.W.2d 688 (1965). 
472.25 Right to Take Possession of Lands 
1. Validity. 
Article 1, Section 18, not violated by permitting condemner to enter 
pending appeal after damages assessed have been deposited with sheriff. 
Peterson v. Ferreby, 30 Iowa 327 (1870). 
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472.25 
Taking before payment cannot be authorized by legislature. Henry v . 
. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 10 Iowa 540 (185g). 
2. Construction and application. 
Condemnor had right of possession of leased property after damages 
assessed by compensation commission were deposited with sheriff. Appeal did 
not interfere with that right, since condemnor did not take physical 
possession and therefore was entitled to collect rent until it took lessee's 
interests by compensating it in· amount of judgment. City of Oes Moines v. 
Geller Glass and Upholstery Inc., 319 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1982). 
Trial court had and continued to have personal jurisdiction to enter 
judgment against defendant condemnees, who without order of court, in 
violation of statute received condemnation fund, which had been deposited by 
condemnor with sheriff, for payments in excess of amount determined on 
appeal. Iowa Dept. of Transp. v. Read, 261 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1978). 
Condemnor does not waive right of appeal by depositing award with the 
sheriff. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 
(Iowa 1975). 
Proceeding before sheriff is administrative. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. 
v. Stude, 74 S.Ct. 290, 346 U.S. 574, 98 L. Ed. 338 (1954), rehearing denied, 
74 S. Ct. 512, 347 U.S. 924, 98 L. Ed. 1078. 
Condemnation proceedings do not afford protection, at least against 
temporary occupation by crossing which railroad may not have right to 
construct. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 91 Iowa 
16, 58 N.W. 918 (1894). 
The only question involved in eminent domain procedure is the value of 
the property taken and the only appeal that can be taken is from the award of 
damages. Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, 249 Iowa 179, 85 N.W.2d 912 (1957). 
A right acquired by condemnation may be waived during pendency of appeal 
to court from appraisement of damages. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 
33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
3. Deposit or payment of dama~es. 
Judgment entered on appea is only for costs when award deposited with 
sheriff in order to obtain possession of condemned property is inapplicable in 
condemnation case. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 
N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Where highway commission deposited amount of award in favor of property 
owner with court and took immediate possession of property and appealed from 
the award, property owner was entitled to interest on award from date highway 
commission took possession although it filed a cross appeal, even though 
amount of award was decreased on appeal. Strange Bros. Hide Co. v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 450, 93 N.W.2d 99 (1959). 
Payment must be in money, and a waiver of rights is not partial payment 
but a limitation on damages. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 
503 (Iowa 1948). 
After having condemned and paid damages, condemnor cannot assert in 
action for breach of agreement to convey right of way, that owner wrongfully 
received such damages. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co. v. Burrell, 184 Iowa 689, 
169 N.W. 53 (1918). 
Award to owner for anticipated damages gives no right to take the land 
until security is given on payment.made. Griffeth v. Drainage Dist. No. 41 in 
Pocahontas County, 182 Iowa 1291, 166 N.W. 570 (1918). 
Sheriff is bound to retain damges for landowner. Bannister v. Mcintire, 
112 Iowa 600, 84 N.W. 707 (1900). 
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Under laws of 1853 payment of damages assessed was condition precedent to 
right of railroad to enter and appropriate land. Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. 
Co., 10 Iowa 540 (1859). 
Right of appeal is waived when condemnor, with knowledge of 
circumstances, voluntarily and intentionally pays award other than under this 
section providing means by which condemnor may deposit award with sheriff in 
order to obtain immediate possession of condemned property and it does not 
matter whether payment occurs before or after notice of appeal is given. 
State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 
1975). 
4. Acceptance of deposit. 
If condemnor highway commission intended to proceed under this section 
providing means by which condemnor may deposit award with sheriff in order to 
obtain immediate possession of condemned property or if condemnor intended to 
condition or limit delivery of checks to condemnees, it had duty to instruct 
sheriff accordingly. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Read, 
228 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1975). 
Landowners' acceptance of railway's deposit with sheriff of amount 
awarded landowners in proceeding to condemn strip of land for right of way 
would bar landowner's right to appeal. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 
30 N.W.2d 743 {Iowa lg48). 
Where, without knowledge of defendant, plaintiff accepted money from 
sheriff, while plaintiff's appeal was defeated thereby, court had jurisdiction 
on defendant's appeal, and plaintiff had right to contest amount of 
recovery. Burns v. Chicago, Ft. M. & D. M. R. Co., 102 Iowa 7, 70 N.W. 728 (18g7). 
5. Possession. 
Deposit with sheriff of sum awarded owner entitled railroad to take 
possession and proceed with improvement. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. 
Co., 30 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1948). 
Instruction that jury should not be influenced by fact that company took 
possession after condemnation against will of owner was not erroneous. Purdy 
v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 172 Iowa 676, 154 N.W. 881 (1915). 
Agreement pending appeal held to not amount to sale by owner to railroad, 
nor confer authority to take possession. Irish v. Burlington Southwestern R. 
Co., 44 Iowa 380 (1876). 
Entering judgment in usual form of judgment for debt only gives the 
company right to enter upon payment of sum assessed. Gear v. Dubuque & S. c. 
R. Co., 20 Iowa 523, 89 Am. Dec. 550 (1866). 
Appropriation by company prior to payment rendered it a trespasser. 
Henry v. Dubuque & P. R. Co., 10 Iowa 540 (1859). 
6. Injunction. 
Decree providing injunction unless award was paid or appeal taken was a 
"final decree", condemnor having appealed, and injunction could not issue on 
condemnee's motion. City of Fairfield v. Dashiell, 217 Iowa 474, 249 N.W. 236 {1933). 
Injunction proper in conditioning its operation on failure to pay 
owner. Scott v. Price Bros., 207 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 75 (1927). 
Injunction will issue to prevent appropriation and use where land was 
condemned for unlawful purpose. Forbes v. Delashmutt, 68 Iowa 164, 26 N.W. 56 
(1927). 
Injunction will issue to prevent appropriation until damages have been 
ascertained and paid. Horton v. Hoyt, 11 Iowa 496 (1861). 
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472.25 
Owner was entitled to injunction pending appeal. Trustees of Iowa 
College v. City of Davenport, 7 Iowa 213, 7 Clarke 213 (1858). 
Injunction will issue to prevent appropriation until damages have been 
ascertained and paid. Ragatz v. City of Dubuque, 4 Iowa 343, 4 Clarke 343 
(1856). 
7. Actions for deposit or payment. 
Suit against sheriff by owner for failure to pay over the award. 
Bannister v. Mcintire, 112 Iowa'600, 84 N.W. 707 (lgoo). 
8. Interest. 
Condemnee entitled to interest earned on lesser than land ajudged to be 
worth, when condemnation award paid into court, pending resolution of 
condemnee's challenge. City of Sac City v. Bentsen, 329 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1982). 
Owner cannot maintain separate action to recover interest on amount 
deposited with sheriff by condemnor. Jamison v. Burlington & W. R. Co., 78 
Iowa 562, 43 N.W. 529 (1889). 
9. Rent. 
Condemnor cannot collect rents from owners in lawful possession in 
condemned lands and buildings. O.A.G. April 20, 1970. 
10. Settlement. 
Settlement of owner's damages not a contract involving realty within 
contemplation of statute of frauds. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. 
Co., 243 Iowa 1377, 55 N.W.2d 552 (1952). 
11. Flood control projects. 
City or town authorized to cooperate in federal flood control projects. 
O.A.G. July 20, 1967. 
12. Court order. 
Newmire v. Maxwell, 161 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1968). 
13. Summara judgment. 
In con emnation appeal, in which condemnor asserted wrongful dispursement 
to condemnees of condemnation award funds which had been deposited with 
sheriff, material issue of fact existed as to whether sheriff received letter, 
allegedly accompanying checks, containing instructions limiting payment of 
award, precluding summary judgment. Iowa Department of Transp. v. Read, 262 
N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1978). 
14. Attorney fees. 
No basis for Supreme Court to award attorney fees to defendant 
condemnees' attorney on appeal to Supreme Court in condemnatin award appeal. 
Iowa Dept. of Transp. v. Read, 262 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1g78). 
15. Appeal. 
Condemnor did not waive its right to appeal condemnation award by 
depositing award with sheriff prior to giving notice of appeal. Iowa Dept. of 
Transp. v. Read, 262 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1978). 
16. Oral leasehold. 
Oral leasehold is compensible property interest when taken through 
eminent domain. City of Des Moines v. Geller Glass and Upholstery, 319 N.W.2d 
239 (Iowa 1982). 
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472.26 Dispossession of Owner 
1. Construction and application. 
Newmire v. Maxwell, 161 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1968). 
472.27 Erection of Dil11 - limitation 
1. In general. 
City or town is authorized to cooperate in federal flood control 
projects. O.A.G. July 20, 1967. 
472.28, 472.29 Repealed by Acts 1959 (58 G.A.) ch. 318, ~ 2. 
472.30 Additional Deposit 
1. Construction and application. 
Because condemnor did not increase deposit after district court judgment 
increased award over compensation commission's award, condemnor did not have 
right to possession. Condemnee fee owners entitled- to rent in lieu of 
increased damages. Condemnee's right to rent must be reduced by extent 
compensatlon was received through other means; interest paid to condemnees 
offset against rents. City of Des Moines v. Geller Glass and Upholstery, 319 
N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1982). 
Condemnor may not take possession without abandoning its appeal, return 
property to owner, in whatever condition it then might be, to avoid making 
additional deposit required by increase in award on appeal. Virginia Manor, 
Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 261 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1978). 
Provision of this section that if court increases damages, whole amount 
of damages shall be paid or deposited with sheriff, cannot be dispensed with 
by giving a supersedeas bond. Downing v. Des Moines N. W.R. Co., 63 Iowa 
177, 18 N.W. 862 (1884). 
2. Appeal. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
472.31 Payment by Public Authorities (No Annotations) 
472.32 Renoval of Condennor 
1. Construction and application. 
Federal court to which appeal was removed, could not properly direct 
marshall to oust railroad until damages were paid since Code of Iowa gave 
injured party a remedy. Reed v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 886 
(1885). 
472.33 Costs and Attorney Fees 
1. Validity. 
Owner could not object to classification allowing attorney's fees in 
certain condemnation proceedings and denying such when brought by the state. 
Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930). 
Provisions authorizing attorney's fees was constitutional. Iowa Electric 
Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
Where company exercised power it was precluded from questioning 
constitutionality of attorney's fees provision. Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. 
R. Co., 114 Iowa 713, 87 N.W. 714 (1901). 
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472.33 
2. Construction and application. 
In ascertaining right of condemnee to recover costs following condemnor's 
abandonment by eminent domain, court bound to construe section as it existed 
prior to amendment which was enacted after proceedings instituted. Atherton 
v. State Conservation Commission, 203 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1973). 
Recovery of attorney's fees in a condemnation proceeding is wholly 
contingent upon landowner's recovery of damages in a larger amount than 
awarded by the condemnation commission. Nelson v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 5g5 (lg62). 
Court not authorized to make allowance for fees and expenses of expert 
witnesses in condemnation case. City of Ottumwa v. Taylor, 251 Iowa 618, 102 
N.W.2d 376 (lg60). 
Provision of this section does not require taxation to the condemnor of 
all costs occasioned by the appeal except where the award of a sheriff's 
commission is increased by the jury verdict. Keeney v. Iowa Power & Light 
Co., 250 Iowa 887, g5 N.W.2d 918 (1959). 
Provisions of~ 677.5, relating to taxation of costs accruing after a 
rejected offer to confess Judgment 1n a larger amount then was later allowed 
upon trial of an appeal from a condemnation award apply to such a 
proceeding. Tilton v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 583, 94 N.W.2d 782 
(1959). 
Code Supp. 1907, section 771 included by reference Code 1897, section 
2007 providing that costs taxable against city should include costs of appeal 
if damages were increased. Globe Machinery & Supply Co. v. City of Des 
Moines, 156 Iowa 267, 136 N.W. 518 (1912). 
3. Costs on appeal - in general. 
Fee contract between condemnee and condemnee's attorney is ignored by 
district court in establishing fees in a condemnation appeal. Carmichael v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 219 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1974). 
In action by state highway commission to condemn leasehold for highway 
purposes, trial court properly refused to give requested instruction that jury 
was not to consider or take into account the matter of court costs, interest, 
or lessees' attorneys fees in awarding damages. Estelle v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 254 Iowa 1238, 11g N.W.2d 900 (1963). 
Provision of this section gave district court no authority to allow fees 
for condemnee's attorney, notwithstanding that while the appeal was pending 
the condemnor had offered to confess judgment in an amount less than the 
amount awarded by commission or in district court. Keeney v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 250 Iowa 887, 96 N.W.2d 918 (1959). 
Trial in district court was continuation on condemnation proceedings 
within Code 1897, relating to taxation of costs on offer to confess judgment. Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 182 N.W. 896 (1g21). 
Where owner obtained verdict in two trials on appeal increasing award it 
was improper to tax him with costs in either trial. Mccaskey v. Ft. Dodge, D. 
M. & S. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 652, 135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
Purchaser of railway liable for costs incurred in appeals pending on date 
of purchase. Frankel v. Chicago, B. & P .. R. Co., 70 Iowa 424, 30 N.W. 679 
(1886), rehearing denied, 70 Iowa 424, 32 N.W. 488. 
Where award was same on appeal owner was entitled to judgment for 
costs. Hanrahan v. Fox, 47 Iowa 102 (1877). 
4. Apportionment of costs on appeal. 
Whether costs should be apportioned in condemnation cases depends upon 
the circumstances of each case. Strange Bros. Hide Co. v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 250 Iowa 450, 93 N.W.2d 99 (1959). 
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Condemnor wa1v1ng some rights on appeal may be required to pay portion of 
costs if waiver has prejudiced plaintiff by making for smaller recovery. De 
Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (lg48). 
Under Code 1873 costs were to be apportioned by court. Noble v. Des 
Moines & St. L. R. Co., 61 Iowa 637, 17 N.W. 26 (1883). 
Where condemnor appealed and verdict was smaller court could, under 
general rules of law, direct part of costs to be taxed to condemnor. Jones v. 
Mahaska County Coal Co., 47 Iowa 35, (1877). 
5. Attorney's fees - in general. 
This section is not strictly construed as in derogation of common law. 
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. M and P Missouri River Levee District, 324 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1g32). 
Where city took and retained condemned property, condemnee was properly 
denied damages, costs and attorney fees occurred in mandamus action to require 
city to make additional deposit of adjudged compensation with sheriff. 
Virginia Manor, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 276 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1g7g). 
Award of fees in condemnation award was for client, not attorney, and 
they were free to make own fee contract. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 21g N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1g74). 
Not taxable as costs unless authorized by statute. Woodcock v. Wabash 
Ry. Co., 135 Iowa 55g, 113 N.W. 347 (lg07). Wilson v. Fleming, 23g Iowa 918, 
232 N.W.2d 798 (1948). 
Trial court's refusal to fix and award attorney fees to condemnees in 
connection with first and second trials, on ground that ultimate recovery 
could not be determined until case had been finally disposed of on appeal, was 
not error. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 185 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 
1971). 
Recommendations of state bar association advisory schedule of minimum 
fees not binding. In re lands, 153 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1967). 
Neither attorney fees nor fees and expenses of expert witnesses are 
embraced within the term "just compensation" for land taken by eminent 
domain. City of Ottumwa v. Taylor, 251 Iowa 618, 102 N.W.2d 376 (1960). 
Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930). 
Condemnor not liable for fees for condemnee's attorney for preparation 
for trial, and for the trial where verdict on appeal from commissioner's award 
was for an amount lower than that for which condemnor had offered to confess judgment. Tilton v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 583, 94 N.W.2d 782 
(1959). 
Attorney fees were not allowed for proceeding before commerce 
commission. Reter v. Davenport, R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 
N.W.2d 863 (1952), 35 A.L.R.2d 1306). 
Owners appealing were entitled to have attorney fees for two trials taxed 
as costs against defendant. Mccaskey v. Fort Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. Co., 154 
Iowa 652, 135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
In proceeding to recover value of property appropriated by railroad, 
attorney fees are allowable. Clark v. Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 
309 (1906). 
Error to tax attorney fee on appeal, and apportion same between parties 
where verdict was much less than commissioner's award. Wormley v. Mason City 
& Fort D.R. Co., 120 Iowa 684, 95 N.W. 203 (1903). 
Fees for services rendered in other suits to protect owner's property 
could not be allowed. Mellichar v. City of Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390, 90 N.W. 
86 (1902). 
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472.33 
6. Amount of attorney's fees. 
Attorney fee awards approximating only 29 percent of sum represented by 
jury verdicts returned were inadequate and unrealistic. Sykes v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 263 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1978). 
"Reasonable fee" for condemnees' counsel. In re lands, 153 N.W.2d 706 
(Iowa 1967). 
Mere comparison of amounts of sheriff's jury and court's jury award in 
condemnation proceedings does not determine whether attorney fees should be 
allowed to the condemnee. Henderson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 
Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 (1967). 
Fixing of attorney's fee not an abuse of discretion. Condemnation of 
Certain Land for Urban Renew a 1 Project Number 1 "River Hi 11 s" in City of Des 
Mo1nes, 254 Iowa 769, 119 N.W.2d 187 (1963). 
Attorney fee award was within court's reasonable discretion. Nelson v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
Allowance not excessive. Danker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 
86 N.W.2d 835 (1958). 
Fee held not to be excessive. Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W.2d 
393 (1928). 
7. Determination of attorney's fees. 
Effects of inflation should not be overlooked. Sykes v. Iowa Power & 
Light Co., 263 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1978). 
In fixing fee, court may hear testimony as to value of an attorney's 
services. Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 133 Iowa 714, 110 N.W. 1039 (1907). 
Provision of this section for taxing of attorney fees did not entitle 
landowner, who on appeal had increased highway condemnation award of damages, 
to tax his attorney fees, since highway condemnation procedure was 
specifically provided for in another chapter which did not provide for taxing 
of attorney fees. Frost v. Cedar County Bd. of Sup' rs, 163 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 
1968). 
Determination of reasonable attorney fees. In re lands, 153 N.W.2d 706 
(Iowa 1967). Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 
N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
Decreased purchasing power of money may properly be considered in fixing 
attorneys fees. Wilson v Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W.2d 393 (1928). 
Court, without jury, authorized to fix attorney's fees for which 
condemnor was liable. Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 
(1928). 
Fee may be determined by court. Richardson v. City of Centerville, 137 
Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071 (1908). 
8. Dismissal of proceedings, attorney's fees. 
Condemnor dismission proceedings prior to trial of appeal, liable for 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by owner for services rendered on 
appeal. Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
Assessment of costs against company was proper where settlement, in 
effect, gave owner more than did commissioners. Heath v. Mason City & Ft. D. 
R. Co., 94 N.W. 467 (1903). 
A corporation, which on appeal by property owner from a commissioners' 
award in condemnation proceedings, dismisses proceeding, is liable for 
appellant's attorney's fees. Mellichar v. City of Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390, 90 
N . W. 86 ( 1902 ) . 
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9. Quantum merit, attorney's fees. 
Where amount of attorney fee is determined by a contingent arrangement, 
there can be no recovery on quantum meruit. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission, 219 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1974). 
settl~~~~~tofx~h~~~ ~~B51~~t·bgtt8E~e~c~qgncl~eqt ~O&~~gb~® ~ha®rt8u~~t~mfair 
meruit. In re lands, 153 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1967). 
10. State's liability, attornea's fees. 
State could not be assesse attorney fees on abandonment of condemnation 
proceedings. Fitzgerald v. State, 220 Iowa 547, 260 N.W. 681 (1935), followed 
in. Corso v. State, 260 N.W. 685. 
State may allow attorney's fees in some situations while withholding them 
in others. Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 
876 ( 1931). 
Attorney fees not an element of just compensation. Nichol v. Neighbour, 
202 Iowa 406, 219 N.W. 281 (1926). 
11. Suereme Court attorney's fees. 
This section ~oes not authorize allowance of attorney's fees for services 
on appeal to Supreme Court. Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 918, 32 N.W.2d 798 (1948). 
District Court, after affirmance of judgment on appeal, could not tax 
attorney's fees or costs of appeal to Supreme Court. Woodcock v. Wabash Ry. 
Co., 135 Iowa 559, 113 N.W. 347 (1907). 
12. Miscellaneous fees. 
In allowing condemnee in eminent domain proceeding sum for fees and 
expenses of expert witnesses, district judge acted "illegally" within meaning 
of R. C. P. 306. City of Ottumwa v. Taylor, 251 Iowa 618, 102 N.W.2d 376 (1960). 
Where notice of appeal from award in condemnation proceedings was served 
by a person other than an officer, his fees therein could not be taxed as 
costs. Conway v. McGregor & M. R. Co., 43 Iowa 32 (1876). 
13. Review. 
In public utility condemnation, landowner had thirty days to appeal 
denial of new trial motion, but time period ran unaffected by unrelated motion 
to reconsider where motion was in substance, only for attorney fees award. 
Supreme Court without jurisdiction to review proceedings on merits. Sykes v. 
Iowa Power and Light Co., 263 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1978). 
Supreme Court will not interfere with trial court's discretionary action 
in matter of attorney's fees recoverable unless there has been abuse of 
discretion. In re lands, 153 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1967). 
Trial court has considerable discretion in fixing attorney's fees. 
Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 115 N.W.2d 695 (1962). 
A judgment entry in condemnation proceeding wherein court entered 
judgment for a specified amount with specified interest, and an allowance of 
costs and attorney's fees, was a final judgement from which an appeal could 
have been taken. Neff v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 253 Iowa 98, 111 
N.W.2d 293 (1962). 
District court's ruling dividing general court costs equally between 
condemnor and condemnee would not be disturbed. Keeney v. Iowa Power & Light 
Co., 250 Iowa 887, 96 N.W.2d 918 (1959). 
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472.34 Refusal to Pay Final Award 
1. Validity. 
472.34 
Provision of this section authorizing attorney's fees was constitutional. 
Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
2. Construction and ap~lication. 
Condemnee's claimor damages may not properly be joined with condemnee's 
action for mandamus to compel c6ndemnor to make deposit. Virginia Manor, Inc. 
v. City of Sioux City, 261 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1978). 
Court, on appeal, could not render personal judgment against condemnor 
for damages. Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co. v. Boynton, 158 F. 599, 85 C.C.A. 
421 (l907). 
Even after final determination condemnor may dismiss, but must pay costs 
and damages suffered by owner including reasonable attorney's fees. De 
Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
Judgment assessing damages does not bind condemnor to take land and pay 
damages assessed. Gear v. Dubuque & S. C.R. Co., 20 Iowa 523, 89 Am. Dec. 
550 {1866). 
3. Dismissal of proceedings. 
Condemnor dismissing proceeding after appeal, but prior to trial was 
liable for reasonable attorney's fee for services rendered on appeal. Iowa 
Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). 
Company, never having paid dama~es or entered on land could dismiss 
proceedings, paying costs. Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Sater, 1 Iowa 421, 1 
Clarke 421 (1855). 
4. Abandoment of proceedings. 
Condemnor may abandon condemnation at any time. Virginia Manor, Inc. v. 
City of Sioux City, 261 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1978). 
Abandonment renders condemnor liable for costs and damages actually 
suffered by landowner and reasonable attorney's fee. Wheatley v. City of 
Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936). 
This section authorizes recovery of damages and attorney fees on 
abandonment after appeal but prior to hearing on appeal. Ford v. Board of 
Park Com'rs of City of Des Moines, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 1030 (1910). 
Condemnor can abandon proceeding even after verdict with liability for 
costs. Klopp v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142 Iowa 474, 119 N.W. 373 
(1909). 
Right to abandon contemplates good faith and complete surrender of the 
project so far as land involved is concerned. Robertson v. Hartenbower, 120 
Iowa 410, 94 N.W. 857 (1903). 
Where assessment exceeds value of public improvement it may be 
abandoned. Hiatt v. City of Keokuk, 9 Iowa 438 (1859). 
5. Waiver of rights. 
A right acquired by condemnation may be waived during pendency of 
appeal. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
6. State's liability. 
State could not be assessed attorney's fees on abandonment of 
proceedings. Fitzgerald v. State, 220 Iowa 547, 260 N.W. 681 (1935), followed 
in. Corso v. State, 260 N.W. 685. 
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7. Attorney's fees. 
Costs and expenses reasonably necessary in preparation and in defense 
against condemnation which was abandoned after appeal had been taken to 
district court were recoverable and liability for reasonable attorney's fees 
paid or incurred by landowner was not limited to services rendered on appeal 
to the district court; overruling Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 
220 N.W. 333. Atherton v. State Conservation Commission, 203 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 
1973). 
8. Damages. 
In absence of statute and showing of unreasonable delay no action lies 
for abandonment of proceedings. Ford v. Board of Park Com'rs of City of Des 
Moines, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 1030 (1910). 
Abandonment is good defense to any claim for additional damages on appeal 
from award. Hastings v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 38 Iowa 316 (1874). 
9. Refund to condemnor. 
On abandonment land reverts to owner, and condemnor is not entitled to 
damages awarded and paid by condemnor for him to sheriff. Hastings v. B. & M. 
R. Co., 38 Iowa 316 (1874). 
472.35 Sheriff to File Record (No Annotations) 
472.36 Clerk to File Record (No Annotations) 
472.37 Form of Record - Certificate (No Annotations) 
472.38 Record of Proceedings (No Annotations) 
472.39 Fee for Recording (No Annotations) 
472.40 Failure to Record - Liability (No Annotations) 
472.41 Presunption (No Annotations) 
472.42 Eminent Domain - Payment to Displaced Persons (No Annotations) 
472.43 Chief Justice to Prepare Instructions (No Annotations) 
472.44 Taking Property for Highway - Buildings and Fences Moved (No 
Annotations) 
472.45 COndemnation for Road or Street - Mailing Copy of Appraisal (No 
Annotations) 
472.46 Special Proceedings to Condemn Existing Utility (No Annotations) 
472.47 Court of Condemnation (No Annotations) 
472.48 Procedure (No Annotations) 
472.49 Notice - Service (No Annotations) 
472.50 Powers of Court - Duty of Clerk - Vacancy (No Annotations) 
472.51 Costs - Expenses (No Annotations) 
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472.53 
472.52 Renegotiation of Damages 
1. Construction and application. 
Easements obtained by public utilities by purchase or condemnation are 
not subject to renegotiation within five years; the renegotiation provision 
applys only to construction or maintenance damages that were not apparent at 
the time of settlement and not to easements. O.A.G. October 26, 1g7z. 
472.53 Procedure for Hanesteading Projects (No Annotations) 
~9 
473A.8 
Chapter 473A 
Metropolitan or Regional Planning C0111Dissions 
473A.1 Authority of Governing Bodies - Joint COllll1ission 
1. Construction and apelication. 
Pol1t1cal subd1v1s1ons creating regional planning commission and 
independent political instrumentality are not oblidged to assume commission's 
liabilities and debts. O.A.G., May 20, 1980. 
Public monies controlled by regional planning commissions do not have to 
be placed in public depositories pursuant to chapter 453 of the Code nor are 
they protected by the state sinking fund under chapter 454. O.A.G., November 
18, 1974. 
473A.2 Membership (No Annotations) 
473A.3 Organization (No Annotations) 
473A.4 Powers and Duties 
1. In general. 
Provision of this section, "a plan or plans of the [joint planning] 
commission may be adopted, added to, and changed from time to time by a 
majority vote of the planning commission", codifies common law rule and 
authorizes joint planning commissions to make decisions by a majority rather 
than requiring majority approval of all members of commission. City of 
Hiawatha v. Regional Planning Commission of Linn County, 267 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 
1978). 
473A.5 Plans Distributed (No Annotations) 
473A.6 Filing Documents with C0111Dission (No Annotations) 
473A.7 Construction of Provisions 
1. In genera 1. 
A county regional planning commission formed under chapter 473A may join 
a multicounty regional planning commission under chapter 28E. O.A.G., July 
30, 1973. 
473A.8 Contracts for Planning (No Annotations) 
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477.1 
Chapter 477 
Telegraph and Telephone Lines and Companies 
477.1 Right of Way 
1. Validity. 
Company not denied constitutional rights by statutory requirement 
prescribing franchise to maintain local exchange. City of Cherokee v. 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 199 Iowa 727, 202 N.W. 886 (1925). 
Code 1897 held to not deprive company which has franchise of its property 
without due process of law. Shaver v. Iowa Telephone Co., 175 Iowa 607, 154 
N.W. 678 (1915). 
Unconstitutionality for failure to provide compensation to abutting 
owners was objection personal to owners. State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 127 
Iowa 194, 103 N.W. 120 (1905). 
2. Construction and application. 
Procedure provided for determination of damages in section 472.1 et seq. 
relative to taking of private property for public use by condemnation, is not 
exclusive. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1969). 
The Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize a telephone company to 
place an underground cable along the untraveled portion of a controlled access 
highway, within primary road system of the state, without consent from 
abutting landowner who holds the underlying fee in such highway. O.A.G. March 
13, 1970. 
Company given right to place lines in city streets. Iowa Telephone Co. 
v. City of Keokuk, D. C., 2J6 F. 82 (1915). 
Telephone companies are quasi-public in character and subject to state 
control. State v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 214 Iowa 1100, 240 N.W. 
252 (1932). 
Code 1851 had reference only to telegraphic communications. City of 
Cherokee of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 199 Iowa 727, 202 N.W. 886 
(1925). 
Where company acquired perpetual right to use highways, such right was 
subject to police power and constitution and statutes of the state. Shaver v. 
Iowa Telephone Co., 175 Iowa 607, 154 N.W. 678 (1916), 678 Am. Cas. 1917E, 
539. 
Suit in equity could be maintained to enjoin trespass because of 
inadequacy of legal remedy where without right another company connected with 
plaintiff's lines.· Dumont v. Peet, 152 Iowa 524, 132 N.W. 955 {1911). 
Company authorized to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for 
transaction of its business. Huffman v. Marcy Mut. Telephone Co., 143 Iowa 
590, 121 N.W. 1033 (1909), 23 L. R. A., N.W. 1010. 
3. Streets, rights in. 
Where road was never condemned by governmental authority as a public 
road, nor was it ever informally dedicated to public use by owners of the land 
it traversed the telephone which laid underground cable on theory that the 
road was a public one was put to proving a public road by common-law 
dedication or by prescription. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 209 
N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1973). 
Grant of perpetual franchise to maintain lines in streets, fixing 
conditions of exercise and rates to be charged was against public policy. 
Iowa Telephone Co. v. City of Keokuk, D.C., 226 F. 82 (1915). 
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Company constructing lines in cities and towns acquires perpetual 
franchise for use and occupation. City of Osceola v. Middle States Utilities 
Co., 219 Iowa 192, 257 N.W. 340 (1934). 
Company was empowered to use such city streets as required to meet 
demands of public. State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 127 Iowa 194, 103 N.W. 
120 (1905). 
4. Municipal franchise. 
The legislative franchise under Code of 1873 to occupy streets and alleys 
with telephone lines was not waived or abandoned by city's grant of franchise 
to telephone company in 1895 and the company's acceptance of such franchise, 
where city did not have the power in 1895 to grant such a franchise. City of 
Emmetsburg v. Central Iowa Telephone Co., 250 Iowa 768, g5 N.W.2d 455 (1959). 
Where company had statutory perpetual franchise, legislature could not 
grant city, when it adopted commission government, power to revoke. Iowa 
Telephone Co. v. City of Keokuk, D. C., 226 F. 82 (1915). 
Evidence established perpetual franchise and city could not interfere 
except in exercise of police power. City of Audubon v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 232 Iowa 79, 5. N.W.2d 5 (1942). 
Consolidated company, one of whose predecessors accepted purported 
franchise by city ordinance, not estopped to claim under legislation perpetual 
franchise. City of Osceola v. Middle States Utilities co., 21g Iowa 192, 257 
N.W. 340 (1934). 
Limitation of ten years to franchise fixed by ordinance held valid. 
City of Pella v. Fowler, 215 Iowa 90, 244 N.W. 734 (1932). 
Company held not authorized to maintain local exchange without first 
obtaining franchise. City of Cherokee v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 199 
Iowa 727, 202 N.W. 886 (1925). 
Franchise not necessary under Code 1897 to E?rect and maintain toll line 
in a town. Talmadge v. Town of Washta, 183 Iowa 792, 167 N.W. 596 (1918). 
Legislative grant, when accepted cannot be added to by city. City of Des 
Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co., 181 Iowa 1282, 162 N.E. 323 (1917). 
Company accepting charter from city not having such authority, not 
estopped to claim rights in street. State v. Chariton Telephone Co., 173 Iowa 
497, 155 N.W. 968 (1916). 
Right to operate under franchise through streets subject to police power 
of city. Shaver v. Iowa Telephone Co., 175 Iowa 607, 154 N.W. 678, Ann. Cas. 
1917E. 539 (1915). 
Code 1897 authorizing construction of lines along public roads limited 
within municipalities. East Boyer Telephone Co. v. Incorporated Town of Vail, 
166 Iowa 226, 147 N.W. 327 (1914). 
Town not estopped from relying on invalidity of franchise where company 
had not acted on it for 10 years. Farmers' Telephone Co. of Quimby v. Town of 
Washta, 157 Iowa 447, 133 N.W. 361 (1911). 
5. Municipal tax or fee. 
Ordinance could not be considered regulatory ordinance in determining 
right to collect percentage of income. City of Pella v. Fowler, 215 Iowa 90, 
244 N.W. 734 (1932). 
Under pleadings city not entitled to recover on implied contract for use 
of streets after franchise expired, no facts showing consent being alleged. 
City of Pella v. Fowler, 215 Iowa 90, 244 N.W. 734 (1932). 
Public service corporation acting under legislative authority which has 
never been revoked may not be charged rental value for use of streets. City 
of Des Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co., 181 Iowa 1282, 162 N.E. 323 (1917). 
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477 .2 
6. Exclusive or concurrent rights. 
In action by city for injunction requ1r1ng telephone company to remove 
its lines from city's streets and alleys, wherein telephone company asserted 
that, its lines having been built prior to October 1, 1897, it secured 
perpetual rights to use streets and alleys under statutes then in force, 
evidence disclosed that transfer, by person who built the first lines, to 
company's predecessor, carried .with it legislative franchise to occupy streets 
and the alleys. City of Emmetsburg v. Central Iowa Tel. Co., 250 Iowa 768, 96 
N.W.2d 445 (1959). 
7. Extension of riaht. 
Right to exten service as demanded by public necessity was presumed. 
State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 127 Iowa 194, 103 N.W. 120 (1905). 
8. Rates. 
Power to fix rates inheres originally in the state. Iowa.Telephone Co. 
v. City of Keokuk, D. C., 226 F. 82 (1915). 
In absence of legislative authority, city had no power to fix rates for 
company holding perpetual franchise from legislature. City of Osceola v. 
Middle States Utilities Co., 219 Iowa 192, 257 N.W. 340 (1934). 
Temporary injunction restraining company from collecting certain rates 
would work irreparable injury and should not be sustained. City of Ft. Dodge 
v. Ft. Dodge Telephone Co., 172 Iowa 638, 154 N.W. 914 (1915). 
9. Tort liability. 
Trespass action against telephone company. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. 
of Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1973). 
For additional annotations, see l.C.A. 
10. Private wires. 
Where company contracted to maintain private wire along its poles, its 
removal to different pegs on poles, if without substantial interference with 
efficiency was proper. Anson v. Fobes, 184 Iowa 585, 169 N.W. 35 (1918). 
11. Transfer of franchise. 
Legislative franchise under the Code of 1873 to occupy streets and alleys 
with telephone lines was transferable without the assent of the state. City 
of Emmetsburg v. Central Iowa Tel. Co., 250 Iowa 768, 96 N.W.2d 445 (1959). 
477.2 Removal of Lines 
1. Construction and application. 
Action by city for injunction requiring telephone company to remove its 
lines. City of Emmetsburg v. Central Iowa Tel. Co., 250 Iowa 768, 96 N.W.2d 
445 (lg59). 
Former construciton of Code 1873, as amended, and Code 1897 held 
determinative under rule of stare decisis. City of Cherokee v. Northwestern 
Bell Telephone Co., 199 Iowa 727, 202 N.W. 886 (1925). 
Proper authority may order poles or fixtures placed anywhere on highway, 
subject to superior right of use of highway by public. O.A.G. 1923-24, p .. 
182. 
2. Expense of removal. 
Where reconstruction of highway necessitates relocation of line, county 
or township has no authority to pay for cost of relocation. O.A.G. 1923-24, 
p. 182. 
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477.3 Construction - Danages 
1. Construction and apelication. 
Under Iowa law, private title to riparian lands run only to high water 
mark and state owns bed of navigable streams within state; state also owns 
islands that form. State v. Woods, 333 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). 
Private property may not be taken by a utility without payment of just 
compensation. Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 
1969). 
Iowa State Highway Commission may authorize a telephone company to place 
an underground telephone cable along the untraveled portion of a controlled 
access highway, within primary road system of the state, without consent from 
an abutting landowner who holds the underlying fee in such highway. O.A.G 
March 13, 1970. 
Bond of company to obtain permit to place its system under street, held 
conditioned only on restoration of streets, etc., and not on maintenance of 
conduits, etc. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Iowa Telephone Co., 174 Iowa 
476, 156 N.W. 727 (1916). 
2. Tort liability. 
Telephone lines along highway need not, except at points of access, be 
constructed so high as to clear traffic. Wegner v. Kelly, 182 Iowa 259, 165 
N.W. 449 (1917). 
Company stringing line along highway is bound to raise them so as not to 
interfere with landowner regardless of whether he was caught at place not 
regularly for access. Wegner v. Kelley, 157 N.W. 206 (Iowa 1916), affirmed 
182 Iowa 259, 165 N.W. 449. 
3. Nuisance. 
Wires constructed so as to discommode public are nuisances, though 
erected under license or permission. Erickson v. Town of Manson, 180 Iowa 
378, 160 N.W. 276 (1917). 
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478.1 
Chapter 478 
Electric Transmission Lines 
478.1 Franchise 
1. Construction and application. 
Legislature may create or destroy rebuttal presumption, but cannot be 
discriminatory between persons or corporations based on unrelated use or 
ownership of utility. Calkins v. Adams County Coop Elec. Co., 259 Iowa 245, 
144 N.W.2d 124 (1966). 
Transmission of electric current for distribution of public is public use 
for which power of eminent domain may be exercised. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light 
& Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 (1965). 
Chapter 306A pertaining only to controlled access highways, enacted after 
this chapter pertaining to location of utility lines on highways outside 
cities and towns, was controlling, if there was a conflict between the two 
chapters and such conflict could not be fairly reconciled. Iowa Power & Light 
Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 (1962). 
"Public grounds" - defined. Taschner v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 
249 Iowa 673, 86 N.W.2d 915 (1958). 
Sections 489.2, 489.3 must be considered with this section. Central 
States Electric Co. v. Incorporated Town of Randall, 230 Iowa 376, 297 N.W. 
804 (1941). 
Granting of franchise for location of line does not cast any restriction 
on use of land of adjacent owner. O.A.G. 1940, p. 364. 
2. Necessity of franchise. 
Necessity for utility to condemn strip across condemnees' land for 
electric transmission line right of way purposes. Vittetoe v. Iowa Southern 
Utilities Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 878 (1963). 
Town could not erect and maintain line to another town without franchise 
from State Commerce Commission. Central States Electric Co. v. Incorporated 
Town of Randall, 230 Iowa 376, 297 N.W. 804 (1941). 
Wisdom of permitting highly charged wires along highway is for 
legislature. Iowa Ry. & Light Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 
461 (1930). State v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467. Central 
States Electric Co. v. Pocahontas County, 231 N.W. 468. 
It is violation of law to erect and operate line without grant from 
proper authority. O.A.G. 1913-14, p. 182. 
3. Power to grant franchise. 
State Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to determine necessity of 
taking particular property by power company. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Co., 
257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 (1965). 
Section 306A.3 authorizing highway authorities to regulate controlled 
access facilities was subsequently enacted to, and was in irreconcilable 
conflict with this section authorizing utility commission to grant franchises 
for erection of electric transmission lines over or across public highways 
outside of cities and towns, and section 306A.3 pertaining to controlled 
access highways was therefor controlling. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 534, 117 N.W.2d 425 (1962). 
·City or town has no authority to grant to another city or town a 
franchise for electric distribution system. Central States Electric Co. v. 
Incorporated Town of Randall, 280 Iowa 376, 297 N.W. 804 (1941). 
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Railroad commissioners had power to grant franchise and designate route 
and location of lines. Iowa Ry. & Light Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 
231 N.W. 461 (1930). State v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467. 
Central States Electric C-0. v. Pocahontas County, 231 N.W. 468. 
Where line to be on public highway grant from board of supervisors was 
all that was required but· if line to cross public roads or streams then grant 
from railroad commissioners sufficient. O.A.G. 1913-14, p. 182. 
4. Location of poles or lines. 
County engineer's act of locating line on highway not illegal because 
written application not filed with auditor, such requirement being directory 
could be waived. Swartzwelter v. Iowa Southern Utilities Corporation, 216 
Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
Where line properly authorized along highway, county engineer could not 
locate line so that part would overhang adjoining land. Iowa Ry. & Light 
Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), followed in 
State v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467. 
5. Actions. 
Corporation operating electric plant in town entitled to maintain suit to 
enjoin allegedly illegal contract for constructing of municipal plant. Iowa 
Southern Utilities Co. v. Cassill, C. C. A. 69 F.2d 703 (1934). 
Owner of electric system in electing to stand on ruling sustaining 
demurer, admitted invalidity of franchise alleged in petition seeking 
ouster. State ex rel. Schlegel v. Munn, 216 Iowa 1232, 250 N.W. 471 (1933). 
Court would not presume corportion erected line on highway without 
procuring franchise. Swartzwelter v. Iowa Southern Utilities Corporation, 216 
Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
Suit to enjoin board of supervisors and others from interfering with or 
removing plaintiff's line properly dismissed. Incorporated Town of Fonda v. 
Bd of Sup'rs of Pocahontas County, 169 N.W. 648 (Iowa 1918). 
478.2 Petition for Franchise - Informational Meetings Held 
1. Validity. 
Requirements that a public utility provide "a statement of legal rights 
of the landowner" and disclose "relationship of project to ••• future land use 
and zoning ordinances" imposed impossible burdens upon utility. O.A.G. April 
14, 1970. 
Code 1931, sections 6142, 8310 held not constitutional as depriving 
taxpayers of property without due process of law by permitting expenditure for 
supplying non excess electricity outside city limits for purely private 
purposes. Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W. 652 (1935). 
2. Construction and application. 
"Public grounds" - defined. Taschner v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 
249 Iowa 673, 86 N.W.2d 915 (1958). 
County engineer's act of locating line on highway not illegal because 
written application not filed with auditor, such requirement being directory 
could be waived. Swartzwelter v. Iowa Southern Utilities Corporation, 216 
Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
3. Location of poles and lines. 
County engineer has control of location of line on highway except that 
poles cannot be located so as to overhang adjoining land. Iowa Ry. & Light 
Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930). State v. Central 
States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467. 
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478.5 
4. Necessity. 
Petitioner seeking grant of electric transmission line franchise has 
burden of proving allegations as to necessity of line and of proposed use. 
Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 (1965). 
Failure and refusal of State Commerce Commission to consider question 
whether it was necessary for utility to condemn strip across condemnees' land 
for electric transmission line right of way purposes. Vittetoe v. Iowa 
Southern Utilities Co., 255 Iowa 805, 123 N.W.2d 878 (1963). 
5. Notice. 
Substantial compliance with notice requirements of this section providing 
for notice of informational meetings prior to filing of power line franchise 
application to all affected parties is sufficient. Anstey v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 292 N.W.2d 380 (Iowa 1980). 
478.3 Petition - Requirements 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
~ 478.4 Franchise Hearing 
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For annotations, see I.C.A. 
478.5 Notice - Objections Filed 
1/2. Validity. 
This chapter did not permit taking of private property for private 
purpose. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 
(1965). 
1. Construction and application. 
One purpose of providing for objections to applications for electric 
transmission line franchise was to allow those interested to attack both 
petition and petitioner's evidence in particulars required to alleged. Race 
v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 (1965). 
Board of railroad commissioners had discretion to refuse or grant 
franchise for lines over highways already occupied by other lines serving same 
territory. O.A.G. 1930, p. 122. 
2. Loction of poles or lines. 
County engineer has control of location of line on highway except that 
poles cannot be located as to overhang adjoining land. Iowa Ry. & Light 
Corporation v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 (1930), followed in 
State v. Central States Electric Co., 231 N.W. 467. 
3. Amendment. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
4. Necessity of condemnation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
5. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
537 
478.17 
6. Review. 
Commerce Commission cannot make determination that it is proper to grant 
electric transmission line franchise without considering and passing on 
matters required by this section relating to findings of public use and public 
necessity. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 335 
(1965). 
7. Findings. 
Commerce Commission finding that it is proper to grant electric 
transmission line franchise over particular route includes finding of public 
use, public necessity for use, and that specified real estate is necessary for 
such purpose. Race v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 257 Iowa 701, 134 N.W.2d 
335 ( 1965). 
478.9 Exclusive Rights - Duration of Franchise (No Annotations) 
478.16 Injury to Person or Property 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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478.17 Access to Lines - Danages ~ 
1. Validity. 
Code Supp. 1913, section 2120-t, not unconstitutional as permitting 
company to take less than full possession of right of way condemned and to pay I 
for less than value of full possession. Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 
1376, 182 N.W. 896 (1921). 
1.5 In general. 
Failure of condemnation notice to describe ingress and egress easement I 
did not render condemnation proceedings void and condemnee was bound. SMB 
Investments v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co., 329 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 1983). 
Secondary easement right of ingress and egress may be obtained as 
incident to easement acquired by eminent domain as well as conveyance. Id. 
Notice of condemnation which said "for condemnation of right of way for I 
transmission line" was reasonably calculated to inform condemnee of interest 
in condemnation. Id. 
2. Construction and application. 1 On condemnation company acquired only an easement which could be used, as necessary, to construct, maintain and operate its line as authorized by franchise. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
3. Waiver. I 
Power company could, on owner's appeal from assessment, surrender its 
right of access to strip over rest of owner's farm. De Penning v. Iowa Power 
& Light Co., 33 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). 
4. Comtensation. I Se tlement of damages to be awarded not contract involving realty within 
statute of frauds. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 243 Iowa 
1377, 55 N.W.2d 552 (1952). 
Damages must be paid for rights appropriated though full use thereof may 
not be immediately contemplated. De Penning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 33 I 
N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1948). Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 182 N.W. 
896 (1921). 
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478.18 Supervision of Construction - Location 
1. Construction and application. 
State Commerce Commission's determination that franchise for new 
transmission lines complied with location design requirements were based on 
engineering consideration of practicality and reasonableness. Anstey v. Iowa 
State Commerce Commission, 292 N.W.2d 380, (Iowa 1980). 
State Commerce Commission's finding that 345,000 volt transmission line 
through Dallas County did not injure Boone County objector's rights was 
supported by evidence and binding on Supreme Court. Clark v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 286 N.W.2d 208 (Iowa 1979). 
Placement of electric transmission lines shall be constructed near and 
parallel to railway right of way along section lines. Hanson v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 227 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 1975). 
Utility not liable for personal injury due to acts of its employees who 
were at the time under control of county engineer. Swartzwelter v. Iowa 
Southern Utilities Corporation, 216 Iowa 1060, 250 N.W. 121 (1933). 
2. Necessity of Condemnation. 
Refusal of State Commerce Commission to consider necessity to condemn 
strip across condemnee's land for electric transmission line right of way 
invalidated franchise and petition for condemnation. Vittoe v. Iowa Southern 
Utilities Company, 123 N.W.2d 878 (Iowa 1963). 
478.19 Manner of Construction 
1. Construction and application. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
478.20 Distance fran Buildings 
1. Construction and application. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
478.26 Wires Across Railroad Right of Way at Highways 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
478.30 Crossing Highway 
1. Construction and application. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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Chapter 479 
Pipe Lines and Underground Gas Storage [New] 
479.l Purpose and Policy 
1/2. Validity. 
Permitting pipeline company engaged in interstate commerce to make 
underground crossing of public highways, grounds and streams would not result 
in taking of public property and statutes authorizing such permits are not 
unconstitutional. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Co., 255 
Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (1964). 
1. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
2. Streams, lines crossing. 
Only legislature may authorize permit to lay pipe line across bed of 
meandered or navigable stream. O.A.G. 1930, p. 364. 
3. Issuance of permits. 
State Commerce Commission has power to issue permits to interstate pipe 
line companies without regard to a convenience or a necessity and is required 
to do so subject only to safety regulations and proper permits to cross 
highways and railroad right of ways. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (1964). 
4. Interstate conrnerce. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
479.3 Conditions Attending Operation 
1/2. Validity generally. 
Permitting pipe line company engaged in interstate commerce to make 
underground crossings of public highways, grounds and streams would not result 
in taking of public property. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (lg64). 
1. Validit~ prior law. 
Code 1 31, section 8338-d2 when read with section 8338-d21 was 
unconstitutional as burdening interstate conrnerce. State ex rel. Board of R. 
R. Com'rs of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 
366 (1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
479.5 Application for Pennit 
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1/2. Validity generally. I 
Permitting pipe line company engaged in interstate commerce to make 
underground crossings of public highways. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa 
State Commerce Commission, 255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (1964). 
Requirements that public utility provide "a statement of legal rights of I 
the landowner" and disclose "relationship of project to ••• future land use and 
zoning ordinances" imposed impossible burdens upon utility. O.A.G. April 14, 
1970. 
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479.8 
1. Validity, prior law. 
Code 1931, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
corrmerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R.R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
Federal eminent domain is available to natural gas companies seeking to 
acquire property rights for undergrounds storage facilities for natural gas. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 369 
Supp. 156 (1974). 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.6 Petition 
1/2. Validity generally. 
Permitting pipe line company engaged in interstate commerce to make 
underground crossings of public highways, grounds and streams would not result 
in taking of public property and statutes authorizing such permits are not 
unconstitutional. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Corrmerce Commission, 
255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (1964). 
1. Validity, prior law. 
Code 1931, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
corrmerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R.R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co.··of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.7 Hearing - Notice 
1. Validity, prior law. 
Code 1931, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
corrmerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R.R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.8 Time and Place 
1. Validit~ prior law. 
Code 1 ~1. section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
corrmerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R.R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
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2. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.9 Objections 
1. Validity, prior law. 
Code 1931, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
co11111erce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R.R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
Right to object that an appropriation of private property is not for a 
public use is not confined to the owner of the property sought to be 
appropriated, but such an objection may be raised by any person interested. 
Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Co11111erce Cormnission, 253 Iowa 1143, 114 
N.W.2d 622 (1962). 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.10 Filing 
1. Validity, prior law. 
Code 1931, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
co11111erce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R. R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.11 Examination - Testimony 
1. Validit~ prior law. 
Code 1 ~1, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
co11111erce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R. R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Construction and application. 
In proceeding before commerce commission for permit to construct pipe 
line, substantial compliance with this chapter sufficient. Browneller v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W.2d 474 (1943). 
479.12 Final Order - Condition 
1/2. Validity generally. 
Permitting pipe line company engaged in interstate commerce to make 
underground crossings of public highways, grounds and streams would not result 
in taking of public property and statutes authorizing such permits are not 
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479.25 
unconstitutional. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 
255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 (1964). 
1. Validit§ prior law. 
Code 1 ~l, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
commerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R. R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S~ Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
2. Issuance of permits. 
State Commerce Commission has power to issue permits to interstate pipe 
line companies without regard to public convenience or necessity and is 
required to do so, subject only to safety regulations and proper permits to 
cross highways and railroad rights of way. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa 
State Commerce Commission, 255 Iowa 1304, 125 N.W.2d 801 {1964). 
3. Interstate commerce. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
479.13 Costs and Fees 
1. Validit§ prior law. 
Code 1 ~l, section 8338-d3 to 8338-dll held invalid as violation of 
commerce clause of federal Constitution. State ex rel. Board of R. R. Com'rs 
of State of Iowa v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366 
(1933), certiorari denied, 54 S. Ct. 120, 290 U.S. 684, 78 L. Ed. 589. 
479.19 limitation on Grant (No Annotations) 
479.24 Eminent Domain 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
479.25 Damages 
1. Construction and application. 
Contracts for right of way and simultaneously executed instruments 
acknowledging receipt of stated sums in settlement of all damages must be 
construed together in action for money due under aforementioned contract. 
Vorthmann v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 228 Iowa 53, 289 N.W. 746 (1940). 
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Chapter 573 
Labor and Material on Public Improvements 
573.1 Terms Defined 
1. Construction and application. 
Notw1thstand1ng equitable concerns, materialman allowed to recover amount 
of unpaid rentals since they did not constitute "unclean hands" nor excuse 
contractor's failure to protect itself by bond or assurance that subcontractor 
would meet obligation to materialman. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
Section 573.23 construed in light of whole chapter. Sinclair Refining 
Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
All sections of chapter considered in relation to entire chapter. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
"Materials" defined in subsection 4 strictly construed. Coon River Co-op 
Sand Ass'n v. McDougall Const. Co. of Sioux City, 215 Iowa 861, 244 N.W. 847 
(1932). Monona County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803. 
"Materials" not groceries for help. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Kimball, 206 Iowa 1251, 222 N.W. 31. Monona County v. O'Connor, supra. 
Petroleum products used in hauling materials constitute "materials." 
Rainbo Oil Co. v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 212 Iowa 1186, 236 N.W. 46. 
Meaning of "materials" based on established judicial interpretation. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Kimball, 206 Iowa 1251, 222 
N.W. 31 (1928). . 
2. Settlement. 
Settlement with first subcontractor did not avoid liability to second 
subcontractor. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Schraag, 211 Iowa 558, 229 N.W. 733 
(1930). 
3. Contract, necessity of. 
Construction of storm sewer with day labor from tax money prohibited. 
O.A.G. 1928, p. 46. 
4. Evidence. 
Seller must prove use of petroleum products in hauling materials. Rainbo 
Oil Co. v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 212 Iowa 1186, 236 N.W. 46 (1931). 
573.2 Public Improvements - Bonds and Conditions 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
When a school dis rict ut1l1zes the services of a construction manager 
for the building of a high school, compliance with the statutory requirements 
of public hearing on the project and form of contract, approval of plans and 
bonding is also required. O.A.G. July 30, 1974. 
Nonstatutory contractors performance bond void. Monona County v. 
O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927); 
Persons supplying fuel granted a lien. Standard Oil Co. v. Marvill, 201 
Iowa 614, 206 N.W. 37 (1926). 
2. Execution of bond. 
Validity of bond to release claim for materials not affected by failure 
of "principal" to sign. Ft. Dodge Culvert & Steel Co. v. Miller, 200 Iowa 
1169, 206 N.W. 141 (1925). 
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573.2 
3. Cost of bond. 
Cost of bond cannot be paid by public body. O.A.G. 1936, p. 527. 
4. Construction of bond. 
Bond given force and effect intended by contracting parties. City of 
Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Public contractors bond not elastic. Queal Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 211 
Iowa 210, 229 N.W. 707. 
Obligation under bond measured by statute. Monona County v. O'Connor, 
205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
Meaning of bond determined by entire contract and bond. Clinton Bridge 
Works v. Kingsley, 188 Iowa 218, 175 N.W. 976 (1920). 
5. Scope of bond. 
Bond limited to its specific provisions. Noyes v. Granger, 51 Iowa 227, 
1 N.W. 519. 
6. Liability on bond. 
Surety liable for faulty construction though engineer makes no 
objection. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 
590 (1938). 
Surety not liable for incorrect payment to assignor where assignee failed 
to notify. Sibley Lumber Co. v. Madsen, 198 Iowa 880, 200 N.W. 425 (1924). 
Liability of surety limited to statutory requirements. Nebraska Culvert 
& Mfg. Co. v. Freeman, 197 Iowa 720, 198 N.W. 7. 
Performance bond liability does not extend to personal injury 
liability. Schisel v. Marvill, 198 Iowa 725, 197 N.W. 662 (1924). 
Surety bond not liable for claims of materialmen who have no claim 
against county. Hunt v. King, 97 Iowa 88, 66 N.W. 71 (1896). 
Subcontractor's performance bond not breached by excessive indebtedness 
of subcontractor. Hahn v. Wickham, 55 Iowa 545, 8 N.W. 358 (1881). 
7. Priorities. 
Surety has prior claim over assignee holding nonstatutory claims. Monona 
County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 111g, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
8. Surety's rights. 
Rights of laborers, materialmen and sureties fixed by this chapter. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
Surety could not recover for "construction fraud" for payments over 
retained percentages. Federal Surety Co. v. Des Moines Morris Plan Co., 213 
Iowa 464, 239 N.W. 99 (1941). 
9. Indemnitors. 
Indemnitors released by contractor's settlement with bond company after 
default. Iowa Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Wagner Co., 203 Iowa 179, 210 N.W. 
775 (1926). 
10. Appropriations. 
Bond for expenditure of public funds authorized payment only after 
commended. Muscatine County v. Carpenter, 33 Iowa 41 (1871). 
11. Actions. 
Failure to file claim and sue within required time bars claim. Zeidler 
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Ryan & Fuller, 205 Iowa 37, 215 N.W. 801 (1927). 
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12. Evidence. 
Whether dam a water tight structure for court under evidence. City of 
Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 214, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Admission of liability by principal not prejudicial. Ft. Dodge Culvert & 
Steel Co. v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1169, 206 N.W. 141 (1925). 
Bond to city immaterial where city had been recognized. Hooven, Owens, 
Rentschler Co. v. City of Atlantic, 163 Iowa 380, 144 N.W. 635 (1913). 
Evidence of forfeit of contract not prejudicial. City of Ft. Madison v. 
Moore, 109 Iowa 476, 80 N.W. 527 (1899). 
573.3 Bond Mandatory 
1. Construction and a~plication. 
Settlement with first subcontractor does not defeat second 
subcontractor's rights. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Schraag, 211 Iowa 558, 229 
N.W. 733 (1930). 
Assignee bank bound to know certain claim lienable. Ottumwa Boiler Works 
v. M. J. O'Meara & Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N.W. 920 (1928). 
Contract construed in light of statute. Nebraska Culvert & Mfg. Co. v. 
Freeman, 197 Iowa 730, 198 N.W. 7 (1924). 
573.4 Deposit in lieu of Bond (No Annotations) 
573.5 Amount of Bond 
1. Construction and agplication. 
Obl1gat1on under ond measured by statute. Monona County v. O'Connor, 
205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
573.6 Subcontractors on Public Improvements 
1. Construction and application. 
Notwithstanding equitable considerations, materialman properly allowed to 
recover amount of unpaid rentals since it did not constitute "unclean hands" 
nor excuse contractor's failure to protect itself by requiring a bond or other 
assurance that subcontractor would meet obligation to materialman. Economy 
Forms Corporation v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
Under subcontract for excavation on highway construction project, final 
payment was an absolute debt of general contractor. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson 
Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 (1960). 
Conflict between contract and statute resolved according to statute. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
Bond provisions governed by statute. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald 
Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Claimant's rights under contractor's bond governed by statute. Southern 
Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
2. liability on bond. 
County's action against contractor and contractor's surety for defects in 
performance. Board of Sup'rs of Winneshiek County v. Standard Appliance Co., 
249 Iowa 438, 87 N.W.2d 459 (1958). 
Acceptance of work no bar to recovery for hidden defects. City of 
Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Surety's liability fixed by statute. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner 
Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
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573.7 
Settlement with first subcontractor did not defeat liability to second 
subcontractor. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Schraag, 211 Iowa 558, 22g N.W. 733 
(1930). 
Bond liability broader than statute limited to statute. Ottumwa Boiler 
Works v. M. J. O'Meara & Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N.W. 920 (1928). 
3. Discharge of surety. 
Surety discharged for lack.of notice of extension only where valid 
agreement to extend. O.A.G. 1919-20, p. 273. 
4. Retained funds, right to. 
Where subcontract for excavation on highway construction project provided 
that final payment to subcontractor should be made after payment of final 
estimate to general contractor by State Highway Commission, but general 
contractor delayed acceptance of this final estimate because of unrelated 
matters, subcontractor was entitled to compensation within a reasonable 
time. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 
(1960). 
Words "the amount then due the contractor" and "said amount" in section 
573.23 refer to retained percentage. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 
594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
0 Laborers and material men could resort only to retained ten percent and 
not to excess retained. Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 
350 (1944). 
5. Filing claims. 
Filing claim within 30 days not condition precedent to claim against 
retained percentage and bond. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 
850, 6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
Failure to file claim in 30 days releases surety. Southern Surety Co. v. 
Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
573.7 Claims for Material or Labor 
1. Construction and application. 
Claimant must substantially comply with statute governing claim for 
material or labor under contract for construction of public improvement. 
Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
This section construed with view to promoting its objectives and 
assisting parties to obtain justice. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
Under the Miller act and statute governing claims for material and labor 
on public improvement, ordinarily contract with prime contractor is 
prerequisite for being subcontractor. Lennox Ind. Inc. v. City of Davenport, 
320 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1982). 
Plaintiff not prohibited from recovering from retainage, contractor, and 
insurer because it did not install units it manufactured. Other requirements 
being met, statute governing claims from material and labor on public 
improvement permit recovery by subcontractor furnishing labor or material to 
subcontractor. Id. 
Contract for mechanical and heating contract, an integral part of 
project, was a subcontract with meaning and intent of statute governing claims 
from material and labor on public improvements. Plaintiff had claim against 
retainage, contractor and insurer for payment of equipment and attorney's 
fees. Id. 
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Under this section requiring that claim filed with officer, board or I 
commission authorized by law to let contracts for public improvement be for 
"labor" or "service," whether claim is for "labor" or "service" is determined 
not by nature of what claimant receives but, rather, by nature of what is done 
to be entitled to receive it. Dobbs v. Knudson, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa I 
1980). 
No lien attaches to public improvements. Cities Service Oil Co. v. 
Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
This section strictly construed. Melcher Lumber Co. v. Robertson Co., 
217 Iowa 31, 250 N.W. 594 (1933). I 
Designation of officer where claims filed strictly construed. Missouri 
Gravel Co. v. Federal Surety Co., 212 Iowa 1322, 237 N.W. 635 (1931). 
Failure of proof of use of petroleum products precludes relief. Rainbo 
Oil Co. v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 212 Iowa 1186, 236 N.W. 46 (1931). 
Filing time mandatory. Francesconi v. Independent School Dist. of Wall I 
Lake, 204 Iowa 307, 214 N.W. 882. Independent School Dist. of Perry v. Hall 
et al., 159 Iowa 607, 140 N.W. 855. McGillivray Bros. v. District Township of 
Barton, 96 Iowa 629, 65 N.W. 974. Manchester v. Popkin et al., 237 Mass. 434, 
130 N.W. 62. Kendall et al. v. Fader, 199 Ill. 294, 65 N.E. 318. Joint Board 
of Sup'rs of Dickinson and Osceola Counties v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., I 
198 Iowa 1382, 201 N.W. 88 (1924). Whitehouse v. Surety Co., 117 Iowa 328, 90 
N.W. 727. 
Filing of claims antedate effective date of act. O.A.G. 1932, p. 166. 
2. Claims, nature of. I 
Payments to trust were for "labor" within meaning of this section 
permitting claim to be made with officer, board or commission authorized by 
law to let public contract where claim is for "labor" or "service." Dobbs v. 
Knudson, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 1980). I 
Claims for labor or material only protected by this section. Nolan v. 
Larimer & Shaffer, 218 Iowa 599, 254 N.W. 45 (1934). 
Trucker for subcontractor could file claim against retained percentage. 
Forsberg v. Koss Const. Co., 218 Iowa 818, 252 N.W. 258 (1934). 
Lumber for cement forms not lienable. Melcher Lumber Co. v. Robertson I 
Co., 217 Iowa 31, 250 N.W. 594 (1933). 
Gasoline and oils used in hauling other materials constitute 
"materials." Rainbo Oil Co. v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 212 Iowa 1186, 236 
N.W. 46 (1931). 
Highway subcontractor not employed by principal contractor could not I 
recover against principal. Commercial State Bank of Independence v. 
Broadhead, 212 Iowa 688, 235 N.W. 299 (1931). 
Claims for repairing machinery not lienable. Ottumwa Boiler Works v. M. 
J. 0' Meara & Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N.W. 920 (1928). 
Contract to furnish labor and material held as subcontractor. Teget v. I 
Polk County Drainage Ditch No. 40, 202 Iowa 747, 210 N.W. 920 (1926). 
Supply of gasoline and oil held supplying materials. Standard Oil Co. v. 
Marvill, 201 Iowa 614, 206 N.W. 37 (1925). 
Contractor not liable for rental or depreciation of grading equipment 1 used by subcontractor. Nebraska Culvert & Mfg. Co. v. Freeman, 197 Iowa 720, 198 N.W. 7 (1924). Bond to pay claims for labor and material or bridge does not extend to 
material for contractor's equipment. Empire State Surety Co. v. City of Des 
Bank loaning money for payroll not entitled to lien. O.A.G. 1928, p. 64. 
Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 132 N.W. 837 (1911). I 
548 I 
u 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
573.7 
3. County or city liability of. 
Material supp11er has no claim against county which let contract for 
drainage district. Iowa Pipe & Tile Co. v. Parks & Gerber, 169 Iowa 438, 151 
N.W. 438 (1915). 
Claimants furnishing material payable out of tax certificate. Empire 
State Surety Co. v. City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 131 N.W. 870 (1911), 
rehearing denied, 152 Iowa 531, 132 N.W. 837. 
Completion of defaulted contract by county relieves retained percentage 
from liability for subcontractor·•s claim. Epeneter v. Montgomery County, 98 
Iowa 159, 67 N.W. 93 (1896). 
City not released from liability for judgment for public improvements 
because not payable out of general revenue. Slusser, Taylor & Co. v. City of 
Burlington, 42 Iowa 378 (1876). 
4. Bond, liabilit~ on. 
Surety's liability fixed by statute. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner 
Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500. 
Settlement with first subcontractor does not defeat second subcontractor 
claim. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Schraag, 211 Iowa 558, 229 N.W. 733 (1930). 
Obligation under bond measured by statute. Monona Couty v. O'Connor, 205 
Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
5. Payments. 
School district payment to subcontractor did not entitle contractor to 
deduct from money due subcontractor. Bain v. Bruce, 164 Iowa 327, 145 N.W. 
865 (1914). 
No defense to suit by materialman against city that certificates had been 
issued. Iowa Brick Co. v. City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 272, 82 N.W. 922 
(1900). 
Subcontractor entitled to lien for net balance due him. Green Bay Lumber 
Co. v. Thomas, 106 Iowa 420, 76 N.W. 749 (1898). 
6. Statement of claim. 
Verified weekly time checks sufficient to recover on bond. Francesconi 
v. Independent School Dist. of Wall Lake, 204 Iowa 307, 214 N.W. 882 (1927). 
Claim for lien on building and funds for its erection does not invalidate 
proper claim. Epeneter v. Montgomery County, 98 Iowa 159, 67 N.W. 93 (1896). 
Statement without jurat though sworn to was insufficient. McGillivray v. 
District Township of Barton, 96 Iowa 629, 65 N.W. 974 (1896). 
7. Filing claim. 
Pursuant to this section governing claims for material or labor under 
construction contract, claim by materialman for rent due from leasing concrete 
forms to subcontractor under contract to install storm sewers for city was 
required to be filed with city council. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar 
Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
Filing of itemized claim essential to enforceable claim. William Penn & 
Co. v. Northern Bldg. Co., C. C., 140 F. 973 (1965). 
Surety of primary road contractor not liable for claims not filed with 
auditor. Missouri Gravel Co. v. Federal Surety Co., 212 Iowa 1322, 237 N.W. 
635 (1931). 
Claims not filed within 30 days not entitled to 10 percent. Southern 
Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). · 
Subcontractor's claims should be filed with county auditor. Fuller & 
Hiller Hardware Co. v. Shannon & Willfong, 205 Iowa 104, 215 N.W. 611 (1927). 
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Claims on school contractor bond must be filed with secretary of school I 
board. Francesconi v. Independent School District of Wall Lake, 204 Iowa 307, 
214 N.W. 882 (1927). 
Subcontractor's claim filed with treasurer of school with notice to 
secretary and president proper. Wackerbarth & Blamer Co. v. Independent I 
School Dist. of Independence, 157 Iowa 614, 138 N.W. 470 (1912). 
One not complying with section could not complain of premature payment. · 
Empire State Surety Co. v. City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 131 N.W. 870 
(1912), rehearing denied, 152 Iowa 531, 132 N.W. 837. 
Payment of contractor proper where right to reserve payment not I 
retained. Modern Steel Structural Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 
N.W. 536 (1905). 
Payment on certificates valid as against materialmen. Green Bay Lumber 
Co. v. Independent School District of Odebolt, 125 Iowa 227, 101 N.W. 84 
(1904). I 
Answer of garnishee corporation valid defense against subcontractor's 
claim. Swearingen Lumber Co. v. Washington School Tp. of Greene County, 125 
Iowa 283, 99 N.W. 730 (1904). 
Surety not released where no obligation to pursue a lien. Whitehouse v. 1 American Surety Co., 117 Iowa 328, 90 N.W. 727 (1902). Failure to file claim did not release surety. Read v. American Surety Co., 117 Iowa 10, 90 N.W. 590 (1902). 
Claims must be filed with county auditor though supervisor named 
superintendent. Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 106 Iowa 420, 76 N.W. 749 I 
(1898). 
Claims must be filed with highway commission on highway work. O.A.G. 
1932, p. 142. 
Claims filed with state auditor should be forwarded to highway 
commission. O.A.G. 1930, p. 142. I 
Notice of existence of claim usually protects laborer on city work. 
O.A.G. 1916, p. 216. 
8. Assignments. 
Assignee bank has prior right over surety on defaulted contract. Coon I 
River Co-op Sand Ass'n v. McDougall Const. Co. of Sioux City, 215 Iowa 861, 
244 N.W. 847 (1932). 
Assignee bank bound to know bond requirements and lienability of 
claims. Ottumwa Boiler Works v. M. J. O'Meara & Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N.W. 
920 (1928). I 
Assignee bank not prior to claim where assignment for payment of lienable 
claims. Reynolds v. City of Onawa, 192 Iowa 398, 184 N.W 729 (1921). 
Materialmen claims not defeated by assignment by contractor. City of 
Boone v. Gary, 162 Iowa 695, 144 N.W. 709 (1913). 
Materialmen's rights following assignment for benefit of creditors purely I 
equitable. Des Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18, 143 N.W. 866 
(1913). 
Assignees for benefit of creditors took only rights of assignor and 
subject to equities. Wackerbarth & Blamer Co. v. Independent School Dist. of I 
Independence, 157 Iowa 614, 138 N.W. 470 (1912). 
9. Actions. 
Question of right of intervenors to recover cannot be raised a month 
after judgment. Henderson v. Wilson, 196 Iowa 631, 195 N.W. 194 (1923). I 
Subcontractor not establishing lien may sue on bond. Streator Clay Mfg. 
Co. v. Henning-Vineyard Co., 176 Iowa 297, 155 N.W. 1001 (1916). 
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10. Garnishment. 
Maturity of school district's debt on contract not postponed by claim for 
materials. Swearingen Lumber Co. v. Washington School Tp. of Greene County, 
125 Iowa 283, 99 N.W. 730 (1904). 
11. Evidence. 
In proving his account against subcontractor as part of action against 
prime contractor, owner of machine rented by subcontractor was properly 
allowed to introduce subcontractor's itemized statement which subcontractor 
testified was verified and correct and which subcontractor had signed. 
Bingham v. Blunk, 253 Iowa 1391, 116 N.W.2d 447 (1962). 
Showing of extent of use of machinery prerequisite to establishing 
claim. Byers Mach. Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1347, 242 
.N.W. 22 (1932). 
Hiring of laborer by subcontractor not contract of principal. Commercial 
State Bank of Independence v. Broadhead, 212 Iowa 688, 235 N.W. 299 (1931). 
Contractor's bond immaterial where city not recouped for value of 
property. Hooven, Owens, Rentschler Co. v. City of Atlantic, 163 Iowa 380, 
144 N.W. 635 (1913). 
Burden of proof of legal filing of claims on city. Iowa Brick Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 272, 82 N.W. 922 (1900). 
573.8 Highway Improvements 
1. Construction and application. 
Where a subcontract provides for payment to subcontractor upon general 
contractor's receipt of payment, and the contractor has by his own fault lost 
the right of payment, the subcontractor is entitled to compensation. Grady v. 
S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 (1960). 
Claims for primary road construction not filed with county auditor. 
Missouri Gravel Co. v. Federal Surety Co., 212 Iowa 1322, 237 N.W. 635 (1931). 
Claims filed with state auditor should be forwarded to highway 
commission. O.A.G. 1930, p. 142. 
573.9 Officer to Indors~ Time of Filing Claim (No Annotations) 
573.10 Time of Filing Claims 
1. Construction and application. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to statutes of 
limitations; L. & W. Const. Co. v. Kinser, 251 Iowa 56, 99 N.W.2d 276 (1959). 
Failure to file claim in 30 days does not prevent recovery on bond. 
Francesconi v. Independent School District of Wall Lake, 204 Iowa 307, 214 
N.W. 882 (1927). Perkins B. S. & F. Co. v. Independent School District, 206 
Iowa 1144, 221 N.W. 793. 
Filing claim in district court after 30 days does not establish claim 
against surety. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 1035, 
1036, 237 N.W. 500, 504. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 
6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
Claim not filed within 30 days could not recover from surety but only 
against balance of contract price. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 
Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
Claim filed after 30 days could not recover in excess of amount 
withheld. Perkins Builders' Supply & Fuel Co. v. Independent School District, 
206 Iowa 1144, 221 N.W. 793. 
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Statute prescribing time of filing inapplicable where non-statutory 
bond. Monona County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
Action against surety barred for failure to file and bring timely suit. 
Zeidler Concrete Pipe Co. v. Ryan & Fuller, 205 Iowa 37, 215 N.W. 801 (1927). 
Claim for materials on county road filed with county auditor. Fuller & 
Hiller Hardware Co. v. Shannon & Willfong, 205 Iowa 104, 215 N.W. 611 (1927). 
Claims maturing under prior law not subject to revised law. Francesconi 
v. Independent School District of Wall lake, 204 Iowa 307, 214 N.W. 882 
(1927). Independent School District of Perry v. Hall et al., 159 Iowa 607, 
140 N.W. 855. McGillivray Bros. v. District Township of Barton, 96 Iowa 629, 
65 N.W. 974. 
Failure to give notice waives claim against school district. Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Des Moines City Evangelistical Union, 184 Iowa 246, 167 N.W. 
695 (1918). 
Failure to file claim defeats rights as against other claimants. 
Humboldt County v. Ward Bros., 163 Iowa 510, 145 N.W. 49 (1914). 
Filing of claim after 30 day period waives lien on building and fund. 
Independent School District of Perry v. Hall, 159 Iowa 607, 14D N.W. 855 
(1913). 
Claim must be filed within 30 day period. Empire State Surety Co. v. 
City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 131 N.W. 870 (1911), reharing denied, 152 
Iowa 532, 132 N.W. 837. 
Subcontractor must file claim within 30 days after last labor by him. 
Breneman v. Harvey, 70 Iowa 479, 30 N.W. 846 (1886). 
2. Computation of time. 
Verified itemized statement must be filed within four months. Queal 
lumber Co. v. Anderson, 211 Iowa 210, 229 N.W. 707 (1930). 
3. Payments. 
Where subcontract for excavation on highway construction project provided 
that final payment to subcontractor should be made after payment of final 
estimate to general contractor by state highway commission, but general 
contractor delayed acceptance of this final estimate because of unrelated 
matters, subcontractor was entitled to compensation within a reasonable 
time. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 
(1960). 
Failure to retain required percentage rendered school district liable. 
C. E. Stukas & Sons v. Miller & ladehoff, 197 Iowa 824, 198 N.W. 65 (1924). 
Payment to subcontractor not a preference. Bain v. Bruce, 164 Iowa 327, 
145 N.W. 865 (1914). 
Premature payment of contractor not subject to question by one not 
complying with section 3102, Code 1897. Empire State Surety Co. v. Des 
Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 131 N.W. 870 (1911), rehearing denied, 152 Iowa 531, 132 
N.W. 837. 
Excessive payments by county does not subject it to liability. Modern 
Steel Structural Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa 606, 102 N.W. 536 (1905). 
4. Revival of claims. 
Right to file claim not revived by furnishing material to trustee in 
bankruptcy. Empire State Surety Co. v. City of Des Moines, 152 Iowa 531, 131 
N.W. 870 (1911), rehearing denied, 152 Iowa 531, 132 N.W. 837. 
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5. Contract, rights under. I 
Assignee not preferred over claimants preferred under contract. Reynolds 
v. City of Onawa, 192 Iowa 398, 184 N.W. 729 (1921). 
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573.12 
Promise of contractor to pay subjected contractor and surety to liability 
beyond filing period. City National Bank of Mason City v. Independent School 
District of Mason City, 190 Iowa 25, 179 N.W. 947 (1920). 
6. Bonds, liability on. 
Subcontractor not filing lien could recover against surety. Streator 
Clay Mfg. Co. v. Henning-Vineyard Co., 176 Iowa 297, 155 N.W. 1001 (1916). 
573.11 Claims Filed After Action Brought 
1. Construction and application. 
Filing of claim not prerequisite to recovery from surety. Cities service 
Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
Rights of claimants determined by statute. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner 
Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
Claims maturing under prior law not affected by revision. Francesconi v. 
Independent School District of Wall Lake, 204 Iowa 307, 214 N.W. 882 (1927). 
2. Lien. 
No lien attaches to public improvements. Cities Service Oil Co. v. 
Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
573.12 Retention from Payments on Contracts 
1. Construction and application. 
Surety on public construction contract for town, as subrogee of town, had 
right to retain all progress payments under the contract not earned by 
contractor at time of his default. First Federal State Bank v. Town of 
Malvern, 270 N.W.2d B18 (Iowa 1978). 
Governmental unit may collect interest on funds retained pursuant to a 
contract or a public improvement. Such interest belongs to the governmental 
unit in most cases. O.A.G. July 17, 1980. 
Legislature intended to protect claimants by this section. Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Rights of laborers, materialmen and surety determined by this chapter. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
Surety's liability on statutory bond fixed by this section. Southern 
Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
Sections 573.12, 573.13 and 573.14 should be strictly followed. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 86. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 85. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 73. 
2. Filing claims. 
Filing of claims within 30 days prerequisite to sharing retained 
percentage. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 
(1931). 
3. Interest. 
Where retained percentage insufficient interest properly denied. 
Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
4. Assignment. 
Assignment in surety bond covers only retained percentage. Federal 
Surety Co. v. Des Moines Morris Plan Co., 213 Iowa 464, 239 N.W. 99 (1931). 
Where estimates assigned, voucher payable to contractor and assignee 
jointly. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 338. 
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5. Contractual provisions. I 
Payments to contractor may be made under this section, though contract is 
silent as to terms of payment. O.A.G. October 7, 1969. 
Payment of entire contract by city no defense where retained percentage 
contracted for. Iowa Brick Co. v. City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 272, 82 N.W. I 
922 (1900). 
Withholding retained percentage proper though mechanics liens not 
secured. Independent School District of Forest Home v. Mardis, 106 Iowa 295, 
76 N.W. 794 (1898). 
Contractor not entitled to any part of retained percentage where county I 
took over work. King v. Mahaska County, 75 Iowa 329, 39 N.W. 636 (1888). 
Special provision in contract must not violate statute. O.A.G. 1925-26, 
p. 73. 
6. Release by filint bond. I 
Retained percen age not released by filing of indemnifying bond. O.A.G. 
1928, p. 312. 
7. Bond of supervisor. 
Bond for proper expenditure of fund subject to recovery. Muscatine 
County v. Carpenter, 33 Iowa 41 (1871). 
573.13 Inviolability and Disposition of Fund 
1. Construction and application. 
Contract not void for failure to require retained percentage. Weiss v. 
Incorporated Town of Woodbine, 228 Iowa 1, 289 N.W. 469 (1940). 
Sections 573.12, 573.13 and 573.14 should be strictly followed. O.A.G. 
1925-26, p. 86. 
573.14 Retention of Unpaid Funds 
1/2. Validity. 
Chapter governing labor and material on public improvements did not deny 
due process to contractor by requiring city, without notice and opportunity 
for hearing, to retain a sum from final payment, of not less than double the 
total amount of materialman's claim against contractor for rent due for 
leasing of concrete forms to subcontractor. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
1. Construction and application. 
Where subcontract for excavation on highway construction project provided 
that final payment to subcontractor should be made after payment of final 
estimate to general contractor by state highway commission, but general 
contractor delayed acceptance of this final estimate because of unrealted 
matters, subcontractor was entitled to compensation within a reasonable 
time. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 
(1960). 
Retained percentage for benefit of claimants and filing of bond releases 
excess. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Rights of laborers, materialmen, and surety determined by this chapter. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
Rights of claimant on bond fixed by this chapter. Southern Sur. Co. v. 
Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500. 
Retention of percentage did not relieve necessity of filing claim. 
Perkins Builders' Supply & Fuel Co. v. Independent School District, 206 Iowa 
1144, 221 N.W. 793. 
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Retained percentage must be held until action brought to adjudicate 
rights. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 102. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 86. O.A.G. 1925-26, p. 
85. 
2. Neglect to retain percentage. 
School district liable for payments of retained funds and not absolved by 
bond. C. E. Stukas & Sons v. Miller & Ladehoff, 197 Iowa 824, 198 N.W. 65 
(1924). 
3. Assignments. 
Assignee acquired only rights of contractor. Independent School District 
of Forest Home v. Mardis, 106 Iowa 295, 76 N.W. 794 (1898). 
4. Interest. 
Interest properly denied where insufficient funds retained. Southern 
Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
5. Bonds, liability on. 
Failure to file claim in 30 days releases contractor's surety. Southern 
Surety Co. v. Jenner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
Subcontractor failing to perfect lien can sue on bond. Streator Clay 
Mfg. Co. v. Henning-Vineyard Co., 176 Iowa 297, 155 N.W. 1001 (1916). 
6. Release by filing bond. 
Retained percentage not released by filing of indemnifying bond. O.A.G. 
1928, p. 312. 
7. Waiver of rights. 
Failure of legal action within six months of completion releases retained 
percentage. O.A.G. 1930, p. 148. 
8. Notice of hearing. 
Statutory provision requiring retention from payment to public 
improvement contractor of sum not less than double total amount of all claims 
on file is part of contractor's obligation. No additional notice or 
opportunity for hearing required for such retention, where materialman filed 
claim for rental for lease of concrete forms to subcontractor. Economy Forms 
Corp. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
Retention from final payment to contractor of sum not less than double 
total amount of all claims does not constitute a seizure of contractor's 
property or require notice or hearing for retention. Economy Forms Corp. v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1983). 
573.15 Exception 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Where mater1atman1led claim for rental of concrete forms to 
subcontractor on city storm sewer project, claim not barred, notwithstanding 
certification by affidavit furnished city was filed separately and did not 
aver the furnishing of invoice to contractor within thirty days of service 
covered by invoice. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 
259 (Iowa 1983). · 
Alleged deficiencies in materialman's claim for rental due for lease of 
concrete forms to subcontractor on city storms sewer project, including 
alleged misidentification of general contractor and project. False statement 
within claim and improper certification were not fatal to materialman's 
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claim. Economy Forms Corp. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 340 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 
1983). 
Surety on public construction contract for town, as subrogee of town, was 
entitled to progress payments which were earned at time of default but unpaid, 
at least where excess cost of completion was greater than those earned 
payments; statute governing claims of materialmen did not apply. First 
Federal State Bank v. Town of Malvern, 270 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 1978). 
"Retained" refers to retained percentage. Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
Burch, 235 Iowa 549, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
573.16 Optional and Mandatory Actions - Bond to Release 
1. Construction and ap~lication. 
Where subcontractor excavation on highway construction project provided 
that final payment to subcontractor should be made after payment of final 
estimate to general contractor by state highway commission, but general 
contractor delayed acceptance of this final estimate because of unrelated 
matters, subcontractor was entitled to compensation within a reasonable 
time. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 737 (1960). 
Enforcement of claim not "mechanics lien." Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa 
Loan & Trust Co., C. C. A., 38 F.2d 608 (1930). 
Provisions of section refer to "retained percentage." Sinclair Refining 
Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Laborers, materialmen and surety could resort only to retained 
percentage. Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
City of Waukon v. Southern Surety Co. of New York, 214 Iowa 522, 242 N.W. 632 
(1932). 
Remedy of materialmen and surety's liability limited by statute. Queal 
Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 211 Iowa 210, 229 N.W. 707 (1930). 
Kerosene supplier not entitled to participate in retained amount. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Kimball, 206 Iowa 1251, 22 N.W. 31 
(1928). 
Duty to retain percentage did not relieve claimant from pursuing 
remedy. Perkins Builders' Supply & Fuel Co. v. Independent School Dist. of 
Des Moines, 206 Iowa 1144, 221 N.W. 793 (1928). 
Construction of bond or contract not affected by balance remaining due. 
Monona County v. O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
Rights against bondsman fixed by statute of limitations. Daniels Lumber 
Co. v. Ottumwa Supply & Construction Co., 204 Iowa 268, 214 N.W. 481 (1927). 
Rights of subcontractor and assignee no different from original rights. 
Independent School Dist. of Perry v. Hall, 159 Iowa 607, 140 N.W. 855 (1913). 
Provisions of section applicable to contracts prior to effective date. 
O.A.G. 1932, p. 166. 
2. Computation of time. 
Limitations commence when public improvement completed. Daniels Lumber 
Co. v. Ottumwa Supply & Construction Co., 204 Iowa 268, 214 N.W. 481 (1927). 
3. Bond to release claims. 
Failure to sign bond by contractor did not affect validity. Fort Dodge 
Culvert & Steel Co. v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1169, 206 N.W. 141 (1925). 
4. Waiver. 
Failure to bring legal action within six months waives rights and 
releases funds retained. O.A.G. 1930, p. 148. 
556 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
573.16 
5. Election of remedies. 
Judgment against principal contractor does not preclude equitable remedy 
against city and surety. Zeidler Concrete Pipe Co. v. Ryan & Fuller, 205 Iowa 
37, 215 N.W. 801 (1927). 
6. Defenses. 
Acceptance bars recovery on bond absent fraud or mistake which must be 
proven. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 
(1938). 
Settlement with first subcontractor no bar to claim of second 
subcontractor. Joseph R. Ryerson 7 Son v. Schraag, 211 Iowa 558, 229 N.W. 733 
(1930). 
7. Accounting. 
Materialmen entitled to know exact status of payments to contractor. 
Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Independent School Dist. of Odebolt, 90 N.W. 504 (Iowa 
1902), affirmed, 121 Iowa 663, 213 N.W. 804. 
8. Dismissal. 
Claimant may dismiss action prior to trial. Eclipse Lumber Co. v. City 
of Waukon, 204 Iowa 278, 213 N.W. 804 (1927). 
9. Issues. 
In action on bond, issue of notice properly withdrawn from jury. City of 
Ottumwa v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 175 Iowa 233, 154 N.W. 306 (1915), Ann. 
Cas. 1917E, 1077. 
Performance subject to attack by city though work accepted. City of 
Ottumwa v. McCarthy Improvement Co., 175 Iowa 233; 150 N.W. 586 (1915), Ann. 
Cas. 1917E, 1077, modified on other grounds and rehearing denied, 175 Iowa 
233, 154 N.W. 306, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 1077. 
10. Evidence. 
In action by subcontractor against prime contractor on highway project to 
recover for cubic yards hauled, evidence established that, in one area, the 
subcontractor had hauled more yards than had been found by trial court, but 
that trial courts findings were correct as to other areas. Grady v. S. E. 
Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.E.2d 737 (1960). 
Evidence showed completion more than six months prior to suit. Daniels 
Lumber Co. v. OtturrMa Supply & Construction Co., 204 Iowa 268, 214 N.W. 481 
(1927). 
Resolution passed by council admissable. City of Ft. Madison v. Moore, 
109 Iowa 476, 80 N.W. 527 (1899). 
11. Instructions. 
Further instructions on statement of issues properly refused. Zalesky v. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 176 Iowa 267, 157 N.W. 858 (1916). 
12. Judgment. 
Decretal portion should establish claim and direct disposition. Cities 
Service Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 N.W.2d 325 (1942). 
Recovery cannot be had on bond piecemeal. City of Osceola v. Gjellefald 
Const. Co., 225 Iowa 215, 279 N.W. 590 (1938). 
Adjudication of claims not resjudicata of city's right to recover from 
surety. City of Waukon v. Southern Surety Co. of New York, 214 Iowa 522, 242 
N.W. 632 (1932). 
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Where plaintiff dismissed action, decree not binding on plaintiff. 
Eclipse Lumber Co. v. City of Waukon, 204 Iowa 278, 213 N.W. 804 (1927). 
13. A~peal. 
Were principal admitted liability admission of other evidence not 
prejudicial. Ft. Dodge Culvert & Steel Co. v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1169, 206 N.W. 
141 (1925). 
Too late on appeal to raise question of sufficiency of allegations of 
petition. City of Ft. Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa 476, 80 N.W. 527 (1899). 
573.17 Parties 
1. Construction and application. 
Any party in interest may litigate claims for public improvement. 
Eclipse Lumber Co. v. City of Waukon, 204 Iowa 278, 213 N.W. 804 (1927). 
2. Failure to make person party. 
Sucontractor entitled to judgment in rem aginst fund. Commercial State 
Bank of Independence v. Boardhead, 212 Iowa 688, 235 N.W. 299 (1931). 
3. Dismissal. 
Dismissal of action by plaintiff renders decree ineffective against 
him. Eclipse Lumber Co. v. City of Waukon, 204 Iowa 278, 213 N.W. 804 (1927). 
573.18 Adjudication - Payment of Claims 
1. Construction and application. 
Where heating and cooling subcontractor undertook to furnish specific 
materials required under original contractor, was subcontractor within meaning 
and intent of statute governing claims from material and labor on public 
improvements. Plaintiff had claim against retainage, contractor and insurer 
for payment of equipment and attorney fees. Lennox Ind. Inc. v. City of 
Davenport, 320 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1982). 
Claims should be ordered paid from retained percentage in order of 
filing. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Laborers, materialmen and surety rights determined by this chapter. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350. 
Filing claim in 30 days not condition precedent to claim against retained 
percentage on surety. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 
N.W.2d 325 (lg42). 
Retained funds paid to court costs and attorney fees, labor claims in 
order filed and material claims in order filed. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner 
Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
This chapter strictly construed. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of 
Hartford, Conn. v. Kimball, 206 Iowa 1251, 222 N.W. 31 (1928). 
2. Priorities. 
Surety has priority over non statutory claimants. Monona County v. 
O'Connor, 205 Iowa 1119, 215 N.W. 803 (1927). 
Surety may compel payment of materialmen prior to general creditors. Des 
Moines Bridge & Iron Works v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18, 143 N.W. 866 (1913). 
Assignee out of profits subject to materialmen claims. Des Moines County 
v. Hinkley, 62 Iowa 637, 17 N.W. 915 (1883). 
573.19 Insufficiency of Funds 
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573.22 
1. Construction and application. 
Retained funds paid to court costs, attorney fees, labor claims in order 
filed and material claims in order filed. Southern Surety Co. v. Jenner 
Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
Where value of old buildings and insurance payments, district entitled to 
credit. Ludowici Caladon Co. v. Independent School Dist. of Independence, 
169 Iowa 669, 149 N.W. 845 (1914). 
Materialmen entitled to preference over general creditors. Des Moines 
Bridge & Iron Works v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18, 143 N.W. 866 (1913). 
Preferred claim not ignored even though assignment for benefit of 
creditors. Wackerbarth & Blamer Co. v. Independent School Dist. of 
Independence, 157 Iowa 614, 138 N.W. 470 (1912). 
Subcontractor acquires no lien though claim in nature of lien. Thompson 
& Peterson v. Stephens, 131 Iowa 51, 107 N.W. 1095 (1905). 
573.20 Converting Property into Money 
1. Construction and application. 
"Said fund" referes to retained percentage. Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 
235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
573.21 Attorney Fees 
1. Construction and application. 
Award of attorney's fees under this section is discretionary and reviewed 
only for abuse of discretion. Sheer Construction Inc. v. W. Hodgman and Sons 
Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1982). 
Subcontractor who sued prime contractor on highway project entitled to 
attorney fees. Grady v. S. E. Gustafson Const. Co., 251 Iowa 1242, 103 N.W.2d 
737 (1960). 
Refusal to allow attorney fees in action against construction company and 
county based on services and use of equipment supplied to company which had 
contracted with county to improve highways. Petit v. Ervin Clark Const. Co., 
243 Iowa 118, 49 N.W.2d 508 (1951). 
Refusal of attorney fees not abuse of discretion. Petit v. Ervin Clark 
Const. Co., 243 Iowa 118, 49 N.W.2d 508 (1951). 
Where attorneys did not represent district, not entitled to fees. Teget 
v. Polk County Drainage Ditch No. 40, 202 Iowa 747, 210 N.W. 954 (1926). 
Where subcontractor settled, attorney fees not taxable against him. 
Fisher v. Independent School District of Keota, 154 Iowa 125, 134 N.W. 545 
(1912). 
2. Estoppe l. 
Settlement of account did not subject claimants to taxing of attorney 
fees. Fisher v. Independent School District of Keota, 154 Iowa 125, 134 N.W. 
545 (1912). 
573.22 Unpaid Claimants - Judgment on Bond 
1. Construction and application. 
"Said amount" refers to retained percentage. Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Preferred claimants could not resort to more than retained 10 percent. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
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2. Filing Claims. 
Filing claim in 30 days not prerequisite to recover against fund or 
surety. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Longerbone, 232 Iowa 850, 6 N.W.2d 325 
(1942). 
3. Judgment. 
Failure to file cross petition not res judicata of city's right to 
recover. City of Waukon v. Southern Surety Co. of New York, 214 Iowa 522, 242 
N.W. 632 (1932). 
573.23 Abandonment of Public Work - Effect 
1. Construction and application. 
Right of action on bond if retained percentage insufficient. Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 594, 16 N.W.2d 359 (1944). 
Laborers, materialmen and surety have resort only to the 10 percent. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
573.24 Notice of Claims to Highway Conmission (No Annotations) 
573.25 Filing of Claims - Effect 
1. Construction and application. 
Laborer, materialmen and surety have resort only to the 10 percent. 
Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Burch, 235 Iowa 568, 16 N.W.2d 350 (1944). 
No liens exist beyond retained percentage. Federal Surety Co. v. Des 
Moines Morris Plan Co., 213 Iowa 464, 239 N.W. 99 (1931). 
2. Order of Payment. 
Liens attach in order of filing claims. Federal Surety Co. v. Des Moines 
Morris Plan Co., 213 Iowa 464, 239 N.W. 99 (1931). 
3. Deductions. 
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Propriety of deduction moot where deficiency of fund greater than I 
deduction. Southern Surety Co. v. Janner Bros., 212 Iowa 1027, 237 N.W. 500 (1931). 
573.26 Public Corporation - Action on Bond 
1. Construction and application. 
Failure to file cross petition not rerequisite to recovery against 
surety. City of Waukon v. Southern Surety Co. of New York, 214 Iowa 522, 242 
N.W. 632 (1932). 
573.27 Pil.YlllE!rlt Before Work Co~leted (No Annotations) 
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573A.10 
Chapter 573A 
Emergency Stoppage of Public Contracts 
573A.1 National Emergency {No Annotations) 
573A.2 Tennination of Contracts {No Annotations) 
573A.3 Detennination of Dispute {No Annotations) 
573A.4 Rules Applicable (No Annotations) 
573A.5 Jurisdiction (No Annotations) 
573A.6 Appeal (No Annotations) 
573A.7 Order of Court (No Annotations) 
573A.8 Limit of P~nt (No Annotations) 
573A.9 Application of Statute (No Annotations) 
573A.10 Definitions (No Annotations) 
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Chapter 589 I 
Real Property Legalizing Acts 
589.27 Condemnation by State Department of Transportation (No Annotations) I 
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613.17 
Chapter 613 
Parties to Actions 
613.1 Joint and Several Obligations 
6. Bonds. 
Plaintiffs could not maintain dramshop action against surety on liquor 
suppliers bond on allegation that surety was on bond posted by and on behalf 
of suppliers pursuant to Dramshop Act with conditions of bond unknown. 
Cochran v. Lovelace, 207 N.W.2d 130 (Iowa 1973). 
613.2 Adjudication (No Annotations) 
613.3 to 613.6 Repealed. Acts 1965 (61 G.A.) ch. 413, ~ 10102. 
613.8 Actions Against State 
1. Construction and application. 
Iowa state highway commission is arm of state, and action against 
commission is therefor action against sovereign. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. 
Iowa State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 53g (Iowa 1974). 
By express mention of forms of action in which State consents to be sued 
and waives it immunity from suit, Legislature has impliedly excluded others. 
Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). 
State cannot make a law impairing the obligation of its contract. O.A.G. 
April 8, 1970. 
613.9 Service on State 
1. Construction and application. 
By express mention of forms of action in which State consents to be sued 
and waives its immunity from suit, Legislature has impliedly excluded 
others. Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1g68). 
613.10 Status of State as Defendant {No Annotations) 
613.11 Actions Against Department of Transportation 
1. Construction and application. 
Iowa state highway commission is arm of state, and action against 
commission is therefor against sovereign. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa 
State Highway Commission, 224 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1974). 
Statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in 
favor of the state so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or 
destroyed. Montandon v. Hargrave Const. Co., 256 Iowa 1297, 130 N.W.2d 659 
(1965). 
613.12 Venue (No Annotations) 
613.13 Service of Notice (No Annotations) 
613.14 Limitation {No Annotations) 
613.15 through 613.17 Omitted 
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Chapter 614 
Limitations of Actions 
614.1 Period 
I. INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE ROADS OR STREETS 
252. Construction and application, defects in roads or streets. 
Subdivision of 1 of this section requiring notice on municipal 
corporation is mandatory and must be substantially complied with. Halvorson 
v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 138 N.W.2d 856 (lg65). 
Pedestrian's cause of action against city for injuries resulting from 
fall on public sidewalk. Hack v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 
58 (1958). 
Purpose of statutory notice to city of injury from defects in street is 
to convey to city prompt information of time, place, and circumstances of 
injury so that necessary investigation may be had. Tredwell v. City of 
Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W.37 _(1933). 
Subdivision 1 of this section applied to city operating under commission 
form of government. Wilson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 210 Iowa 790, 231 N.W. 
495 (1930). 
This section should be liberally construed. Blackmore v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 189 Iowa 157, 176 N.W. 369 (1920). 
The provision of subd. 1 of this section is mandatory, and cannot be 
waived by the municipality. Starling v. Incorporated Town of Bedford, 94 Iowa 
194, 62 N.W. 674 (1895). 
253. Purpose and necessity of notice, road defects. 
Individual officers or agents of city, other than its governing body, 
have no power to waive provision of this section for notice of claim against 
municipal corporation. Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 138 N.W.2d 
856 (1965). 
The notice required under subd. 1 of this section, requiring written 
notice to city of claim for injuries from defects in street, is not jurisdictional, but is for the purpose of preventing cause of action from 
becoming barred in three months after happening of injury and to provide a 
method by which prompt information of time, place and circumstances thereof 
may be conveyed to city so that investigation may be had while facts are 
fresh. Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
Notice of claim of injury against municipality necessary only if suit is 
not commenced within three month period of limitation. Gates v. City of Des 
Moines, 38 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1949). 
Pedestrian was not estopped from claiming any cause of action against 
city because notice served on city by pedestrian was defective, since city was 
timely advised as to exact facts of accident within statutory period. Id. 
Subdivision 1 of this section is mandatory and must be complied with. 
Tredwell v. City of Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 37 (1933). 
Statutory notice of injuries on defective sidewalks is condition 
precedent to suit. Luke v. City of Keokuk, 202 Iowa 1123, 211 N.W. 583 (1926). 
254. Nature of defects in roads, bridges or streets. 
"Defective condition" defined. Pasold v. Town of De Witt, 198 Iowa 966, 
200 N.W. 595 (1924). 
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614.1 
This section applies to fatal inJuries received through the negligence of 
a municipality in failing to protect travelers from dangerous embankments by 
lights or otherwise. Bixby v. Sioux City, 184 Iowa 89, 164 N.W. 641 (1917). 
Notice is required for injuries occurring in a ditch in a street. Giles 
v. City of Shenandoah, 111 Iowa 83, 82 N.W. 466 (1900). 
Falling of a bridge within subdivision 1 of this· section. Sachs v. Sioux 
City, 109 Iowa 224, 80 N.W. 336 (1899). 
255. Failure to give notice, excuse, road defects. 
Giving notice of defect in street, is not excused by fact that city owned 
abutting property. Pasold v. Town of De Witt, 198 Iowa 966, 200 N.W. 595 (1924). 
256. Sufficiency of notice, road defects. 
Notice to municipal corporation is sufficient if it conforms to statute 
as to time, place and circumstances, is in writing and is served. Halvorson 
v. City of Decorah, 138 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa 1965). 
Statute requiring written notice to city of claim for injuries from 
defects in street is mandatory and must be substantially complied with, and 
burden rests upon injured party to plead and prove such compliance. Heck v. 
City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
Written statement made by injured person in response to questions asked 
him by the city solicitor was a sufficient notice to the city. Ray v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 193 Iowa 620, 187 N.W. 447 (1922). 
Two notices taken together constituted sufficient compliance with this 
section. Blackmore v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 Iowa 157, 176 N.W. 369 (1920). 
Notice of claim against county for personal injuries which fails to state 
time of injury was insufficient to stop running of statute of limitations. 
Howe v. Sioux County, 180 Iowa 580, 163 N.W. 411 (1917). 
Subdivision 1 of this section does not require specification of the 
manner in which the defendant has been negligent. Magee v. Jones County, 161 
Iowa 296, 142 N.W. 957 (1913). 
Approximate location of accident on defective sidewalk was efficient. 
Harrison v. City of Albia, 144 Iowa 132, 122 N.W. 816 (1909). 
Notice dismissed as containing none of the "circumstances" of the 
injury. Giles v. City of Shenandoah, 111 Iowa 83, 82 N.W. 466 (1900). 
257. Description of place in notice, road defects. 
Party injured from defect in street must designate place of injuries with 
reasonable certainity. Tredwell v. City of Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 
37 (1933). 
Notice defective for failure to specifiy place where accident took 
place. Ray v. City of Council Bluffs, 193 Iowa 620, 187 N.W. 447 (1922). 
Notice of injury required to be served upon city is sufficient if 
sufficiently specific to enable officers of the city to know the time and to 
locate the place where the injury occurred and to investigate and determine 
for itself whether or not the claim is well founded. Blackmore v. City of 
Council Bluffs, 189 Iowa 157, 176 N.W. 369 (1920). 
Whether notice of claim for injuries from defective walk sufficiently 
describes the place is ordinarily for the court; but sometimes, when proof of 
the physical conditions and surroundings, considered in connection with the 
description, raises an issue as to whether the place is stated with reasonable 
certainty, it becomes a jury question. Sollenbarger v. Incorporated Town of 
Lineville, 141 Iowa 203, 119 N.W. 618 (1909). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
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258. Service of notice, road defects. 
Notice required by this section in order to suspend limitations on the 
bringing of suits founded on injuries to person on account of defective 
sidewalks must be wholly in writing. Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 
314, 138 N.W.2d 856 (lg65). 
An injured pedestrian's giving of statement to adjuster of city's 
liability insurance carrier, did not constitute substantial compliance with 
requirement of notice under subdivision 1 of this section. Heck v. City of 
Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
Admitting testimony of claim agent as to date of filing of notice of 
accident was not reversible error. Smith v. Sioux City, 200 Iowa 1100, 205 
N.W. 956 (1925). 
Form of notice or service thereof is immaterial. Ray v. City of Council 
Bluffs, 193 Iowa 620, 187 N.W. 447 (1922). 
Service of written notice of injury is sufficient if it is served on any 
officer of the city whose relation to the city is such that notice to him of 
matters affecting the interest of the city is notice to the city. Blackmore 
v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 Iowa 157, 176 N.W. 369 (1920). 
Service of notice is not a fact essential to recovery, the question of 
limitations not being raised. Belken v. City of Iowa Falls, 122 Iowa 430, 98 
N.W. 296 (1904). 
259. Service of notice as affecting limitations, road defects. 
Subdivision 1 of this section is strictly a statute of limitations, and 
in the absence of notice, bar is complete in three months. Tredwell v. City 
of Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 37 (1933). 
Notice to city of injury caused by defective streets, etc., is not 
jurisdictional, but is required merely to prevent the cause of action for such 
injuries from being barred. Ray v. City of Council Bluffs, 193 Iowa 620, 187 
N.W. 447 (1922). 
An action for the death from injuries received from defects in highway 
must be brought within three months unless notice is duly given. Bixby v. 
Sioux City, 184 Iowa 89, 164 N.W. 641 (1917). 
For additional annotations, see I.C.A. 
260. Computation of limitation, road defects. 
In action by pedestrian falling on icy sidewalk, amendment to petition 
filed after action was barred did not state independent cause of action. 
Casper v. Sioux City, 213 Iowa 69, 238 N.W. 591 (1931). 
An amended petition for injuries from a defective sidewalk does not state 
a new cause of action by charging the city with actual and constructive 
notice, where the original petition only charged actual notice. Blake v. City 
of Bedford, 170 Iowa 128, 151 N.W. 74 (1915). 
261. Estoppel or waiver, defects in roads or streets. 
City solicitor's waiver of statute of limitations, being unauthorized, 
did not estop city from relying on limitation, where notice of injury was not 
served. Welu v. City of Dubuque, 202 Iowa 201, 209 N.W. 439 (1926). 
That officers of county, upon receipt of plaintiff's claim for personal 
injuries due to effective approach to bridge, made full investigation and 
offered inducement to settle, did not estop county from pleading statute of 
limitations. Howe v. Sioux County, 180 Iowa 580, 163 N.W. 411 (1917). 
Individual officers or agents of city, other than its governing body, 
have no power to waive a notice to city of claim for injuries from defects in 
street or sidewalk. Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
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262. Actions, defects in roads or streets. 
IlllTlaterial whether the defect was a defect in the sidewalk or in the 
street. Daniels v. Iowa City, 188 Iowa 1012, 177 N.W. 42 (1920). 
A person injured by a defective sidewalk, having given required notice 
could sue for injuries without presenting her claim to the council, though an 
ordinance of the city, under a special charter, required claims to be so 
presented. McFarland v. City o.f Muscatine, 98 Iowa 199, 67 N.W. 233 (1896). 
In absence of an express statutory requirement, it is not a condition 
precedent to a right of action against a city that the claim should be 
presented to the city council. Green v. Town of Spencer, 67 Iowa 410, 25 N.W. 
681 (1885). 
263. Pleadings, defects in roads or streets. 
Statute requiring written notice to city of claim for 1nJuries from 
defects in street is mandatory and must be substantially complied with, and 
burden rests upon injured plaintiff to plead and prove such compliance. Heck 
v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
City waived plaintiff's failure to allege that claim for damages was 
served or filed with the council by failure to attack petition by demurrer or 
motion and by filing an answer, which was in effect a general denial. Heller 
v Smith, 188 N.W. 878 (Iowa 1922). 
Failure of complaint, in action against municipality, to allege that 
notice was given simply affected plaintiff's right to recover, and did not go 
to the court's jurisdiction, and hence it could not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Reed v. City of Muscatine, 104 Iowa 183, 73 N.W. 579 (1897). 
The fact of the service of the notice is a material allegation. Pardey 
v. Incorporated Town of Mechanicsville, 101 Iowa 266, 70 N.W. 189 (18g7). 
264. Issues, proof, and variance, defects in roads or streets. 
Evidence did not establish such variance in location of injury as to 
require holding that city had not been sufficiently notified. Ahern v. City 
of Des Moines, 234 Iowa 113, 12 N.W.2d 296 (1944). 
Variance in time of injury of one hour was not fatal. Brose v. City of 
Dubuque, 193 Iowa 763, 187 N.W. 857 (1922). 
265. Evidence, defects in roads and streets. 
Statute requiring written notice to city of claim for injuries from 
defects in street is mandatory and must be substantially complied with, and 
burden rests upon injured plaintiff to plead and prove such compliance. Heck 
v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 88 N.W.2d 58 (1958). 
Error in admitting notice in evidence was not prejudicial to defendant. 
Taylor v. City of Sibley, 238 Iowa 1010, 29 N.W.2d 251 (1947). 
Plaintiff had burden of proving written notice had been served 
designating place in street where injuries were received. Tredwell v. City of 
Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 37 (1933). 
Notice of injuries from defective sidewalk, having thereon an 
acknowledgment of service which plaintiff's attorney testified was signed by 
the mayor, was admissable. Daniels v. Iowa City, 188 Iowa 1012, 177 N.W. 42 (1920). 
In action against city for personal injuries, defendant, who set up the 
statute of limitation as a defense, had the burden of proving that the action 
was not commenced within three months. Hearn v. City of Waterloo, 185 Iowa 
9g5, 169 N.W. 392 (1918). 
Where plaintiff in a suit for injuries on a city sidewaik had introduce 
proof that the original preliminary notice of injuries given by plaintiff to 
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the city was lost or destroyed, secondary evidence thereof was admissable. I 
Considine v. City of Dubuque, 126 Iowa 283, 102 N.W. 102 (1905). 
Evidence that the mayor's attention was called to the exact place of the 
accident three days after it happened. Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa 
281, 67 N.W. 281 (1896). I 
Evidence that a member of county board had notice of defects in bridge. . 
Morgan v. Fremont County, 92 Iowa 644, 61 N.W. 231 (1894). 
266. Instructions, defects in roads or streets. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
267. Jury questions, defects in roads or streets. I 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
268. Review, defects in roads or streets. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
269. Waiver of notice. 
City has no power to waive substantial compliance with requirement of 
this section that it be given notice of claim. Halvorson v. City of Decorah, I 
258 Iowa 314, 138 N.W.2d 856 (1965). 
270. Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Women injured in fall on sidewalk had burden of pleading and proving 
ultimate facts showing compliance with this section requiring notice to a I 
municipal corporation. Halvorson v City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 138 N.W.2d 
856 (1965). 
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657.1 
Chapter 657 
Nuisances 
657.1 Nuisance - What Constitutes - Action to Abate 
1/2. Val id ity. 
Undefined term "indecent" used in this section prohibiting public 
nuisance is vague in violation of due process clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment. State ex rel. Clemens v. ToNeCa, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 
1978). 
1. Construction and application. 
For purposes of determining whether nuisance exists, major factor in 
determining reasonableness of condition in place and under circumstances is 
character and gravity of resulting injuries rather than injury threatened. 
Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
Although in most situations a penal provision is a sufficient remedy for 
violation of an ordinance, where the ordinance is regulatory and its principal 
purpose is to promote the public interest and welfare, the penal provision is 
merely incidental. Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson Excavation & 
Wrecking Co., 241 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1g16). 
Statutes defining nuisance do not abrogate the common law of nuisance. 
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1g14). 
A "private nuisance" is an actionable interference with a person's 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of his land. Larsen v. McDonald, 
212 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1973). 
Statutory enumerations do not modify common-law application to 
nuisances. Wymer v. Dagnillo, 162 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 1968). 
Action for nuisance is not predicated on negligence since nuisance is a 
condition, and not an act or failure to act, and if wrongful condition exists, 
person responsible for its existence is liable for resulting damages to 
others. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (lg68). 
Dense smoke may be declared to be a nuisance. Northwestern Laundry v. 
City of Des Moines, 36 S.Ct. 206, 23g U.S. 486, 60 L. Ed. 396 (1916). 
Court properly refused bond where not properly completed. Harding v. 
McCullough, 236 Iowa 556, 1g N.W.2d 613 (1945). 
"Nuisance" has special meaning when applied to public streets or 
highways. Stokes v. Sac City, 151 Iowa 10, 130 N.W. 786 (1911). 
Within province of legislature to determine what constitutes a 
nuisance. State v. Beardsley, 108 Iowa 3g5, 79 N.W. 138 (1899). 
2. Nature and element of nuisance. 
Under Iowa law, a "nuisance per se, or in law," is an act which is a 
nuisance at all times and under all circumstances. Stockdale v. Agrico 
Chemical Co., Division of Continental Oil Co., 340 F. Supp. 244 (1972). 
Under Iowa law, a "nuisance per accidents, or in fact" arises where a 
lawful activity is conducted in such a manner as to be a nuisance. Id. 
Under Iowa law, the invasion must be intentional, unreasonable, and 
substantial in order to support a recovery of damages for nuisance. Id. 
Conduct alleged to be nuisance under statute prohibiting public nuisance 
must cause tangible injury; mere annoyance, aesthetic objections, offense to 
community tastes or community disapproval are not sufficient. State ex rel. 
Clemens v. ToNeCa, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 9D9 (Iowa 1978). 
Although purpose of municipal sanitary landfill ordinance was to prevent 
a nuisance, defendant's violations of the ordinance did not automatically 
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constitute a nuisance in fact. Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson 
Excavating & Wrecking Co., 241 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976). 
Action by owner of servient estate against owners of dominant estate 
seeking relief from alleged drainage nuisance was premised upon and alleged 
private nuisance. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
The existence of a nuisance is not affected by the intention of its 
creator not to injure anyone. Larsen v. McDonald, 212 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1973). 
One must use his property so that his neighbor's comfortable and 
reasonable use and enjoyment of his estate will not be unreasonably interfered 
with or disturbed. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (1972). 
The standard used in determining whether an invasion involving personal 
discomfort or annoyance is substantial, is the standard of normal persons in a 
particular locality. Id. 
Gravity of harm to plaintiff will be weighed against utility of 
defendant's conduct. Pitsenbarger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 
658 (1962). 
To constitute a nuisance there must be a degree of danger, likely to 
result in damage, inherent in the thing itself, beyond that arising from mere 
failure to exercise ordinary care. Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 187, 137 
N.W.2d 909 (1965). 
Unsightliness does not constitute nuisance. Livingston v. Davis, 243 
Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d (1952). 
Negligence not essential to recover for nuisance and damages therefrom. 
Blackman v. Iowa Union Electric Co., 234 Iowa 859, 14 N.W.2d 721 (1944). 
Nuisance is interference with use and equipment of land. Ryan v. City of 
Errmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942). 
Solicitation of orders for goods is property right and not a nuisance. 
City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 2 N.W.2d 83 (1942). 
Courts should consider sensibilities of reasonable ordinary persons in 
considering nuisance. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 
109, 81 A.L.R. 1199 (1932). 
Conduct of legitimate business may be nuisance. Pauly v. Montgomery, 209 
Iowa 699, 228 N.W. 648 (1930). 
Element of nuisance is invasion of rights of persons or threatened danger 
to public. State v. Jacob Decker & Sons, 197 Iowa 41, 196 N.W. 600 (1924). 
"Public nuisance" effects rights enjoyed by every citizen. State v. 
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 166 Iowa 494, 147 N.W. 874 (1914). 
"Nuisance" has special meaning applied to public highways or streets. 
Stokes v. Sac City, 151 Iowa 10, 130 N.W. 786 (1911). 
Every person entitled to redress where exclusive uninterrupted enjoyment 
of premises is disturbed. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 
118 N.W. 786, 20 L.R.A., N.S. 466 (1908). 
Intent not an element in question of presence of nuisance. Bonnell v. 
Smith & Bro., 53 Iowa 281, 5 N.W. 128 (1880). 
2.5. Burden of proof. 
In light of dispute as to sufficiency of showing of reasonableness and 
necessity of costs of abatement which county board of health sought to assess 
against property owners, mere payment of bill by county board to another 
branch of county government, standing alone, was not sufficient to warrant 
assessment of amount claimed. Local Bd. of Health, Boone County v. Wood, 243 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1976). 
An ordinance is presumed reasonable and valid and the burden is on the 
one who attacks it to show it is not; evidence of invalidity must be clear. 
Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 241 
N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976). 
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.3. Enjo~ent of life or property. 
Vehicular use of private road to take children to private school not 
nuisance. Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592, 27 A.L.R.2d 1237 
(1952). 
Use of property should not unreasonably interfere with neighbors use of 
land. Amdor v. Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Substantial interference with enjoyment of property subject to 
abatement. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W.2d 109 
(1932), 20 L. R. A., N. W. 466. 
Where use of dwelling or health of occupants affected, damages 
recoverable. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 
(1908), 20 L. R. A., N. S. 466. 
Stench and effect on health enough to support nuisance. Percival v. 
Yousling, 120 Iowa 451, 94 N.W. 913 (1903). 
Unsightly building not nuisance per se. Trulock v. Merte, 72 Iowa 510, 
34 N.W. 307 (1887). 
4. Dangerous devices. 
Failure of municipality to keep metal traffic sign post, which fell 
killing child, in proper repair was not nuisance. Hall v. Town of Keota, 248 
Iowa 131, 79 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1957). 
Trap door not nuisance per se. Sulhoff v. Everett, 235 Iowa 396, 16 
N.W.2d 737 (1945). 
Unlocked and unguarded well drilling equipment not nuisance per se. Wood 
v. Independent School District of Mitchell, 44 Iowa 27 (1876). 
5. Pollution of atmosphere. 
Injunction restraining emission of noxious odors into air from feed 
grinding and fertilizer sales business should restrain only normal and not 
accidental emissions. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 
1102, 109 N.W.2d 5g5 (1961). 
The statutory enumeration of noxious exhalations, offensive smells, or 
other annoyances as being nuisances does not modify the common-law rule. 
Riter v. Keokuk Electric-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Pollution of waters by city a nuisance. Newton v. City of Grundy Center, 
70 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1955). 
Stockyards not nuisance per se but method of conduct may create it. 
Funnell v. City of Clear Lake, 239 Iowa 135, 30 N.W.2d 722 (1948). 
Noxious gases and odors not a "trespass" but a "nuisance". Ryan v. City 
of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942). 
Honest attempts to overcome dust in school yard prevent injunction as 
"nuisance". Ness v. Independent School District of Sioux City, 230 Iowa 771, 
298 N.W. 855 (1941). 
Rendering plant within city limits a nuisance. Harris v. Drayer, 218 
Iowa 446, 255 N.W. 532 (1934). 
Excessive smoke, cinders, fumes and dust from asphalt plant a nuisance. 
Andrews v. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 193 Iowa 1047, 188 N.W. 900 
(1922). 
Showing of actual physical discomfort to ordinary persons required. 
Soderburg v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 167 Iowa 123, 149 N.W. 82 
(1914). 
Unreasonable emission of smoke and cinders resulting in tangible injury a 
nuisance. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 
(1908), 20 L. R. A., N. S. 466. 
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6. Necessities for business and enjoyment of property. 
City seeking to require railroad to abandon right of way along certain 
street within city because of traffic problem had right to apply to interstate 
commerce commission ICC for abandonment for such portion of line. City of Des 
Moines, Iowa v. Chicago & M. W. Ry. Co., 159 F. Supp. 223 (1958). 
Under modified civil law rule which recognizes a servitude of natural 
drainage as between adjoining lands, a servient estate must accept surface 
waters which drain thereon from a dominant estate. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 
N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
The operation of lawful industry which would be considered a nuisance in 
a residential section may not be considered such when conducted in an 
industrial locality. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 
N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Owner may put property to reasonable use depending on locality. Casteel 
v. Town of Afton, 227 Iowa 61, 287 N.W. 245 (1939). 
Stretching wires over street a "nuisance". Incorporated Town of Ack1ey 
v. Central States Electric Co., 204 Iowa 1246, 214 N.W. 879 (1927), 54 A. L. 
R. 474. 
7. Cemeteries. 
Cemetery not nuisance per se. Payne v. Town of Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 
109 N.W. 203 (1906). 
8. Fences and hedges. 
Fence of the kind commonly used and standard in the industry was not a 
nuisance. Wymer v. Dagnillo, 162 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 1968). 
Fence erected on own property not a nuisance. Livingston v. Davis, 243 
Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1952), 27 A. L. R.2d 1237. 
Adjoining owners may be enjoined from cutting down trees. Musch v. 
Burkhart, 83 Iowa 301, 48 N.W. 1025 (1891), 12 L. R. A. 484, 32 Am. St. Rep. 
305. 
9. Funeral homes. 
Undertaking not nuisance per se but may constitute nuisance through 
method of operation. Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 
(1950). 
Evidence justified injunction of funeral home as nuisance. Bevington v. 
Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N.W. 98 (1937). 
Funeral home reasonably operated in business district not a nuisance. 
Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759 (1933), 87 A. L. R. 1055. 
10. Games and entertainment. 
Baseball park not nuisance per se but operation may make it so. Amdor v. 
Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Public playgrounds not nuisance per se but may be so. Casteel v. Town of 
Afton, 227 Iowa 61, 287 N.W. 245 (1939). 
Playground equipment not nuisance per se. Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 
391, 239 N.W. 29 (1931). 
11. Garages and filling stations. 
Service station not nuisance per se. Yeanos v. Skelly Oil Co., 220 Iowa 
1317, 263 N.W. 834 (1936). 
Whether garage a nuisance depends on circumstances. Pauly v. Montgomery, 
209 Iowa 699, 228 N.W. 648 (1930). 
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12. Junk dealers. 
Town may by statute declare junk dealer a nuisance. Town of Grundy 
Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
13. Keeping and slaughter of animals. 
County board of supervisors, by rezoning neighbors' farm as industrial so 
as to allow formerly agricultural land to be used for hog-slaughtering plant, 
did not, as a matter of law, authorize creation of nuisance. Montgomery v. 
Bremer County Bd. of Sup' rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
Defendants' keeping at least forty dogs, not including puppies, on their 
premises in R-2 zone, resulting in noise and odor, constituted nuisance. 
Larsen v. McDonald, 212 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1973). 
Stockyards in heavy industrial district are not nuisances per se, 
although they may be so conducted as to become nuisances. Chicago, R. I. & P. 
R. Co. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 112 N.W.2d 852 (1962). 
Poultry and produce plants not nuisance per se. Higgins v. Decorah 
Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932), 81 A. L. R. 1199. 
Animal breeding may be nuisance if particularly annoying to others. 
Williams v. Wolfgang, 151 Iowa 548, 132 N.W. 30 (1911). 
Slaughtering and rendering may be nuisance. Rhoades v. Cook, 122 Iowa 
336, 98 N.W. 122 (1904). 
Slaughter house in city is nuisance per se. Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa 
540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
Livery stable may be nuisance. Shiras v. Olinger, 50 Iowa 571, 32 Am. 
Rep. 138 (1879). 
13.5 Manufacturing plants. 
Operation of cement plant constituted a nuisance. Helmkamp v. Clark 
Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
Nuisance caused by method of operation of a manufacturing plant is a 
temporary nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 
N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
14. Noises. 
Test of whether the operation of a lawful trade or industry constitutes a 
"nuisance" is the reasonableness of conducting it in the manner, at the place 
and under the circumstances in question. Bates v. Quality-Ready Mix Co., 261 
Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
Noise may be a nuisance. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 
Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). · 
Playing of baseball not nuisance per se. Ness v. Independent School 
District of Sioux City, 230 Iowa 771, 298 N.W. 855 (1941). 
Noises which unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of property are 
"nuisance" and showing of injury to health unnecessary. Higgins v. Decorah 
Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932). 
Unloading dairy cans at night a nuisance. Mitchell v. Flynn Dairy Co., 
172 Iowa 582, 151 N.W. 434 (1915), modified on other grounds, 172 Iowa 582, 
154 N.W. 878. 
Manufacturing noises must be unreasonable and of physical discomforts to 
constitute nuisance. McGill v. Pintsch Compression Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 
N.W. 786 (1908), 20 L. R. A., N. S. 466. 
15. Exercise of legal right. 
Legitimate character of dam does not defeat showing of nuisance. Mills 
County v. Hammack, 200 Iowa 251,. 202 N.W. 521 (1925). 
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Proper discharge of water from building lawfully erected not nuisance. 
Reynolds v. Union Savings Bank, 155 Iowa 519, 136 N.W. 529 (1912), 49 L. R. 
A., N. S. 194. 
All property subject to use for common good and welfare. McGill v. 
Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908), 20 L •. R. A., N. S. 
466. 
No action for nuisance where use is lawful. Quinn v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 63 Iowa 510, 19 N.W. 336 (1884). 
Additional track in city by R. R. not a nuisance. Davis v. Chicago & N. 
W.R. Co., 46 Iowa 389 (1877). 
16. Municipal regulations. 
City could not, by zoning as an industrial district, or issuing permits 
for construction, authorize creation or maintenance of nuisance. Schlotfelt 
v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
City ordinance establishing bus zone for loading and unloading interurban 
buses in the street fronting business property adjoining bus station was 
illegal and created a public nuisance. Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 
671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). 
Damages recoverable from city for creation of public nuisance. Gates v. 
City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). 
Ordinance regulating solicitors invalid. City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 
Iowa 770, 2 N.W.2d 83 (1942). 
City may adopt reasonable regulations governing use of property. Town of 
Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
Unreasonableness of ordinance immaterial. Miller v. Webster City, 94 
Iowa 162, 62 N.W. 648 (1895). 
Railroads authorized by municipalities not nuisances. Milburn v. City of 
Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 (1861). 
Ordinance prohibiting hogs from running at large not invalid. Gosselink 
v. Campbell, 4 Iowa 296, 4 Clarke 296 (1856). 
17. Care, precautions against annoyance or injury. 
Negligence not essential to nuisance action. Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 
232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942). 
School's conduct of playground must not create private nuisance. Ness v. 
Independent School District of Sioux City, 230 Iowa 771, 298 N.W. 855 (1941). 
Use of property should not be injurious to others. Casteel v. Town of 
Afton, 227 Iowa 61, 287 N.W. 245 (1939). 
Others may not ignore improper use of property. State v. Jones, 202 Iowa 
640, 210 N.W. 784 (1926). 
Freedom from negligence no defense to nuisance. Andrews v. Western 
Asphalt Paving Corporation, 193 Iowa 1047, 188 N. W. 900 (1922). 
Negligence and nuisance may combine in same act. Erickson v. Town of 
Manson, 180 Iowa 378, 160 N.W. 276 (1917). 
Damages recoverable regardless of negligence. Soderburg v. Chicago, St. 
P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 167 Iowa 123, 149 N.W. 82 (1914). 
Contributory negligence not applicable. Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 
Iowa 459, 124 N.W. 764 (1910). 
Contributory negligence not complete defense. Steber v. Chicago & G. W •
. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
18. Similar annoyances or injuries from other causes. 
Contribution of garbage no bar to contributor suit against city. Correll 
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 110 Iowa 333, 81 N.W. 724 (1900). 
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All contributors to smoke nuisance need not be joined in nuisance 
action. Harley v. Merill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N.W. 1000 (1891). 
Evidence as to another sewer properly excluded unless alike in 
construction and use. Randolph v. Town of Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50, 41 N.W. 562 
(1899), 14 Am. St. Rep. 268. 
Similar use by plaintiff of his own property not admissable. Baker v. 
Bohannan, 69 Iowa 60, 28 N.W. 435 (1886). · 
Maintaining structure on complainant's property bars objection to like 
structure on neighboring land. ·cassady v. Cavenor, 37 Iowa 300 (1873). 
19. Defenses. 
Use of the most modern machinery was no defense to creation of nuisance 
by operation of asphalt plant in close proximity to populated area. Claude v. 
Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Intent to injure not required in dumping molasses in ditch. Iverson v. 
Vint, 243 Iowa 949, 54 N.W.2d 494 (1952). 
Construction permit no defense for construction of nuisance. Dawson v. 
Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950). 
An agreement for discharge of sewer no defense to nuisance. Ruthven v. 
Farmers' Co-op Creamery Co., 140 Iowa 570, 118 N.W. 915 (1908). 
Legislative authorization of city operation of public work no defense to 
nuisance. Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 89, 62 N.W. 646 (1895). 
Separate nuisance operated by plaintiff considered in fixing liability. 
Randolf v. Town of Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50, 41 N.W. 562 (1889)., 14 Am. St. Rep. 
268. 
20. Estoppel or laches. 
Failure of owners of realty to object sooner to alleged nuisance caused 
by corporation in method of operating manufacturing plant was not such laches 
or acquiescence as to constitute an estoppel. Riter v. Keokuk Elector-Metals 
Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Knowledge of erection of baseball park did not estop complaint as 
nuisance. Amdor v. Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Failure to protest erection of asphalt plant did not bar complaint as 
nuisance. Andrews v. Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 193 Iowa 1047, 188 
N.W. 90b (1922). . 
Mere delay does not constitute estoppel to complain of nuisance. Smith 
v. City of Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220 (1913), 45 L. R. A., N. W. 
792, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 97. 
Purchaser near cemetery not bound to submit to enlargement. Payne v. 
Town of Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N.W. 203 (1906). 
Plaintiff setting out hedge may not require defendant to remove it as 
nuisance. Hardon v. Stultz, 124 Iowa 440, 100 N.W. 329 (1904). 
Purchaser not estopped to complain of nuisance. Van Fossen v. Clark, 113 
Iowa 86, 84 N.W. 989 (1901), 52 L. R. A. 279. 
Evidence of cost of factory admissible where plaintiff knowingly 
permitted it to be built. Harley v. Merill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N.W. 
1000 ( 1891). 
Control of use of adjoining property cannot be gained by erection of 
nuisance. Bushnell v. Robeson, 60 Iowa 540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
21. Damages in general. 
Remedy of town against encroachment of landowners' garage into public 
street and alley was not restricted to an action at law for damages. Town of 
Marne v. Goeken, 259 Iowa 1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
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Jury has great deal of discretion in awarding damages in nuisance case, 
where damages may not be precisely measured. Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 
Iowa 1055, 114 N.W.2d glo (1962). 
Damages may be recovered though injunction denied. Friedman v. Forest 
City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). 
Damages recovered in equity suit may thereafter be recovered at law. 
Stover v. Town of Calmar, 207 Iowa 1123, 224 N.W. 24 (1929). 
Joint perpetrator of nuisance may compel contribution for damages paid. 
Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988 (1924), 38 A. L. R. 
554. 
Plaintiff may elect whether to seek permanent damages or recover in 
successive actions. Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 Iowa 459, 124 N.W. 764 
(1910). 
Finding by board of health not prerequisite to recovery. Baker v. 
Bohannan, 69 Iowa 60, 28 N.W. 435 (1886). 
One who suffers nuisance to arise again liable without notice. Drake v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa 302, 19 N.W. 215 (1884), 50 Am. Rep. 746. 
Complainant entitled to jury assessment of damages though injunction 
requested. Miller, Trustee v. Keokuk & Des Moines Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 680, 16 
N.W. 567 (1884). 
Recovery limited to special damages shown. Prosser v. City of Ottumwa, 
42 Iowa 509 (1876). 
22. Elements and measure of damages. 
When a nuisance is abatable and thus temporary, measure of damages under 
Iowa law, in absence of injury to the property itself, is the loss in value of 
the use of the land plus special damages. Stockdale v. Agrico Chemical Co., 
Division of Continental Oil Co., 340 F. Supp. 244 (1972). 
Plaintiff owner of servient estate, who brought action seeking relief 
from alleged drainage nuisance, was not entitled to exemplary damages. 
Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Measure of damages in case involving temporary nuisance which is subject 
to abatement is the diminution in rental value of involved land proximately 
caused by the nuisance, plus any resultant special damages. Earl v. Clark, 
219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974). 
Mere commission of nuisance justifying award of actual damages would be 
insufficient to justify assessment of punitive damages as a penalty. Claude 
v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Measure of damages for nuisance, where nuisance is not permanent but is 
subject to abatement, and there is no injury to property itself, is diminution 
in rental value caused by nuisance together with other special damages. 
Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 114 N.W.2d 910 (1962). 
Action for special damages for private nuisance limited to invasion of 
use and enjoyment of land. Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 
435 (1942). 
Discomfort of owners proper element of damage. Stover v. Town of Calmar, 
Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 (1927). 
Wife entitled to damages for extra cleaning and washing. Andrews v. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 193 Iowa 1047, 188 N.W. 900 (1922). 
Inconvenience and discomfort sufficient basis for substantial damages. 
Boyd v. City of Oskaloosa, 179 Iowa 387, 161 N.W. 491 (1917). 
Recovery had for diminished enjoyment of premises. Soderburg v. Chicago, 
St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 167 Iowa 123, 149 N.W. 82 (1914). 
Damages not limited to injury to land but may include special damages to 
private person. Van Fossen v. Clark, 113 Iowa 86, 84 N.W. 989 (1901), 52 L. 
R. A. 279. 
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Where smoke nuisance, damages not confined to loss in rental value but 
include special damages. Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 89, 62 
N.W. 646 (1895). 
Impairment of enjoyment of premises, loss in rental value, sickness are 
proper elements. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 
(1889), 14 Am. St. Rep. 319. 
Where premises are homestead, damages not limited to rental value. 
Randolf v. Town of Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50, 41 N.W. 562 (1889), 14 Am. St. Rep. 
268. . 
Loss of time for sickness recoverable. Loughran v. City of Des Moines, 
72 Iowa 382, 34 N.W. 172 (1887). 
Damages confined to time nuisance exists. Quinn v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 63 Iowa 510, 19 N.W. 336 (1884). 
23. Damages accruing after commencement of action. 
Proof of damages to date of trial not error. Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 
Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904). 
Supplemental petition may set up damages since petition filed. Foote v. 
Burlington Gaslight Co., 103 Iowa 576, 72 N.W. 755 (1897). 
24. Continuing nuisances, damages. 
A "permanent nuisance" is one of such character and existing under such 
circumstances that it will be reasonably certain to continue indefinitely in 
the future, and this contemplates that it is at once necessarily productive of 
all damage that can ever result from it. Patz v. Farmegg Product, Inc., 196 
N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1972). 
In case of continuing nuisance, subject to abatement, the measure of 
damages is diminution in rental value of property caused by nuisance, plus any 
special damages. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 
(1967}. 
Damages in case of continuing nuisance is loss in value of use of land. 
Duncanson v. City of Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa 1325, 11 N.W.2d 583 (1943). 
Every day's continuance of nuisance is new cause of action. Thompson v. 
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 Iowa 35, 179 N.W. 191 (1920). 
Removal of obstruction in drainage built by nature may not be nuisance. 
Taylor v. Frevert, 183 Iowa 799, 166 N.W. 474 (1918). 
Owner may elect to sue for damages as a whole or continuing damages. 
Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674 (1915), L. R. A. 1916E 
990. 
Recovery for permanent damages bars later suit for continuing nuisance. 
Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 Iowa 459, 124 N.W. 764 (1910). 
Indefinite continuance of nuisance entitles recovery but once, but 
temporary may entitle to successive damages. Harvey v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. 
Co., 129 Iowa 465, 105 N.W. 958 (1906), 3 L. R. A., N. S. 973,, 113 Am. St. 
Rep. 483. 
Measure for continuing nuisance is loss of its use. Vogt v. City of 
Grinnell, 123 Iowa 332, 98 N.W. 782 (1904). 
Recovery of continuing damage no bar to later actions. Bennett v. City 
of Marion, 119 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 558 (1903). 
Wrongful operation of railroad is continuing nuisance. Cain v. Chicag, 
R. I. & P. R. Co., 54 Iowa 255, 3 N.W. 736 (1879), rehearing denied, 54 Iowa 
255, 6 N.W. 268. 
Where nuisance continues without change it may be fully compensated in 
one action. Powers v. City of Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa 652(1877), 24 Am. Rep. 
792. 
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25. Permanent nuisance, damages. I 
A nuisance which is subject to abatement is not permanent. Patz v. 
Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
Common law "nuisance" was created by dust raised by trucks. Shannon v. 
Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 255 Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). I 
Permanent nuisance damage is value before and after. Conklin v. City of 
Des Moines, 184 Iowa 384, 168 N.W. 874 (1943). Wesley v. City of Waterloo, · 
232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430 (1943). 
Where progressive and increasing discomfort, permanent damages 
recoverable. Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). I 
Only one action maintainable for permanent injury. Wesley v. City of 
Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430 (1943). 
"Permanent nuisance" is one which is reasonably certain to continue 
indefinitely. Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942). 
Recovery for permanent and original damage bars later suit for unforseen I 
injury. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 Iowa 35, 179 N.W. 191 (1920). 
Permanent construction of sewer does not preclude later recovery. City 
of Ottumwa v. Nicholson, 161 Iowa 473, 143 N.W. 439 (1913), L. R. A. 1916E 
983. I Recovery is limited to difference in value of home where injury 
permanent. Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 Iowa 459, 124 N.W. 764 (1910). 
Where smoke abated prior to trial no permanent injury. Foote v. 
Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 200, 62 N.W. 648 (1895). 
26. Temporary nuisance, damages. I 
Fact that nuisance is intermittent due to changing seasons or wind 
direction variations will not prevent-the granting of injunctive relief or an 
award of damages. Kriener v. Turkey Val. Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 
526 (Iowa 1973). 
Depreciation in rental value measure of damages for temporary nuisance. I 
Shively v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. R. Co., 74 Iowa 169, 37 N.W. 133 (1888), 7 
Am. St. Rep. 471. 
27. Diminution in value, damages. I 
To recover damages for diminution of land value under Iowa law, plaintiff 
farmer would have to prove that defendant's plant constituted a nuisance and 
that the nuisance was permanent. Stockdale v, Agrico Chemical Co., Division 
of Continental Oil Co., 340 F. Supp. 244 (1972). 
Evidence supported award of money damages for diminution in rental value I 
of plaintiff's residential property. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply 
Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Where a nuisance is not permanent but subject to abatement, in the 
absence of injury to the property itself, the measure of damages is the 
diminution in rental value caused by the nuisance, together with such special I 
damages as may result therefrom, and such rule applies even though plaintiff 
is both owner and occupant of premises. Kellerhals v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 
974, 103 N.W.2d 691 (1960). 
No recovery by owner for decreased value for nuisance after lease. 
Stovern v. Town of Calmar, Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 I 
(1927). 
Measure of damages is diminution of value. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing 
Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908), 20 L. R. A., N. S •. 466. 
Instructions limiting recovery to difference in value before and after 
proper. Holbrook v. Griffis, 127 Iowa 505, 103 N.W. 479 (1905). I 
Test of damages is value of use of property for purposes for which 
suitable. Pettit v. Incorporated Town of Grand .Junction, Greene County, 119 
Iowa 352, 93 N.W. 381 (1903). 
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Special damages and abatement proper where refuse discharged onto dairy 
land. Van Fossen v. Clark, 113 Iowa 86, 84 N.W. 989 (1go1), 52 L. R. A. 279. 
Instruction that damages are difference in rental value before and after 
nuisance proper. Podhaisky v. City of Cedar Rapids, 106 Iowa 543, 76 N.W. 847 
(1898). 
"Value of use" before and "value of said premises" with nuisance 
improper. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 (1889), 14 
Am. St. Rep. 319. 
Damages are difference in rental value before and after plus loss of time 
for sickness. Loughran v. City of D~s Moines, 72 Iowa 382, 34 N.W. 172 
(1887). 
28. Public nuisance, damages. 
Term "private nuisance" refers to an actionable interference with a 
person's interest in private use and enjoyment of his land. Patz v. Farmegg 
Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
Individual may recover special damages for public and private nuisance. 
Park v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co., 43 Iowa 636 (1876). Platt v. Chicago, B. & Q. 
R. Co., 74Iowa127 (1888). 
Suit by citizen for public nuisance may show special damage. Dugan v. 
Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927). 
Showing of special damages sufficient to recover for public nuisance. 
Pettit v. Incorporated Town of Grand Junction, Greene County, 119 Iowa 352, 93 
N.W. 381 (19D3). 
Franchise from city no defense to action for special injury. Cain v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 54 Iowa 255, 3 N.W. 736 (1879), rehearing denied, 
54 Iowa 255, 7 N.W. 268. 
29. Amount of damages. 
$30.00 ordinary damages plus $9600 special damages with interest. Earl 
v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974). 
Reasonable and proper compensatory award of $500. Claude v. Weaver 
Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
In order to be liable for actual damages, one need not create or commit a 
nuisance, but to be punished for it by exaction of exemplary damages, he must 
create and persistently maintain it with a reckless disregard for rights of 
others. Id. 
Damages and special damages award in nuisance action excessive. Bates v. 
Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
Excessive award. Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 114 N.W.2d 910 
(1962). 
$259.91 adequate for creek through farm. Stovern v. Town of Calmar, 
Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 (1927). 
Nominal damages proper where special injury not shown. Perry v. Howe Co-
op Creamery Co., 125 Iowa 415, 101 N.W. 150 (1904). 
3D. Persons entitled, damages. 
In action by owner of servient estate against owners of dominant estate 
seeking relief from alleged drainage nuisance, trial court balanced the 
equities and properly held that retaining wall construction costs should be 
shared. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Owners of farm who endured obnoxious odors for years. Kriener v. Turkey 
Val. Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Damages recoverable by one who is specially injured by public nuisance. 
Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). 
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No defense that present owner was not owner when nuisance commenced. 
Miller v. Keokuk & D. M. R. Co., 63 Iowa 680, 16 N.W. 567 (1883). 
Widow of owner may recover for R. R. track placed during life of 
husband. Cain v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 54 Iowa 255, 3 N.W. 736 (1879), 
rehearing denied, 54 Iowa 255, 6 N.W. 268. 
Any person injured may obtain injunction and damages. Ewell v. 
Greenwood, 26 Iowa 377 (1868). 
31. Persons liable for damages. 
Where creation of nuisance was apparent mutual effort, owners' liability 
for abatement thereof would likewise be mutual. Local Bd •. of Health, Boone 
County v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1976). 
Counties are financially responsible for any violation of dust 
regulations committed by county officers, agents or employees without exercise 
of due care. O.A.G. September 11, 1973. 
Repair of hangar by city not "nuisance". Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 
230 Iowa 494, 298 N.W. 649 (1941), 139 A. L. R. 120. 
Collapse of speakers' stand not "nuisance" for which school district 
liable. Larsen v. Independent School Dist. of Kane Tp., Council Bluffs, 223 
Iowa 691, 272 N.W. 632 (1837). 
Dairy owner not liable for nuisance of patrons feeding horses on 
street. Mitchell v. Flynn Dairy Co., 172 Iowa 582, 151 N.W. 434 (1915), 
modified on other grounds, 172 Iowa 582, 154 N.W. 878. 
32. Abatement and injunction - nature of remedy. 
Although violation of municipal sanitary landfill ordinance was a 
misdemeanor, such fact did not preclude issuance of injunction restraining 
continued violation of the ordinance. Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. 
Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 241 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976). 
Grant or denial of injunctive relief of any nature unquestionably rests 
in the sound judicial discretion of the court. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 
N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Permanent injunctive relief and damages may be had for a temporary 
nuisance which is subject to abatement. Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 
1974). 
When the tort of nuisance is proved and the plaintiff seeks an 
injunction, the court can hold that damages are appropriate and turn plaintiff 
out of court, hold that injunction is appropriate and prohibit operation of 
the nuisance, grant an injunction relating to manner of operation of the 
nuisance, or remand with permission for plaintiff to amend to ask damages. 
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
Injunction against operation of ready-mix cement plant. Bates v. Quality 
Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
Granting of injunction rests largely in sound judicial discretion of 
trial court under facts of particular case. Gilbrech v. Kloberdanz, 252 Iowa 
509, 107 N.W.2d 574 (1961). 
An action to enjoin a nuisance and recover damages may be brought either 
in equity or at law, and plaintiff may choose either forum and secure the same 
relief. Kellerhalls v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 103 N.W.2d 691 (1960). 
Injunction to be granted sparingly and with caution. Dawson v. 
Lauferswelier, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950). 
In injunction proceedings character and sufficiency of nuisance is for 
court. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 2 Black 485, 17 L. Ed. 
311 (1862). 
Injunction of nuisance may be brought either in law or equity. Friedman 
v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). 
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Action for permanent injunction may be brought but once. Cary-Platt v. 
Iowa Electric Co., 207 Iowa 1052, 224 N.W. 89 (1929). 
No proof of special damages in action to enjoin public nuisance. Lytle 
Inv. Co. v. Gilman, 201 Iowa 603, 206 N.W. 108 (1925). 
Where public benefits outweigh private no injunction. Molden v. Town of 
Batavia, 200 N.W. 183 (Iowa 1924). 
Judgment for injunction and damages not inconsistent. Steber v. Chicago 
& G. W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
No injunction after abatement by owner. Perry v. Howe Co-op Creamery 
Co., 125 Iowa 415, 101 N.W. 150 (1904). 
Action for injunction and damages may be tried in equity. Gribbin v. 
Hanson, 69 Iowa 255, 28 N.W. 584 (1886). 
Injunction will lie to abate nuisance. Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa 540, 
17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
33. Jurisdiction and venue. 
Jurisdiction in equity may be invoked to enjoin maintenance of nuisance 
even though compensatory relief is also sought. Kriener v. Turkey Val. 
Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Action to enjoin must be brought in district where nuisance is. 
Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 2 Black 485, 17 L. Ed. 311 
(1862). . 
Proper relief is abatement and not criminal prosecution. Town of Grundy 
Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
Prevention of nuisance proper is exercise of police power. City of Des 
Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 23 A. L. R. 1322 
(1921), 
Title held subject to authority of state to abate nuisance. City of 
Waterloo v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 149 Iowa 129, 125 N.W. 819 (1910). 
34. Abatement. 
To justify abatement, the annoyance must be such as would cause physical 
discomfort or injury to person of ordinary sensibilities. Schlotfelt v. 
Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Adjoining property owner entitled to have nuisance abated. Kellerhals v. 
Kallenberger, 103 N.W.2d 691 (Iowa 1960). 
Equity has the power in a proper case to prevent a nuisance. Harvey v. 
Prall, 250 Iowa 1111, 97 N.W.2d 306 (1959). 
Action to abate is preventive justice. State ex rel. Swanson v. Heaton, 
237 Iowa 564, 22 N.W.2d 815 (1946). 
Tubercular animal is a nuisance and may be slaughtered. Loftus v. 
Department of Agriculture of Iowa, 211 Iowa 566, 232 N.W. 412 (1930), appeal 
dismissed, 51 S. Ct. 647, 283 U.S. 809, 75 L. Ed. 1427. 
Proper exercise of police power not limited to suppression of co111Tion law 
nuisance. Fevold v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Webster County, 202 Iowa 1019, 210 N.W. 
139 (1926). 
Where dam endangered R. R. bridge and rendered highway bridge useless it 
is a nuisance. Mills Couty v. Hammack, 200 Iowa 251, 202 N.W. 521 (1925). 
Recovery of damages for permanent nuisance bars injunction. Downing v. 
City of Oskaloosa, 86 Iowa 352, 53 N.W. 256 (1892). 
Recovery of damages does not bar abatement and removal. Platt v. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 74 Iowa 127, 37 N.W. 107 (1888). 
No negligence for failing to abate nuisance. Cooper v. Dolvin, 68 Iowa 
757, 28 N.W. 59, 56 Am Rep. 872 (1886). 
Abatement of water pollution does not include filling pond. Finley v. 
Hershey, 41 Iowa 389 (1875). 
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Abatement by individual proper to extent of destruction. Morrison v. I 
Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35, 92 A. Dec. 444 (1868). 
Abatement authorized by individual only in case of particular. 
emergency. Moffett v. Brewer, 1 G. Greene 348 (1848). 
Common law right to abate nuisance not abrogated by penal offense for I 
injury to milldam. State v. Moffett, 1 G. Greene 348 (1848). 
35. Wrongful abatement. 
Restoration proper for wrongful abatement of nuisance. Morrison v. 
Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35, 92 Am. Dec. 444 (1868). I 
Appropriation of gas without payment improper where nuisance not 
established. Davenport Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Davenport, 13 Iowa 229 
(1862). 
36. Grounds for abatement or injunction. I 
Landowners entitled to injunction prohibiting operation of cement plant 
even though the plant was located on unzoned land outside city limits. 
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
Appropriateness of an injunction to abate a nuisance depends on a 
comparative appraisal of all the factors in the case. Riter v. Keokuk I 
Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Anticipated nuisance enjoined on·lY where it is certain to follow. 
Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592, 27 A. L. R.2d 1237 (1952). 
Depreciation in value of home from mortuary construction not 
enjoinable. Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950). I 
Abatement granted only where annoyance such as to cause actual physical 
discomfort. Amdor v. Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Injunction asked on grounds of anticipated nuisance is subject to use of 
surrounding premises. Funnell v. City of Clear Lake, 239 Iowa 135, 30 N.W.2d 1 722 (1948). Prohibition of junk yards not "penal ordinance" but was regulatory. Town 
of Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
Annoyance and discomfort must be actual discomfort. Casteel v. Town of 
Afton, 227 Iowa 61, 287 N.W. 245 (1939). I 
Equity will enjoin cemetery constituting a nuisance. Payne v. Town of 
Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N.W. 203 (1906). 
No injunction where proper basis not shown. Harndon v. Stultz, 124 Iowa 
734, 100 N.W. 851 (1904). 
Deposit of excrement of horses on city street no basis for injunction. I 
Miller v. Webster City, 94 Iowa 162, 62 N.W. 648 (1895). 
Ordinary operation of feed lots a nuisance and enjoinable. Baker v. 
Bohannan, 69 Iowa 60, 28 N.W. 435 (1886). 
Where injury will result irrespective of existence of nuisance it will 
not be abated. Langdon v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 48 Iowa 437 (1878). I 
Obstruction in highway is subject to abatement and individual may also 
have relief. Ewell v. Greenwood, 26 Iowa 377 (1868). 
37. Persons entitled, abatement and injunction. 
Injunction against maintenance of nuisance is not mandated where adequate I 
redress can be afforded by a monetary award even though the nuisance be 
clearly shown to exist. Kriener v. Turkey Val. Community School Dist., 212 
N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Action by six owners of realty against corporation to abate an alleged 1 nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
5~ I 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
657.1 
Private suit against public nuisance must show special damage. 
Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 2 Black 485, 17 L. Ed. 311 
(1862). 
Private individual not entitled to injunction if he is only one of a 
class. Farmers Co-op Assn. v. Quaker Oats Co., 233 Iowa 701, 7 N.W.2d 906 
(1943). 
Town entitled to injunction for junk yard in violation of ordinance. 
Town of Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
"Incumbering streets" a nuisance and subject to injunction. Incorporated 
Town of Lamoni v. Smith, 217 Iowa 264, 251 N.W. 706 (1934). 
Owner not estopped to enjoin enlargement of poultry business. Higgins v. 
Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109, 81 A. L. R. 1199 (1932). 
Private injury special to plaintiff sufficient to abate public 
nuisance. Livingston v. Cunningham, 188 Iowa 254, 175 N.W. 980 (1920). 
One who assisted city to construct dam cannot thereafter claim a 
nuisance. Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674, L. R. A. 
1916E, 990 (1915). 
Presence of hitching posts subject to abatement if special injury 
shown. Smith v. City of Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220 (1913), 45 L. 
R. A., N. S. 792, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 97. 
Affect on others of nuisance does not preclude plaintiff's right to bring 
suit. Percival v. Yousling, 120 Iowa 451, 94 N.W. 913 (1903). 
Action against public nuisance must show peculiar injury. Innis v. Cedar 
Rapids, I. F. & N. W.R. Co., 76 Iowa 165, 40 N.W. 701, 2 L. R. A. 282 (1888). 
No authority for city to enjoin on ground of general harm to public. 
City of Ottumwa v. Chinn, 75 Iowa 405, 39 N.W. 670 (1888). 
Circuitous route required by construction of turntable is sufficient 
special damage. Platt v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 74 Iowa 127, 37 N.W. 107 
(1888). 
Individuals may sue to restrain slaughter house though public too 
affected. Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa 540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
Maintenance of nuisance on own premises precludes suit for similar 
nuisance on adjoining premises. Cassady v. Cavenor, 37 Iowa 300 (1873). 
Obstruction in highway subject to abatement. Houghman v. Harvey, 33 Iowa 
203 (1871). 
Public and individual may enjoin obstruction in highway. Ewell v. 
Greenwood, 26 Iowa 377 (1868). 
38. Persons who may be enjoined. 
Injunction will not issue against defendant unless he is in control of 
action restrained. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 
109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Injunction against municipal light plant proper only in extreme 
circumstances. Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). 
Injunction not proper against owner permitting playing ball on his 
premises. Spiker v. Eikenberry, 135 Iowa 79, 110 N.W. 457 (1907), 11 L. R. 
A., N. S. 463, 124 Am. St. Rep. 259, 14 Ann. Cas. 175. 
39. Defenses, abatement and injunction. 
Building permit no defense to wrongful erection of building. McCartney 
v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 1358, 54 N.W.2d 462 (1952). 
No defense that residential area is small. Higgins v. Decorah Produce 
Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109, 81 A. L. R. 1199 (1932). 
Minor contribution in nuisance by plaintiff will not bar injunction 
against city. Rand Lumber Co. v. City of Burlington, 122 Iowa 203, 97 N.W. 
1096 ( 1904) • 
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40. Relief awarded, abatement and injunction. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to a decree permanently enjoining defendants 
from permitting grinding operations within certain distance. Kellerhals v. 
Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 103 N.W.2d 691 (1960). 
Delay of owners of realty in bringing action to abate alleged nuisance 
was one factor to be considered in determining what kind of relief should be 
allowed. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Condemnation not such adequate remedy as to preclude abatement of 
nuisance. Newton v. City of Grundy Center, 70 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1955). 
Where no complaint in petition as to fence, injunction of fence 
improper. Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592, 27 A. L. R.2d 1237 (1952). 
Injunction decree should not go beyond particular case. Amdor v. Cooney, 
241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Injunction improper which enjoined use already abated. Trulock v. Merte, 
72 Iowa 510, 34 N.W. 307 (1887). 
Where premises cannot be used except to create nuisance injunction 
restraining absolutely their use is proper. Baker v. Bohannan, 69 Iowa 60, 28 
N.W. 435 (1886). 
Injunction proper, forcing removal of hog house to different part of 
lot. Cook v. Benson, 62 Iowa 170, 17 N.W. 470 (1883). 
Court can only enjoin such use of hog lot as amounts to nuisance. 
Richards v. Holt, 61 Iowa 529, 16 N.W. 595 (1883). 
Defective water ways not sufficient to establish nuisance. Fuller v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 61 Iowa 125, 15 N.W. 861 (1883). 
Blacksmith shop not nuisance per se and injunction should only restrain 
use for that purpose. Faucher v. Grass, 60 Iowa 505, 15 N.W. 302 (1883). 
Rebuilding of stable not enjoined if use modified so as to not constitute 
a nuisance. Shiras v. Olinger, 50 Iowa 571, 32 Am. Rep. 138 (1879). 
41. Violation of injunction. 
Violation of injunction. Ford v. Oliver, 124 N.W. 1067 (Iowa 1910). 
42. Prescription and limitation of actions. 
Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof 
is upon the pleader. Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974). 
No vested right to continue nuisance against public. Mills County v. 
Hammack, 200 Iowa 251, 202 N.W. 521 (1925). 
Damages do not accrue until nuisance causes damage. Churchill v. 
Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 89, 62 N.W. 646 (1895). 
A slaughter house a nuisance and priority of erection no defense. 
Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa 540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
Right to continue a nuisance cannot be gained by prescription. Cain v. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 54 Iowa 255, 3 N.W. 7.36 (1879), rehearing denied, 
54 Iowa 255, 6 N.W. 268. 
42 .5 Temporary nuisances. ,.--
Under Iowa law, a nuisance which is 
permanent. Stockdale v. Agrico Chemical 
340 F. Supp. 244 (1972). 
,/ 
subject to abatenieri(.i s not 
Co., Division of Continental Oil Co., 
Nuisance caused by method of operation of a manufacturing plant is a 
temporary nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 
N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
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42.6 Continuing nuisances. 
Award of money damages is authorized in continuing as well as in 
permanent nuisances. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 
1972). 
Evidence sustained trial court's finding that operation of corporation's 
plant constituted a continuing nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 
248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
43. Actions. 
It was proper for trial court to retain jurisdiction of drainage nuisance 
action to the end that the litigation be equitably terminated by means of the 
building of a retaining wall. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 
1976). 
Failure of defendant to pursue remedy afforded by statute. Riter v. 
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Abatement action joined with damages not subject to dismissal. Newton v. 
City of Grundy Center, 70 N.W.2d 162 (1955). 
Action to enjoin raising dam and for past damages could not be joined. 
Watt v. Robbins, 160 Iowa 587, 142 N.W. 387 (1913). 
43.5 Presumptions. 
There is no presumption of reasonableness of expenditures by governmental 
body in abating a nuisance. Local Bd •• of Health, Boone County v. Wood, 243 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1976). 
44. Parties. 
Where nuisance erected by several parties those within jurisdiction are 
the only necessary parties. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 2 
Black 485, 17 L. Ed. 311 (1862). 
Tenant of filling station "indispensable party" to injunction suit 
against filling station. Wright v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 234 Iowa 1241, 
15 N.W.2d 275 (1944). 
Individuals specially injured may join in injunction proceedings against 
public nuisance. Bushnell v. Robeson, 60 Iowa 540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
45. Pleadings. 
Prayers for injunctive relief liberally construed. Braverman v. Eicher, 
238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Nuisance action by six owners of realty brought as a class action was 
merely an invitation to others in the class to intervene and was proper. 
Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
No reply necessary where answer sets out building permit as defense. 
Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 {1950). 
Division asking past and present damages not repugnant to division asking 
past, present and future damages. Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 
N.W.2d 752. 
Striking from answer allegations as to proper construction not error. 
Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435. Ryan v. City of 
Emmetsburg, 228 Iowa 678, 293 N.W. 29 {1940). 
Negligence may exist where no nuisance and vice versa and both may be 
present. Erickson v. Town of Manson, 180 Iowa 378, 160 N.W. 276 (1917). 
Motion in arrest of judgment proper where location of obstruction not 
pleaded or found by jury. Sloan v. Rebman, 66 Iowa 81, 23 N.W. 274 {1885). 
Defendants cannot object on trial to evidence of multiple plaintiff's 
interest in property. Bushnell v. Robeson, 60 Iowa 540, 17 N.W. 888 (1883). 
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46. Evidence. 
Objections in nuisance action were sufficient to preserve error for 
appelate review. Local Bd •• of Health, Boone County v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 1976). 
Evidence did not show, in action by owner of servient estate against 
owners of dominant estate seeking to recover for drainage nuisance, that 
installation by owners of dominant estate of drainage pipe in embankment on 
dominant estate so altered the natural system of drainage as to substantially 
increase the burden on servient estate. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 
(Iowa 1976). 
Evidence was insufficient to establish that sewage treatment lagoon 
emitted such odors as to be a nuisance which could be enjoined. Bader v. Iowa 
Metropolitan Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1970). 
Evidence sustained finding that, although during heavy rain sanitary 
sewer water backed up and did considerable damage to owners' property, city 
had not created nuisance. Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 187, 137 N.W.2d 
909 (1965). 
Testimony that grinding did not make more noise than ordinary operations 
of a grinding business did not render defendants immune from liability. 
Kellerhals v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 103 N.W.2d 691 (1960). 
Evidence sustained trial court's finding that operation of corporation's 
plant constituted a continuing nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk· Electro-Metals Co., 
248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Burden on plaintiff to plead and prove nuisance. Livingston v. Davis, 
243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592, 27 A. L. R.2d 1237 (1952). 
Presumption that plaintiff has ordinary sensibilities. Amdor v. Cooney, 
241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Testimony of what visitors in home said properly excluded. Friedman v. 
Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). 
Testimony of health hazard permitted where noxious odors from sewage. 
Hill v. City of Winterset, 203 Iowa 1392, 214 N.W. 592 (1927, followed in 
Brooker v. City of Winterset, 215 N.W. 668). 
Evidence of other residents as to smoke soot and gas admissible. 
Soderburg v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 167 Iowa-123, 149 N.W. 82 
(1914). 
Clerk's testimony as to collection of fines admissible without reference 
to police record. Ford v. Oliver, 124 N.W. 1067 (1910). 
Instruction as to decrease in value cured admission of decrease in rental 
value. Risher v. Acken Coal Co., 147 Iowa 459, 124 N.W. 764 (1910). 
Difference in value before and after nuisance as distinguished from 
difference in value from date of decree to time of trial inadmissible. 
Holbrook v. Griffis, 127 Iowa 505, 103 N.W. 479 (1905). 
Premises of nuisance may be identified by evidence aliunde. Jasper 
County v. Sparham, 125 Iowa 464, 101 N.W. 134 (1904). 
Construction of sewer proper evidence. Suddith v. Incorporated City of 
Boone, 121 Iowa 258, 96 N.W. 853 (1903). 
Objection to admission of similar petition should be sustained. Bennett 
v. City of Marion, 119 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 558 (lg03). 
Matters subsequent to verification of petition admissible. State v. 
Williams, 90 Iowa 513, 58 N.W. 904 (1894). 
Manner in which nuisance affected other persons not parties to suit 
inadmissible. Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N.W. 1000 (1891). 
Competent for defendant to show other causes contributed to damages. 
Loughran v. City of Des Moines, 72 Iowa 382, 34 N.W. 172 (1887). 
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47. Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
Special damages in action for abatement were barred by five-year 
limitations period. Earl v. Clark, 21g N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1974). 
Evidence as to odors emanating from sewage lagoon sufficient to establish 
that maintenance of lagoon constituted a private continuing nuisance. Kriener 
v. Turkey Val. Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Unanimity of neighbors not required to prove a substantial invasion of 
rights of those neighbors whose sensibilities were unreasonably offended. 
Larsen v. McDonald, 212 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1973). 
Finding that concrete plant constituted a nuisance was supported by 
evidence. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 
(1967). 
Evidence established that baseball games caused actual discomfort. Amdor 
v. Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 43 N.W.2d 136 (1950). 
Evidence sustained $300 verdict. Ness v. Independent School Dist. of 
Sioux City, 230 Iowa 771, 298 N.W. 855 (1941). 
Evidence showed offensive odors may be reduced by sanitary measures. 
Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109, 81 A. L. R. 1199 
(1932). 
Temporary injunction proper when defendants agreed to comply though 
evidence failed to establish a nuisance. Walter v. Howe, 184 Iowa 563, 168 
N.W. 867 (1918). 
Evidence sufficient to enjoin sand pit within town. City of Hawarden v. 
Betz, 182 Iowa 808, 164 N.W. 775 (1917). 
Evidence showed nuisance complained of did not frighten horse. Stokes v. 
Sac City, 155 Iowa 334, 136 N.W. 207 (1912). 
Evidence insufficient to sustain damages for more than nominal amount. 
McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786 (1908), 20 L. R. 
A., N. S. 466. 
If injury is doubtful or contingent equity will not interfere. Payne v. 
Town of Wayland, 131 Iowa 659, 109 N.W. 203 (1906). 
Evidence that garbage dump was nuisance sufficient. Percival v. 
Yousling, 120 Iowa 451, 94 N.W. 913 (1903). 
48. Trial. 
Denial of relief not necessarily a dismissal. Friedman v. Forest City, 
239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948). 
Trial may be either at law or in equity. Gribbin v. Hanson, 69 Iowa 255, 
28 N.W. 584 (1886). 
Plaintiff entitled to have damages assessed by jury. Miller v. Keokuk & 
D. M. R. Co., 63 Iowa 680, 16 N.W. 567 (1883). 
Finding that gas works are permanent is equivalent to finding that injury 
is pennanent. Baldwin v. Oskaloosa Gaslight Co., 57 Iowa 51, 10 N.W. 317 
(1881). 
49. Jury questions. 
Generally, probable cause of damages to person or property by maintenance 
of a nuisance is determinable by the trier of facts. Kriener v. Turkey Val. 
Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Jury question as to whether construction company acted with malice or in 
reckless disregard of the rights of others. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 
Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Question of whether nuisance has been created and maintained is 
ordinarily one of fact and not of law. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 
Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 582 (1967). 
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Evidence not sufficient to submit to jury depreciation of rental value. 
Soderburg v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 167 Iowa 123, 149 N.W. 82 (1914). 
50. Instructions. 
Instruction not erroneous on ground that it permitted jury to speculate 
as to what nuisance is. Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 114 N.W.2d 
910 (1962). 
Use of nuisance statutes not objectionable where limited. Wesley v. City 
of Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430 (1943). 
Instructions to damages for each year alike improper where damages 
different each year. Friend v. City of Grinnell, 200 N.W. 592 (1924). 
Evidence must be sufficient to submit question of injury. Nuessle v. 
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, 194 Iowa 626, 190 N.W. 5 (1922). 
Doctrine of contributory negligence may apply. Holbrook v. Griffis, 127 
Iowa 505, 103 N.W. 479 (1905). 
Plaintiff need not prove every allegation of her petition. Harley v. 
Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N.W. 1000 (1891). 
Instruction that stockyards necessary properly refused. Shively v. Cedar 
Rapids I. F. & N. W. R. Co., 74 Iowa 169, 37 N.W. 133, 7 Am. St. Rep. 471 (1888). 
51. Judgment or decree. 
Mere fact that plaintiff owner of servient estate, in action against 
owners of dominant estate seeking relief from alleged drainage nuisance sought 
compensatory redress in addition to equitable relief did not, per se, mean 
that the case stood in law. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Where judgment was not challenged on appeal, existence of nuisance as 
alleged was thereby established. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 
158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Where no issues or evidence, necessity of proof by defendant improper. 
Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1952), 27 A. L. R.2d 1237. 
Decree should be interlocutory rather than final. Stovern v. Town of 
Calmar, Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 (1927). 
Denial of order enjoining construction not conclusive that nuisance will 
not result. Thomas v. City of Grinnell, 171 Iowa 571, 153 N.W. 91 (1915). 
No prejudice to defendant where prior judgments pleaded. Bennett v. City 
of Marion, 119 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 558 (1903). 
Injunction abatement must include all parties interested. Danner v. 
Hotz, 74 Iowa 389, 37 N.W. 969 (1888). 
Judgment to abate nuisance res judicata to another action between same 
parties. Brant v. Plumer, 64 Iowa 33, 19 N.W. 842 (1884). 
52. Appeal. 
Review in Supreme Court was de novo. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 
(Iowa 1976). 
On appeal of action seeking injunction against a nuisance, the Supreme 
Court hears the appeal de novo, and while it gives great weight to the trial 
court's fact findings, it is not bound by them. Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix 
Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
Where issue of liability for exemplary damages in creating a nuisance was 
neither urged nor discussed by defendant on appeal, such issue was not open to 
Supreme Court's determination. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225 (Iowa 1968). 
Where motion to dismiss or direct a verdict was taken with submission of 
the case, determination that no nuisance had been created was a finding of 
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fact, and not a ruling as a matter of law. Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 
187, 137 N.W.2d 909 (lg65). 
Where record did not establish a clear and strong case supporting right 
to abate nuisance, and District Court erroneously concluded that where a 
nuisance was shown, the injured person is entitled, as a matter of right, to 
its abatement by injunction, without reference to comparative benefits or 
injuries, and various factors, which should have been appraised in determining 
appropriateness of injunctive relief where not considered, judgment granting 
injunctive relief was required to be modified by Supreme Court. Rider v. 
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Where claim of misjoinder withdrawn by stipulation, no basis for 
appeal. Steber v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (1908). 
Plaintiff entitled to modification of decree. Harndon v. Stultz, 124 
Iowa 440, 100 N.W. 329 (1904). 
Appellate court may consider survey though no plea of res judicata. 
Brutsche v. Bowers, 122 Iowa 226, 97 N.W. 1076 (1904). 
An order conditioned on voluntary abatement by defendant not 
appealable. Suddith v. Incorporated City of Boone, 121 Iowa 258, 96 N.W. 853 
(1903). 
Objection of no avail on appeal where not made below. Bennett v. City of 
Marion, 119 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 558 (1903). 
53. Criminal liability. 
A person may be indicted for maintaining nuisance. State v. Chicago 
Great Western Ry. Co., 166 Iowa 494, 147 N.W. 874 (1914). 
Indictment need not specify premises for purposes of lien. Jasper County 
v. Sparham, 125 Iowa 464, 101 N.W. 134 (1904). 
Indictment sufficiently described public nuisance. State v. Close, 35 
Iowa 570 (1873). 
Defendant may not show public benefit equals public inconvenience. State 
v. Kaster, 35 Iowa 221 (1872). 
Description in indictment sufficient. State v. Schilling, 14 Iowa 455· 
(1862). 
54. Negligence. 
One must use his own property so that his neighbor's comfortable and 
reasonable use and enjoyment of his estate will not be unreasonably interfered 
with or disturbed. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 
109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
55. Obstruction of roads, ways and streets. 
Even if dust on road caused by truck traffic constituted an obstruction 
within statutes pertaining to duty of a county board of supervisors to cause 
all obstructions in highways to be removed, residents of homes along such 
roadway would at most be entitled to an order requiring the board to perform 
its duty and remove the obstruction. Shannon v. Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 
255 Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
A businessman's customers cannot create nuisance in alley and cannot 
block alley with standing vehicles. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 
252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Only in extreme situations would it be necessary for the county to use 
night patrol crews to avoid the accumulation of accident producing deposits of 
earth or other materials on road surfaces. O.A.G. Sept. 11, 1973. 
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56. Businesses. I 
In determining whether a nuisance has been created by a business 
operation, considerations are priority of location, nature of neighborhood and 
wrong complained of. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 1g5 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 
1972). I A lawful business is not nuisance merely because it attracts many 
customers. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 
N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
57. Aiding nuisances. 
Customer of a limestone quarry could not be held responsible for creation 
of nuisance caused by hauling of limestone from the quarry. Shannon v. 
Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 255 Iowa 528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
58. Sewers. 
Common-law definition of a nuisance must be applied where action was 
against city to recover damages for the construction and maintenance of a 
sewer as nuisance. Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 187, 137 N.W.2d 909 
(1965). 
58.5 Sanitary landfills. 
Although a refuse disposal operation including a sanitary landfill is not 
a nuisance per se, it may become a nuisance in fact as a result of the manner 
in which it is operated. Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson 
Excavating & Wrecking Co., 241 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976). 
59. Encroachments. 
Encroachment of landowner's garage upon a street and alley in the town. 
Town of Marne v. Goeken, 259 Iowa 1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
60. Priority of occupation. 
Priority of occupation is a circumstance of considerable weight in 
nuisance actions. Bates v. Quality Read-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 
(1967). 
61. Massage parlors. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
62. Zoning. 
Governmental body cannot, by zoning an industrial district, authorize 
creation or maintenance of nuisance. Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of 
Sup'rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
657.2 What Deemed Nuisances 
1. Construction and application. 
Under Iowa law, the invasion must intentional, unreasonable, and 
substantial, '.iri order to support a recovery of damages for nuisance. 
Stockdale v. Agrico Chemical Co., Division of Continental Oil Co., 340 F. 
Supp. 244 (1972). 
For pur.poses of determining whether nuisance exists, major factor in 
determining reasonableness of condition in place and under circumstances is 
character and gravity of resulting injuries rather than injury threatened. 
Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Sup'rs, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1980). 
Statutes defining nuisance do not abrogate the common law of nuisance. 
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
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Existence of nuisance is not affected by lawfulness of an offending 
establishment or absence of intention to injure. Kriener v. Turkey Val. 
Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Where a statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, 
persistently and intentionally violated, a public nuisance is created. State 
ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973). 
Existence of a nuisance is not affected by the intention of its creator 
not to injure anyone. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 
1972). 
A "nuisance per se" is a structure or activity which is a nuisance at all 
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. 
Bader v. Iowa Metropolitan Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1970). 
Action for nuisance is not predicated on negligence since nuisance is a 
condition. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Mere commission of nuisance justifying award of actual damages would be 
insufficient to justify assessment of punitive damages. Id. 
Term "private nuisance" refers to an actionable interference with 
person's interest in private use and enjoyment of his land. Bates v. Qualtiy 
Ready-Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
Statutory enumerations of nuisances does not modify the common-law rule 
applicable to nuisances. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 
1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
"Private nuisance" has reference to an actionable interference with a 
person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of his land. Riter v. 
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
To constitute a nuisance there must be a degree of danger, likely to 
result in damage, inherent in the thing itself, beyond that arising from mere 
failure to exercise ordinary care in its use. Hall v. Town of Keota, 248 Iowa 
131, 79 N.W.2d 748 (1957). 
That thing is unsightly or offends aesthetic sense not sufficient for 
nuisance. Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.d 592, 27 A. L. R.2d 1237 
(1952). 
Only one action for permanent nuisance and all damages assessed but 
once. Wesley v. City of Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430 (1943). 
"Nuisance in fact" is legitimate business conducted as nuisance. Pauly 
v. Montgomery, 209 Iowa 699, 228 N.W. 648 (1930). 
Decrease in rental value on leased farm is damage to owner. Stovern v. 
Town of Calmar, Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 (1927). 
Criminal nuisance statute did not abrogate common-law nuisance. State v. 
Chicago Great Western R. Co., 166 Iowa 494, 147 N.W. 874 (1914). 
2. Noxious exhalations or offensive smells. 
Chick-raising facility constituted a nuisance. Patz v. Farmegg Products, 
Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
Sewage disposal facility is not a "nuisance per se." Bader v. Iowa 
Metropolitan Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1970). 
Jury question as to whether construction company acted with malice or in 
reckless disregard of rights of others. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 
1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
Defendant required to operate machinery so as not to cause undue noises 
and vibrations annoying to persons of ordinary sensibilities. Schlotfelt v. 
Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Right of a person to pure air may be surrendered in part by his election 
to live in a city where the atmosphere is impregnated with impurities. Riter 
v. Keokuk Electo-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
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Allegation of emission of odors, pollution and corruption made a case of 
nuisance. Newton v. Grundy Center, 70 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1955). 
Not error for court to cite nuisance statutes though not pleaded. Wesley 
v. Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430. 
"Private nuisance" is actionable invasion of interests in use and 
enjoyment of land. Ryan v. City of E11111etsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435. 
All property owners have right to have air diffused without undue soot, 
smoke or fumes. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109, 
81 A. L. R. 1199 (1932). 
Discomfort from odors from pollution of creek proper element of 
damages. Stovern v. Town of Calmar, Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 
112 (1927). 
Allegation of offensive odors permit testimony as to health hazard. Hill 
v. City of Winterset, 203 Iowa 1392, 214 N.W. 592 (1927), followed in Brooker 
v. City of Winterset, 215 N.W. 668. 
Admission of evidence of offensive odors not prejudicial where 
instruction limited damages. Chase v. Winterset, 203 Iowa 1361, 214 N.W. 591 
(1927), followed in Brooker v. City of Winterset, 215 N.W. 668. 
Where no evidence of injury from discharge of waste no nuisance. Ruthven 
v. Farmers Co-op Creamery Co., 140 Iowa 570, 118 N.W. 915 (1908). 
An offensive trade though lawful should be exercised in remote place. 
McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786, 20 L. R. A., N. 
s . 466 ( 1908) • 
Though "creamery odor" could be noticed, its discharge not a nuisance. 
Perry v. Howe Co-op Creamery Co., 125 Iowa 415, 101 N.W. 150 (1904). 
Knowledge of construction does not estop complaint as nuisance. Harley 
v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N.W. 1000. 
Annoyance from coal chute not enough to constitute. nuisance. Dunsmore v. 
Central Iowa R. Co., 72 Iowa 182, 33 N.W. 456 (1887). 
Annoyance without injury or destruction insufficient for nuisance. 
Daniels v. Keokuk Waterworks, 61 Iowa 549, 16 N.W. 705 (1883). 
Corruption and infesting of air constitutes public indictable nuisance. 
State v. Kaster, 35 Iowa 221 (Iowa 1872). 
3. Filth or noisome substances. 
Considerable dust and noise which would cause physical discomfort to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities. Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 
126 (Iowa 1974). 
Unregulated accumulation of garbage is, or may become a public 
nuisance. Harvey v. Prall, 250 Iowa 1111, 97 N.W.2d 306 (1959). 
Common-law rule not modified by statutory enumeration. Riter v. Keokuk 
Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
Verbatim use of statutes in instructions not objectionable where 
limited. Wesley v. City of Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 8 N.W.2d 430. 
Unusually large manure pile a nuisance. Smith v. City of Jefferson, 161 
Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220, 45 L. R. A., N. S. 792, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 97 (1913). 
Plaintiff's dumping of garbage on own property no defense to action 
against city. Correll v. City of Cedar Rapids, 110 Iowa 333, 81 N.W. 724 
(1900). 
Due care to prevent nuisance and evidence sufficient to show no 
nuisance. Bennett v. National Starch Mfg. Co., 103 Iowa 207, 72 N.W. 507 
( 1897). 
4. Conditions endangering public welfare. 
"Junk dealer" may be declared nuisance by ordinance. Town of Grundy 
Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
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Repair of hangar tower not nuisance. Abbott v. Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 
298 N.W. 649, 139 A. L. R. 120 (1941). 
Playground equipment in park not nuisance. Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 
391, 239 N.W. 29 (1931). 
5. Noises. 
Noises may be of such a character and intensity as to so unreasonably 
interfere with comfort and enjoyment of private property as to constitute a 
"nuisance" and, in such cases, injury to health need not be shown. Bates v. 
Quality Ready Mix Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
Noise may be a nuisance. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 
Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Breeding of horses in residential district a nuisance. Williams v. 
Wolfgang, 151 Iowa 548, 132 N.W. 30 (1911). 
Whether smoke or noise constitutes nuisance depends on evidence. McGill 
v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N.W. 786, 20 L. R. A., N. S. 466 
(1908). 
Conditions under which shop could be operated so as not to constitute 
nuisance should be shown. Hughes v. Scheurman Bros., 134 Iowa 742, 112 N.W. 
198 (1907). 
6. Obstructing streams. 
Pier erected in navigable water without authority is a nuisance. Atlee 
v. Union Packet Co., 88 U.S. 389, 21 Wall 389, 22 L. Ed. 619 (1874). 
Erection of bridge in reasonable place and in reasonable manner no 
nuisance. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 2 Black 485, 17 L. 
Ed. 311 (1862). 
Where discharge of sewer into stream caused injury to property and 
streets, obstruction of it is a nuisance. Sioux City v. Simmons Warehouse 
Co., 151 Iowa 334, 129 N.W. 978 (1911), rehearing denied, modified on other 
grounds, 151 Iowa 334, 131 N.W. 17. 
No defense that obstruction caused flood only in very high water. 
Hastings v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 148 Iowa 390, 126 N.W. 786 (1910). 
Right of unobstructed flow of water may be lost by prescription. 
Marshall Ice Co. v. La Plant, 136 Iowa 621, 111 N.W. 1016, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 
1073 (1907). 
Riparian owner may construct pier on navigable lake if navi9ation not 
obstructed. Mills & Allen v. Evans, 100 Iowa 712, 69 N.W. 1043 (1897). 
Ferry franchise cannot be exercised to inconvenience, annoy or damage 
boat passage. The Globe, 4 G. Greene 433 (Iowa 1854). 
Mississippi River cannot be obstructed or monopolized. Jones v. Fanning, 
1844, Morris, 348. 
7. Pollution of water. 
Allegation of emission of offensive materials into pasture creek makes a 
case of nuisance. Newton v. Grundy Center, 70 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1955). 
Decree should be interlocutory to give city change to abate pollution. 
Stovern v. Town of Calmar, Winneshiek County, 204 Iowa 983, 216 N.W. 112 
(1927). 
Failure to be specific in petition rendered it fatally defective. State 
v. Jacob Decker & Sons, 197 Iowa 41, 190 N.W. 600 (1924). 
Jury may consider decrease in rental value and inconvenience and 
discomfort. Boyd v. Oskaloosa, 179 Iowa 387, 161 N.W. 491 (1917). 
Plaintiff may recover for damages sustained for five years preceding 
action. Vogt v. Grinnell, 133 Iowa 363, 110 N.W. 603 (1907). 
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Contributory negligence not applicable to nuisance. Bowman v. Humphrey, 
132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906), 6 L. R. A., N. S., 1111, 11 Ann. Cas. 131. 
Deposit of refuse which affected use and enjoyment of property a 
nuisance. Perry v. Howe Co-op Creamery Co., 125 Iowa 415, 101 N.W. 150 
(1904). 
Where health or comfort destroyed or visible injury to property rights 
there is a nuisance. Bownan v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904). 
Defendant cannot complain in action for permanent nuisance where only 
temporary damages are asked. Hollenbeck v. City of Marion, 116 Iowa 69, 89 
N.W. 210 (1902). 
Where causes of offense are removed prior to trial it will not be 
enjoined. Bennett v. National Starch Mfg. Co., 103 Iowa 207, 72 N.W. 507 
(1897). 
One who merely contributes to pollution of stream is guilty of 
nuisance. State v. Smith, 82 Iowa 423, 48 N.W. 727 (1891). 
Recovery proper of depreciation in rental value and for sickness. 
Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 (1889), 14 Am. St. 
Rep. 319. 
8. Obstruction of roads, ways and streets. 
City's assessment against owner of property adjacent to city parking of 
cost of removal of trees from city parking was void. Shriver v. City of 
Jefferson, 190 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1971). 
Extent of obstruction of public street or alley was not important in 
determining whether defendants had violated ordinance making obstruction of 
streets and alleys by buildings a nuisance. Town of Marne v. Goeken, 259 Iowa 
1375, 147 N.W.2d 218 (1966). 
Dust on road caused by traffic constituted an obstruction within statutes 
pertaining to duty of county board of supervisors to cause removal of 
obstructions in highways. Shannon v. Missouri Val. Limestone Co., 255 Iowa 
528, 122 N.W.2d 278 (1963). 
A businessman's customers cannot create nuisance in alley and cannot 
block alley with standing vehicles. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 
252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
City requirement that private water hydrant, installed by corporation in 
sidewalk abutting its property, be removed as nuisance violating this section 
and city ordinance. Midwest Inv. Co. v. City of Chariton, 248 Iowa 407, 80 
N.W.2d 906 (1957). 
Obstruction of access need not be continuous to allow recovery. Gates v. 
City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). 
Gasoline pumps in street are "incumbering" street. Incorporated Town of 
Lamoni v. Smith, 217 Iowa 264, 251 N.W. 706 (1934). 
Cities may enjoin stretching of wires across street without showing 
damages. Incorporated Town of Ackley v. Central States Electric Co., 204 Iowa 
1246, 214 N.W. 879 (1927), 54 A. L. R. 474. 
Obstruction of alley is nuisance. Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 
211 N.W. 986 (1927). 
No private person has right to obstruct streets. Mettler v. Ottumwa, 197 
Iowa 187, 196 N.W. 1000 (1924). 
Unloading circus on street not prohibited by this section. Carlisle v. 
Sells-Floto Show Co., 180 Iowa 549, 163 N.W. 380 (1917). 
Obstruction of streets by parking of autos is nuisance. Pugh v. Des 
Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916), L. R. A. 1917F, 345. 
Finding of nuisance in hitching posts will not be disturbed. Kent v. 
City of Harlan, 170 Iowa 90, 152 N.W. 6 (1915). 
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Hitching posts constructed by city council no nuisance. Smith v. City of 
Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 N.W. 220 (1913), 45 L. R. A., N. S. 792, Ann. 
Cas. 1916A, 97. 
No defense to city council action to remove hitching posts that they are 
not a nuisance. Lacey v. Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 121 N.W. 542 (1909), 31 L. 
R. A., N. S., 853. 
A fence extending into public highway is a nuisance. Quinn v. Baage, 138 
iowa 426, 114 N.W. 205 (1907). 
Advice of judge no defense ·for violation of injunction. Young v. 
Rothrock, 121 Iowa 588, 96 N.W. 1105 (1903). 
Trees in street not a nuisance where they do not obstruct travel and 
public policy to preserve. Burget v. Incorporated Town of Greenfield, 120 
Iowa 432, 94 N.W. 933 (1903). 
Lessee may proceed against obstruction though it existed prior to 
tenancy. Morrison v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 117 Iowa 587, 91 N.W. 793 
(1902). 
Cities and towns may fine one for obstructing streets. Incorporated Town 
of Nevada v. Hutchins, 59 Iowa 506, 13 N.W. 634 (1882). 
No defense that grievance committed under authority of law. Scheckner v. 
Milwaukee & P. Du C.R. Co., 21 Iowa 515 (1866). 
Injunction will not lie against city where no showing stream will 
obstruct street. McMahon v. Council Bluffs, 12 Iowa 268 (1861). 
Equity has no power to restrain removal by city of obstruction in 
street. Sayers v. City of Lyons, 10 Iowa 249 (1859). 
9. Sidewalks, obstructing. 
Private water hydrant installed by corporation in sidewalk abutting its 
property was unlawful obstruction. Midwest Inv. Co. v. City of Chariton, 248 
Iowa 407, 80 N.W.2d 906 (1957). 
Newstand operation in public street not authorized by prescriptive right 
or license. Cowin v. Waterloo, 237 Iowa 202, 21 N.W.2d 705 (1946), 163 A. L. 
R. 1327. 
Permission by city to build housing in street does not render city liable 
for death of child. Jones v. City of Ft. Dodge, 185 Iowa 600, 171 N.W. 16 
(1919). 
10. Obstructions authorized by public authority. 
Business owner could sue city for nuisance though permit granted by 
city. Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). 
Obstructions to travel are "nuisance" absent valid ordinance authorizing 
same. Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa 166, 284 N.W. 145 (1939). 
City may authorize use of streets for areaways if no injury to others. 
Wendt v. Incorporated Town of Akron, 161 Iowa 338, 142 N.W. 1024 (1913). 
Public market not nuisance per se where only temporary or partial 
obstruction. State v. Smith, 123 Iowa 654, 96 N.W. 899 (1903). 
Traffic post of pipe filled with concrete attached to pavement is an 
obstruction. O.A.G. 1916, p. 235. 
11. Abatement, obstructions of way. 
Suit to restrain city from removing, as a nuisance, a private water 
hydrant installed by plaintiff corporation in sidewalk abutting its 
property. Midwest Inv. Co. v. City of Chariton, 248 Iowa 407, 80 N.W.2d 906 
(1957). 
Ditch which changes natural course of drainage is nuisance and may be 
abated. Droegmiller v. Olson, 241 Iowa 456, 40 N.W.2d 292 (1950). 
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City may bring action to abate nuisance though summary remedy provided. 
Polk City, Polk County v. Gemricher, 185 Iowa 278, 170 N.W. 378 (1919). 
City may prohibit parking or limit time of parking. Pugh v. Des Moines, 
176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W. 892 (1916), L. R. A. 1917F, 345. 
City may order removal of one entering on or excavating on street without 
permission. Callahan v. City of Nevada, 170 Iowa 719, 153 N.W. 188 (1915). 
Action by individual against city must show special injury. Collins v. 
Keokuk, 147 Iowa 605, 125 N.W. 231 {1910). 
City may not arbitrarily destroy trees. Waterbury v. Morphew, 146 Iowa 
313, 125 N.W. 205 (1910). 
Limited extent of street obstruction is immaterial to right to remove. 
Lace v. Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 121 N.W. 542 (1909), 31 L. R. A., N. S. 853. 
City charged with duty of keeping full width of street in repair. Kemper 
v. City of Burlington, 81 Iowa 354, 47 N.W. 72 (1890). 
Right to continue obstruction not gained by perscription or estoppel. 
City of Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa 437, 34 N.W. 197 {1887). 
Shade trees cannot be removed unless actual obstruction to travel. 
Everett v. City of Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa 66 (1877). 
If enclosure of street affects value of property, owner entitled to 
restrain enclosure. Prince v. McCoy, 40 Iowa 533 (1875). 
12. Damages, obstructions of ways. 
Private citizen complaining of nuisance in street must show special 
damages. Lytle Inv. Co. v. Gilman, 201 Iowa 603, 206 N.W. 108 (1925). 
Instruction as to wind condition improper where burden on plaintiff. 
Kiple v. Town of Clermont, 193 Iowa 243, 186 N.W. 889 (1922). 
Proof that obstruction is a nuisance not prerequisite to recovery of 
damages. Raine v. City of Dubuque, 169 Iowa 388, 151 N.W. 518 (1915). 
Special interrogatories assuming knowledge by plaintiff properly 
refused. Hall v. City of Shenandoah, 167 Iowa 735, 149 N.W. 831 (1914). 
Ultimate effect on instructions was proper as to proximate case. Stokes 
v. Sac City, 162 Iowa 514, 144 N.W. 639 {1913). 
Violation of duty of city to maintain streets may subject them to 
liability. Wheeler v. Fort Dodge, 131 Iowa 566, 108 N.W. 1057 (1906), 9 L. R. 
A., N. S. 146. 
Abutting owner may recover from city for injury from erection of 
buildings in street by city. Pettit v. Incorporated Town of Grand Junction, 
Greene County, 119 Iowa 352, 93 N.W. 381 {1903). 
Cause of action for R. R. nuisance arose at first occupancy. Fowler v. 
Des Moines & K. C. R. Co., 91 Iowa 533, 60 N.W. 116 (1894). 
Town had right to remove hedges if in public street. Philbrick v. Town 
of University Place, 88 Iowa 354, 55 N.W. 345 {1893). 
R. R. laying track beyond limits authorized subject to damages for 
special injury. Cain v. Chicago, R. R. & P. R. Co., 54 Iowa 255, 3 N.W. 736 
(1879), rehearing denied, 54 Iowa 255, 6 N.W. 268. 
Lamp post at center of intersection a nuisance but whether city subjected 
to liability quaere. O.A.G. 1916, p. 235. 
13. Diversion of water. 
Diversion of surface water inconsequential and no nuisance. Grimes v. 
Polk County, 34 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 1949). 
Defendant could not complain of admission of evidence of permanent 
damage. Valentine v. Widman, 156 Iowa 172, 135 N.W. 599 {1912). 
That dike diverted less water than before did not excuse maintenance of 
dike as nuisance. Meyers v. Priest, 145 Iowa 81, 123 N.W. 943 (1909). 
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657.2 
Action for damages and for abatement not inconsistent. Steber v. Chicago 
& G. W. Ry. Co., 13g Iowa 153, 117 N.W. 304 (lg08). 
One who without objection watches construction of diversion bank may not 
later enjoin. Slocumb v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 57 Iowa 675, 11 N.W. 641 
(1882). 
14. Billboards and signs. 
Failure of municipality to keep metal traffic sign post, which fell 
killing child, in proper repair, was not nuisance. Hall v. Town of Keota, 248 
Iowa 131, 79 N.W.2d 784 (1957). 
The only expressed power given the city to abate billboards is found in ~ 
657.2 subd. 7, and when construed with§ 319.10, relates only to the abatement 
of nuisances. Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 
N.W.2d 843 (1956). 
15. Dams. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Garages and filling stations. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Houses of ill fame, etc. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Municipal regulations. 
City could not, by zoning as an industrial district, or issuing permits 
for construction, authorize creation or maintenance of nuisance. Schlotfelt 
v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
Ordinance prohibiting junk yard not unconstitutional. Grundy Center v. 
Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W.2d 677 (1942). 
Vacation of street no defense to suit to enjoin nuisance for obstructing 
street. Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa 166, 284 N.W. 145 (1939). 
Cities have no authority to punish by fine the obstruction of street with 
buildings. Incorporated Town of Nevada v. Hutchins, 59 Iowa 506, 13 N.W. 634 
(1882). 
19. Weeds. 
Primary duty on city to destroy weeds in streets and alleys. O.A.G. 
1938, p. 802. 
20. Remedies. 
Action by owner of servient estate against owners of dominant estate 
seeking relief from alleged drainage nuisance was premised upon an alleged 
private nuisance. Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1976). 
Compensatory award not challenged on appeal was accepted as reasonable 
and proper. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 
(1968). 
Injunction warranted in view of record showing that no other appropriate 
order could be entered which would abate as to adjoining landowners the 
nuisance created by noise of operation of a plant. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix 
Co., 261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
21. Criminal liability. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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21.5 Evidence. 
Expert testimony on standard of normal persons in a particular locality 
with respect to whether invasion involving personal discomfort or annoyance is 
substantial. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 1g5 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
Evidence sustained finding that operation of plant constituted a 
continuing nuisance. Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 
N.W.2d 151 (1957). 
22. Re pea 1 s. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
.23. Schools. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
24. Particular nuisances. I 
Evidence insufficient to establish that operation of underground natural 
gas storage area constituted nuisance. Pitsenbarger v. Northern Natural Gas 
Co., 198 F. Supp. 665 (1962). 
Question of whether a nuisance has been created and maintained is 
ordinarily one of fact, and not of law. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 I 
N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
25. Businesses. 
License to carry on particular trade or business does not given licensee 
permission to carry it on in such manner as to constitute nuisance. 
Pitsenbarger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 665 (1962). 
Fair test of whether operation of lawful trade or industry constitutes a 
"nuisance" is the reasonableness of conducting it in the manner, at the place 
and under the circumstances in question. Patz v. Farmegg Products, Inc., 196 
N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1972). 
Concrete plant constituted a nuisance. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 
261 Iowa 696, 154 N.W.2d 852 (1967). 
A lawful business is not nuisance merely because it attracts many 
customers. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 
N.W.2d 695 (1961). 
26. Sewers. 
Sewage disposal facility is not a nuisance per se. Kriener v. Turkey 
Val. CoTITnunity School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
Common-law definition of nuisance must be applied where action was 
against city to recover damages for the construction and maintenance of a 
sewer as nuisance. Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 187, 137 N.W.2d 909 
(1965). 
26.5 Sanitary landfills. 
Although a refuse disposal operation including a sanitary landfill, is 
not a nuisance per se, it may become a nuisance in fact as a result of the 
manner in which it is operated. Incorporated Town of Carter Lake v. Anderson 
Excavating & Wrecking Co., 241 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1976). 
Purpose of municipal regulation of landfills is to prevent them from 
becoming public nuisances. Id. 
27. Defenses. 
Existence of nuisance is not affected by lawfulness of an offending 
establishment or absence of intention to injure. Kriener v. Turkey Val. 
CoTITnunity School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1973). 
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657.8 
Use of most modern machinery to alleviate offensive situation was no 
defense to creation of nuisance. Claude v. Weaver Const. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 
158 N.W.2d 139 (1968). 
28. Common law. 
Basic elements of common-law public nuisances are (1) unlawful or 
antisocial conduct that (2) in some way injures (3) a substantial number of 
people; a public nuisance is thus unlike a private nuisance of tort law where 
specific injury to an individual must be shown. State ex rel. Turner v. 
Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973). 
29.5. Slaughter of animals. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
657.3 Penalty - Abatement (No Annotations) 
657.4 Process (No Annotations) 
657.5 Repealed by Acts 1972 (64 G.A.) ch. 1124, ~ 282, eff. July 1, 1973. 
657.6 Stay of Execution 
1. Construction and application. 
an order continuing decision on abatement is not final order and not 
appealable. Suddith v. City of Boone, 121 Iowa 258, 96 N.W. 853 (1903). 
657.7 Expenses - How Collected 
1. Construction and application. 
Expense of removal of obstruction in highway borne by owner who created 
obstruction. O.A.G. 1938, p. 318 
657.8 Feed Lots (No Annotations) 
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Chapter 721 
Official Misconduct 
721.1 Felonious Misconduct in Office (No Annotations) 
721.2 Non-felonious Misconduct in Office 
1. Validity. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
2. In genera 1 • 
Absent a vote of two-thirds of the members of each branch of the General 
assembly, a city may not, consistent with the Iowa constitution, authorize the 
use of city property by city employees for their private use. O.A.G. June 18, 
1g80. 
Subsection 1 of this section imposes non-felonious criminal liability on 
any public officer or employee who knowlingly makes a contract that 
contemplates an expenditure known to be in excess of that authorized by law. 
O.A.G. September 25, 1979. 
Public officers not liable for acts of commission or omission by 
predecessors. Dewell v. Suddick, 211 Iowa 1352, 232 N.W. 118 (1930). 
For the misfeasance or non-feasance of a ministerial officer, the party 
injured may have redress by civil action. Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa 153 
(1864). 
Board of supervisors could not authorize grading of private lanes leading 
from secondary roads to farms despite offer of payment for such service by 
farmers. O.A.G. 1938, p. 837. 
3. Misfeasance. 
"Act of misfeasance" is positive wrong, and every employee whether 
employed by a private person or municipal corporation owes duty not to injure 
another by a negligent act of commission. Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 
1159, 281 N.W. 837 (1938). 
Misfeasance of a county officer or employee is the improper doing of an 
act which a person might lawfully do. Moore v. Murphy, 254 Iowa 969, 119 
N.W.2d 759 (1963). 
A municipal employee is liable for an act of misfeasance on his part even 
though he is engaged in the performance of a governmental function. Shirkey 
v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 115g, 281 N.W. 837 (1938). 
A city, county, or state employee, committing wrongful or tortious act, 
violates duty owed to one injured thereby and is personally liable for 
damages. Montanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 1159, 280 N.W. 608 (1938). 
4. Nonfeasance. 
Nonfeasance of a county officer or employee is the omission of an act 
which a person ought to do. Moore v. Murphy, 254 Iowa 969, 119 N.W.2d 759 
(1963). 
Officer or employee of county not personally liable for acts of 
nonfeasance in connection with duties as an employee. Id. 
5. Judicial acts. 
Officer not liable for judicial acts where no malice. Green v. Talbot, 
36 Iowa 499 (1873). 
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6. Ministerial acts. 
A ministerial officer is liable for damages caused by his misfeasance and 
nonfeasance in office. Howe v. Mason, 14 Iowa 510 (1863). 
7. Lobbyists. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
8. Subdivisions or agencies of state. 
A governmental subdivision of the state is a part of the state or a 
subdivision thereof, exercising powers of government such as a county or a 
city. 0.A.G. 1934, p. 96. 
9. Conflict of interest. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
10. Public monies - in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
11. Intent, public monies. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
12. Burden of proof, public monies. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
13. Fact questions, public monies. 
For annotations, see l;C.A. 
14. Instructions, public monies. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
15. Compensation - in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
16. Gifts in general, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
17. Rewards, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
18. Bribery, compensation. 
Person offering or promising to give anything of value or benefit to a 
legislator or other public official, with intent to influence the act, vote, 
opinion, decision, or exercise of discretion of the legislator or official 
with respect to his service as such would be guilty of bribery, a class D 
felony. O.A.G. December 27, 1977. 
19. Expense reimbursements, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
20. Indictment and information, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
21. Burden of proof, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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22. Review, compensation. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
23. Acting in excess of authority. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
24. Oppression - in general. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 
25. Intent, oppression. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. I 26. Indictment and information, oppression. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
27. Private use of public property. I 
Use of state motor vehicles. O.A.G. December 2, 1975. 
No authority for the use of state vehicles by any one other than a state 
officer or employee. O.A.G. February 8, 1972. 
Superintendent of state institutions may not use state cars for private I 
use. O.A.G. 1940, p. 116. 
28. Performance of duty - in general. 
Refusal of public officer to perform mandatory act subjects him to 
personal liability. Amy v. Des Moines County Sup'rs, 78 U.S. 136 (1870). 
29. Intent, performance of duty. 
Honest intentions of officer in official act does not affect his personal 
liability. Amy v. Des Moines County Sup'rs, 78 U.S. 136 (1870). 
Officer's actions within statutory limitations unaffected by malice. 
Anderson v. Park, 57 Iowa 69, 10 N.W. 310 (1881). 
Officer's actions invalidating private rights incurs personal liability 
without proof of malice and intent. McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868). 
30. Special injuries, performance of duty. 
Proof of special injury required to recover for failure to perform 
mandatory official act. Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391, 239 N.W. 29 (1931). 
Public officer liable for special injury sustained by failure of 
ministerial duty. Gutschenritter v. Whitmore, 158 Iowa 252, 139 N.W. 567 
(1913). 
31. Torts, performance of duty. 
Employee of governmental body does not share immunity of principle. 
Lenth v. Schug, 226 Iowa 1, 281 N.W. 510 (1939). 
Knowing deception by public officer imposes liability. Perkins v. Evans, 
61 Iowa 35, 15 N.W. 584 (1883). 
32. Malicious prosecution. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
33. Res Judicata. 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
34. Burden of proof in general. 
Officer has bur~en of proving existence of order and compliance with 
prerequisites. Andrew v. Winnebago County Bank, Forest City, 208 Iowa 392, 
226 N.W. 73 (1929). 
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721.11 
721.3 Solicitation for Political Purposes 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.4 Using Public Motor Vehicles for Political Purposes 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.5 State Employees not to Participate 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.6 Exception to Sections 721.3 to 721.5 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.7 Penalty for Violating Sections 721.3 to 721.6 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.8 Labeling Publicly Owned Motor Vehicles 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.9 Punislunent for Violation of Section 721.8 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.10 Misuse of Public Records and Files 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
721.11 Interest in Public Contracts 
For annotations, see I.C.A. 
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ABANDONMENT 
Highways 
Generally, 306.10-306.26, 306.41 
Railroad right of way 
Generally, 327G.76, 327G.77, 
471.15-471.18 
Condemnation, 327G.64 
Reversion, 327G.76, 327G.77 
ACCESS 
Right of municipality, 409.24 
Land without access, securing 
road, 471.4 
Right of private owner to condemn, 
471.4 
Right of way to mineral lands, 
471.4 
ALLEYS AND STREETS 
See CITIES 
ACTIONS 
Limitations, 614.1 
Parties 
Generally, 613.1-613.6, 613.8-
613.14 
Adjudication, jointly bound 
parties, 613.2 
Death, joint action, survivors 
represent, 613.l 
Joinder of parties, joint and 
several obligations, 613.1, 
613.2 
Transportation department, 
613.11-613.14 
ADJOINING OWNERS 
Drainage, chs. 455, 460, 465, 467B 
Eminent domain right, 471.4 
Sidewalks to school outside city, 
costs assessed, 320.1-320.3 
Weed law, assessments against, 
317.18-317.21 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
Administrative procedure act, ch. 
17A 
Agency, administrative 
Authority to implement act, 
17A.22 
Defined, 17A.2(1) 
Duties, 17A.3-17A.5, 17A.7, 
17A.9-17A.13, 17A.15 
INDEX 
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AllMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES--cont. 
Appeal board, judicial review of 
decisions, 23.15 
Appeals 
Generally, 17A.20 
Highways, condemnation awards, 
306.17 
Internal agency review, 17A.15 
Availability of rules and orders, 
17A.3(1) 
Billboards, 306C.11 
Contested cases 
Contempt, failure to answer 
subpoena, 17A.13(1) 
Counsel, right to, 17A.12(4) 
Decisions and orders 
Final and proposed, 17A.15(1-
3) 
Hearing officer renders, 
17A.11 
Indexed for public inspection, 
17A.3(1) 
Written and supported in 
record, 17A.16(1) 
Defined, 17A.2(2) 
Findings of fact 
Based solely on evidence, 
17A.12(8) 
Included in final decisions 
and orders, 17A.16(1) 
Hearing 
Admissable evidence, 17A.14 
Conducted by agency or hearing 
officer, 17A.11(1) 
License procedure, 17A.18 
Opportunity, 17A.12(1) 
Rehearing, 17A.16(2) 
Without one party, 17A.12(3) 
Intervention by interested 
parties of record, 17A.19(2) 
Licenses and licensing 
Generally, 17A.18 
Defined, 17A.2(3, 4) 
Notice 
Contents, 17A.12(2) 
Delivery constitutes commence-
ment of action, 17A.12(1) 
Ex parte communications, 
17A.17(1) 
Final or proposed decisions, 
17A.16(1) 
Judicial and official notice, 
17A.14(4) 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES--cont. 
Contested cases--cont. 
Notice--cont. 
Judicial review, notice given, 
17A.19(2) 
Licensing procedures, 
17A.18(3) 
Written, 17A.12(1) 
Open to public, 17A.12(7) 
Record 
Contents, 17A.12(6), 
17A.14(4), 17A.16(1) 
Methods of making, 17A.12(7) 
Sole basis for findings of 
fact, 17A.12(8) 
Rehearing 
Application, 17A.16(2) 
Denial prior to judicial 
review, 17A.19(3) 
Subpoenas, 17A.13 
Witnesses 
Interested persons, rule 
adoption procedure, 17A.4(1) 
Previous statements or reports 
made available, 17A.13(2) 
Subject to cross examination, 
17A.14(3) 
Declaratory ruling by agencies, 
17A.9 
Definitions, 17A.2 
Displaced persons 
Highways, 316.9 
Utilities or railroads, 472.42 
Filing and taking affect of rules, 
17A.5 
Hearings 
Record, 17A.12(6) 
Transportation department, 
307.19 
Highway beautification, 306C.11 
Intermediate review, 17A.15(4) 
Interstate bridges, transportation 
department, 313A.6 
Judicial review 
Administrative action, 17A.19 
Agency review not adequate 
remedy, 17A.19(1) 
Appeal board, decisions 
reviewed, 23.15 
Appeal following judicial 
review, 17A.20 
Burden of proof shifted to 
agency, 17A.4, 17A.5 
Declaratory ruling denied, 
17A.19 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES--cont. 
Judicial review--cont. 
Highways, condemnation award, 
306.17 
Intervention by any party of 
record, 17A.19(2) 
Motor vehicle financial 
responsibility, 321A.2 
Notice to parties of record, 
17A.19(2) 
Remedies against agency, 17A.19 
Stay ending review, 17A.19 
Subpoenas enforced, 17A.19 
Junkyards, 306C.2, 306C.4 
Licenses and licensing, 17A.18 
Parties 
Absence of party, case tried 
anyway, 17A.12(3) 
Defined, 17A.2(5) 
Discovery and subpoenas 
available to all, 17A.13(1) 
Exceptions to proposed decisions 
filed, 17A.15(3-5} 
Ex parte communications limited, 
17A.17(1, 2) 
Failure to appear, penalty, 
17A.12(3) 
Hearing, opportunity, 17A.12(1) 
Informal settlements optional, 
17A.10(1) 
Opinions 
Attorney general's opinions 
not rules, 17A.2(7) 
Indexed, 17A.3(1) 
Invalid against public unless 
available, 17A.3(2) 
Represented by counsel, 
17A.12(4} 
Petitions 
Adoption, amendment or repeal of 
rules, 17A.7 
Declaratory rulings, 17A.9 
Railroad crossings, 327G.15, 
327G.16 
Railroad employees sanitation and 
shelter, 327F.37 
Remedies 
Generally, 17A.19 
Agency remedies, exhaustion, 
17A.19 
Contempt, failure to answer 
subpoena,. 17A.13(1) 
Rehearing, 17A.16(2) 
Rule declared invalid, 17A.4(4) 
Stay of execution, 17A.19(5) 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES--cont. 
Remedies--cont. 
Violation of rules against ex 
parte communications, 
17A.17(2) 
Rules and rulemaking procedure 
Adminstrative rules review 
committee, objections to 
rules, 17A.4(4), 17A.8(6, 8) 
Adoption, 17A.3, 17A.4, 17A.7 
Availability to public, 17A.3 
Burden of proof, 17A.4(4) 
Commerce commission 
Eminent domain, displaced 
persons, 472.42 
Publication, 17A.6 
Public participation 
Afforded, 17A.4 
Suspended, 17A.4(2) 
Transportation departments 
Generally, 307.10(5), 
307A.2(13) 
Displaced persons, highways, 
316,g 
Eminent domain, 472.42 
Functional classification 
board, 306.6(1) 
Hazardous wastes, 307.10(11) 
Highway beautification, 
306C.ll 
Interstate bridges, 313A.6 
Junkyards, 306C.2, 306C.4 
Mississippi river parkway, 
308.4(3) 
Outdoor advertising, 306B.3 
Railroad crossings, 327G.15, 
327G.16 
Validity, when presumed, 
17A.4(3) 
Settlements, informal, 17A.10 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Access to controlled access high-
ways prohibited, 306A.5 
AGREEMENTS 
Interstate compacts, 28E.9 
Joint exercise of governmental 
powers, 28E.l-28E.17 
APPEAL BOARD 
Claims by or against the state, 
generally, ch. 25 
Public contracts and bonds, 
generally, ch. 23 
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APPEAL BOARD--cont. 
Public contracts and bonds--cont. 
Appeal by municipalities or 
objectors, 23.1, 23.4 
Contracts for $5,000 or more, 
23.2 
Decision of board final, 23.15 
Definitions, 23.1 
Non-approve~ contract void, 23.9 
Notice of hearing, 23.2, 23.6 
Objections, hearing, decision, 
23.3 
Tort claims, 25A.1-25A.22 
ASSESSMENTS 
City, generally, 384.37-384.79 
Weeds, cost of destruction, 
317.18-317.21 
AUTOMlBILES 
Financial responsibility act, ch. 
321A 
Motor vehicles, generally, ch. 321 
Publicly owned, private use, 721.2 
BIDS AND BIDDERS 
Cities 
Public improvements, 23.18, 
384.41 
Contracts, public 
Public improvement contracts, 
23.7 
Sealed bids, divulging contents, 
72.3, 72.4 
Secondary roads, 309.39-309.43 
County bonds sold, ch. 72 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.14 
Interstate bridges, 313A.25, 
313A.26 
Iowa products, preference, 73.2 
Primary roads, 313.10, 313.37 
Railway finance authority, pub-
lic buildings and construction 
exempt, 307B.17 
Roads, secondary, construction, 
309.39-309.43 
State parks and lands, leases, 
111.25 
Transportation department, road 
equipment, 313.37 
BIKEWAYS, RECREATIONAL 
Generally, ch. 308A 
Elevated structures, 308A.3 
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BILLBOARDS 
Generally, ch. 306B, 306C.10-
306C.23, 319.10-319.15, 321.259, 
657.2, see SIGNS AND SIGNBOARDS 
BONDS 
Abatement bonds, nuisance, 657.6 
Ac ti on on bonds 
Highway contractors bonds, sued 
on, 309.58, 573.16, 573.22, 
573.23 
Nuisance abatement stay, 
forfeited, 657 .6 
Public improvements bonds, 
573.16-573.26 
Secondary road construction, 
309.58 
Automobile accidents, 321A.24 
Bid bonds, public improvements, 
23.20 
Bridges, interstate, 313A.7, 
313A.12-313A.24, 313A.33 
Contractors bonds, public 
contracts, ch. 573 
County boards, 346.1-346.23 
Elections to approve may be 
waived , 384 • 26 
Joint city-county undertaking, 
28E.16 
liquidated damages, sealed bids, 
divulging contents, 72.4 
Mass transportation, urban, 28E.17 
Motor vehicle law, bond provisions 
Employees as traffic officers, 
321.478 
Financial responsibilty, 321A.24 
Municipal, ch. 384 
Nuisance action, abatement stay, 
657 .6 
Proof of financial responsibilty, 
321A.24 
Railway finance authority, 307B.4, 
307B.7-307B.13 
Refunding county bonds, 346.1, 
346.12 
BOUNDARIES 
Bridges on boundaries, inter-
county, 309.68-309.84 
Corners established by survey, 
355.3 
State 
Bridges, 309.85-309.91 
State and private, 111.20-111.24 
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BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
Avoidance in road buildinq, 306.27 
Bonds in general -
Authorization and sale, 23.12-
23.16 
County bond issues, 346.1-346.22 
Highways, 309.85, 309.89,345.9 
Maturity and payments, ch. 76 
Refunding, 346.2 
Secondary road bridge bonds 
Certificates issued, form 
309.46-309.55 
Construction fund anticipated, 
309.46 
Exempt from taxation, 309.51 
Holders registered, 309.53, 
309.54 
Interstate bridges, 309.89 
Tax levies, 316.13, 316.14, 
346.2, 346.10-346.17 
Bridge commission as public 
corporation, 573.l 
Bridges with a roadway specified, 
309 .74 
City operation, 384.24(2,g) (3,e) 
City Taxation, 384.12 
Contracts in general 
Claims for labor and material, 
ch. 573 
Interest in construction 
contracts, 314.2 
Culvert, with a roadway specified, 
309.74 
Drainage, highway or natural 
watercourse changes, 455.118 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.4 
Gift to state, boundary river 
bridges, 313.59-313.65 
Highways, institutional and parks, 
307A.2(11) 
Intercounty, 309.68-309.75, 309.84 
Interstate bridges 
Acquisition, 313A.5 
Boundary river bridges, gifts, 
313.59-313.65 
County construction, 309.79-
309.82, 309.85-309.89 
Franchises granted by city, 
314 .11 
Improvement and maintenance, 
314.10 
Purchase by state, 313.66 
Secondary roads, 309.85-309.89, 
314.10, 314.11 
BRIDGES AND CULVERTS--cont. 
Interstate Bridges--cont. 
State toll bridges, generally, 
ch. 313A-
Use by utilities, 314.11 
Joint construction by city and 
county, 309. 7 3 
Maintenance, state institutional 
roads, 307A.2(11) 
Mississippi bridges, purchase, 
313.66 
Municipal bridges 
Authority of state in city, 
313.21-313.36 
City boundary bridges, 309.73 
Claims for labor and material, 
573 .6-473 .11 
Primary road extension, pro rata 
cost, 313.27 
Payment before work completed, 
373.27 
Primary road bridge system 
Bonds, 309.85 
Boundary river bridges, gift, 
313.59-313.65 
- Claims, payments, 313.14, 573.6-
573.26 
Construction in cities, 313.27 
Construction over ditches or 
drains, 455.118 
Contracts awarded, 313.10 
Engineers to give bond, 313.13 
Funds 
Contingent fund, use, 313.17 
Primary road fund, use 313.3-
313.8 
Use in cities, 313.21, 313.27 
Improvement in cities, 313.21-
313.36 
Plans, surveys required, 313.9 
Supervision and inspection, 
313.12 
Transportation department, 
duties, 313.8 
Railroad bridges 
Catwalks and handrails, 327F.3 
Drawbridge, safety devices, 
327G.28 
Highways or railways, authority 
to cross, 327F.2 
Interlocking switches at 
bridges, 327G.28 
Maintenance, damages for 
failure, 327F.2 
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BRIDGES AND CULVERTS--cont. 
Railroad bridges--cont. 
Repair and maintenance required, 
327F.2 
Specifications by transportation 
department, 309.79 
Viaducts, 309.79 
Watercourse, authority to cross, 
327F.1 
Secondary roa~ bridge system 
Bonds, 309.46-309.55, 309.89, 
346.1-346.22 
Bridges defined, 309.75 
Bridges on county line, 
construction, 309.84 
Change of road or stream, 306.27 
City boundary bridges and 
culverts, 309.73 
Claims for labor and material, 
573 .6-573 .11 
Construction 
Bids, advertising and letting, 
309.40-309.43 
Ditches or drains crossed, 
455 .118 
Plans and surveys required, 
309.24-309.40 
Contracts 
Action on contractor's bonds, 
309.58 
Advertisement and letting, 
309.40-309.43 
Approval by transportation 
department, 309.42, 309.80 
Bond·of contractor, 314.1-
314.3 
Record and filing of plans, 
309.81, 309.82 
Specifications required for 
bids, 309.39 
County-line bridges, 309.84 
Culverts, 309.74, 309.75 
Defined, 309.3 
Drainage rights of landowners, 
314.7 
Expenditures, 343.11(1,3) 
Funds 
Anticipatory certificates, 
309.46-309.55, 311.28-311.31 
Maintenance fund, use 316.17 
Intercounty, 309.68(2)-309.71 
Interstate bridges, 309.85-
309.89, 314.10, 314.11 
Officer's interest in contract, 
314.2 
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BRIDGES AND CULVERTS--cont. 
Secondary road bridge system--
cont. 
Payment for, 314.3, 314.4 
Plans and costs to be filed, 
309.81, 309.82 
Record of costs and plans filed, 
309.81, 309.82 
Research, 310.35 
Specifications furnished by 
state, 309.79 
State boundary bridge, county 
share of maintenance, 309.91 
Time for election after filing 
of petition, 309.86 
Transportation department's 
duties, 309.56, 309.69-309.71, 
309.79-309.82, 310.35 
Trees protected, 314.7 
Tuck law, 343.10, 343.11 
Utilities, use of state boundary 
bridge, 314 .11 
Warrants, construction payroll, 
309.61 
Speed regulated, 321.295 
Toll bridges 
Interstate bridges, ch. 313A 
Width of bridges and culverts, 
309.74 
CAffiE 
On highways, 320.4-320.8, see 
HIGHWAYS 
CITIES 
Actions brought or defended 
Personal injuries, 364.14 
Appraisal, railway overpass or 
underpass, damages from work on, 
364.8 
Assessments 
Generally, 384.37-384.79 
Contracts for construction, 
384 .53 
Paving, 384.55 
Railway company right of way, 
384.38, 384.64, 384.77 
Railway overpass or underpass, 
damages from work, 364.8 
Secondary road extensions, ch. 
311 
State lands, 307A.5, 384.56 
Attorney, condemnation proceed-
ings, conducted, 472.2 
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CITIES--cont. 
Bonds 
Assessments, 384.68 
Definitions, generally, 384.24 
Election, general obligation, 
general purposes, 384.26 
General obligation bonds 
Categories, 384.28 
Cost of improvements paid 
from, 384.71 
Defined, 384.24 
Essential purposes, 384.25 
Execution, 384.30 
Forum, 384.29 
Interest to pay, 384.12 
Limitation of actions, 384.33 
Negotiable instruments, 384.31 
Payment of principal and 
interest from debt service 
fund, 384.4(2) 
Prior proceedings may 
continue, 384.36 
Sale of, 384.27 
Taxes for the payment of, 
384 .32 
Improvement bonds, 384.68 
Joint city-county buildings, 
28E.16 
Limitation of action, 384.33, 
384.92 
Parking facilities, 384.24 
Payable from net revenue, 
384.82, 384.87 
Public improvements, 384.68 
Revenue bonds, 384.82, 384;83, 
384.87, 384.88, 384.92, 384.94 
Urban mass transportation, 
28E.17 
Bridges, 384.12, 384.24(2, g), 
384.84 
Buses, fr an chi se. granted, 364. 2 
Business districts, detour route 
markings, 313.43-313.45 
Change of grade in streets, 
384.24(3, a) 
City defined, 362.2 
Contracts 
Award of, 384.99 
Bids on improvements 
When required, 384.96 
Opening and considering, 
384.100 
Sealed, 384.96 
Security, 384.97, 384.98, 
384.100 
CITIES--cont. 
Contracts--cont. 
Bond of contractor, 573.2, 
573.26 
Bonds authorized, 384.103 
Bridges, contract for use, 
384.12(B) 
Defined, 362.5 
Emergency repair, 384.103 
Hearing, when required, 384.102, 
384.103 
Improvements, joint under-
takings, 384.76 
Joint city-county holdings, 
346.26, 384.24(4, h) 
Labor and material on public 
improvement, ch. 573 
Letting procedure, 384.95-
384.103 
Notice of bidders, 384.96, 
384.97 
Notice of hearing, 384.102 
Officers not to have interest, 
362.5 
Payment before work completed, 
573.27 
Preference for Iowa products, 
73.1-73.6 
Public improvements, 384.41, 
384.52-384.58, 384.95-384.103 
Services to persons outside 
city, 364.4 
Controlled access highways, 
306A.l-306A.8 
Council 
Asssessment, 384.38, 384.41, 
384.51, 384.52, 384.54, 
384.58-384.60, 384.63 
Bonds, 384.25, 384.26, 384.28 
Bridge, boundary rivers, ~13.65 
County trunk roads, approval, 
314.5 
Hearing on railway overpass or 
underpass, 364.8 
Improvement, 384.54 
Interest in contracts prohi-
bited, 362.5 
Mississippi bridge purchase 
approval, 313.66(4) 
Parks, state, maintenance, 
111. 27 
Paving of streets, 384.55 
Through traffic, stop signs, 
authority, 321.347 
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CITIES--cont. 
Drainage 
Assessments, 384.37(1, b) 
Compulsory connection with 
systems, 364.12(3) 
Eminent Domain 
Powers, generally, 471.4 
Proceedings to condemn, ch. 472 
Engineer 
Assessment for paving along 
railway, 384.77 
Inspection of improvements, 
384.58 
Equipment, use fcir private 
purposes, 721. 2 
Grade crossing separations, 364.12 
Grade of street, 409.5 
Hearings 
Bonds, 384.25 
Paving of streets, 384.55 
Highways, 384.12 
Highways, continuous through 
cities, 306.5 
Improvements 
Assessment, determined by 
benefit to property, 384.61 
Bids, when required, 384.96-
384.100 
Bonds issued, 384.68 
Contracts for construction, 
384.53 
Cost assessable, 384.38 
Cost defined, 384.37 
Costs estimated, 384.44 
Emergency repair, 384.103 
Grade, brought to, 384.39 
Grade changes, 364.15 
Joint undertakings, 384.24, 
384.76 
Labor and materials, claims, ch. 
573 
Notice to bidders, 384.52, 
384.97-384.99 
Paving, 384.55 
Payments to contractors, 384.57, 
573.27 
Petition of property owners, 
384.41 
Plats, 384.45, 384.48 
Procedure on public improve-
ments, 384.42, 384.43, 384.53, 
384.75 
Public improvement defined, 
384.37, 384.95 
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CITIES--cont. 
Improvements--cont. 
Railway crossings, maintenance, 
364.11 
Resolution of necessity, 384.49, 
384. 51 
Special assessments, generally, 
384. 37-384. 79 
Interstate bridges, ch. 313A, 
384.12, 384.24, 384.84 
Joint county-city building 
authority, 346.26, 346.27, 
384.12, 384.24 
Joint undertakings, projects, 
384.24, 384.76 
Municipal transit system, 384.12 
Notice 
Assessments, 384.50, 384.60 
Bonds, 384.25, 384.26 
Improvements, 384.40, 384.50 
Paving of streets, 384.55 
Officers 
Bonds, sealed bids, divulging, 
72.4 
Contracts, interest in 
prohibited, 362.5, 721.11 
Misconduct or neglect in office, 
721.2 
Parking facilities, 384.24, 
384.37' 386.13 
Plats 
Generally, ch. 409 
Approval, 409.9 
Public improvements, 384.45 
Subdivision, 409.1 
Primary road markings, 313.43-
313.45 
Public contracts, letting proce-
dure, 384.95-384.103 
Public improvements 
Generally, 384.38-384.79 
Bids, 384.95-384.103 
Defined, 384.37, 384.95 
Public transportation company, 
384.12(9) 
Rail roads 
Generally, chs. 327F, 327G 
Assessments, 384.64, 384.77 
Crossing maintenance, 327G.30, 
364.11 
Crossings, blocking prohibited, 
327G.32 
Fences, local regulations not 
applicable, 327G.8 
Flood control, 364.9 
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CITIES--cont. 
Railroads--cont. 
Overpass or underpass, 364.8 
Right of way responsibilities, 
327G.81 
Speed regulated, 307.18 
Tax to aid, 384.12 
Warning signs, 321.342 
Roads 
Added to primary system, 313.2 
County trunk roads, 314.5 
Tax exempt, 427.2 
Use tax fund, use limited, 
312.6, 312.11-312.15 
Sewers 
Generally, 364.12, 384.24, 
384.37-384.75 
Defined, 362.2 
Labor and material claims, 
573.7-573.11, 573.18, 573.19 
Liens for nonpayment of sewage 
charges, 384.84 
State to share cost, 384.56 
Sidewalks 
Assessment or costs, schools, 
320.2 
Construction and repair, 384.24, 
384. 37-384. 77 
Maintenance for public places, 
364.12 
Motor vehicle law, parking on 
sidewalk, 321.358(1) 
Repair by city, cost assessed, 
364.12, 364.13 
School outside certain cities, 
320.1-320.3 
Snow and ice removal, 364.12 
Transportation department, 
construct, 313.21, 320.4(3) 
Signs, traffic, ordinance powers, 
321.472 
Snow removal 
Parking regulations, 321.358 
Posting of signs, 321.237 
Special events signs, 306C.10(2), 
306C.23 
Speed signs, duty to install, 
321.289 
Street railway, 364.2 
Streets and alleys 
Annual reports to department of 
transportation, 312.12, 312.14 
Assessments 
Generally, 384.37-384.77 
CITIES--cont. 
Streets and alleys--cont. 
Districts, road extension, ch. 
311 
Secondary road extensions, ch. 
311 
State lands, cost paid by 
state, 307A.5, 384.56 
Authority, generally, 
384.24(3, a) 
Billboards deemed nuisance, 
657.2(7) 
Bonds, 384.25, 384.68 
Closing of streets, plat 
vacated, 409.18-409.25 
Closing primary roads, 
limitation, 321.348 
Controlled-access highways, 
306A.l-306A.8 
Definition of terms used, 384.37 
Detour markings on highways, 
313.43-313.45 
Farm-to-market road continua-
tion, 314.6 
Funds for improvement 
Applicable funds, 384.71 
Construction fund, 312.6 
Local streets, 312.11 
Motor vehicle fuel tax, 324.63 
Road use tax, ch. 312 
Grade changes, 364.15 
Grading, generally, 
384.24(3, a), 384.37, 384.39 
Improvement and repairs, 
384.24(3, a), 384.37 
Labor, claim for labor and 
materials, ch. 573 
Maintenance responsibility for 
public places, 364.12 
Markings of_ through or detour 
routes, 313.43-313.45 
Nuisance, obstructions, abate-
ment, 657.2(5) 
Obstructions in primary road 
extensions, 321.348 
Parking 
Meters, 384.24(2, a) 
Prohibited, generally, 321.358 
Paving, 313.21-313.24, 
384.24(3, a), 384.37, 384.39, 
384.55, 384.56, 384.77 
Payment before work completed, 
384.57' 573.27 
Primary road extension, 313.21-
313.24 
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CITIES--cont. 
Streets and alleys--cont. 
Program of improvements submit-
ted annually to department of 
transportation, 312.12 
Railway crossing, blocking 
prohibited, 327G.32 
Railway crossing maintenance, 
327G.30, 364.11 
Railway overpasses and under-
passes, 364.8 
Report to department of trans-
portation annually, 312.14 
Roads 
Added to primary system, 313.2 
Tax exempt, 427.2 
Use tax fund, use limited, 
312.6, 312.11-312.15 
Secondary road extension, 311.5 
Snow removal, 321.237, 
321.358(14), 364.12 
Snow routes, 321.236, 321.237 
Speed limits, establishment, 
321.290 
Speed signs, installed, 321.289 
Streets with tracks, improvement 
costs, 384.77 
Supervision and control, 364.12 
Surfaces, 384.37 
Through traffic, stop, 321.347 
Traffic signals, 321.252-321.257 
Train signals at crossings, 
327G.13, 327G.14 
Transportation department, 
authority on primary road 
extensions, 313.21-313.24 
Trees, 364.12, 384.24(3, a, o), 
384.37(1, 1), 658.4 
Truck regulations, signs, 
321.473 
Through highways defined, 321.350 
Transit systems, 28E.17, 364.2, 
384.12, 384.24 
Trees, 364.12, 384.12, 384.24, 
384.37 
Vacation of public ways and 
grounds, 364.12 
Viaducts, 364.8 
Warrants 
Eminent domain, damages paid, 
472. 31 
Payments to contractors, 384.57 
Weed eradication, ch. 317, 
364.12(3) 
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allff:RCE allfHSSION 
Eminent domain, payment to 
displaced persons, 472.42 
Regulatory jurisdiction and power 
Utility rates, road lighting, 
313;4 
Transmission lines, supervision, 
ch. 478 
aJMPTROLLER 
Farm-to-market road fund, 310.3-
310.7, 312.5 
Primary road fund, 312.2, 313.3, 
313.5, 313.7 
Public contracts, appeal 
procedure, 23.1-23.15 
aJNDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 
Generally, ch. 472 
Railroad rights of way, 327G.64 
Utilities, 472.46-472.52 
aJNFLICTS OF INTEREST 
County officials, interest in 
contracts, 314.2 
Municipal officials and employees, 
362.5 
Transportation department and 
employees, 314.2 
aJNSTITIJTION, IOWA 
Eminent domain, compensation 
required, I., 18 
aJNTRACTS 
Defined for purposes of city 
contracts, 362.5 
Emergency stoppage, public 
contracts, ch. 573A 
Public contracts 
Abandonment, effect, 573.23 
Amount limited 
Generally, 72.1, 72.2 
Counties, 23.4, 343.10 
Appeals 
Appeal board hearing, 23.1-
23.15 
Bids 
Generally, 72.3,, 72.4, see 
BIDS AND BIDDERS 
Iowa products, preference, 
73.2 
Penalty for divulging con-
tents, 72.3, 72.4 
Primary roads, 313.10, 313.37 
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CONTRACTS--cont. 
Public contracts--cont. 
Bids--cont. 
Public improvement contracts, 
23.7. 23.18 
Secondary roads, 309.39-309.43 
Transportation department, 
road equipment, 313.37 
Bond of contractor, ch. 573 
Claims, farm-to-market road, 
310.16, 310.18 
Claims for labor or material, 
573.7-573.25 
Claims, priority of payment, 
573.18-573.20 
Completion reports, contents, 
23.11 
Conflict of interest 
Transportation department and 
employees, 314.2 
County contracts, amount limi-
ted, 343.10, 343.11, 346.19 
Definitions, 23.1, 573.1 
Expenditure, excess, penalty, 
721.2 
Highways 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.14 
Primary roads, 314.1, 314.2, 
314.4 
Secondary roads, 309.39-
309.43, 311.21 
Improvements costing $5,000 or · 
more, 23.1-23.16 
Joint exercise of government 
powers, 28E.l-28E.17 
Payments, 573.12-573.15, 573.27 
Performance enforced, 23.8, 
573.26 
Provisions read into contract, 
573.6 
Secondary roads, 309.39-309.43, 
314.1-314.4 
Security for performance, 573.2-
573.4 
Unauthorized contracts 
forbidden, 72.1 
COUNTY 
Bids 
Divulging contents, penalty, 
72.3 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.14 
Iowa labor and products 
preferred, 73.2 
COUNTY--cont. 
Bonds 
Generally, ch. 346 
Action on bonds, defenses, 
346.21 
Balances used after redemption, 
346.13-346.15 
Board member liable, excess 
issue, 346,g 
Bond fund from tax levies, use, 
346.12 
Expenditures limited by re-
ceipts, 343.10, 343.11, 346.lg 
Funding or refunding bonds, 
generally, 346.1-346.18 
Hearing on improvements over 
$5,000, 23.1-23.16 
Highway, 3og,46-30g,55 
Interstate bridge bonds, 3og,3g 
Public improvement contracts, 
county bonds deposited, 573.4 
Road bonds, 3og,46-30g,55 
Bridge bonds, 3og,46-30g,55, 
346.1-346.22 
Bridges, city aid, 384.12 
City bridge tax prohibited, 346.2 
Eminent domain, chs. 471, 472 
Funds 
Interstate bridges, ch. 313A 
Road clearing fund, road weeds 
cut, 317.lg 
Road funds, 310.3, 312.2 
Road use tax apportioned, 312.3 
Highways 
Eminent domain, 471.4 
Railroad warning signs, 321.342 
Joint city-county building 
authority, 346.26, 346.27 
Joint exercise of governmental 
powers, 28E.l-28E.17 
Public improvement contracts and 
bonds 
Preference for Iowa labor and 
materials, 73.1, 73.10 
Requirements before issuance, 
approval, 23.1-23.16 
Railroad fences, local regula-
tions not applicable, 327G.8 
Railroads, right of way responsi-
bilities, 327G.81 
Special event signs, 306C.10(2) 
State land assessed for improve-
ments, 307A.5 
Warrants, condemnation damages, 
procedure, 472.31 
614 
COUNTY--cont. 
Weed eradication, c·h. 317 
Zoning law, generally, ch. 358A 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Vegetation on railway right of 
way, 327F.2g 
Weed law enforcement, 317.23 
COUNTY AUDITOR 
Pl at 
Certified copies from county 
recorder, 409.22 
City plat filed, 409.12-409.16 
Resurveys, 409.43 
Roads and highways, 306.21 
Streets, 4og,17 
Reports received 
County engineers, 311.8 
Road district, proof of notice, 
311.12 
Road assessments, 311.25, 311.26 
Road relocation, duties, 306.29-
306.31 
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
Appointments by board 
Condemnation commission, 472.4 
Engineer, county, 309.17, 309.19 
Weed supervisors and deputies, 
317.3 
Bonds, liability of board members, 
314.3, 346,g 
Contracts 
Bonds, 573.2 
Hearing on, publication, appeal, 
23.1-23,g 
Labor and materials, ch. 537 
Payment for improvement before 
completion, 573.27 
Farm-to-market roads, ch. 310, 
314.3, 314.5 
Funds 
Bond fund excess, disposition, 
346.14, 346.15 
Condemnation funds, sheriff's 
report, 337.16 
Highways 
Generally, ch. 306 
Advancement on labor payrolls, 
309.61 
Advice from transportation 
department, 309.16 
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COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS--cont. 
Highways--cont. 
Anticipation of funds, 309.46-
309.55, 311.28 
Assistance from transportation 
department, 306.3 
Bills for road work, certified, 
allowed, 314.3 
Bonds required of contractors, 
309.58, 314.1 
Budget requirements, 309.93-
309 .97 
Cattleways, permission to 
construct, 320.4 
Classification review board, 
306.6 
Construction program, 314.7 
Contract letting, 309.41 
Drainage districts, 460.1-460.13 
Duty to maintain, 309.67 
Easements to United States, 
306.39, 306.40 
Intercounty roads, duties, 
309.68-309.71 
Jurisdiction, secondary roads, 
313.2 
liability on bond for violation, 
314.3 
Obstructions removed, ch. 319 
Secondary road funds, 309.8, 
309.9 
Sidewalk to school outside city, 
320.1-320.3 
Survey of road projects 
approved, 309.56 
Tax levy for secondary roads, 
309.7, 311.10-311.26 
Use restricted by resolution, 
321.471-321.473 
Violations, road bills, penalty, 
314.3 
Water and gas mains, use of 
highway, 320.4-320.8 
Interest in contracts prohibited, 
314.2 
Mississippi bridge purchase 
approval, 313.66(4) 
Motor vehicles, parking 
restrictions, 321.239 
Parks, state, maintenance, 111.27 
Secondary road 
Budget, 309.93-309.97 
Control and jurisdiction, 306.4, 
306.5, 306.8 
Tax levy, 309.7 
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COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS--cont. 
Signs, advertising on roads, duty 
to remove, 319.10-319.15 
Tax assessments, cost of weed 
destruction assessed, 317.21 
Weed law enforcement duties, ch. 
317 
Zoning duties, generally, ch. 358A 
COUNTY ENGINEER 
Appointment, term, 309.17, 309.19 
Bonds given, 309.18 
Boundaries, 111.21-111.23 
Boundary markers replaced, 314.8 
Bridges and culverts, plans filed, 
3og.81, 309.82 
Compensation fixed by board, 
309.18, 309.19 
Duties, 111.21, 309.18, 309.21 
Farm-to-market road, duties, 
310.8, 310.13-310.19 
Fences or road obstructions, 
removal, 319.1-319.6 
liability on bond, 314.2, 314.3 
Public utility, new lines, 
located, 319.5 
Removal from office, 309.17 
Report to department of transpor-
tation, 309.22, 309.56 
Roads 
Bills for work certified, 314.3, 
314.4 
Government corners preserved, 
314.8 
Secondary assessment districts, 
311.8-311.22 
Use of county equipment and 
personnel, 309.41 
Rubbish collection, special 
permit, 321.473 
Secondary road maintenance, 
duties, 309.67 
Secondary road research, 310.36 
Supervision of road work, 309.21 
Surveys and reports, 309.56, 
311.8, 314.9, 460.5 
Tenure of office, 309.17 
COUNTY OFFICERS 
Bonds 
Divulging bids, action on, 72.4 
-contract, excess of receipts, 
penalty, 343.10, 343.11 
Crimes, interest in contract, 
721.11 
COUNTY OFFICERS--cont. 
Private use of public property, 
721.2 
Sealed bids divulged, penalty, 
72.3, 72.4 
Violations 
Bonds prohibited, action, 
346.21, 346.22 
Misconduct or neglect in office, 
721.2 
Warrants, excess of receipts, 
343.10, 343.11 
COUNTY RECORDER 
Books, drainage record and index, 
465.25, 465.26 
Fees 
Drainage records and copies, 
465.29 
Eminent domain record, 472.3B, 
472.39 
Instruments filed or recorded 
Change of name, street, 409.17 
Condemnation record, 472.35-
472.40 
Drainage decisions, 465.8 
Drainage, private systems, 
465.24 
Plats, ch. 409 
Plat book, drainage, form, 465.25 
Platting subdivisions, duties, 
409.9-409.15, 409.32, 441.65-
441.71 
Violation, plat filing, 409.14 
COUNTY SURVEYOR 
City plats resurveyed, 409.40-
409.45 
Damage by survey, procedure, 
355 .11-355 .14 
Duties in general, 355.1-355.10 
Federal survey rules followed, 
355.4 
Fees charged, 355.15 
Monuments, federal, interference, 
355.14 
Survey record, presumptive 
evidence, 355.1-355.5 
Witnesses subpoened, fees, 355.9 
COUNTY TREASURER 
Bonds~ county, 346.4-346.13 
Funds, road funds, 312.3 
Motor vehicles, fees and penalties 
collected, 321.145 · 
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COUNTY TREASURER--cont. 
Plats, city certifies no tax lien, 
409.9 
Revenues received, weed cost 
assessments, 317.21 
Road matters, assessment district 
accounts separate, 311.27 
Tax collection duty, rail compa-
nies, delinquent, 307.2g 
Warrants, cancellation on exchange 
for bonds, 346.6 
CRil'ES 
Bids, sealed, divulging contents, 
72.4 
County officers 
Bonds prohibited, action, 
346.21, 346.22 
Misconduct or neglect in office, 
ch. 721 
Stockholders, forbidden, 
penalty, 346.20, 346.22 
False acts, accounts, fees and 
fines falsified, 721.10 
Graft and corruption, public con-
tracts, officers' interest in, 
721.11 
Highways 
Advertising signs on inter-
states, 3D6B.2 
Contracts, requirements, 
violations, 314.2 
Use of highway, grant violated, 
penalty, 320.8 
Violations, penalties 
Gravel, unlawful disposal, 
309.66 
Obstructing road, 657.2, 657.3 
Obstructions in highway, 
319.8-391.12 
Iowa products, failure to give 
preference, 73.5 
Junk yards, 306C.6 
Malicious mischief and trespass, 
highways, 321.369-321.371 
Misconduct or neglect in office, 
721.2 
Motor vehicles 
Axle weight limits, schedule of 
penalties, 321.463 
Exceeding maximum size or 
weight, 321.452 
Financial responsibility act, 
321A.32 
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CRIIES--cont. 
Motor vehicles--cont. 
Obstructing weight officer, 
321.476 
Overloading unlawful, 321.466, 
321.471, 321.474 
Size, weight, and load regula-
ti ans, 321.452 
Unsafe condition, driving 
prohibited, 321.381 
Weigh load, refusal by driver, 
321.465 
Weight limits, schedule of 
penalties, 321.463 
Neglect or misconduct in office, 
721.2 
Nuisances, 657.3 
Obliteration 
Railroad signs or signals, 
321.260 
Traffic signs or signals, 
321.260 
Plat filing violations, 409.14 
Road, obstructing or defacing, 
321.369 
Weed law official, penalty, 
317.24, 317.25 
CROSSINGS 
Generally, see HIGHWAYS, MOTOR 
VEHICLES, or RAILROADS 
Railroad crossings, ch. 327G 
CULVERTS 
Generally, see BRIDGES AND 
CULVERTS 
DAMAGES 
Billboards and signs removed, 
nonliability, 319.13 
Condemnation 
Pipeline, 479.24, 479.25 
Private drainage, 465.5-465.13 
Proceedings, Const., Iowa, I, 
18, 471.5, 471.18, 472.4-
472.35 
Telephone and telegraph lines, 
477 .3 
Highways 
Entering private land for sur-
veys and other tests, 314.9 
Establishment or vacation, 
306.10-306.37 
Land Surveys, 355.11-355.14 
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DAMAGES--cont. 
Liquidated damages, divulging con-
tents of sealed bid, 72.3, 72.4 
Motor Vehicle operation, over-
loads, owner and driver liable, 
321.475 
Nuisances, damages arising from, 
657.1 
Pipelines, payment of damages, 
479.25 
Roads, establishment or vacation, 
306.10-306.37 
Survey of land, damage procedure, 
355.11-355.14 
Transmission lines, 478.16, 478.17 
DAMS AND RACES 
Condemnation of land by railway, 
471.9(4)-471.12 
Construction, condemnation, 
limitation, 472.27 
DEPOTS AND GROUNDS 
Eminent domain, 471.9(1) 
DISCRIMINATION 
Bridges, joint use by utilities, 
314 .11 
DISTRICT COURT 
Appeals to district court 
Bonds, appeal from city 
council's decision, 384.25 
Condemnation proceedings, 
472.18-472.34 
County zoning law, 358A.18 
Condemnation court, existing 
utilities, 472.46-472.52 
Condemnation duties of chief judge, 472.3-472.5 
Tort claims against state, 25A.4 
Transportation department, 613.11-
613.14 
DRAINAGE 
Constitutional authorization to 
establish, Const., Iowa, I, 18 
Highways, 314.7, ch. 460 
Private rights, ch. 465 
DRAINAGE AND LEVEE DISTRICTS 
Appeals 
Drainage through other's land, 
findings, 465.9-465.13 
Mutual drains, 465.32 
DRAINAGE AND LEVEE DISTRICTS--cont. 
Bridges on roads relocated, 
455.118 
Constitutional authorization, 
Const., Iowa, I, 18 
Contract with city, water recrea-
tional areas, 111.76 
Costs 
Highway drainage district, 
dismissal, 460.9 
Railroad construction costs 
recovered, 465.15 
Damages, condemnation, 472.14-
472.24, 472.26 
Engineer 
Highway drainage district, 
460.4, 460.5, 460.11 
Individual drain plats recorded, 
465.25-465.27 
Flood control, ch. 4678 
Highway districts, ch. 460 
Mutual drains, 465.31-465.35 
Taxation, highway districts, 
460.3, 460.6 
Warrants 
Highway funds, advance payments, 
460.7 
Special warrants, 460.7 
Water recreational areas, contract 
with cities, 111.76 
EASEIENTS 
Condemnation for United States, 
conveyance, 471.3 
Controlled-access highways by pre-
scription, prohibited, 306A.5 
Egress and ingress, how obtained, 
471.4 
Federal water resources projects, 
306.40 
Motor vehicles, landowners to 
control use, 321.251 
Railways, abandonment, 327G.76, 
327G.77, 471.15-471.18 
EJECTM::NT 
Limitation of action, 614.1(5) 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Abstract of land taken required, 
471.20 
Attorney fees on appeal, 472.33 
Authority includes right to 
purchase, 471.4, 471.5 
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EMINENT DOMAIN--cont. 
Bi 11 boards 
Interstate highways, 306B.4 
Regulations, 306C.10-306C.23 
Cemeteries, township trustees, 
471.5 
Cities, generally, ch. 472, see 
CITIES 
Coal mine dra,inage, 465.1-465.29 
Compensation required, Const., 
Iowa, I, 18 
Conservation commission's rights, 
111.8, 111.9 
Counties, right of way ditch or 
drain, 460.10 
Damages assessed by commission, 
472.4, 472.14 
Dams and races, 471.9(4)-471.12, 
472.27 
Drainage 
Highway, 460.10-460.13 
Mineral land, 465.1-465.29 
Egress to land without roadway, 
471.4 
Federal government's power, 471.2, 
471.3 
Guardian appointed by court, 
472.15, 472.16 
Highways 
Advertising, state can condemn, 
3068.4 
County gravel and material beds 
for, 306.19, 309.63 
Drainage, 306.19, 314.7, 460.10-
460.13 
Established, altered, vacated, 
306.10-306.37 
Procedure, generally, 306.19-
306.37. ch. 472 
Roads to parks, 111.8, 111.9 
Interpretive clause, 471.19 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
Mineral land, owner seeking 
railway, 471.4 
Moving expenses, 472.14 
Pipeline companies rights, 479.24, 
479.25 
Plats, applicability, 409.33 
Private individuals rights, 471.4 
Proceedings to condemn 
Generally, ch. 472 
Appeal procedure, 472.18-472.24 
Applicant's right of possession, 
472.25-472.30 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I EMINENT DOMAIN--cont. 
Proceedings to condemn--cont. 
I Application for condemnation, filing, 472.3 Appraisement procedure, 472.14, 472.17 
Attorney to conduct, fees, 
I 472.2, 472.33, 472.34 Clerk's duty, liability, 472.35-472.37' 472.40 
Commission to assess damages, 
472.4-472.14, 472.17, 472.33, 
I 472.43 Condemner removed, failure of duty, 472.32 
Highway matters, appeal, 589.27 
I 
Homesteading projects, 472.53 
Notice of assessment, service, 
472 .8-472 .13 
Optional county procedure, 
highways, 306.27-306.37 
I 
Owner under disability, 472.15, 
472.16 
Owner, when disposessed, 472.26, 
472.30 
Parks, state, by executive 
I council, 111.7-111.9 Payment of damages by public body, 472.31 Recorder's record, fee, 
liability, 472.38-472.40 
1· Record filed by sheriff and clerk, 472.35-472.37 Refusal to pay final award, 
penalty, 472.34 
Sheriff's duties, liability, 
I 472.7, 472.40, 472.43 Title of condemner, validity presumed, 472.41 
Protection from condemnation 
Buildings, 471.4, 472.26, 472.27 
I Cemeteries, 306.20, 471.4, 471.7 Railroads, water supply protected, 471.12 
Trees and orchards 
I 
Damage paid before taking, 
472.26 
Dams erected, overflowing 
prohibited, 472.27 
Highway drainage, 314.7, 
I 460.12, 460.13 Landowners seeking egress, 471.4 Supervisor's discretion, 
highways, 460.12, 460.13 
I 
I 
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EMINENT DOMAIN--cont. 
Public improvements, power to 
condemn or purchase, 471.1, 
471.4, 471.5 
Public utilities, cities 
Payment to displaced persons, 
472.42 
Power to condemn, 472.46-472.52 
Railroad corporations 
Generally, 471.6-471.19 
Abandoned right of way, 3276.76, 
327G.77, 471.15-471.19 
Pipeline under right of way, 
479.24 
Riparian rights, 327F.5, 471.12 
Spur tracks, 327G.64-327G.69 
Reversion of condemned land, 
327G.76, 327G.77 
Riparian owners on boundary 
rivers, 327F.4, 327F.5 
Sheriff's duties, procedure, 
472.1-472.45 
Soil conservation subdistricts, 
471.4 
State's power 
Generally, 471.1-471.5 
Highways and parks, 111.7-111.9 
Telegraph and telephone companies, 
477 .1-477 .3 
United States right to condemn, 
471.2, 471.3 
Ellf>LOYEES, STATE 
Highway employees, moving 
expenses, 307A.2 
Public contracts, 721.11 
Public records, misuse of, 721.10 
Tort claims, defense and indemni-
fications, 25A.21 
ENGINEERS 
Drainage plats of individuals 
recorded, 465.25-465.27 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
Boundaries, state lands, 
adjustment, approval, 111.24 
Eminent domain, parks, 111.7-111.9 
Parks conveyed to city, 111.32 
Primary road fund, disbursement, 
313.4 
Sale of highway land approved, 
conveyance, 306.22, 306.25 
FARM-TO-MARKET ROAOS 
Generally, 309.10, ch. 310, 312.2-
312.5 
FARM TRACTOOS AND FARM EQUIPIENT 
Railroad crossings, requirements, 
321.344 
Size, weight and load exceptions, 
321.453 
FEES 
Billboards, licensing, 306C.11, 
306C.18 
FENCES 
Highway obstructions removed, 
319.1-319.4 
Hog-tight fences, railway right of 
way, 327G.5 
Railway fence requirements, 
327G.3-327G.10 
Roads, 319.1-319.6 
Viewers, railway fences, 327G.4 
FINES 
Billboard violations, 306C.19 
City, power and limitation, 364.3 
Junkyard regulation, 306C.6 
FLOOD AND EROSION CONTROL 
Counties, ch. 467B 
Federal flood control projects, 
co-operation 
Cities, 384.3 
Counties and other political 
subdivisions, ch. 467B 
FRANOIISES 
Electric transmission lines, 
364.2, ch. 478 
Utilities, 364.2 
II.ASS 
Clearing up wrecks on highway, 
321.371 
Penalty for throwing on highway, 
321.369 
GOVERNOR 
Appointments 
Mississippi river parkway 
commission, 308.1 
Transportation commission, 307.3 
Transportation regulation board, 
307.15 
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GOVERNOR--cont. 
Condemnation of land for United 
States, 461.3 
Reports made to governor, trans-
portation commission, 307A.2(7) 
GYPSUM 
Drainage and drains, 465.1-465.19 
HEDGES 
Drainage ditches, removal, 460.13 
Removal from highway, 460.12, 
460.13 
HIGHWAYS 
Abandoned, 306.10-306.26, 306.41 
Advertising on interstate roads, 
ch. 306B 
Aid by city 
Assessment districts, 311.5 
Bridges and culverts on city 
boundaries, 309.73 
Aid to cities 
Arterial or through highways 
defined, 321.350 
Bridges and culverts, city 
boundary, 309.73, 313.27 
Bridges, use granted public 
utilities, 314.11 
Farm-to-market roads, 306.13, 
306.15, 310.22, 314.5, 314.6 
Primary road, improvements, 
313.21, 313.27, 314.5 
Primary roads marked, 313.43-
313.45 
Public utilities, use of high-
ways, mains, sidewalks and 
cattleways, 320.4-320.8 
Road use tax, ch. 312 
Secondary roads, 314.5 
Streets or roads along state 
land, 307A.5 
Alteration of roads, 306.10-306.37 
Assessments for improvements, ch. 
311 
Billboards and signs, 306C.10-
306C.23, 319.10-319.15 
Bonds 
Bridges over city line, 309.73 
Bridges over state boundary 
line, 309.85, 309.89 
Contractor's bond, 314.1 
County engineer to be bonded, 
309.18, 314.8 
Farm-to-market roads, 314.1 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Bonds--cont. 
Primary roads 
Construction claims paid from, 
313.14 
Engineers to be bonded, 313.13 
Maturity date, limitation, 
312.2 
Public improvement contracts, 
paving bonds deposited, 573.4 
Secondary roads 
Generally, 309.49-309.58, 
309.89 
Construction, contractor's 
bond, 309.51, 309.52, 573.2-
573.6 
Engineers to be bonded, 313.13 
Taxation exemption, 309.51 
Borrow pits, restoration, 314.12 
Boundary line roads, secondary, 
between counties, 309.68-309.71 
Bridges, ch. 309 
Bridges, use granted utilities, 
314.11 
Brush, undergrowth, cut on county 
roads, 317.19 
Budget requirement, secondary 
road, 309.93-309.97 
Burial grounds, not condemned, 
306.20 
Cattleways permitted, 320.4(2)-
320.8 
Cemeteries protected, 306.20 
Census, special federal for 
allocation of road use tax 
funds, 312.3 
Cities 
Annual reports to transportation 
department, 312.12, 312.14 
Controlled-access highway, 
306A.l-306A.8 
Claims for labor and material on 
improvements filed, ch. 573 
Classified, 306.1-306.3, 306.5-
306 .8 
Condemnation 
General procedure, 306.10-
306.37, 471.4, 471.5, ch. 472 
Constitutional provisions, 
Const., Iowa, I, 18 
County condemnation, gravel and 
material beds, 306.19, 309.73, 
314.7 
Drainage of highways, 306.19, 
460.10-460.13 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Condemnation--cont. 
State condemnation 
Authorization, 306.19, 471.1-
471.5 
Park highway and roads 
thereto, 111.7-111.9 
Trees outside highways, 460.13 
Contractors 
Generally, 573.12-573.25 
Bonds, 309.58 
Payment, partial, 310.18, 314.4 
Secondary road requirements, 
314.1 
State officials, 314.2 
Contracts 
Archaeological objects, 
preserved, 305A.4-30~A.6 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.14 
Primary roads, 314.1, 314.2, 
314.4 
Public contracts, ch. 72 
Secondary roads, 309.39-309.43, 
311.21 
Contracts, public, percentage 
retained, ch. 573 
Controlled-access highways, 
306A.1-306A.8 
Control of roads, 306.4, 306.5, 
306.8 
Control of roads, 306.4, 306.5, 
306.8 
Crossings 
Change of stream to avoid, 
306.27 
Railroad crossings, 
Blocking prohibited, 327G.32 
Cities, primary road, 
elimination, 313.27 
Construction required, 327G.2 
Elimination, commission's 
duty, 307A.2(4) 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.4, 
314.5 
Fund for improvement, 327G.19 
Lights and reflectors 
confusing motorists, 
removal, 307A.2(9) 
Maintenance and repairs, 
327G.29-327G.31 
Primary roads, 313.4, 313.27 
Private crossings furnished, 
327G.ll, 327G.12 
Signals, 327G.13, 327G.15 
HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Crossings--cont. 
Railroad crossings--cont. 
Specifications for 
elimination, 309.79 
Warning sign, 307.26, 321.342 
Damages paid,306.26 
Detours established, 306.41 
Displaced persons, relocation, 
ch. 316 
Districts, assessment, ch. 311 
Drainage 
Assessment of benefits, 460.6 
Bridge requirements, 455.118 
Condemnation of right of way, 
460.10 
Connection by private drains, 
465.23 
Construction along highway, 
455.116 
Cost apportionment, payment, 
460.6-460.9 
Districts, highway, ch. 460 
Farm-to-market roads, 310.4, 
314.7 
Levees, highways along 
embankments, 455.117 
Natural flow maintained, 314.7 
Obstructions, injury, 314.7 
Private connection with road 
drains, 465.23 
Road construction, drainage 
protected, 314.7 
Easements, federal water resources 
projects, 306.39, 306.40 
Electric transmission lines, use, 
ch. 478 
Entering private land for surveys 
and other tests, 314.9 
Established, 306.10-306.26 
Failure to maintain granted use, 
forfeiture, 320.7 
Farm-to-market roads 
Authorized uses of fund, 309.10, 
310.4, 310.28, 314.5, 314.6 
Bids, 310.14 
Bridges and culverts built, 
310.4 
City streets and roads aided, 
314.5, 314.6 
Claims for labor and material 
filed, 573.8 
Claims for work paid, 310.16, 
310.18 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Farm-to-market roads--cont. 
Comptroller, state, duties, 
310.7, 314.3 
Condemnation authorized, 306.19, 
471.4 
Construction supervised by 
engineer, 310.19 
Contracts, ~10.9-310.14 
Corporate line roads improved, 
314.6 
County engineer advised as to 
funds allotted, 310.8 
County supervisors' duties 
Generally, ch. 310 
Claims for road costs 
approved, 310.18, 314.3 
Location in cities, 314.5 
Day labor on project, 314.1 
Definitions, 306.1-306.3, 310.1 
Engineer, county, duties, 
310.19, 310.28 
Factors to be considered, 309.25 
Federal aid, 310.1-310.3 
Federal and state aid, co-
operation, 310.2 
Funds 
Generally, 310.3-310.36 
Apportionment and allotment, 
312.5 
Claims audited and paid, 
310.16, 314.3 
Equalization fund, 312.5 
Expended funds, defined, 
presumption, 310.27 
Road use tax allocations, 
312.2 
Sources of fund, 312.5 
Temporary allocation, 310.27 
Grading, draining and surfacing, 
authorized, 310.4, 314.5 
Maintenance, 310.29 
Motor fuel tax aid, 310.7 
Partial payment before 
completion, 310.18 
Plans filed after approval, 
310.14 
Railroad crossing elimination, 
310.4 
Right of way, how acquired, 
310.4, 310.22 
Road use tax, 310.l 
Transportation department's 
duties, 
Generally, ch. 310 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Farm-to-market roads--cont. 
Transportation department's 
duties--cont. 
Bond required of contractors, 
314.1 
Cities, projects, 314.5, 314.6 
Claims audited and paid, 
310.16 
Contracts for projects 
awarded, 310.14, 314.1 
Interest of officials in 
contract, 314.2 
Treasurer, state, duties, 
310.7, 310.20, 314.3 
Federal aid, 307A.3, 307A.4, 
310.2, 313.1 
Flooding, federal water resources 
projects, 306.39, 306.40 
Funds 
City paving, advanced, repaid, 
313.22, 313.23 
City street improvement, ch. 312 
Displaced persons, relocation, 
316.14 
Drainage paid from road funds, 
460.8 
Expenditures limited, 343.10, 
343.11 
Gravel beds, 309.63-309.66 
Improvement contracts, 
percentage retained, 573.12, 
573.24 
Institutional roads, 313.4 
Maintenance fund, 312.6 
Park roads, 313.4 
Road clearing fund, 317.19 
Road use tax fundi 312.1-312.15, 
321.145 
Gas mains, outside cities, 320.4-
320.8 
Grade crossing fund, 312.2, 
327G.19, 327G.29-327G.31 
Grants for use, conditions, 320.5-
320.8 
Great river road, jurisdiction, 
ch. 308 
Hay on roads, landowner's right to 
cut, 317 .11 
Hedges, removal for drainage, 
460.12, 460.13 
Improvement contracts, percentage 
retained, 573.12, 573.24 
Improvements, claims for labor and 
material filed, 573.8 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Improvements, use of existing 
right of way, 306.9 
Intersection lights, confusing, 
removal, 307A.2(10) 
Interstate highways 
Advertising regulated, ch. 306B 
Defined, 306.3 
Rest areas, 306C.21 
Interstate toll bridges, state, 
ch. 313A 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
Jurisdiction over 306.4, 306.5, 
306.8, 306.9, 307A.1(11), 313.2 
Labor on highways 
Claims, filing, priority, 573.7-
573.11, 573.18, 573.19 
Payment, how made, 573.l.6, 
573.17. 573.27 
Payroll advancements on 
secondary systems, 309.61 
Landowner, adjoining 
Grass on road, right to harvest, 
317 .11 
Weeds on road, 317.10, 317.18 
Ledges park road, opening, 111.3 
Lights and reflectors, power of 
commission to remove, 
307A.2(9, 10) 
Littering highway, 321.369 
Maintenance patrolmen 
Obstructions removed, 319.7 
Weed law, duties, 317.22 
Material furnished, claims filed, 
573.7-573.25 
Mississippi river parkway, 308.1-
308.5 
Obstructions on highways 
General provisions, ch. 319 
Billboards and signs, ch. 306B 
Cities not to obstruct roads, 
exception, 321.348 
Glass, rubbish, penalty, 321.369 
Officers 
County engineer 
Generally, 309.17-309.21 
Duty of engineer, 309.67 
May be drainage engineer, 
460.4 
Surveys for conservation 
commission, 111.21 
Interest in contracts forbidden, 
314.2 
Park roads improved and maintained 
by commission, 307A.2 
HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Parks, roadside, authority to 
establish, 313.2 
Patent suits defended, 307A.2 
Payment before work completed, 
573.27 
Pipes and pipelines, 479.3, 479.5, 
479.24 
Plank roads, 346.20 
Plats and field notes filed, 
306.21 
Poles and wires on highway 
Bridges, use granted, 314.11 
Electric lines, 319.5, 47B.1, 
478.30 
Pole removal, 319.1-319.6 
Telegraph and telephone, 319.5, 
477.1-477.3 
Primary roads 
Alteration of primary system, 
306.10-306.26, 313.2 
Annual program published, 
307A.2(12) 
Auditor of transportation 
department, bond, 313.20 
Bids 
Advertisement for bids, 313.10 
City street paving, 313.22 
Rejection, right reserved, 
314.1 
Bridges, Mississippi, purchase, 
313.66 
Changes in primary system, 313.2 
Cities, marking routes 
authorized, 313.43-313.45 
Claims 
Adjudication, priority, 573.18 
Audited by department auditor, 
313.20 
Contingent claims, audit, 
313.19 
Effect of filing, on contract, 
573.25 
Material and labor, filing, 
573.7-573.11 
Payment, 313.14, 314.3, 314.4 
Payment before completion, 
573.27 
Closed, 306.10-306.26, 306.41 
Contracts 
Appeals on public contracts, 
23.1 
Bids, advertisement, 313.10 
Bonds required, 314.1, 573.2-
573.6 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Primary roads--cont. 
Contracts--cont. 
City street paving, 313.22 
Contracts invalid, officials 
interested, 314.2 
Emergency, 313.10 
Payment, general provisions, 
573.12-~73.15 Qualifications of bidder 
· considered, 314.1 
Control by transportation de-
partment, 306.4, 306.5, 306.8 
Controlled-access highways, 
306A.1-306A.8 
Co-operation of federal and 
state governments, 313.1 
Corporate line highways, 314.6 
Defined, 306.3, 313.2 
Detours, 306.41, 313.4, 313.28, 
313.29 
Differentiated from secondary 
roads, 312.2 
Establishment, alteration and 
vacation, 306.10-306.26 
Expenditures supervised, 313.12 
Extensions in cities, 306.5 
Federal aid, 307A.3, 307A.4, 
313.1 
Funds 
Accounts and records, 313.6, 
313.7 
Advanced for city 
reimbursement, 313.23 
City extensions, 313.36 
Contingent fund, 313.17-313.19 
Definition, creation, 313.3 
Disbursement, use, 313.4 
Drainage projects, use for, 
455.118, 460.8 
Farm-to-market expense, 310.28 
Interstate bridges, 313A.7 
Materials and equipment 
revolving fund, 307A.7 
Reimbursement by city, 313.23 
Road use tax allocation, 312.2 
Scenic improvement fund, 
313.67 
Sources of primary road fund, 
313.3, 313.5 
Tort claims, 313.16 
Unexpended balances, revert to 
fund, 313.5 
Use, specific purposes, 313.4 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Primary roads--cont. 
Funds--cont. 
Weight, size and load 
enforcement, 321.480 
Grading and bridging projects, 
preference, 313.8 
Improvements 
General provisions, 313.1, 
313.8-313.37 
Boundary river bridges, gift, 
313.59-313.65 
Contracts awarded, bonds, 
314.1 
Scenic improvement fund, 
313.67 
Jurisdiction 
Transfer, 313.2 
Vested in transportation 
department, 306.4 
Lighting, freeway and primary 
roads, 313.4 
Long-range program, 307A.2(12) 
Machinery purchased or donated, 
307A.3, 313.37 
Maintenance, 313.36 
Market roads included, 313.2 
Materials for improving 
Eminent domain, 471.1-471.19 
Misuse, penalty, 309.66 
Partial payments, 314.6 
Patent suits, defended, 
307A.2(5) 
Paving, limitation on amount, 
313.8 
Paving of city streets, reim-
bursement, 313.22, 313.23 
Road equipment, purchase 
authorized, 313.37 
Road systems defined, 313.2 
Secondary roads excluded, 313.2 
Telephone and transmission 
lines, 477.1-477.3 
Through highways defined, 313.2 
Transportation department 
Generally, 313.1-313.45 
Annual program published, 
307 .5(13) 
Bids, contracts awarded, 
313.10, 314.1 
Cities, 313.21-313.24, 314.6 
Contractor's bond required, 
314.1 
Control vested in, 306.4 
Provisions, generally, Gh. 306 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Primary roads--cont. 
Vacation of primary roads, 
306.10-306.26 
Public travel, noninterference, 
damages, 320.6 
Railroad bridges, maintenance, 
327F.2 
Relocation of roads, ch. 306 
Right of way 
Changes made in, permit 
required, 319.14 
Cost paid, 306.26 
Entering private land for 
surveys and other tests, 314.9 
Fund, primary, to acquire, 313.4 
Jurisdiction over, 306.9 
Private owner, acquisition, 
471.4 
Sale of, conditions, 306.21-
306.25 
Telegraph and telephone lines, 
477 .1 
Transmission lines, right to 
cross, 478.30 
Use of existing right of way, 
306.9 
Road defined, 306.3 
Road machinery 
Considered in accepting contract 
bid, 314.1 
Donation by federal government, 
307A.3 
Transportation department's 
authority, 313.37 
Roadside parks, 313.2 
Road use tax fund, ch. 312. 
327G.29 
Road workers, exempt from traffic 
laws, 321.233 
Rumble strips at dangerous 
crossings, 321.342 
Secondary roads 
Generally, ch. 309 
Advance payment for labor, 
309.61 
Advice by department to 
supervisors, 309.16 
Altered, 306.10-306.37 
Anticipatory certificates 
Construction indebtedness, 
309.46-309.55 
Improvement indebtedness 
Anticipating revenues, 
311.23, 311.28-311.31 
HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Secondary roads--cont. 
Anticipatory certificates--cont. 
Improvement indebtedness--
cont. 
Tax exempt, 312.4 
Apportionment of benefits, 
311.8-311.10 
Assessments, generally, ch. 311 
Bids, 309.39-309.43 
Billboards forbidden, 319.10-
319.15 
Bills itemized and certified, 
314.3 
Bridges and culverts, 309.3-
309.16 
Budget, 309.93-309.97 
Claims for labor and material, 
573.1-573.27 
tlassified, subclassifications, 
306.1-306.3, 306.5-306.7 
Closed, 306.10-306.37, 306.41 
Construction and maintenance, 
duty of supervisors and state, 
309.16 
Construction program 
Generally, 309.22-309.43 
Drainage flow, trees 
protected, 314.7 
Priority projects, 309.22 
Contracts 
Advertising and letting, 
309.39-309.41, 314.1 
Approval, when necessary, 
309.42, 311.21 
Bidders' qualifications, 314.l 
Bids, 309.39-309.43 
Bonds required, 573.2-573.6 
Duties, public contracts, 
72.1-72.4 
Interest of official's barred, 
314.2 
Partial payments, 310.18, 
573.12 
Public improvements, ch. 573 
Specifications, standard, 
309.39 
Control vested in board of 
supervisors, 306.4 
County line roads, 309.68-
309.71, 309.84, 311.4 
County trunk roads, classifi-
cation abolished, 309.11 
Definition, 306.3 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Secondary roads--cont. 
Detour use by state, restora-
tion, 313.4, 313.28, 313.29 
Draining of roads, 311.22, 314.7 
Duty of supervisors and 
engineer, 309.67 
Establishment, alteration, and 
vacation,. 306.10-306.37 
Farm-to-market roads 
General provisions, ch. 310 
Defined, 306.3 
Funds 
Anticipation of funds, 309.46-
309.55 
Engineer's compensation paid 
from, 309.lB 
Research fund, 310.34 
Road use tax, 310.l 
Road use tax allocation, 312.2 
Secondary road fund, 309.8, 
309.9, 309.12 
Use specified 
Drainage projects, 455.118, 
460.8 
Stop signs, 321.346, 321.352 
Government corners, preserved, 
314.8 
Grading and draining, 311.22 
Gravel beds, 309.63-309.66, 
314.9 
Improvements 
Generally, ch. 311 
Limitation on expense, 309.63 
Intercounty, county line roads, 
309.68-309.84 
Interstate roads 
Advertising, ch. 306B 
Bridges across, 309.85-309.89, 
314.11 
Maintenance, 314.10 
Jurisdiction vested in board of 
supervisors, 306.4 
Labor furnished, advance on 
payroll, 309.61 
Levee roads, establishment, 
455 .117 
Levy by supervisors, 309.7 
Local county roads, classifi-
cation abolished, 309.11 
Local secondary roads, 306.3 
Machinery and materials, 314.1 
Maintenance, duties of super-
visors and engineer, 309.67 
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I HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Secondary roads--cont. 
I Oiling and other surfacing, 311.1 Payment, partial, for work, 314.4, 573.27 
Payrolls, advance on, 309.61 
I Primary roads excluded, 313.2 Repair, supervisors' duties, 309.67 
Research, 310.34-310.36 
Reversion, primary roads, 313.2 
I Signs, costs, 321.352 Street improvement, 311.5 Supervisors, county, duties 
Generally, ch. 311 
I 
Improving and financing, 
309.3-309.91, 314.2 
Jurisdiction granted, 306.4 
Tax levy, 309.7 
Transmission lines, 478.20, 
I 478.30 Transportation department's duties Adjoining counties, road 
problems, 309.68-309.71 
I Advice to supervisors, 309.16 Anticipatory certificates, advice, 309.46 Assessment districts 
Hearings on apportionment, 
I 311.11 Notice of boundary change, 311.12 
Assistance in work given, 
309.16 
I Bridge and culvert contracts, 309.79-309.82 Bridges and culverts, city 
boundaries, 309.73 
I 
Construction program approved, 
309.22-309.56 
Detour use, restoration, 
313.4, 313.28, 313.29 
Forms for construction 
I 
bidding, 314.1 
Intercounty highways, 309.68-
309.71 
Interstate roads, 314.10 
Railroad crossings, specifi-
I cat i ans, 309 .79 Research report, 310.36 Survey and report, approval, 309.56 
I 
I 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Secondary roads--cont. 
Vacated and closed, 306.10-
306.37 
Sidewalks, elevated structures, 
bikeways, 308A.3 
Sidewalks on highways, 320.43(3)-
320.8 
Sidewalks out of city, 320.1-320.3 
Signboards, advertising, 
prohibited, 319.10~319.15 
Signs, transportation department, 
321.253 
Signs with lights, removal, 
307A.2(9, 10) 
Snow routes, 321.236, 321.237 
State institutional roads 
Definition, 306.3 
Funds, 313.4 
Highway division to improve and 
maintain, 307A.2(11) 
Improvement by city or county, 
307A.5 
Jurisdiction, 306.4 
State line highways, maintenance, 
314.10 
State park roads 
Construction, improvement, 
maintenance, 307A.2(11) 
Defined, 306.3 
Funds, 313.4 
Improvement by city or county, 
308A.5 
Jurisdiction, 306.4 
Purchase of land authorized, 
111.7-111.9 
Stop signs at through highways, 
321.345 
Streets, defined, 306.3 
Subdivisions, rural, road plan 
filed and approved, 306.21 
Supervisors, county 
Advancement on labor payrolls, 
309.61 
Advice from transportation 
department, 309.16 
Anticipation of funds, 309.46-
309. 55. 311. 28 
Appraisers appointed, 306.28 
Assistance from transportation 
department, 314.10 
Bills for road work, certified, 
a 11 owed, 314. 3 
Bonds required of contractors, 
314.1 
HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Supervisors, county--cont. 
Cattleways, permission to 
construct, 320.4 
Construction program, 314.7 
County trunk, program adopted, 
314.5 
Drainage districts, ch. 460 
Duty to maintain roads, 309.67 
Establishment, alteration or 
vacation, 306.10-306.37 
Intercounty roads, duties, 
309.68-309.71 
Jurisdiction, secondary roads, 
306.4 
Obstructions removed, ch. 319 
Patent infringement suits, state 
to assist, 307A.2 
Secondary road budget, 309.93-
309.97 . 
Secondary road levy, 309.7 
Sidewalk to school outside city, 
320.1-320.3 
Streams changed to aid roads, 
306.27-306.37 
Subdivisions, rural, road plan 
approved, 306.21 
Survey of road projects 
approved, 309.56 
Tax levy for secondary roads, 
311.10-311. 26 
Use of highway grant, 
enforcement, 320.8 
Use restricted by resolution, 
321.471-321.473 
Violations, road bills, penalty, 
314.3 
Water and gas mains, use of 
highway, 320.4-320.8 
Watercourses changed to aid 
roads, 306.27-306.37 
Widening secondary roads, 
authority, 306.27-306.37 
Surveys, entering private land, 
314.9 
Taxes 
Assessment, special, 311.8-
311.26 
Public road lands exempt, 427.2 
Temporary closing for 
construction, 306.41 
Through highways defined, 321.350 
Transmission lines, 319.2-319.7, 
478.20, 478.30 
Transportation department, ch. 307 
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HIGHWAYS--cont. 
Trees, protected, 314.7 
Use tax fund, 312.1 
Utilities relocated, cost, 
306A .10-306A .13 
Utility mains, conditions, 320.4-
320.8 
Vacation of roads, 306.10-306.37 
Violations 
Contracts, requirements, 
violations, 314.2 
Engineers survey violations, 
314.8 
Grant for use, 320.5-320.8 
Gravel, unlawful disposal, 
309.66 
Water mains outside cities, 320.4-
320.8 
Weeds destroyed, ch. 317 
Witness corners preserved, 314.8 
lftl>ROVEMENTS 
Assessments, cities and counties, 
384.38 
Cities, capital improvement fund, 
384.7 
Public improvement, contracts and 
claims, ch. 573 
INDEBTEDNESS, PUBLIC 
Bonds, see BONDS 
Cities, see CITIES 
County, see COUNTY 
Limitation, generally, 346.24, 
346.25 
State, see STATE OF IOWA 
INGRESS 
Land without access, 471.4 
INJUNCTION 
Billboards on highway, 306B.5, 
306C.19, 319.10-319.15 
County zoning, 358A.14, 358A.23 
Highway obstruction, 319.8-319.11 
Junkyards, 306C.6 
Signs or billboards on highways, 
319 .10, 319 .11 
INTEREST 
County bonds, 346.3, 346.11-346.14 
INTERSECTIONS 
Highways and boulevards, traffic, 
321.345 
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INTERSECTIONS--cont. 
Traffic signs, 321.252-321.260 
INTERSTATE 
Agreements to exercise joint gov-
ernmental powers, 28E.l-28E.17 
Bridges, ch. 313A 
Highways, ch. 306 
IOWA PRODUCTS AND LABOR, PREFERRED 
Generally, ch. 73 
IOWA TORT CLAIMS ACT 
Actions 
Limitations, 25A.13 
When permitted, 25A.5 
Adjustment and settlement, 25A.3 
Appea 1, 25A. 7 
Appeal board, duties, 25A.3 
Application, 25A.19 
Attorneys fees and expenses, 
25A.15 
Award 
Effect, 25A.10 
Payment, 25A .11 
Claims defined, 25A.2 
Compromise and settlement, 25A.9 
Comptroller, duties, 25A.12 
Defense of employees, federal 
court, 25A.22 
District court, jurisdiction, 
25A.4 
Employees defended and 
indemnified, 25A.21 
Exceptions, 25A.14 
Extension of time, 25A.18 
Insurance, 25A.20 
Judgment as bar, 25A.8 
Limitations of actions, 25A.13 
Malfeasance excluded, 25A.2 
Remedies exclusive, 25A.16 
JOINT UNDERTAKINGS 
City-county buildings, 28E.16, 
384.24 
City-federal, 364.5 
Drainage districts, city and 
county, 3D8.5 
Governmental powers, ch. 28E 
Improvements, cities, 384.76 
rnterstate bridges, maintenance, 
county and public utilities, 
309.91, 314.11 
Interstate secondary road, 314.10 
Metropolitan or regional planning 
commissions, 28E.15, ch. 473A 
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JOINT UNDERTAKINGS--cont. 
Unified law enforcement, 28E.21-
28E.28 
JUNK 
Inflammable, nuisance, 657.2(10) 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
Legalizing acts, condemnation pro-
ceedings, transportation depart-
ment, 589.27 
LEVEES 
See DRAINAGE AND LEVY DISTRICTS 
LIGHTS 
Removal from highways, 307A.2(9, 
10) 
Traffic lights, 321.252-321.260 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
Actions not specifically 
mentioned, 614.1(4) 
Assessments, special, 384.66 
Bonds 
City, 384.92 
Road contractor's bond, 309.58 
Contracts 
Actions on, 614.1(2, 4, 5) 
In writing, 614.1(5) 
Not in writing, 614.1(4) 
Realty, 614.1 
Road contractor's bond, 309.58 
Fines and forfeitures, ordinance, 
614.l 
Fraud or mistake, relief, 614.1(4) 
Judgments and decrees, quieting 
title, 614.1(7) 
Ordinance penalties and 
forfeiture, 614.1 
Periods of limitations stated, 
614.1 
Property, injury to, 614.l 
Public improvement contract 
action, 573.16 
Public officer, action against, 
614.1 
Quieting title, action to set 
aside, 614.1(7) 
Real estate 
Recovery, 614.1 
Relative rights, injury, 
614.1(2) 
Sheriff or officer, action 
against, 614.1(3) 
Special charter cities, claims 
against, 420.45 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS--cont. 
State, claims against, 25A.13 
Statute of limitations, generally, 
614.l 
Tort actions, 614.l 
Trespass actions, 614.1 
Unliquidated claim against city, 
420.45 
Unwritten contracts, 614.1(4) 
Wage claims, liability for 
nonpayment, 614.1 
LOANS 
City, short term loans, 384.10 
Federally insured, 384.10 
Railway finance authority, 307B.7 
MASS TRANS IT 
Cooperation with the United States 
government, 28E.7 
MINERALS 
Eminent domain, railway right of 
way, 471.4 
MISCONDUCT <R NEGLECT IN OFFICE 
See PUBLIC OFFICERS 
MISSISSIPPI AND MISSOURI RIVERS 
Bridge purchase, 313.66 
Mississippi river parkway, ch. 308 
Parkway commission, rulemaking, 
308.4(3} 
Railroad crossing near river, 
327G.22 
Riparian rights protected, 327F.4, 
327F .5 
l«>T<R VEHIO..ES 
Accidents 
Bond, financial responsibility, 
321A.5, 321A.24 
Proof of financial responsi-
bility, 321A.12-321A.29 
Security following accident, 
321A.4-321A.11 
Wrecks cleared from highway, 
321. 371 
Axles, minimum distance apart, 
321.459, 321.463 
·Bonds, employee of department, 
traffic officer, 321.478 
Bottles thrown on highway, 
removal, 321.369, 321.370 
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MOTOR VEHIO..ES--cont. 
Buses, routes, considered in 
locating roads, 309.25 
Crosswalk, parking or stopping, 
321.358( 5) 
Dealers 
Liability insurance, statement 
required, 321A.39 
Load weight increase, 
reregistration, 321.466 
Dual axles, minimum separation, 
321.459 
Equipment in condition for safe 
driving, 321.381 
Farm products, overload on trucks, 
321.466 
Farm tractors and farm equipment 
Size, weight and load, 
exceptions, 321.453 
Fire apparatus 
Fire hydrant, parking or 
stopping near prohibited, 
321.358( 4) 
Fire station entrance, stopping 
near, 321.358(9) 
Length, exception, 321.457 
Size, weight, and load, excep-
tions, 321.453 
Streets may be closed by cities, 
321.348 
Glass on highway, removal, 
321.369, 321.371 
Injurious substances on highway, 
321.369, 321.371 
Intersections 
Parking or stopping prohibited, 
321.358(3} 
Stop signs, 321.345 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
Headlights, lamps, required for 
safe driving, 321.381 
Penalty for improper equipment, 
321.381 
Local authorities, power to 
regulate 
Generally, 321.236, 321.237, 
321.239, 321.249 
Conflict with state law, 
illegal, 321.236 
Excess load, 321.473 
Intersection markers, 321.345 
Railroad crossings, 321.342 
Real property owners' rights, 
321.251 
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ll()T~ VEHIO..ES--cont. 
Local authorities, power to 
regulate--cont. 
Reciprocal rules and ordinances, 
321.250 
School zones, movable stop 
signs, 321. 249 
Signs, posting of regulations, 
321.237 
Size, weight and load pro-
visions, 321.473 
Snow routes, 321.236, 321.237 
Speed limits altered, 321.293 
Speed signs installed, 321.289 
Traffic-control devices, 
321.254, 321.255 
Weight of vehicles, 321.471-
321.473 
Marks on publicly owned vehicles, 
721.8 
Nails on highway, removal, 
321.369, 321.370 
Nonresidents, financial responsi-
bility, 321A.8 
One-way roads and streets, power 
to install, 321.236(4) 
Overloading of vehicles, 321.466 
"Owner" defined, 321A.1(8) 
Parked motor vehicles 
Double parking prohibited, 
321.367 
Regulations, local authorities, 
321.236(1), 321.239 
Park regulations 
Generally, 111.36-111.38 
Speed in city parks, 321.236(5) 
Peace officer provisions 
Authority to weigh and inspect, 
321.476-321.481 
Department employees as peace 
officers, 321.477 
Directing traffic, 321.256, 
321.358 
Duties unimpaired by weight law, 
321.481 
Parking, exceptions at officer's 
direction, 321.358 
Pedestrians 
Traffic-control signals, duty, 
321.257 
Processions, local authorities 
power, 321.236(3) 
Public vehicles, marking and 
using, 721.2, 721.8 
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MOTOR VEHIO..ES--cont. 
Railroad crossings 
Parking or stopping distance, 
321.358(8) 
Warning sign, 321.342 
Real property owners, right to 
control vehicular travel, 
321.251 
Reciprocity, discrimination 
against Iowa vehicles, 321.250 
Restricting highway use, condi-
tions, local power, 321.236(8) 
Right of way 
Intersections, 321.257 
One-way roads, 321.236(4) 
Traffic signal at intersection, 
321.257 
Road machinery 
Caterpillar tractors, 321.344, 
321.422 
Lighting equipment, 321.381 
Purchase by transportation 
department, 313.37 
Road tractors, fann products, 
overload permitted, 321.466 
Rubbish collection, special 
permit, 321. 473 
Rumble strips at dangerous 
crossings, 321.342 
Safety zone, 321.358 
School district marked, 321.285 
School zones, movable stop signs, 
321.249 
Semitrailers 
Authority to weigh and inspect, 
321.476-321.481 
Axles, distance apart, load, 
321.459, 321.463 
Length, maximum, 321.457 
Overloads, lawful or unlawful, 
321.466 
Registration, 321.466 
Truck tractor, connection type 
approved, 321.462 
Sidewalk, parking or stopping on 
prohibited, 321.358(1) 
Signs to regulate traffic 
Arrangement of signs, meanings, 
321.258 
Commercial advertising 
prohibited, 321.259 
Flashing signals, meaning, 
321.257 
Injury or defacement unlawful, 
321.260 
lll>TOR VEHICLES--cont. 
Signs to regulate traffic--cont. 
Lights near railroad crossings 
ordered removed, 307A.2(9), 
327C.3 
Local authorities, powers, 
321.236, 321.254, 321.255 
One-way traffic roads, 321.236 
Posting signs required, 321.237 
Private property signs, limita-
tion, 321.259 
Railroad signals, 321.259, 
321.260 
Right turn on red, 321.257 
School zones, movable stop 
signs, 321. 249 
Snow removal, 321.237 
Specifications by highway 
division, 321.252 
Speed signs, cities to install, 
321.289, 321.290, 321.295 
Stop signs 
City through traffic, 321.347 
Movable, school zones, 321.249 
Parking or stopping near, 
prohibited, 321. 358 
Streetcars, obedience, 321.256 
Traffic control devices 
Erection by highway division 
of transportation depart-
ment, 321. 253 
Local authorities, erection, 
321.347-321.349 
Meanings of lights, signals 
and terms, 321.257 
Parking or stopping near 
prohibited, 321.358 
Pedestrians to obey signals, 
321.257 
Permission by transportation 
department to local authori-
ties, 321.253 
Primary highways, transporta-
tion department to erect, 
321.253 
Red lights, 321.257 
Standard manual specificatins, 
321.252 
Uniform system by highway 
division of transportation 
department, 321.252 
Unlawful possesssion, 321.260 
Trucks, local authority, 321.473 
Turning on red light, 321.257 
632 
lll>TOR VEHICLES--cont. 
Signs to regulate traffic--cont. 
Unauthorized signs, removal, 
321.259 
Size, weight and load 
Authority of officers to weigh, 
321.476-321.481 
Axles, distance between, 
321.459, 321.463 
Axles, maximum gross weight, 
321.463 
Chains, safety, for towing, 
321.462 
Damage liability due to 
overload, 321.475 
Drawbars for towing, 321.461, 
321.462 
Dual axles, distance apart, 
321.459, 321.463 
Employees of highway division of 
transportation department, 
321.476-321.481 
Excess gross weight, percentage 
allowed, 321.463, 321.466 
Excess weight load removed, 
321.465 
Exemption 1 border cities, 321.457 \ 7) 
Fire apparatus, exception, 
321.453, 321.457 
Front load extension limit, 
321.458 
Gross weight, maximum, axles, 
321.463 
Height of vehicle or .load, 
321.456 
Length, limitation, 321.457 
Loading beyond fenders, 321.455 
Loading beyond front, 321.458 
Load, maximum, 321.452, 321.463 
Local regulation, 321.471-
321.473 
Overload damage, driver and 
owner liable, 321.475 
Overload law, 321.466 
Parks, excessive weight 
prohibited, 111.37 
Passenger carriers, tests, 
321.464 
Penalty for exceeding maximum, 
321.452 
Projecting load, flag or lamp, 
321.455 
Safety investigation, 
passengers, 321.464 
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llllTOR VEHILCES--cont. 
Size, weight and load--cont. 
I Scope and effect, 321.452 Sealed loads certified by weight officer, 321.464 
Spilling loads on highways, 
I 
321.460 
Transportation department's 
authority to restrict, 321.474 
Violations, penalty, 321.452 
Weighing by transportation 
I department, 321.476 Weighing of load by peace officer, 321.465 Weight, maximum, 321.463 
Wheelbase, minimum, 321.459 
I Width limit on vehicle and load, 321.454 Special stops required, 321.342, 321.344-321.352 
Speed regulations 
I Approaching emergency vehicle, 321.288 Approaching slow-moving vehicle, 
321.288 
Assured clear distance ahead, 
I 321.285 Bridges, 321.295 Careful prudent speed defined, 
321.285 
I 
Control of vehicle, 321.288 
Determination of safe speed by 
highway divison, 321.290, 
321.295 
Districts enumerated, 321.285 
I Elevated structures, 321.295 Fuses, flares and signals, 321.288 Interstate system, 321.285(8) 
Local authorities, regulations, 
I 321.236(5) Local speed changes, signs, 321.293 Minimum speeds 
Slow, blocking normal traffic, 
I 321.294 Trucks and buses, adequate speed required, 321.464 Nighttime defined, 321.285 
Parks, state, 111.36 
I Passenger bus speed limits, 321.287 Primary roads, 321.285(5) 
Reasonable speed, 321.285, 
I 
321.288, 321.290, 321.294 
I 
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MOTOR VEHIO..ES--cont. 
Speed regulations--cont. 
Reduction of speed, when 
required, 321.288 
School buses, 321.287 
Secondary roads, 321.285(7) 
Signs, duty to install, 321.289, 
321.290, 321.295 
Special restrictions, 321.290 
Towing another vehicle, 321.285 
Trailer, 321.285 
Truck speed limits, 321.286 
Speed traps, prohibited, 321.285 
Sprinkling to clean roadway, 
321.460 
Standing vehicles, local authori-
ties, regulation, 321.236(1) 
Stops required 
City, through traffic, 321.293, 
321.345 
Dangerous railroad crossings, 
321.342 
Heavy equipment at railroad 
crossing, 321.344 
Intersection, 321.236(6) 
Local authorities, stop signs, 
321.236 
Overload tested by officers, 
321.465 
Prohibited parking places, 
321.358 
Railroad crossings, 321.342, 
321.343 
School zones, movable stop 
signs, 321.249 
Signs at highway, cost, 321.346, 
321.352 
Through highway signs, 321.345-
321.350 
Weighing and inspecting, 
321.476-321.481 
Yield signs, 321.345 
Through highways 
Definition, 321.350 
Designated, authority, 321.345 
Stops required, signs, 321.236, 
321.293, 321.345-321.350 
Tires, snow, 321.236 
Towing vehicles 
Chain, safety, required, 321.462 
Drawbar distance limited, 
321.461 
Trailers 
Authority to weigh and inspect, 
321.466-321.481 
l«>TOR VEHIQ.ES--cont. 
Trailers--cont. 
Axles, distance apart, 321.459, 
321.463 
Chain, safety, required, 321.462 
Drawbars, 321.461, 321.462 
Farm products, overload 
permitted, 321.466 
Length, maximum, 321.457 
Load increase, classification, 
payment, 321.466 
Load limit, 321.463 
Trucks 
Authority to weigh and inspect, 
321.476-321.481 
Axles, distance between, 
321.459~ 321.463 
Capacity registered, 321.466 
Dual axles, distance apart, 
321.459, 321.463 
Farm products, overload 
permitted, 321.466 
Length, maximum, 321.457 
Load increase, classification, 
payment, 321.466 
Load, maximum per wheel, 321.463 
Loads spilled on highways, 
321.460 
Local regulation, power, signs 
erected, 321.473 
Restrictions, exemptions for 
border cities, 321.457(7) 
Restrict size or load, signs, 
321.472-321.474 
Speed limits, 321.286 
Truck tractors 
Connection with semitrailer, 
approval, 321.462 
Weight over that registered, 
unlawful, 321.466 
Turning right on red light, 
321.257 
Unsafe condition, 321.381 
Violation 
Axle-weight limits, schedule of 
penalties, 321.463 
Equipment in unsafe condition, 
321.381 
Failure or refusal to allow 
officer to weigh vehicle, 
321.465 
Financial responsibility Act, 
321A.32 
Lighting equipment, 321.381 
Local ordinances, 321.473 
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l«>TOR VEHIQ.ES--cont. 
Violation--cont. 
Obstructing weighing officer, I 321.476 Overloading unlawful, 321.466 
Passengers seated improperly, 
321.455 
I Preventing weighing officer from performing duties, 321.476 Slow speed 'blocking traffic, 
321.294 
Weigh load, refusal by driver, I 321.465 Weight limits, schedule of penalties, 321.463 
Wheel load maximum, 321.463 
NOTICE I Administrative hearings, 17A.2, 
17A.19 
Constructive notice, condemnation 
proceedings, 472.41 I Highway obstructions, removal, 319.3 
Road assessment, 311.11-311.13 
Water recreational areas, hearing 
notice, 111.63 I Weed control program, 317.14 Weed law violation assessment, 
317.21 
NUISANCES I Generally, ch. 657 Advertising signs, road or 
railroad, 657.2(7) 
Billboards I Interstate highway, removal, 306B.5 Regulation, 306C.19 
Roads, abated, 319.10 
Views, 657.2(7) I Bond given, effect, 657.6 Damages, 657.1 Highway obstructions, removal, 
319.8-319.15 
Highway signs, unauthorized, I removal, 321.259 Inflammable junk, 657.2(10) 
Junkyards, 306C.6 
Obstruction of water courses, 
657.2(3) I Obstructions on highway, injunction, 319.8, 319.9 
Order of abatement, process, 
657.3, 657.4 
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NUISANCES--cont. 
Procedure for abatement, 657.4-
657.7 
Signboards obstructing view, 
657 .2(7) 
Signs, advertising on roads, 
319.10-319.15 
Signs on highways, unauthorized, 
321.259 
Weeds, 657.2(12) 
OBSTRUCTIONS 
Ditches or drains, 319.7, 319.8 
Highways, obstructions removed, 
314.7 
Nuisances, obstruction deemed, 
657 .2(5, 7) 
Signs and billboards on highways, 
ch. 319, 657.2(5, 7) 
~CHARDS 
Condemnation 
Generally, chs. 471, 472 
Damage paid before taking, 
472.26 
Dams erected, overflowing 
prohibited, 472.27 
Highway drainage, 314.7, 460.13 
Railway condemnation, 471.12 
Supervisor's discretion, 
highways, 460.13 
OVERHEAD CROSSINGS 
Highways, see VIADUCTS AND 
UNDERPASSES 
Motor vehicles, speed regulation, 
321.295 
Railways, 309.79, 327F.2, 327G.12 
PARKS 
City parks, 384.24 
Motor vehicle regulation 
Speed in city parks, 321.236(5) 
State parks, 111.36-111.38 
Private parks, 111.34 
State parks and land 
Acquisition by condemnation, 
111.7 
Boundaries established, 111.20-
111.23 
Bridges improved and maintained 
by highway commission, 
307A.2(11) 
Cities, care or purchase, 
111.27. 111.32 
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PARKS--cont. 
State parks and land--cont. 
Condemnation of land, 111.7-
111.9 
Conservation commission, duties, 
111.3 
Counties, maintenance arrange-
ment, 111.27 
Destructive acts prohibited, 
111.35 
Engineers, highway, county, 
111.20-111.23 
Excessive loads, director's 
powers, 111.37 
Highways established, 111.8, 
111.9 
Highways under control of 
commission, 307A.2(6, 11) 
Maintenance by cities or 
counties, 111.27 
Motor vehicles in parks, 111.35-
111.38 
Roads, 111.8, 111.36-111.38, 
306.3, 306.4, 307A.2(6, 11) 
Surveys and plats, 111.21, 
111.22 
Weed extermination by supervi-
sors, 317.9 
PATROL 
Road maintenance patrol 
Obstructions removed, 319.7 
Weed law, duties, 317.22 
PAVING 
Primary road extension, 313.21-
313.24 
State to pay costs on state land, 
307A.5 
PIPELINE AND PIPELINE COMPANIES 
Generally, ch. 479 
PLANNING COlll4ISSIONS 
Metropolitan or regional, 28E.15, 
ch. 473A 
PLATS 
Assessment of platted lots, 409.48 
Certified, 409.43 
City 
Generally, ch. 409 
Abstract of title attached, 
409.9 
Acknowledgement by owner, 409.13 
PLATS--cont. 
City--cont. 
Approval or disapproval, 409.7, 
409.14-409.16 
Condemnation application, 472.3 
Conveyances according to plat, 
409.3 
Corners or monuments, 409.l 
Encumberances, affidavit, bond, 
409.10, 409.11 
Engineer, information furnished, 
384.45-384.48 
Recording 
Annulled if improperly filed, 
409.16 
Covenant of warranty as to 
filing, 409.2 
Effect of record, 409.13 
Fee of county surveyor, 
355.15(3) 
Penalty for failure to record, 
409.45 
Requirement for fire lane, 
409.12 
Replatting, 409.26-409.27 
Resurveyed, 409.38-409.44 
Sale or lease without plat, 
penalty, 409.45 
Streets and alleys 
Generally, 409.1-409.7, 409.14 
Change of street names, 409.17 
Enclosure and use of vacated 
land, 409.20 
Vacation of plats, effect, 
409 .18 
Subdivisions, plat required, 
409.1 
Survey by county surveyor, 
355.1-355.7 
Vacation of plats, 409.18-409.36 
Void plats, action to annul, 
409.16 
County records 
Drainage plat book kept, 465.25-
465.27 
Weed eradication plats, 
317.21(2) 
Error or ommission, 409.32 
Highway plats, 306.21, 311.8 
Railroads, private farm crossings 
requested, 327G.12 
Requirements prior to recording, 
409.31 
Rural subdivisions, approval and 
filing, 306.21 
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PLATS--cont. 
State parks plat filed, 111.22, 
111.32 
Subdivision, 409.1 
Surveyor's plats 
Book kept in auditor's office, 
355.1 
Certification, 409.12, 409.43 
Certified, admissable in 
evidence, 355.5 
Fee for survey, 355.15 
State park plats by county 
engineer, 111.21 
Utility easement not encumbered, 
409.9 
POLES AND WIRES 
Highway obstructions, removal, 
319.2-31g.4 
Highways, right of utility to 
cross, 478.30 
Removal from highways, 319.1-319.6 
Telephone and telegraph lines, 
ch. 477 
Transmission lines, ch. 478 
PREFERENCE LAWS 
Inconsistency with federal laws, 
73.11 
Labor, Iowa, preferred, ch. 73 
Products, Iowa, preferred, ch. 73 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS AND BONDS 
Generally, ch. 23, see CONTRACTS 
PUBLIC Ifl>ROVEMENTS 
Abandonment of work, effect, 
573.23 
Actions, optional and mandatory, 
573.16 
Action to adjucate rights to 
retain fund, 573.16 
Bids, see BIDS AND BIDDERS, 
CONTRACTS 
Bond by contractor 
Action to adjucate rights, 
573.16, 573.17 
Action when work stopped, 573.23 
Amount of bond, 573.5 
Approval by officer or board, 
573.5 
Benefited water district 
contracts, 357.17 
Deposit or check in lieu of 
bond, 573.4 
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PUBLIC Illf>ROVE.-ENTS--cont. 
Bond by contractor--cont. 
Enforcement of bond, 23.8 
Judgment entered when claims 
unpaid, 573.22 
Release bond to obtain unpaid 
funds, 573.16 
Requirements of bond, 573.2, 
573.3 
Revealing contents of bid, 
liability, 72.4 
Secondary road construction, 
309.58, 314.1 
Subcontractor's provisions on 
bond, 573.6 
Suit by public corporation, 
573.26 
Claims for labor and material 
Attorney FEES taxed as costs, 
573.21 
Claimants joined as parties to 
suit, 573.17 
Claims paid only from withheld 
percentage, 573.25 
Filing of, 573.7 
Fund retained to pay, 573.12-
573.14 
Highway claims, where filed, 
573.8 
Insufficient funds, order of 
payment, 573.19 
Material defined, 573.1(4) 
Order of payment from fund, 
573 .18, 573 .19 
Payment from retained fund, 
proof, 573.15 
Retained fund to pay claims, 
573.12, 573.13 
Service defined, 573.1(5) 
Subcontractor's rights on bond, 
573.6(1) 
Work stopped, how claims are 
paid, 573.23 
Construction defined, 573.1(3) 
Contract law, see CONTRACTS 
Filing claims, percentage held, 
573.25 
Filing of claims after action 
brought, 573 .11 
Highway claims, where filed, 573.8 
Insufficient funds, order of 
payment, 573.19 
Joint exercise of governmental 
powers, 28E.1-28E.17 
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PUBLIC IM>ROVEMENTS--cont. 
Judgment on bond when claims 
unpaid, 573.22 
Limitation of action against 
subcontractor, 573.6 
Limitation on contract payments, 
573.12 
Order of payment from retained 
fund, 573.18, 573.lg 
Payment before work completed, 
573. 27 
Payment from primary road fund, 
573.24 
Payment from retained fund, 
573.15, 573.18 
Payments under public contracts, 
573.12 
Preference for Iowa products and 
labor, ch. 73 
Priority of filing claims within 
class, 573.19 
Property converted to money to pay 
claims, 573.20 
Retention, percent of estimates, 
573.12 
Service defined, 573.1(5) 
State land, assessment, munici-
palities and counties, 307A.5 
Time of filing claims, 573.9, 
573 .10 
Unpaid funds to be retained, 
573.14 
PUBLIC LANDS 
Electric lines, franchise, 478~1-
478.5 
Public parks, generally, ch. 111 
State 1 ands 
Communication companies, use 
granted, 477.1-477.3 
Conveyances, unused highway 
right of way, 306.16-306.20 
PUBLIC OFFICERS 
Accounts, failure to report 
expenditures, 721.2 
Administrative rules, 17A.l-17A.17 
Bids, sealed, divulging, penalty, 
72.3, 72.4 
Contributions for political 
purposes, 721.2, 721.3 
Limitation of actions against, 
614.1(3) 
Motor vehicles 
Labeling publicly owned, 721.8 
PUBLIC OFFICERS--cont. 
Motor vehicles--cont. 
Use of public car in campaign 
prohibited, 721.4 
Preference given Iowa products and 
labor, required, penalty for 
noncompliance, 73.1-73.10 
Private use of public property, 
penalty, 721.2 
Records, public misuse, 721.10 
Violations 
Bids, sealed, divulging 
contents, 72.4 
Contracts to spend more than 
authorized, 721.2 
Duties, failure to perform, 
721.2 
Extortion, 721.2 
Failure to report expenditures, 
721.2 
False entries of fees, 721.10 
Fees, failure to pay over, 721.2 
Fees, taking more than lawful, 
721.2 
Iowa labor and material, failure 
to give preference, 73.3-73.5 
Neglect or misconduct in office, 
721.2 
Political activities and contri-
butions, employees of state, 
prohibited, 721.3-721.5 
Private use of public property, 
721.2 
Public contracts, unauthorized 
expenditures, 72.1, 72.4 
State owned cars, use 
prohibited, 721.2 
PUBLIC lJTILITIES 
Bonds, financing by cities, 
ch. 384 
Bus and motor transit, city 
franchise, 384.24 
Condemnation, chs. 471, 472 
Franchises 
Cities, power to grant, 364.2 
Electric transmission lines, 
384.24, ch. 478 
Exclusive franchise prohibited, 
478.9 
Telephone and telegraph 
companies, 384.24 
Term of franchise, 478.9 
Use of streets and public 
places, 364.2 
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PUBLIC lJTILITIES--cont. 
Freight companies, 479.1 
Gas mains, grants along highways, 
320.4, 320.5 
Highway right of way sold, utility 
right of way preserved, 306.22 
Poles and wires 
Highway obstructions, removal, 
319.1-319.6 
Highways, r'ight of utility to 
cross, 478.30 
Railroads, wires across 
regulated, 478.26 
Transmission lines, ch. 477 
Privately owned utilities 
Condemnation procedure, ch. 472 
Contracts for public 
improvements, ch. 573 
Railways, chs. 327F, 3276 
Rates and service regulated by 
city, 384.84 
Water works 
Condemnation by railroad, 
471.9-471.14 
Mains in highways, 320.4-320.8 
Railways, chs. 327F, 3276 
Regulation by cities, 384.24 
Relocation for highway, cost paid 
by state, 306A.10-306A.13 
Revenue bonds, city financing, 
ch. 384 
Right of way preserved when 
highway land sold, 306.22 
Telephone and telegraph companies 
Actions against companies, no-
tice to remove lines, 319.2, 
477 .2 
Bridges, use, 314.1 
Construction of line, damages, 
477 .3 
Construction of line on 
secondary roads, 319.5 
Highway obstructions prohibited, 
319.2-319.7 
Liability, 477.3 
New lines, located by engineer, 
31g.5 
Regulation by cities, 384.24 
Removal of lines for road 
construction, 477.2 
Removal when obstructing roads, 
319.1-319.6 
Right of way for lines 
authorized, 477.1, 477.3 
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PUBLIC IJTILITIES--cont. 
Telephone and telegraph companies-
-cont. 
Violations, failure to remove 
wire or poles, 319.8 
Transit system establishment or 
acquisition by public agencies, 
28E.17 
Transmission lines 
Access to lines, damages, 478.17 
Bridges, use, 314.11 
Commerce commission, regulation, 
limitation, 478.30 
Construction, 478.18-478.20 
Crossing highways, rights, 
478.26, 478.30 
Franchises, ch. 478 
Highway obstructions prohibited, 
319.2-319.7 
Highways, lines along, 478.20, 
478.26, 478.30 
Injury to persons or property, 
478.16 
New lines, located by engineer, 
319.5 
Railroad, wires crossing, 478.26 
Removal of poles, notice, 319.1-
319.6 
Supervision by commerce 
commission, 478.1, 478.30 
Wires, regulations, 478.18-
478.20, 478.30 
Use of highways 
Bridges, use granted, 314.11 
Electric lines, 319.5, 478.1,. 
478.26, 478.30 
Mains, 320.4-320.8 
Pole removal, 319.1-319.6 
Telegraph and telephone, 319.5, 
477 .1-477 .3 
Water mains, grants for construc-
tion along highways, 320.4, 
320.5 
RAILROADS 
See STREET RAILWAYS 
Abandonment or right of way, 
327G.76, 327G.77, 471.15-471.18 
Actions against company 
Double damages, loss of stock, 
327G.7 
Stock killed on track, 327G.6, 
327G. 7 
Billboards and signs, removal, 
319 .10, 319 .11 
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RAILROADS--cont. 
Bonds, Spur track construction, 
327G.66, 327G.67 
Bridges 
Catwalks and handrails, 327F.3 
City to aid construction, 384.12 
Drawbridge, safety devices, 
327G.28 
Flood control in cities, 364.9 
Highways or railways, authority 
to cross,327F.2 
Interlocking switches at 
bridges, 327G.28 
Maintenance, damages for 
failure, 327F .2 
Specifications by transportation 
department, 309.79 
Watercourse, authority to cross, 
327F.1, 327F.2 
Watercourse, change to eliminate 
bridge, 471.13 
Buildings and spur tracks, 
generally, 327G.62-327G.69 
Cabooses, 327F.18-327F.20 
Canals, railway crossing, 327F.1 
Catwalks and handrails, 327F.3 
Condemnation rights 
Generally, 471.4-471.19 
Abandonment of right of way, 
327G.76, 327G.77 
Pipeline under right of way, 
479.24 
Procedure, ch. 472 
Spur tracks, 327G.64-327G.69 
Crossings 
Generally, chs. 327F, 327G 
Blocking streets prohibited, 
327G.32 
Dangers eliminated, 307A.2(4) 
Farm-to-market road crossings, 
310.4 
Hearings on controversies, 
327G.17 
Heavy vehicles, notice before 
crossing, 321.344 
Lights, interfering with 
signals, 307A.2(9) 
Maintenance and repairs, 
327G.29-327G.31 
Motor vehicle parking 
restricted, 321.358(8) 
Overhead crossing, 309.79, 
327G.2 
Pipelines, only at right angles, 
479.24 
RAILROADS--cont. 
Crossings--cont. 
Primary roads, 313.4, 313.27, 
314.5 
Railways crossed, 327F.l, 327F.2 
Secondary road crossings, 
306.27, 314.5 
Signal maintenance, 327G.15 
Signals defined in motor vehicle 
law, 321. 342 
Signs 
Duty to erect, 321.342 
Injury or defacement unlawful, 
321.260 
Obstructing view, nuisance, 
319.10, 319.11 
Private or advertising 
forbidden, 321.259 
Required, large and distinct 
letters, 327G.2 
Unauthorized removed as 
nuisance, 321.259 
Streets in cities, 314.5 
Traffic-control devices, 
321.259, 321.260 
Transportation department, 
327G.l 
Transportation division, power, 
307A.2, 313.21, 313.27 
Viaducts, 309.79, 327F.2 
Violations, 327G.14 
Warning devices, 307.26 
Watercourses, 327F.1, 327F.2 
Drains and ditches, highway 
drainage districts, 460.3, 
470.5, 460.6(3) 
Electric wires crossing, 478.18, 
478.20, 478.26 
Embankments, condemnation for, 
471.9(3) 
Eminent domain, chs. 471, 472 
Employees 
Buildings, destruction, 327G.63 
Conductors, power to eject 
passengers, 327F.30 
Livestock, killing through 
negligence, 327G.10 
Passengers, power to eject, 
327F.30 
Sanitation and shelter, 327F.30 
Engines 
Screen exhaust fire control, 
327F.36 
Signals sounded at road 
crossings, 327G.13, 327G.14 
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RAILROADS--cont. 
Engines--cont. 
Water supply, 471.9(4) 
Equipment 
Horns and bells, 327G.13 
Interlocking switches, 327G.28 
Lights, 327F.14 
Windshields, 327F.34 
Fences, 327G.3-327G.10 
Grade crossing fund, 327G.19, 
327G.29-327G.31 
Grades, condemnation of land for 
change, 471.9(3) 
Headlights and taillights, 327F.14 
Interurban railroads 
Caboose cars, exemption, 327F.18 
Headlights, 327F.14 
Intoxication, passengers ejected, 
327F.30 
Jurisdiction of grade crossing, 
327G.23 
Liability of railroads 
Bridge maintenance, neglect, 
damage, 327F.2 
Buildings, destruction, 327G.63 
Livestock killed, 327G.10 
Signals at road crossings, 
327G.13 
Mississippi river, railway 
crossings near, 327G.22 
Operation of road 
Generally, ch. 327F 
Failure to operate as 
abandonment, 327G.77 
Private buildings on railroad 
lands, 327G.62 
Repairs or changes, temporary 
road, 327G.21 
Returns on crossing expense, held 
in trust, 327G.18 
Reversion of abandoned right of 
way, 327G.76, 327G.77 
Right of way 
Abandonment, 327G.76, 327G.77, 
471.15-471.18 
Acquisition, 327G.64, 327G.81 
Fences required, 327G.3-327G.6 
Flood protection, city, 364.9 
Limitation on right to condemn, 
471.8 
Maintenance and improvements, 
327G.81 
Purposes for condemnation, 471.9 
Streams, change to protect, 
471.13 
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RAILROADS--cont. 
Right of way--cont. 
Transmission lines, 478.18, 
478.20 
Vegetation destruction, 327F.27-
327F.29 
Weed destruction, 317.9-317.14 
Wires across, 478.18, 478.26 
Riparian owners' rights, 327F.4, 
327F.5 
Rolling stock 
Railway finance authority, 
3078.2 
Removal from tracks as 
abandonment, 471.15, 471.16 
Safety devices 
Compulsory at crossing or 
bridge, 327G.28 
Interlocking switches, 327G.28 
Traffic devices at crossings, 
321. 259 
Spur tracks, 327G.64-327G.69, 
471.9 
Stations, eminent domain for depot 
grounds, 471.9(1) 
Stock holders 
County not to be stockholder, 
346.20 
Stopping at grade crossings, 
327G.23 
Switches, interlocking, 327G.28 
Tracks 
Crossings, ch. 327G 
Eminent domain for land 
necessary, 471.9(2, 3) 
Spur tracks, 327G.64-327G.6g 
Street maintenance between 
tracks, 374.11 
Trains 
Cars, requirements, 327F.19, 
327F.20 
Ejection of passengers, drunken-
ness or profanity, 327F.30 
Signals at crossings, 327G.13, 
317G.14 
Speed in cities, 307.18 
Stopping at crossings, 327G.23 
Transmission lines, 478.18, 
478.20, 478.26 
Transportation regulation board, 
327F.38 
Trust funds, expenses of crossing 
changes, 327G.18 
Vegetation destruction, 327F.27-
327F.29 
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RAILROADS--cont. 
Viaducts, 309.79, 327F.2, 364.8 
Violations 
Cabooses, illegal construction, 
327F.20 
Crossing violations, 327G.14, 
327G.32 
Fences, failure, penalties, 
327 G. 3-327 G. 9 
Length of cars, equipment, 
327F.20 
Lighting equipment improper, 
327F.14 
Screen exhaust fire control, 
engines not equipped, 327F.36 
Signals at crossings not given, 
327G.13, 327G.14 
Signs at railroad crossing, 
damage liability, 327G.2 
Signs or signals, interference 
with , 321.260 
Vegetation on right of way, 
327F.28 
Windshields, 327F.34 
RAILWAY FINANCE AUTHORITY 
Generally, ch. 3078 
REAL PROPERTY 
Access 
Condemnation by private owner, 
471.4 
Rights of municipalities, 409.24 
Actions, limitation, 614.1 
City, power to acquire and 
dispose, 364.4, 364.7, 384.24 
Condemnation proceedings, 
generally, ch. 472, see EMINENT 
DOMAIN 
Easements 
Condemnation for United States, 
conveyance, 471.3 
Egress and ingress, how 
obtained, 471.4 
Motor vehicles, landownwers to 
control use, 321.251 
Railways, abandonment, 471.15-
471.18 
Entering for highway surveys and 
other tests, 314.9 
Limitation of actions, 614.1 
Monument, land surveys, corners 
marked, 355.3 
Motor vehicles, right of realty 
owner to control vehicular 
travel, 321.251 
REAL PROPERTY--cont. 
Occupants, notice of road changes, 
306.29, 306.30 
Plats, generally, ch. 409, see 
PLATS 
Public lands 
Electric lines, franchise, 
478.1-478.5 
Public parks, generally, ch. 
111, 384.24, see CITIES, PARKS 
Generally, ch. 111, 384.24 
State lands, see STATE OF IOWA 
Riparian owners, 327F.4, 327F.5 
Transmission lines, electric, 
crossing, ch. 478 
RECIPROCITY 
Interstate bridges, 313A.34 
REFUNDING BONDS 
City bonds, 384.68 
County bonds, 346.1, 346.2 
Public utilities owned by city, 
384 .82 
REGIONAL PLANNING ct»'MISSION 
Generally, ch. 473A 
RIGHT OF ENTRY 
Access to land taken by eminent 
domain, 471. 4 
RIGHT OF WAY 
Billboards, 306C.10-306C.23 
Change in, permit required, 319.14 
Electric and communications lines, 
477 .1, 478.30 
Highways, 306.19, 313.4, 313.55-
313.57 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
Land without access, securing 
road, 471.4 
Maintenance, railroads, 327G.81 
Motor vehicle law, see MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
Railroads, see RAILROADS 
RIPARIAN OWNERS 
Boundary rivers and streams, 
327F.4, 327F.5 
Right of access to stream after 
condemnation, 471.12 
ROADS 
See HIGHWAYS 
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SECONDARY ROADS AND BRIDGES 
Bridges and culverts, 309.3-
309 .91, see BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
Roads, ch. 306, see HIGHWAYS 
SIGNALS 
Railroad crossing, penalty, 
327G.13, 327G.14 
Traffic sign~ls, 321.252-321.260, 
see MOTOR VEHICLES 
SIGNS AND SIGNBOARDS 
Advertising signs 
Advertising on traffic signs 
barred, 321. 259 
Billboard control, 306C.10-
306C.23 
Highways, advertising, 319.10-
319.15, 657.2(7) 
Imitating traffic signs 
prohibited, 321.259 
Interstate highways, ch. 306B 
Nuisance, abatement, 306B.5, 
319.10, 319.11, 657.2(7) 
Obscuring traffic signals 
prohibited, 321.259 
Prohibited within highway bound-
ary, 319.12, 319.13, 657.2(7) 
Removal after notice, 306B.5 
Roads, billboards as nuisances, 
abatement, 319.10-319.15, 
657 .2( 7) 
Highway business signs permitted, 
306C.11 
Lights near railway crossings 
removed, 307A.2(9) 
Political signs, 306C.10(20), 
306C.22 
Railroad crossing, signs required, 
327G.2 
School zones in cities, 321.249 
Special event advertising, 306C.23 
Speed limit signs on highway, 
321.289, 321.290, 321.293, 
321.295 
Stop signs at through highways, 
321. 345-321. 352 
Traffic signs, 321.252-321.260 
STATE OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS 
See PUBLIC OFFICERS 
STATE OF IOWA 
Actions against the state, tort 
claims, 25A.1-25A.22 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
STATE OF IOWA--cont. 
Bonds 
Highway drainage district 
warrants, 460. 7 
Public improvement contracts, 
state bonds deposited, 573.4 
Railway finance authority, ch. 
307B 
Boundaries 
Bridges, 309.85-309.91, 384.12 
State and private, 111.20-111.23 
Contracts 
See CONTRACTS 
Bond required of contractors, 
573.2, 573.3 
Laborer's and materialmen's 
rights, ch. 573 
Funds 
Highways, ch. 312 
Violations, failure to report 
expenditures, 721.2 
Immunity waived, 25A.4 
Joint exercise of powers, 28E.l-
28E.17 
Lands 
Communications companies, use 
granted, 477.1-477.3 
Conveyances, unused highway 
right of way, 313.53-313.57 
Improvement costs, 384.56 
Liability for torts, 25A.4 
Parks, see PARKS 
Public records, misuse and 
penalty, 721.10 
Railroad right of way, responsi-
bilities, 327G.81 
Right of way over lands, telegraph 
and telephone lines, 477.1 
Roads, see HIGHWAYS 
Tort claims, ch. 25A 
STREAMS 
See WATER ANO WATERCOURSES 
STREET If4>ROVEMENTS 
See chs. 312.314 
STREET RAILWAYS 
Assessments for city improvements, 
364.9, 364.11, 384.64, 384.65, 
384. 77 
Billboards, obstructing tracks, 
657 .2(-7) 
Bridges, use, 314.1 
643 
STREET RAILWAYS--cont. 
Flood protection construction, 
364.g 
Franchise granted, 364.2 
STREETS AND ALLEYS 
See CITIES 
SURVEYORS 
County engineer, surveys and 
reports, 309.56, 311.8, 460.5 
County surveyor, ch. 355 
Field notes and plats, use in 
evidence, 355.5 
Land surveys, ch. 355, see SURVEYS 
Monumentation, permanent control 
corners, 409.30 
Plats 
Generally, ch. 409, see PLATS 
Certified, 409.43 
Recording requirements, 409.31 
SURVEYS 
City engineer, see CITIES 
Conservation land surveys, 111.21-
111.23, 111.32 
Corners destroyed, penalty, 314.8 
County engineer, 309.56, 311.8, 
460.5 
County surveyor, ch. 355 
Drainage 
Highway drainage district 
surveys, 460.5 
Individual systems, recorder's 
record, 465.26 
Federal survey, rights, damages, 
355.10-355.14 
Highway surveys 
Entering private land, 314.9 
Primary roads 
Generally, 313.9 
Highway division's authority, 
307A.2(4) 
Secondary roads 
Construction programs 
prepared, 309.26-309.38, 
309.56, 311.8 
Drainage survey, 460.5 
Farm-to-market road surveys, 
310.13 
Gravel lands surveyed, 309.65 
Research, 310.34-310.36 
Violations by engineer, 
penalty, 314.8 
Plats, city, ch. 409, see PLATS 
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES 
Actions against companies, notice, 
to remove lines, 319.2, 477.2 
Bridges, use, 314.11 
Construction of line, damages, 
477 .3 
Construction of line on secondary 
roads, 319.5 
Highway obstructions prohibited, 
319.2-319.7 
Liability, 477.3 
New lines, located by engineer, 
319.5 
Poles and wires, see POLES AND 
WIRES 
Removal of lines for road 
construction, 477.2 
Removal when obstructing roads, 
319.1-319.6 
Right of way for lines authorized, 
477.1, 477.3 
Violations, failure to remove wire 
or poles, 319.8 
TOLL BRIDGES 
See BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
TOOT a.AIMS 
See IOWA TORT CLAIMS ACT 
TOWNS 
See CITIES 
TOWNSHIP 
Bonds 
Indebtedness reported, appeals 
on contracts, 23.5(9) 
Public contracts, hearings, 
procedure, 23.12-23.16 
Township hall bonds, 360.7 
Void if improperly issued, 23.16 
Condemnation, right to purchase, 
471.5 
Fences, railway, local regulations 
not applicable, 327G.8 
Public contracts and bonds, 
hearings, procedure, 23.1-23.15 
Public improvements and bonds, 
23.1-23.16 
Railroad fences, local regulations 
not applicable, 327G.8 
Weed eradication, ch. 317 
TRAFFIC SIGNS 
Power to regulate, 321.252-321.260 
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TRAFFIC SIGNS--cont. 
Railroad signs, 321.342 
TRAILERS 
Authority to weigh and inspect, 
321.476-321.481 
Axles, distance apart, 321.459, 
321.463 
Chain, safety, required, 321.462 
Drawbars, 321.461, 321.462 
Farm products, overload permitted, 
321.466 
Fertilizer, overload permitted, 
321.466 
Length, maximum, 321.457 
Load limit, 321.463 
Overloads permitted, 321.466 
Speed limit, 321.285(3) 
Weight over that registered, 
unlawful, 321.466 
TRAINS 
See RAILROADS 
TRANSIT LINES 
See PUBLIC UTILITIES, STREET 
RAILWAYS 
TRANSIT SYSTEMS 
See MASS TRANSIT, CITIES 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 
Railroads, chs. 327F, 327G, see 
RAILROADS 
Street railways, see STREET 
RAILWAYS 
TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTMENT OF 
General provisions, ch. 307 
Condemnation proceedings, 306.19, 
ch. 472, 589.27 
Director 
Duties, generally, 307.12 
Snow tires, requirements, 
321.236 
Eminent domain, 306.19, ch. 472, 
589.27 
General counsel division 
Condemnation proceedings, notice 
of appeal served upon, 472.19 
Creation and duties, 307.14(4), 
307.23 
Highway patent cases, assistance 
provided, 307A.2(5) 
Hearings, 307.19 
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TRANSPORTATION .. DEPARTl£NT OF--cont. 
Highway division 
General directive to administer, 
chs. 306-320, 307.24 
Advertising signs prohibited, 
ch. 306B, 319.10-319.14 
Advice on road matters 
furnished, 307A.2(2) 
Advice to board of supervisors 
furnished, 309.16 
Annual reports from cities, 
312.12-312.14 
Archaeological remains salvaged 
or preserved, 305A.2, 305A.4-
305A.6 
Billboards 
Duty to remove, 319.10-319.14 
Interstate highways, 306B.5 
Regulation, 306C.10-306C.23 
Boundary river bridges, gifts 
accepted, 313.59-313.65 
Bridges across drainage ditches, 
455.118 
Bridges, Mississippi, purchase 
and maintenance, 313.66 
Budget for highway administra-
tive expense, 313.5 
Classification of highways, 
306.1-306.3, 306.6, 306.7 
Conservation commission 
boundaries of state land, 
111.20-111.23 
Contingent fund, 313.17-313.19 
Contracts, personal interest 
prohibited, 314.2 
Controlled-access highways, 
authority to establish, 306A.3 
Creation and duties, 307.14, 
307.24 
Crossings 
Railroad, dangerous crossings 
designated, 321.342 
Railroad, improvements and 
maintenance, 307A.2, 313.4, 
313.27 
Regulations, 327G.23, 327G.28 
Detours, temporary, 313.4, 
313.28, 313.29 
Displaced persons, relocation, 
ch. 316 
Duties, 307.24 
Eminent domain, 306.19, ch. 472, 
589.27 
Engineer 
Bonds required, 313.13 
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TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTl£NT OF--cont. 
Highway division--cont. 
Engineer--cont. 
Fences and public utility 
poles, 319.4 
Fences as highway obstruc-
tions, 319.1-319.6 
Public utility, new lines, 
319.5 
Engineering studies, 310.35 
Entering private land for sur-
veys and other tests, 314.9 
Federal aid, powers, 307A.4, 
313.1, 313.3 
Grade crossing regulations, 
327G.23, 327G.28 
Highway materials and equipment 
revolving fund, 307A.7 
Highways, establishment, 
alteration or vacation, 
generally, 306.10-306.26 
Institutional roads and bridges 
improved and maintained, 
307A.2(12) 
Intersection lights, confusing, 
removal, 307A.2(10) 
Interstate rest areas, duties, 
306C.21, 313.2 
Interstate roads, advertising 
regulated, ch. 306B 
Interstate toll bridge, ch. 313A 
Investigation of highway 
conditions, 307A.2(4) 
Junkyards, regulation, 306C.1-
306C.9 
Jurisdiction over primary roads, 
306.4, 306.5, 313.2 
Land acquired for future use, 
rented, 306.38 
Long-range primary road program, 
307A.2(12) 
Mississippi river parkway, 
authority, ch. JOB 
Obstructions on highways 
removed, 319.1, 319.13 
Park roads and bridges 
maintained, 307A.2(11) 
Patent suits, highway, assist 
defense, 307A.2 
Permits for mains, sidewalks and 
cattleways, 320.4 
Pipelines, 320.4, 479.24 
Plans, construction, mainte-
nance, adopted, 307A.2(5) 
TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTllENT OF--cont. 
Highway division--cont. 
Power to alter, vacate, close 
roads, 306.10 
Primary roads 
Bids for road work, 313.10 
Cities, streets designated, 
313.24 
Claims for road work, 313.14-
313 .20 
Control and jurisdiction, 
306.4, 306.5 
Extensions in cities, 313.21 
Funds 
Materials and equipment 
revolving fund, 307A.7 
Tax claims, 313.16 
Power to restrict weight of 
vehicles, 321.474 
Use of highways grant, duty to 
enforce, 320.8 
Railroad crossings, 307A.2, 
313.4, 313.27, 321.342 
Record of commission operations, 
307A.2(7) 
Recreational bikeways, ch. 308A 
Roads altered, vacated, closed, 
306.10 
Roadside parks, 313.2 
Rubbish collection, special 
permit, 321.473 
Rulemaking power, 307A.2(13) 
Scenic improvement fund, admin-
istration 313.67 
Secondary road budget, 309.93-
309.97 
Signs and signals on highways 
Billboards, ch. 306B, 319.10-
319.14 
Confusing lights removed, 
307A.2(9, 10) 
Elevated structure signs, 
321.295 
Installation on primary roads, 
321.253 
Permission to local 
authorities, 321.254 
Purchase from state 
institutions, 321.253 
Specifications for uniform 
system, 321.252 
Speed signs, 321.289, 321.290, 
321.295 
Stop signs, 321.342, 321.345-
321.348 
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TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTllENT OF--cont. 
Highway division--cont. 
I Signs and signals on highways--cont. Traffic manual, adoption, 
321.252 
Size, weight and load 
I restrictions, signs required, 321.472-3,21.474 Speed regulations, 321.289, 
321.290, 321.295 
Speed regulations by local I authorities approved, 321.290, 321.293 State park and institutional 
roads, 307A.2(11) 
Stops, prescribed at crossings, I 321.342, 321.345, 321.347, 321.348 Subdivisions delineated, 307.24 
Surveys and estimates of cost, 
307A.2(4) I Utilities, cost of relocation paid, 306A.10-306A.13 
Violation of duties, report to 
general counsel, 307A.2(5) 
I Watercourses, changed to aid roads, 306.27 Weeds, control along primary 
roads, 317 .11 
Planning division, 307.14, 307.22 
I Railroad transportation division Generally, chs. 327F, 3276 City crossings, regulations 
challenged, 364.10 
Construction and operation, I 327F.38 Interlocking switches, 3276.28 Investigations and examinations 
made 
Spur track approved, 3276.64 I Orders and rules Private railway crossings, 3276.11, 3276.12 
Spur tracks, 3276.64-3276.69 
Overpasses, underpasses, city I approval, 364.8 Safety devices approved, 3276.28 
Records management act, exemption, 
304.17 
Rubbish collection, special I permit, 321.473 Rulemaking, see ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES 
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TRANSPOOTATION, DEPARTIENT OF--cont. 
State transportation commission 
Generally, 307.3-307.10, ch. 
307A 
Expenditures authorized 
Assessments, 307A.5 
Highway materials and 
equipment, 307A.7 
Federal donations and appropria-
tions, 307A.3, 307A.4 
Study of roads and bridges, 
307A.2, 312.4, 312.5 
Transportation, regulation and 
safety division 
Duties 
Generally, 307.27 
Eminent domain, railroad, 
471.10, 471.11, 472.42 
Nonresidents, actions against, 
321.498-321.513 
Transportation regulation board 
Carriers, railroads, chs. 327F, 
327G 
Duties 
Generally, 307.18 
Eminent domain, railroad, 
471.10, 471.11, 472.42 
Orders enforced-by department, 
307.20 
TREES 
Disease, city to control, 364.12, 
384.24 
Dutch elm disease, nuisance, 
657.2(13) 
Ornamental, highway drainage, 
protection, 460.13 
Parks, injury to state trees, 
111.35 
Protection from condemnation 
Damages, 472.26, 472.27 
Orchards, 460.13, 461.4(2, 3), 
471.12 
Protection from destruction 
Trees on highway, exception, 
460.12 
Trees outside highway, excep-
tion, 460.13 
Road construction, protection 
from, 314.7 
Wind breaks, drainage, highway, 
protected, 460.13 
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UNITED STATES 
Condemnation by states for United 
States, 471.2, 471.3 
Federal aid 
Highway aid, 307A.3, 307A.4, 
310.1, 310.2, 313.1 
Mississippi river parkway, 
308.1-308.5 
Interstate bridges, ch. 313A 
URBAN MASS TRANSIT 
See MASS TRANSIT, CITIES 
UTILITIES 
See PUBLIC UTILITIES 
VIADUCTS AND UNDERPASSES 
Bridges, ch. 309 
City authority, 364.8, 364.12, 
384.24 
Highway division's duties 
Aid on primary extensions, 
313 .27 
Elimination of dangerous 
crossings, 307A.2(4) 
Specifications, secondary roads, 
furnished, 309.79 
Surveys for railroads, 307A.2(4) 
Railroad viaducts and underpasses 
Authority to cross railway or 
watercourse, 327F.l 
Duty of railroad to maintain, 
327F.2 
Highway division survey for 
railroad, 307A.2(4) 
Private owners of land, 
crossings, 327G.ll, 327G.12 
Specifications, secondary roads, 
furnished by transportation 
department, 309.79 
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES 
Bridges, see BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
Cities, water recreational areas, 
111.59-111.78 
Courses changed, supervisor's 
power, 306.27-307.37 
Dams and races 
Cities, authority to build, 
384.24 
Condemnation of land by railway, 
471.9( 4 )-471.12 
Construction, condemnation, 
limitation, 472.27 
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES--cont. 
Ditches, see DRAINAGE, DRAINAGE 
AND LEVEE DISTRICTS 
Drainage, see DRAINAGE AND LEVEE 
DISTRICTS 
Easements, federal water resources 
projects, 306.39, 306.40 
Flood protection in cities, 384.24 
Lakes 
Boundaries, state land, 
determined, 111.20-111.23 
Destructive acts, prohibited, 
111.35 
Levees, see DRAINAGE AND LEVEE 
DISTRICTS 
Nuisances 
Abatement, 657.3-657.7 
Watercourse obstructions, 657.2 
Water pollution, 657.2(4) 
Obstructions 
Drains, penalty, 319.7, 319.8 
Nuisances, 657.2(3) 
Ponds, pollution as nuisance, 
657.2(4), 657.3 
Railroad, right to bridge across· 
watercourse, 327F.l, 327F.2 
Recreational areas 
Application, 111.61, 111.62 
Condemnation and land 
acquisition, 111.75 
Contract with land and levee 
districts, 111.76 
Hearing, notice, order, 111.63-
111.68 
Municipal, establishment, 111.59 
Permits, 111.59-111.74 
Petition, contents, 111.61 
Prohibited near state 
boundaries, 111.77 
Public access and use, 111.71 
Riparian owners 
Boundary rivers and streams, 
327F.4, 327F.5 
Railroads along boundary rivers, 
327F .5 
Right of access to stream after 
condemnation, 471.12 
Rivers and streams 
Bridges, see BRIDGES AND 
CULVERTS 
Change by railroads, limitation, 
471.13, 471.14 
Change by supervisors, 306.27-
306 .37 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers 
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WATERS AND WATERCOURSES--cont. 
Rivers and streams--cont. 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers-
-cont. 
Bridge purchase, 313.66 
Railroad crossing near river, 
327G.22 
Obstruction, nuisance when 
unlawful,, 657.2(3) 
Railroads, right to change, 
471.13. 471.14 
Right of way, telegraph and 
telephone lines, 477.1 
Telegraph and telephone lines, 
crossing, 477.1 
Violations, ditches or drains, 
obstructing, 319.7, 319.8 
Watercourses 
Change 
Bridge requirement, 455.118 
Road benefits, supervisor's 
power, 306.27-306.37 
Drains, private, to follow 
natural course, 465.22 
WEEDS 
Generally, ch. 317 
Botanist, state, duties, 317.2 
Commissioner, county weed, 317.3-
317.18 
Cost of treatment for eradication, 
317.16-317.21 
County attorney, duties, 317.23 
County board of supervisors, 
duties, 317.3, 317.4, 317.9, 
317.11-317.13, 317.17-317.21 
Dipsacus, sale or distribution 
prohibited, 317.25 
Enumerated, 317.1 
Highway maintenance personnel, 
duties, 317 .22 
Landowners' duties, 317.10, 
317 .13-317 .21 
Noxious, 317 .1 
Nuisance, 657.2(12) 
Railroad lands, 317.9, 317.12, 
327F.27, 327F.28 
Road clearing fund, 317.19 
Secretary of agriculture, duties, 
317.8 
Seeds, 317.25 
Teasel, sale or distribution 
prohibited, 317.25 
Violations, 317.24, 317.25 
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WEIGHTS AND lt:ASffiES 
Motor vehicles, weighing loads, 
321. 463-321. 475 
Public scales, 321.465 
WIRES 
Cables laid under streets, 384.40 
Erection on highways, 319.5 
Poles, see POLES AND WIRES 
Regulation, city, 364.2 
Removal from highway, procedure, 
319.1-319.9 
ZONING LAW 
Billboards, 306C.10-306C.23 
Certiorari to court of record, 
358A.19, 358A.20 
Commission authorized, duties, 
358A.8 
County, ch. 358A, see COUNTY 
Junkyards, 306C.l-306C.9 
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